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

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

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Note to Contributors

The Indian Council for Africa welcomes articles and contributions from all interested in African affairs, especially from those making particular studies of African problems and people. Remuneration may by paid for articles and contributions accepted for publication in the journal.

The views expressed in the articles under the authors' names are not necessarily those held by the Council.

AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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AFRICA QUARTERLY is devoted to a study and objectve understanding of African affairs. It publishes contributions from outstanding writers, experts and specialists on various political, economic, social, cultural and literary subjects of interest to the people of Africa. Apart from these, it carries documentation on different specialised African subjects.

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Recent Developments in Africa—I

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

The African scene was surveyed at a seminar organised by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi from April 23 to 26, 1967. The discussions covered four broad themes: 1. Recent developments in Africa, 2. The role of Great Powers in Africa, 3. India's interests in Africa and 4. Whither Africa: Afro-Asia or Afro-Europe? We publish in this issue four of the papers read at the seminar, one from each section. A detailed report of the proceedings of the seminar will be published in the next issue of the journal.—Ed.

> (1) "Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Europeans, have all in turn failed to see the man, and to recognize the brother, in the dark-skinned African. They have variously seen the monkey, the animated tool, the subhuman, the vassal—anything but the man, the handicapped but autonomous member of the human family.
>
> "In a very real sense, the rehabilitation of Africa will spell the discovery of man. Morally, the negro is at the hub of pan-humanism."
>
> —Father Bede Onuha, *The Elements of African Socialism* (Andre Deutsch, 1965) p. 59.
>
> (2) "I think the African countries will have to make up their minds whether they will give priority to Africa or to their association with their former rulers. At present .... it is really up to Africa to be truly independent or to remain colonies of France and Britain".
>
> —President Nyerere at the close of OAU conference in November 1966, The Standard, 11 November 1966.

THESE two statements express two widely different moods of Africa in two different stages of development. In the fifties Africa was indeed on the march; independence came to Africans in a miraculously easy and swift manner, and it seemed as if the scramble for partition which Africa had witnessed in the late 19th century was being repeated, but this time in the reverse gear. In 1958 there were only 8 independent African States; by 1963 their number had crossed 30, with nearly a dozen more to join their ranks soon after. How far was this change due to what has come to be called in common parlance the onslaught of revolutionary anti-colonial movements? With a few exceptions—

Algeria, Kenya, and to some extent Ghana—such movements were hardly revolutionary. Was it then due to a change of heart of the colonial powers, or to the 'wind of change' of which Britain became the first proponent? This seems to be partly true as one finds that independence was granted even to such territories as Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho, etc., which had not very eagerly asked for it. But then the 'wind of change' did not seem to work precisely in those areas where western interests, investments and securities are comparatively vital, say, South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal's colonial possessions.[1]

This aspect of African independence deserves further investigation, but for the moment let us say that the rapid process of decolonization brought about an immense change in Africa's physical and mental horizons. Along with it came a new sense of self-confidence and self-assertion on the part of Africans, as seen in their joint presence in the UN, in Afro-Asian and Commonwealth conferences, and in the propagation of new values—Pan-Africanism, African Personality, African socialism, negritude, etc. How far, again, these values and theories were genuinely believed by Africans or bolstered by their well-wishers abroad, cannot be said. Nevertheless, the years 1958-63 witnessed Africa's phenomenal emergence in the world arena.

Since then it seems the optimists have been outnumbered by the cynics. Things have not turned out well for Africans; in place of the old nationalist euphoria there is now fast growing a sense of disillusionment. The arduous task of nation-building seems to have dampened the old fervour—one after another, in about two years, established regimes in 18 countries have been overthrown by either the military or other political groups. The army has become politically active in the former French territories—7 out of 10 coups in these territories have been engineered by the army, while the process is spreading in Commonwealth Africa as well (Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone). No wonder the London *Times* cryptically observed, "It seems in Africa Sandhurst is replacing the London School of Economics."[2] Political instability is not confined to these states only; others are increasingly facing the same problem. In Kenya the split in the KANU party has created a dangerous situation; in Uganda a constitutional crisis resulted in the flight of the Kabaka; in Zambia the unrest on the Copperbelt is still smouldering, while recent reports from Guinea show that even Sekou Toure's single-party regime is apprehensive about its future.

Similarly, many of the African values seem to have become somewhat misty. African socialism has become different with different leaders; in Kenya it could even co-exist with the prevailing colonial pattern of the economy largely unchanged.[3] On the other hand, doctrinaire approaches to socialism do not also seem to have made any headway—the UAR's socialist planning is nearly wrecked by its population problem; Guinea's economic growth has been far below that of Ivory Coast which has shunned the socialist path, while Ghana's socialist policies led, in 1965, to a total external debt of £187 million of which at least £157 million were suppliers' credits repayable within four to six years.[4]

In the sphere of pan-African unity, again, the goals remain as far away as before. In fact, the dissensions in the OAU have become more marked of late and its performance on the Rhodesian crisis has been anything but inspiring.[5] As the old vision of African unity is receding, inter-state relations are taking a new, and not altogether encouraging shape—Somali-Ethiopia dispute of which the latest development is the rioting in Djibouti; tensions between Ghana and Guinea, and the growing estrangement in the relations among the three East African States. Obviously, 1966-67 have been, as many believe, Africa's bad years.

Pattern of Revolt and Compromise

How could we explain these intriguing developments? To me it seems that the happenings in Africa must be interpreted within a broad framework in which revolt against and compromise with old political patterns, values and concepts have been taking place hand in hand. Pan-Africanism is Africans' ultimate protest against colonial partition ; at the same time, by accepting independence as individual nations, Africans compromised with the old pattern. It is strange how the concept of national state took root in Africa in so brief a time. Perhaps due to the lack of organized parties or indigenous systems in the Congo the national structure would have collapsed but for the outside interventions in 1960-61 and 1964.

This brings us to the question: has political independence been followed by total withdrawal of the ex-colonial powers from their former dependencies ? The infamous role of the Belgians to proteet their interests in Katanga through the mechanism of Union Moniere is well known. The paratroop operations of November 1964 in Stanleyville further showed that in times of crisis the US and Britain could side with an ex-colonial power despite African protest. On the other hand, in their relations with Francc, the ex-French states have gone to such lengths as to station French troops in their territories for security reasons[6]. The close association of this group with France would certainly make one doubt the essence of the non-alignment they profess. But, this too could be a form of compromise in which idealism must suffer if hard economic realities are to be accepted. It should be noted that the vast geographical area formerly occupied by France is singularly lacking in natural resources and is inhabited by a smaller population than Nigeria alone. Relatively large and wealthy states like Ivory Coast and Senegal have the potential for independent activity and their leaders are key figures in African politics, but states as small and as economically backward as Mauritania or Chad have no option but to accept charity and act within limits largely determined by France.

British involvement in Africa is not so apparent, yet in 1964 it was the presence of British troops which quelled a mutiny in Kenya. Both in the economic and administrative spheres, British influence is still formidable.

But, it is not only in these aspects that one should try to gauge the extent of West's influence in Africa: it spreads through many other channels like newspapers, radio, TV, expatriate officers, and private banks, firms and trading companies. Thus, to give a few examples:

(i) As Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, H. F. Oppenheimer presides over interests with a capital of £336 million and total reserves of £268 million. His enterprises extend from the Cape to the borders of Kenya and cover S. W. Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Tanzania, the Congo, Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. He is responsible for an annual wage bill of £25 million, paid to some 20,000 whites and 136,000 non-whites.

(ii) Tanganyika Concession, formerly based in Salisbury but now in the Bahamas, has two major assets—Benguela railways running from the Congo through Angola to the Atlantic and 180,000 shares in the Union Moniere, Katanga. Depreciation in 1965-66 was £10,000 whereas dividends on ordinary shares amounted to £750,000.

(iii) Ashanti Goldfields made a profit of £2.6 million in January-September 1965, at a time when Ghana was going bankrupt. Welcoming the coup in Ghana, its Chairman, Maj-Gen Edward Spears, said: "If we do obtain tax relief we shall be able to increase production and profits."—*The Economist*, 2 April 1966.

Thus, with the acceptance of sovereignty and territorial integrity at the time of independence, Africans made their first compromise. But, with that they also accepted the administrative structures, the economic complex and the divisions among tribes, communities and regional groups as determined by the metropolitan powers. Most colonial administrations had been rudimentary, highly centralized, and were moulded in such a way as to suit the interests of imperial powers. The British policy of indirect rule was nothing but a clever and practical device to rule Africans with the least possible expense.

On the other hand, it fostered the self-isolation of ethnic groups and perpetuated their separate identities. It could not be said that the impact of Western influence was not felt by these traditional cultures. For instance, while the Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria maintained their medieval economy and feudal system, the people of Buganda accepted the process of modernization. But westernization of traditional cultures has not been able to overcome tribal or regional barriers, otherwise the animosity between Bugandans and other tribes in Uganda cannot be explained. In general, the tribal factors have become more active in the politics of Commonwealth Africa than, say, in that of the French-speaking territories. But border disputes on the basis of tribal affinities have involved both English-speaking and French-speaking states, as the dispute between Ghana and Togo shows. The Somali irridentism, on the other hand, illustrates how clan ties and loyalties could help the growth of a sub-national consensus, albeit aggressively. Again, ethnic and regional separatism may take the form of racial conflicts as between the Arab north and the neolithic South of the Sudan. In all such situations violence may become endemic as witnessed in Sudan, Burundi and Northern Nigeria.

The third kind of compromise is the Africans' acceptance of a world economic order in which their status, as independent nations, is the weakest. The economies of most African states remain dependent on the prevailing market systems of the metropolitan countries. Yet, the total African share of world trade is less than 5 per cent, comprised mostly of primary products whose price in the world market is constantly falling[7]. The disastrous results of such dependence were seen in Ghana when the price of cocoa in the world market fell steadily, causing a crisis in its balance of trade. Such problems of economic imbalance, shortage of foreign exchange and decreasing capital resources are overtaking most independent African states. Another striking factor is the existing duality in the internal economies of these countries. In most of them, a modern money economy exists side by side with a subsistence agricultural system and, as in the colonial days, the roles of the two are not complimentary. In fact, the militant political postures of African leaders have a very weak economic foundation which was determined by the old colonial powers. "Colonies were operated as a part of a foreign economy, that of a colonial empire. No attempt was made to make the individual colony a national economy viable on its own."[8] At one time Africans questioned the values of such an unjust system: after independence, they are faced with the choice of challenging the *status quo* which would inevitably bring them into conflict with the dominant West or make them accept the realities of the present world, and enter into bilateral trade and aid agreements in the immediate interests of their national communities. But such short-term agreements may not prove beneficial in the long run; the immediate benefits of economic aids remain mainly confined to a small stratum of the ruling elite. "Sooner or later, such regimes are likely to undergo internal coups when discontent with cultural subordination and the lack of international militancy of the regimes become too galling, and the profiteering too great."[9] Thus, very often nationalist politicians lose the confidence of their people because of corruption and malpractices which invade public life, in spite of their wishes.

The 'Rash' of Coups

It is in this perspective that one should try to understand the present 'rash' of coups in Africa. It is very hard to generalize on the causes of these coups; they vary in accordance with the situations prevailing in different countries. Again, the pattern of the military coups has not been even; whereas in Algeria the army was closely associated with the nationalist movement, in Ghana, it represented the privileged strata of the new Westernized elite. It is not as yet certain whether the military can play a modernizing role in politics; the two coups in Nigeria, and the growing antagonism between army officers of the Eastern and Northern regions shows that tribal factors are as much active among armymen as among politicians.

The present political instability in Africa has been explained differently by different sources. The conservatives in metropolitan countries still think that the rapid withdrawal of colonial powers has created a 'power vacuum' in Africa which its leaders are unable to fill. From this flow some wild theories, the most ludicrous being the one which Ian

Smith's regime in Rhodesia is daily preaching, that Africans are unfit to govern themselves. Of course, such theories need not be taken too seriously. But there are others who think that most coups in Africa have been engineered by foreign sources – the U. S., French, British and Chinese. The evidence to support such views is fragmentary. It may be true that some members of the new regime in Ghana were in contact with foreign elements, but the way the Ghanaians welcomed the overthrow of Nkrumah shows that outsiders had little say in it. In turn, some African leaders like Houphet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Hamani Diori of Niger are convinced that the Chinese are laying the groundwork for subverting Africa for an eventual take-over. Perhaps their fears originate from the limited support the Congolese rebels received from China during 1963-64; with the elimination of these rebel bands, it does not seem that the Chinese have much chance to influence Africa's internal developments. In perspective, it seems that the period of direct contest, diplomatic or otherwise, among outside powers in Africa has come to a close, though indirect methods of influencing African developments have not been abandoned altogether.

As a result, the problems Africans face today are of their own making and the extent of their success in tackling them would depend on their own ability and resources. It is possible that the one-party system, which was once regarded as an organic feature of the evolving African politics, has indeed encouraged the army to intervene in politics, but one has to wait and see whether the new rulers can show any better results than those achieved by the politicians whom they have ousted.

Nation-building and the Evolues

The real issue is that most African leaders are facing the problem of nation-building and, at the same time, the problem of legitimizing their hold on political power. The two objectives are not always complementary; besides, the measures which a political elite may adopt might, paradoxically, weaken its total hold on the country. This makes it most necessary to go into the origins of African evolues—the elite, and the role they are playing in their national communities. By and large, the African evolues are of a very recent origin, and they have the following main characteristics: they are the most affluent class in society; their social mobility and influence is mostly restricted to the urban areas; and an overwhelming majority of them are in political and bureaucratic professions. The most important aspect of the evolues is that it is a highly artificial class and it sprang up mostly in the later stages of colonial rule, with the exception perhaps of some West Coast societies. The rootless foundation of the evolues makes them a consuming class rather than productive; at the same time it is they who have benefited most from the phase of colonial withdrawal. "For too many African elites, writes Rene Dumont, "independence has meant taking the place of the whites and enjoying the privileges, often exorbitant, hitherto accorded to colonials".[10] The immediate issue is whether the African systems could expand the base of the elite class and thus create a consensus in favour of their systems. So far, the findings of sociologists do not make one optimistic about the success of this process[11]. Thus, the tendency is to perpetuate a social class into a status group. As a result, politics in most newly independent countries show: (1) tensions among different groups of the elite competing for higher benefits; (2) tensions between the elite and the people expressed in terms of ethnic, cultural and other kinds of conflict; and (3) tensions between the ruling elite and other organized professional or military groups who have a stake in preserving their sectional interests. Trends show that all these factors may work simultaneously, giving rise to new tensions, conflicts and sudden political upheavals.

Duality in African Character

These insecurities give a dual character to most African political themes. Leaders try to be both revisionist and status-quo seekers, nationalists and pan-Africanists; advocates of free enterprise and socialists, and so on. Certainly, it seems that the more difficult the domestic situation becomes, the more the African leaders would insist on their "Africanness" to claim distinction from others—Europeans or Asians. This trend may also be encouraged by outside factors—the frustration of Africans over the Rhodesian crisis, their inability to liberate the dependent territories in the South, etc. Perhaps the coups would also accentuate this trend. On the other hand, it does not seem that a mere assertion of pan-Africanism would solve Africa's domestic and external problems.

To the author it seems that Africa is going through a period of transition, working to overcome both the built-in legacies of colonial rule and the problems of reshaping its economic, social and political life. Africans have experienced many disappointments, but they have not lost hope. And perhaps that is what President Modibo Keita of Mali meant when he cited Renan: "Humanity achieves perfection in wishing for it and hoping for it."

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2. 6 April 1967.
3. African socialism, in practice, has been discussed well in W. H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg (ed). *African Socialism.*
4. Some however doubt if socialism was practised at all in Ghana, see Bob Fitch and Mary Openheimer, *Ghana : End of Illusion,* Monthly Review, July-Aug. 1966.
5. See my article in *Times of India,* April 1967.
6. Of late, however, France is pursuing the policy of ending its military commitments in Africa.
7. See P. Ndegwa, *Aid and Trade, Transition,* January 1964, p. 30
8. G. Benveniste and W. E. Moran, Jr., *African Economic Problems,* in *The Study of Africa,* p. 266.
9. I. Wallerstein, *African Unity Reassessed, Africa Report,* April 1966, p. 44.
10. Rene Dumont, *L' Afrique noire est mal parties,* Paris, 1962, p. 34.
11. See L. Loyd, *The New Elite of Tropical Africa,* London, 1966.

Chronology of Recent Coups d'etat

1. Algeria, 19 June 1965	President Ben Bella deposed by Col. Houari Boumedienne.
2. Congo-Leopoldville, 25 November 1965	Kasavubu and Tshombe deposed by Lt.-Gen. Joseph Mobutu.
3. Dahomey, 22 December 1965	General Soglo assumed power.
4. Central African Republic, 1 January 1966	Col Jean Bedel Bokassa deposed President Dacko.
5. Upper Volta, 3 January 1966	Lt-Col Lamizana seized power.
6. Nigeria, (1) January 15-16 1966	Army officers mutinied; Maj-Gen Ironsi became President of Federal Military Government.
(2) August-September 1966	Ironsi ousted and assassinated; Gen Gowan assumed power.
7. Ghana, 24 February 1966	Nkrumah overthrown by army headed by Gen. Ankrah.
8. Sierra Leone, March 1967	Army intervened after an uncertain election.

Recent Developments in Africa—II

China's Policy Objectives

G. P. DESHPANDE

AS Professor John M.H. Lindbeck put it during the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "From listening to public discussions and reading newspaper articles about China, one might gain the impression that China's Communist leaders spend much, if not most, of their time thinking about promoting revolutions around the world and plotting to extend their control over China's neighbours".[1] In any analysis of Chinese foreign policy it is necessary to discard this impression; more so in any discussion of China's policy aims in Africa. "The East Wind over Africa" should be surveyed more dispassionately and a realistic picture of China's policy objectives in Africa drawn. In this paper an attempt is made to assess the possible Chinese objectives in Africa.

China is a Marxist-Leninist country. There is therefore no gainsaying the fact that there is a definite and very obvious ideological component in China's view of international affairs. Chinese leadership believes, or says that it does, that we are living in a world where "capitalism" is on the way out and "socialism" on the way to triumph and consolidation. Chinese leadership has time and again proclaimed that imperialism (which is the last stage of capitalism) is crumbling. The most forceful exposition of this theory was given by Lin Piao in 1965 in his now famous article, "Long live the victory of the people's war".[2] Drawing upon the experience of the Chinese revolution the article attempts to analyse the world situation in terms of a "world countryside" consisting of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as against the "world cities" of North America and Western Europe. Lin Piao's prophesy was that following the pattern of revolution in China, where the countryside surrounded and ultimately triumphed over the cities, the world countryside would also triumph. Premier Chou En-lai also talked of Africa being ripe for revolution during his tour of Africa in late 1963 and early 1964. On the face of it, these statements may conjure up a peculiar image of China which Prof. Lindbeck so aptly described in the quotation cited above. The question now is what do these slogans mean in reality? For, we should remember that the Chinese, who have upheld, at least in words, the cause of national liberation everywhere, have also maintained that revolution cannot be exported. This again is part of China's own revolutionary experience. In all Chinese writings on revolutionary warfare and national liberation struggles the emphasis is on indigenous movements. There is also an emphasis on men rather than on materials. Lin Piao's thesis is certainly the product of China's revolutionary experience and yet it is precisely this experience which rules out any large-scale Chinese involvement in any national liberation struggle in a foreign country. Lin Piao in the above mentioned article made it clear that:

> The common victory was won by all peoples who gave one another support and encouragement. Yet each was above all. liberated as a result of its own people's effort.[3]

So the Chinese role, one can imagine, should be one of "support and encouragement". It seems that this is the operative part of Lin Piao's thesis as far as China's conduct of foreign relations is concerned. In any case, in Africa it cannot be anything else in view of the limitations which geography and its comparatively weak economy have placed on China's activities in Africa.

China's contact with Africa is now more than a decade old. In 1956 Egypt established diplomatic relations with China. Since 1956, the Chinese have come a long way in winning friends and influencing people in Africa. As of August 1966 China has established diplomatic relations with 15 African states and with four others it has some official contact through either trade or payments agreements as with Burundi, or through cultural, economic and scientific cooperation agreements (besides trade) as with the Central African Republic or through representatives of the New China News Agency as with Ethiopia and Senegal. These account for 19 out of 37 African states. This surely is a big achievement for a state which attempts to defy all big powers and which has been systematically left out of the United Nations. In fact it is beyond doubt that the Chinese are cultivating their relations with Africa with vigour and zeal in order to project their country as a power which matters.

It could be safely said here that this is one of China's major policy goals everywhere and more particularly in Africa and that China has been eminently successful in projecting her image as a power which matters. All setbacks which the Chinese are said to have suffered should be viewed against this background. Although it is true that the Central African Republic, Dahomey and Senegal broke off diplomatic relations with China, both the Central African Republic and Senegal, as already pointed out, have maintained contacts with China. The point is not to underestimate the harm this diplomatic break has done to China's prestige but to point out that African states seem to be gradually realising the bargaining strength they themselves have and also the bargaining strength their relationship with China gives them vis-a-vis other big powers and even India.

Secondly, anti-imperialism has always been a popular slogan in China's foreign policy utterances. This is true (or was so in some cases) of most Asian-African countries. The Chinese have always professed complete support to anti-imperialist struggles in Africa. Their support to the struggle for the liberation of Portuguese Africa or the black Africans' struggle in South Africa is well known. Their entry into the

African field was heralded by their very vocal support to Egypt during the Suez crisis. Their support to the Algerian Government in exile came when that Government was seeking outside support. China was one of the first among foreign states to recognise the Government in exile.

However, anti-imperialism has always had a specific meaning in China's vocabulary. China tries to analyse every African crisis in terms of American initiative or complicity. The United States, in the Chinese view, is the foremost and most vicious imperialist country today. Chinese comments and statements on every African crisis make it a point to name the United States as the real enemy. Thus one of the goals of China's African policy is to rally as many African states on her side as possible in condemning the United States.

It should be pointed out that the African experience of imperialism and colonialism has been of the European variety. It is either the English, French, Portuguese, Belgian or for the Arabs Israeli imperialism. The Americans have been involved only indirectly. The Chinese argument that it was "the five hundred years of barbaric slavery and exploitation" which turned Africa into a "Dark Continent"[4] finds many a responsive ear in Africa. Most African theories of under-development also harp on this theme. It is not possible to measure the success of China's policies in this sphere inasmuch as this is a continuing theme of China's foreign policy in Africa. With the existence of Portuguese colonies, South Africa's apartheid policies, problems like those of the Congo and in the case of Arab Africa the continuing existence of Israel which had committed aggression on Egypt this anti-imperialist and anti-American posture of China is likely to carry conviction with many African states.

Another major objective of China's African policy seems to be to discredit the Soviet Union in African eyes. China is thus attempting to make Africa yet another stage for enacting the drama of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. bitter and noisy as it has become over the years. It seems unlikely that the Chinese will achieve any considerable success in this venture. Twenty-nine out of 37 African states have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Liberia, the Malgasay Republic and Niger have some other channels of communication with it. The large amount of foreign aid which is disbursed by the Soviet Union, and its anti-imperialist and radical stand on most African problems make it difficult for the Chinese to depict the Soviet Union as an "accomplice of US imperialism" which is the main burden of their propaganda.

Foreign aid, which the African states value considerably, makes the competition with the Russians a tough affair. Some estimates of foreign aid for Africa for 1954-65 are given below.[5]

USA	*USSR*	*Eastern Europe* *(in million dollars)*	*China*
2,807.0	1,556.4	237.2	312.0

These make it clear that a poor and struggling China is bound to be at a disadvantage in its competition with either the Americans or the Russians and their East European allies in winning friends in Africa. It seems unlikely therefore that in the near future China can achieve any major success in its drive to oust the Russians from the African scene. In Africa, at any rate, the Russians have been very generous and very vocal on most problems of interest to the Africans.

Fourthly, China's aim is to establish its credentials as the only lawful Government of China as against the Formosan Government. If the pattern of voting in the United Nations is any guide, this policy is paying dividends. In 1965, there was a tie in the UN Assembly. The vote was evenly split into 47 for China's admission and 47 against with 20 abstentions. The opposition vote rose to 57 in 1966. It is reasonable to assume that it may decline again this year. In any case, these rich dividends are not really the success of China's policy. The vote reflects, if anything, the relationship of various UN members with the US. So hat it is quite possible that the Chinese may in fact gain a majority in their favour in the UN but it should be rightly interpreted as a rebuff to the very unrealistic policy of the US rather than a clear sign of support to China. African states clearly hold the balance in this case as would be clear from the following table.[6]

Opposition in 1965 but support in 1966	*Senegal*
Support in 1965 but opposition in 1966	*Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic*
Abstention in 1965 but opposition in 1966	*Chile, Libya, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Iceland*
Not present in 1965 and opposition in 1966	*Guyana, Lesotho*
Not present in 1965 and abstention in 1966	*Botswana*

China's objectives in Africa are thus varied and some of them are clearly short-term objectives. Even a casual look at the Chinese economy should be enough to convince anybody that it is not possible for China to have very ambitious designs on Africa. Most of her aid commitments are very modest and even these it has not been able to fulfill in their entirety. As a result, in any balance of power in Africa today China would be a marginal power. Yet it is this marginal position which enables it to wield considerable influence in Africa. When it attempts to achieve something clearly out of proportion to its standing it fails. The Algiers Conference which did not take place is a good testimony to both its strength and its weakness in Africa. China wanted to exclude the Soviet Union from the Afro-Asian Conference but it failed. It was brutally reminded of its weakness. Yet, at the same time, it is also true that the Conference could not be held without it. It can be argued, of course, that it is more a tribute to its size and population than to its diplomacy. But are not size and population assets in diplomacy? The Algiers fiasco proved that they are.

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Recent Developments in Africa—III

India's Economic Relations with Africa and Foreign Policy Implications

K. MATHEW KURIAN*

INDIA'S economic relations with Africa, both in respect of trade and participation in manufacturing enterprises through joint ventures and technical collaboration, have exerted considerable influence on the evolution of India's foreign policy. Yet, the precise nature of the correlation between India's economic interests (or lack of interests) in Africa and their political manifestations as revealed through her foreign policy postures remains one of the less known aspects of India's external relations. In this paper an attempt is made to relate the economic factors, both trade and investments, and the broader questions of India's foreign policy.

India shares with Africa most of the major maladies of the primary producing and less-developed segment of the world economy. Historically, African countries have been linked with Western powers as their major trading partners; the dependence on the metropole nations for both exports and imports continues even today in spite of deliberate attempts to diversify the trade pattern. The commercial relations of African countries with the rest of the world depend on what Herbert Frankel called "a very fragile foundation of specialised export production."[1] The concentration of production and export trade on a few primary products has not only exposed many African countries to fluctuations in international commodity prices, but has placed them in a disadvantageous position due to the deteriorating terms of world trade.

The undue dependence of African countries on Western Europe and the U. K. for their normal trade transactions has been a source of economic and political weakness for African nations in their foreign policy postures. The formation of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations and the attempts at strengthening African unity should be considered in relation to the above facts, apart from the equally or more compelling factors relating to the struggle against imperialism and racialism in the African continent.

At the African Summit Conference of 1963, the Heads of States were concerned about the problem of deterioration in the terms of world trade, and the need for abolition of trade barriers among African States. The Economic and Social Commission established by the Organisation of African Unity adopted several resolutions in September 1963. These covered the vital issues relating to the liberalization and strengthening of the trade and monetary relationships among the developing countries, the setting up of mutually beneficial trade agencies within the framework of co-ordinated development programmes, the co-ordination of plans for developing transport and communications for expanding continental and inter-continental trade, and the setting up of an international machinery for financing the flow of trade of developing countries.

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*The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not necessarily those of the organisation to which he belongs.

In the context of the increasing tendency on the part of the African nations to enlarge the area of regional co-operation in Africa, the future of India's trade relations with Africa will depend to a large extent on the development of mutually beneficial trade between India and Africa on the basis of an elaborate identification of the commodities in which India and Africa have a comparative advantage. Such an effort in identifying the areas of mutually beneficial trade, unfortunately, has not been undertaken so far.

India's trade relations with African countries have so far remained one of the most neglected areas of our foreign economic policy. During the period 1951-66, India's exports to African countries were more or less stagnant with a noticeable decline in some years. (A commodity-wise break-up of India's exports and imports is given in Annexures I and II). Our import trade with Africa has shown a marked decline over the years. India's trade with Africa as part of its total foreign trade has shown a disturbing trend as is evident from the following table:

India's Trade with Africa

Years	*Exports to Africa as percentage of India's total exports*	*Imports from Africa as percentage of India's total imports*
1951-52	6.9	8.5
1955-56	8.2	10.4
1961-62	8.3	5.8
1962-63	7.0	7.7
1963-64	5.8	4.2
1964-65	5.7	5.2
1965-66	7.6	4.0

It is true that the African countries taken as a group had a favourable trade balance vis-a-vis India during the period 1951-1965 though in 1965-66 the position was reversed.

India's Balance of Trade Position with African Countries

(Rs. lakhs)

Years	*Exports including re-exports*	*Imports*	*Balance of Trade*
1960-61	4901	7068	—2167
1961-62	5632	6404	—772
1962-63	4995	5631	—636
1963-64	4644	5077	—433
1964-65	4624	6581	—1957
1965-66	6185	5584	+601

The overall balance of trade position as shown in the above table is however very misleading. If one studies the trade position with individual countries it will be found that India's trade with a number of African countries is one-sided, India trying to export to the African countries and not being in a position to import anything substantially from them. This is particularly true of countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mauritius and dependencies, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia Republic. Details of imports, exports and the balance of trade of these countries are given in Annexure III.

A review of India's trade with African countries will reveal that one of the basic causes of the stagnation in our trade with Africa is the lack of a clear-cut understanding of the areas of mutually beneficial trade. India's attempts to promote trade with Africa have been, by and large, limited to the narrow field of promotion of Indian exports to Africa. The fact that long-term trade relations can be established only by expanding both import and export trade has not been seriously considered by India's policy-makers.

Take the case of India's trade with Nigeria. India produces practically all the items Nigeria is at present exporting. The only item India is importing from Nigeria is palm oil as shown in the following table:

India's Imports from Nigeria

	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65
Palm Oil	17.7	1.1	7.6	9.8
Total imports (including others)	17.8	1.2	7.6	9.8

The fact that India is buying from Nigeria only one commodity is inhibiting the future prospects of India's exports to Nigeria. It will be a folly on our part to believe that any country will be interested in continuing to buy from us while we are not inclined to buy from it.

Ivory Coast, which is primarily an agricultural country, produces coffee, cocoa, bananas and palm nuts. The republic is one of the largest producers of coffee in Africa, accounting for about 4 per cent of the total world production of coffee. It also produces 9 per cent of the world output of cocoa. It depends on France for over 47 per cent of its exports and about 63 per cent of its imports. India's exports to Ivory Coast showed a sharp decline in 1963-64 compared to the previous year though there was some improvement in 1964-65. One of the main reasons for the decline in our exports to Ivory Coast is that we import practically nothing from that country.

Again, in the case of Guinea, India's trade is limited mainly to exports. India's exports to Guinea have shown a declining tendency in recent years, not only because of the increasing competition from Pakistan and the policy of the Government of Guinea to cut down imports, but also because of the continued indifference on the part of India to buy goods from Guinea and ease its foreign exchange difficulties. India could increase its imports of palm oil and crude diamonds from Guinea and thus pave the way for higher exports to that country.

Sierra Leone is a growing market for engineering goods and there are bright prospects for Indian goods, such as steel furniture, G. I. buckets, automobile parts, water coolers, dry batteries. If India has to successfully compete in this market and dislodge the U. K. from the commanding position it enjoys in this market,[2] it must identify the products which can be imported from Sierra Leone rather than follow the narrow policy of promoting Indian exports to this region.

The marketing opportunities for Indian goods in Africa are tremendous and there is a distinct possibility that India's trade relations with Africa can be expanded at a much higher rate provided the Government and the business community in India take imaginative steps to tap the potential demand and develop a trading pattern on the basis of the principle of mutual advantage.

The standard of living of the African people, though at a lower level at present, is rising fast. Incomes of several million Africans have already risen much above the level where minimum consumer demands are met; they are having increasing amounts of discretionary incomes and are beginning to buy a very wide range of consumer goods and durables.

Any attempt to expand India's exports to Africa should take into consideration the vast potential demand that is emerging there. Indian business men have to free themselves from their limited vision of trading almost exclusively with European and Asian communities in Africa. In the long run, it is "the emerging and potential mass markets of the lower income African and, to a lesser degree, Asian populations that offer the greatest opportunities for expanding consumer sales."[3]

Joint Ventures

Apart from India's trade relations with Africa, the most important field in which India and Africa have come together in recent years is the investment of Indian capital in industrial enterprises in African countries. Indian investments in Africa have taken place mainly in the form of joint ventures between Indian and African entrepreneurs.

The Government of India has adopted a liberal policy vis-a-vis joint ventures in other developing countries, including Africa. Approval for Indian investments abroad is generally given only to the limited extent of the value of indigenous machinery, equipment, structurals, spares, etc., cash remittances abroad not being feasible in view of India's stringent foreign exchange position.

In support of increased Indian private investments in Africa a number of arguments have been advanced. Joint ventures in African countries are expected to promote India's exports of capital goods, machinery, spares, building materials, etc. In addition to the creation of immediate export opportunities in Africa through the supply of capital goods, joint ventures help in providing the Indian business community with a "window on the world", enabling business men to familiarise the African market with the wide range of goods which India is in a position to supply. Moreover, valuable market information could be collected about the country where investments are made, thus placing Indian industry and trade on a sounder footing in regard to the sale of their products.

Establishment of joint ventures abroad has been suggested as a sure way of finding entry into even those markets where India's export sales are restricted by import restrictions and elaborate foreign exchange regulations. Joint ventures are, in this context, considered as a method of jumping over prohibitive tariff walls in foreign countries.

Though Indian investments in Africa are encouraged primarily in India's own national interests, namely, promotion of India's exports, the benefits that will accrue to the recipient countries in Africa are advanced in support of such investments. It is argued that since private foreign investments help in modernising the economic structure of African countries and making them industrially independent, such investments play an important role in enhancing the possibilities of social changes of a far-reaching nature. Increased employment, increased flow of wage incomes into African hands, increased dissemination of technical know-how and knowledge among the African people, urbanisation and widening of the African market, etc., are advanced as benefits which will flow from expanded Indian private investment in Africa.

The Government of India has so far approved several proposals for Indian collaboration in African enterprises. These ventures cover a wide range of industries, such as textile mills, sugar plants, razor-blades, a pencil factory, woollen textile mills, engineering industries, etc.

The entrenched position of Indians in the retail trade has been a major source of potential friction between Indians and Africans in many countries, particularly in East Africa. The joint industrial ventures on the anvil in Kenya have a novel solution to the problem of Indian concentration in the retail trade. The Indian industrial enterprises being set up in Kenya are absorbing Indian traders into manufacturing activities, thus leaving some room for the emerging Africans to step in. The long-term effects of such a shift in the occupational pattern of Indians vis-a-vis Africans will be far-reaching, particularly in view of the fact that a generation of managerial and technical personnel, once entrenched in their positions, will have much influence on Kenya.[4]

The role of the Indian merchant communities settled in Africa should be considered in this context. A major proportion of Indians settled in Africa have not yet integrated themselves into the stream of African politics and social life. The failure on the part of Indian settlers to evolve an identity with Arican nationalism is not only unfortunate but has very serious implications for the future economic and political relationship between India and African countries.

India stands high among developing countries which have the technological capacity to support industrial development schemes in other developing countries. India has had not only an early start in the process of industrialisation but has also gained substantial experience during the last two decades. And the national leaderships of many African countries have expressed their willingness to encourage Indian capital and technical participation in the industrial development programmes of their countries.

It is often argued that many African countries have limited consumption markets owing to their small populations and that the size of the markets therefore favours only small and medium industries there. India's experience and knowledge of medium-size and small-size industries would be of advantage and this factor should attract the African entrepreneurs towards Indian partners for setting up enterprises. It is further pointed out that, since entrepreneurs in the advanced countries of the West are not interested in setting up small units, Indian entrepreneurs will have to face no competition in entering African industry through investments and technical participation.

The dynamics of private foreign capital however do not warrant such a simplified analysis. In fact, it is the big business in India which is going abroad. The growth of monopoly in India and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few big business enterprises has only strengthened this tendency.

It is a big folly to allow Indian business houses to invest in African countries at a time when Indian entrepreneurs have yet to learn how to shoulder social responsibilities back at home. Will Indian entrepreneurs going to Africa conduct themselves well and be the best possible ambassadors for India and help, rather than hinder, the efforts towards independent economic development in the African continent?

In the process of developing Indian enterprises in African countries vested interests are bound to develop in India which will adversely affect our foreign policy postures in Africa. Pressure groups and lobbies in India are already working for the modification of our foreign policy objectives in Africa to suit the needs of big business houses. The evidence in this regard is little, but definitive. Similarly, the danger that Indian investors will in due course create and support oligarchies and vested interests in African countries with the support of the minority Indian community settled there has not been seriously taken into account.

None of the present or potential Indian investors in Africa is likely to grow into a financial octopus in Africa able to control African Governments. Yet, the danger that some of the big Indian industrial houses with entrenched positions might try to acquire positions of industrial and financial power to influence the domestic, economic and political policies of African countries cannot be completely ruled out.

One of the most delicate tasks confronting our diplomacy abroad against the backdrop of the increasing Indian participation in industrial ventures in Africa will be the continued and successful adoption of a flexible attitude towards the changing political leadership in Africa, particularly changes in Governmental authority resulting from army-supported transfers of power. If the Government of India takes on itself the burden of supporting Indian business interests in Africa, it will have to do much tight-rope walking, supporting the established Governments from whom Indian investors receive privileges and not annoying the potential political power groups which are likely to be their benefactors in the future.

India's efforts on the question of racialism have been concerned largely with the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa and the general question of apartheid. The belief that India's policy towards South Africa is based on peaceful intentions and the search for a gradual, pragmatic solution is misplaced. The fact is that India's policy in South Africa is dictated by narrow national interests, namely, the protection of the rights of people of Indian origin there. No doubt its support to the Indian cause in South Africa coincides to a certain extent with the anti-racialist movement of the African people themselves.

The real test of India's genuine interest in the cause of Africans and their struggle against racialism and imperialism is the extent to which it is prepared to help them actively. In today's context the major question is the question of use of force against the tyrannical rule in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

India's Long-term Interests in Africa

Freedom movements in African countries have been inspired and encouraged by India's struggle for independence. In evolving their policies the African nations have also been influenced by India's post-independence policies, particularly the policy of non-alignment and the attempts at national economic planning and rapid industrialisation based on priorities for heavy industries and a dominant role for the public sector.

Though India's image among Africans did receive a setback during the late fifties, the Indian action on Goa inspired many Africans and strengthened their determination to liquidate the remnants of colonialism in Africa. India's attitude to imperialist machinations in Africa, however, has been "soft", to use a mild expression. This is not because the Africans have learned to be louder. India's support to the African cause has in recent years become a routine repetition of old speeches and resolutions rather than an active involvement in the African predicament.

> "The less patient Africans do not conceal their disappointment that India only talks and votes in the United Nations for Africa's liberation"[5].

India's cautious attitude about a direct involvement in the African struggle against the vestiges of colonialism is partly a reflection of the "new orientation" in its foreign policy. In the name of pragmatism, India has moved away from emotional attachment to any cause which is not concerned directly with the Indian nationals.

India is committed to supporting the cause of African nationalism in developing economically independent and self-reliant nations free from the fetters of colonialism and imperialism. The struggle for "Uhuru" in the African continent in the present epoch means consistent opposition to all imperialist designs and attempts to prop up colour-caste minority Governments such as that of South Africa and Rhodesia. A mere expansion of technological horizons of the African peoples and the setting up of industrial complexes with the aid of Indian private capital cannot be an answer to the problem of sustaining economic independence in African countries. India has to give much more concrete and effective support in terms of anti-imperialist foreign policy postures and material support to the anti-imperialist forces, particularly in Angola and Mozambique.

India's Leadership Role

The illusion that India, being one of the leaders of the non-aligned nations, wields substantial influence over the newly independent and developing countries of Africa has been fostered by Indian intellectuals and official spokesmen much beyond what realities warrant. It must be accepted that the Indian attempt to play the leadership role in Africa has misfired and that, in view of the economic and political crisis which has been brewing in India during the last couple of years, such a role does not fit in with the realities of India's national power. The slightest suspicion that India is trying to show a big brotherly attitude to the newly independent African nations can be disastrous to its long-term relationships with these countries.

India has yet to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it is capable of achieving rapid industrialisation and independent economic growth. Within the framework of our present economic policies, even economic survival is increasingly becoming a doubtful proposition. How could India, then, project in other developing countries the image of an effective supporter of economic independence?

The impact which the Indian national movement and the political and economic policies which it represented prior to 1947 had of course a tremendous impact on the peoples of Africa and other developing countries. But the developments in India since independence have eroded the original Indian image. India stands today, in the eyes of many African people, as a negative example of how a developing country should shape its destiny after independence, politically and economically. The African countries can no doubt gain from the Indian experience and avoid the mistakes and inadequacies which have marred Indian development.

Conclusions

The enlargement of mutually beneficial trade between India and Africa, continued scrutiny of Indian private investments and joint ventures in Africa to ascertain their economic and political impact on the recipient countries, and strict vigilance to ensure that big business undertaking industrial operations in Africa does not develop vested interests in African politics are some of the lines on which India's economic relations with Africa should be remodelled.

The weaknesses in India's economic and political relations with Africa are a reflection of the weaknesses inherent in the Indian economic and political system. In view of the economic and political crisis which has been developing in India for several years, India's ability to play a leadership role in Africa is extremely limited.

India cannot be a party to the manoeuvres of Western countries in Africa to stem the tide of African resentment against imperialism and racialism on the pretext of maintaining stability in the African continent. The real test of India's genuine interest in the African cause is the extent to which it is prepared to help actively in the consummation of the African struggle against imperialism and racialism.

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Annexure I

India's Exports to African Countries

(Rs. lakhs)

Commodities	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
Cotton manufactures	1148	926	847	844	814
Jute manufactures	1475	1556	964	1553	2072
Tea	1181	1118	1307	858	1300
Footwear	20	21	20	22	13
Tobacco unmanufactured	49	21	27	77	64
Apparel	8	9	25	20	85
Sugar	3	22	—	—	Negl.
Spices	95	103	99	111	212
Shellac	7	9	10	13	13
Total Exports					
(including others)	5632	4995	4644	4624	6185

Source : Government of India, Office of the Economic Adviser, *India's Foreign Trade Statistics, with special reference to African Countries*, Annual Volume XII, Part II.

Annexure II

India's Imports from Africa

(Rs. lakhs)

Commodities	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
Cotton raw	3186	3180	2565	3242	2588
Copper	1106	453	238	254	87
Zinc or spelter	127	99	113	229	170
Cashew nuts	669	912	1093	1644	1506
Manganese ore	37	25	60	25	5
Palm oil	177	111	76	98	21
Rock phosphate	149	162	200	284	328
Precious and semi-precious stones	1	—	—	34	40
Spices	104	130	22	11	33
Wattle bark and extract	128	157	124	245	137
Asbestos crude (incl. asbestos fibre)	175	108	96	46	34
Gums, resins and lac	46	45	25	39	36
Non-ferrous metal scrap	19	5	6	12	4
Total Imports (including others)	6404	5631	5077	6581	5584

Source: Government of India, Office of the Economic Adviser, *India's Foreign Trade Statistics with special reference to African Countries,* Annual Volume XII, Part II.

Annexure III

India's Balance of Trade Position with Selected African Countries

(Rs. lakhs)

Countries	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
ALGERIA					
Imports	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Exports[1]	23	16	39	48	37
Balance of Trade	+23	+16	+39	+48	+37
ETHIOPIA					
Imports	5	1	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Exports	274	198	179	133	117
Balance of Trade	+269	+197	+179	+133	+117
GAMBIA					
Imports	—	—	—	37	1
Exports	49	15	10	15	25
Balance of Trade	+49	+15	+10	—22	+24

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[1] Exports include re-exports in the case of all countries.

Annexure III (Continued)

Countries	1961–62	1962–63	1963–64	1964–65	1965–66
GHANA					
Imports	44	30	66	59	24
Exports	265	140	147	29	112
Balance of Trade	+221	+110	+81	—30	+88
LIBERIA					
Imports	—	—	—	—	—
Exports	34	36	2	6	9
Balance of Trade	+34	+36	+2	+6	+9
LIBYA					
Imports	—	—	Negl.	Negl.	7
Exports	38	36	61	60	62
Balance of Trade	+38	+36	+61	+60	+55
MALAGASY					
Imports	—	—	Negl.	3	1
Exports	27	39	16	13	7
Balance of Trade	+27	+39	+16	+16	+6
MAURITIUS AND DEPENDENCIES					
Imports	2	—	2	6	5
Exports	143	112	120	109	94
Balance of Trade	+141	+112	+118	+103	+89
MOROCCO					
Imports	26	81	51	87	11
Exports	142	109	58	27	21
Balance of Trade	+116	+28	+7	-60	+10
NIGERIA					
Imports	178	12	76	98	21
Exports	705	615	378	512	401
Balance of Trade	+527	+603	+302	+414	+380
SIERRA LEONE					
Imports	—	—	—	Negl.	—
Exports	81	52	73	74	46
Balance of Trade	+81	+52	+73	+74	+46
SOMALIA					
Imports	Negl.	2	1	1	Negl.
Exports	12	50	53	48	26
Balance of Trade	+12	+48	+52	+47	+26
CANARY ISLANDS					
Imports	—	—	—	—	—
Exports	2	26	81	44	1
Balance of Trade	+2	+26	+81	+44	+1

Recent Developments in Africa—IV

African Personality and Western Culture

M. S. N. MENON

"YOU are not a country, Africa, you are a concept, which we all fashion in our minds, each to each, to hide our separate years, to dream our separate dreams." Indeed, Africa has remained a concept for not only Abioseh Nicol, the famous Nigerian writer of these lines, but many other thinkers and dreamers of Africa. There are other such concepts too—African Personality, African Socialism, Pan-Africanism, Negritude, which too have remained as mere slogans. These, like a tide, helped to carry forward the freedom movement. But as we are now discovering in Asia, there are limitations to slogans which were hidden during the years of struggle.

Freedom and independence were once a panacea to the subject peoples. They are even so today. But we are wiser by our experience. The reality of Africa tells a different story, just as that of India. Day by day, year by year, the African reality is unfolding before the world, and it is not pleasing. And yet of all continents and peoples, Africa and the Africans have suffered most, and we thought that from this great suffering would emerge an idealism more powerful than any other known to man. This hope was legitimate. Today we have our doubts.

It is said that people have a sacred history and a profane history. the former timeless, the latter time-bound. One restores a people to vitality, the other speeds up their decay. But what is Africa's sacred history? There is none which can be a *leitmotiv* of her history. But its profane history was poignant. It served to arouse the dark continent, and perhaps it may yet serve its future fulfilment.

Nature was the ever-present reality and mystery of Africa, the giver as well as the destroyer. The elements were in an epic clash, heat and cold, the desert and the forest. They advanced or retreated, kingdoms and empires were swallowed up and people were driven away from their hearths and homes. Indeed, nature overwhelmed man. The invincible hero did not emerge to challenge its great might; more often the hero turned to worship it. Therefore, the sacred hero, the exemplar of history, the model for all generations, is absent in African history. That is why Africa has to create one. Those who try to define the African Personality are doing nothing but personifying Africa.

The rape of Africa by Europe is a traumatic event of Africa's profane history. The slave trade, Africa's humiliation, its final subjection—these are historical facts, spanning almost four centuries of African agony. These were the days of Africa's bondage, the Egyptian captivity, which gave another race, the Jews, the *leitmotiv* of their history. the *idee fixe*, which became their greatest obsession. The African trek to the "promised land" has hardly begun; in fact, I suspect there is no Moses to lead Africa. What is worse, there is also no clear idea of the promised land. Pan-Africanism, African Socialism—these are just memories of what might have been. They need a more favourable condition for their revival.

The great flood of African nationalism did not, therefore, threaten any one, not even the oppressors. Now it has run into desert sands. African nationalism has relapsed into tribalism and parochialism, and Africa's universality has turned to particularism. The political kingdom is there today, given or taken, not of course for all Africa, but all else has not been added to it as was promised by the African leaders. And those who promised to add it are themselves in disgrace and in the wilderness, either fallen by their megalomania or by the dissensions within the political kingdom. Military men have taken over in nearly half of Africa. Their vision is narrow, objectives suspect and abilities questionable. In fact, Africa presents today not the picture of an awakening giant, as Nehru once picturesquely described it, but of a paralytic who has lost control of his limbs. Is this "African Personality"? Not quite.

I am afraid I have drawn a depressing picture, but let us err on the side of truth and reality rather than on the side of falsehood and hypocrisy. The "African Personality" was once a magic word, an evocative word, which seemed to infuse life into that whole massy continent. Indeed, I have pictured in my mind this African continent rising up like a giant, like Atlas. Of course, I had my fears and doubts too, as also joyful expectations over this rather weird prospect. But that magic word has lost its appeal today. We know now that between the pygmies and the Watutsi of Africa, there are racial, tribal, linguistic and religious differences. But this is not peculiar to Africa. Only the African problems seem to be magnified by the size of that vast continent.

But let us examine the history, the catharsis of this concept of African Personality.

The expression African Personality was born at the All African People's Congress in 1958. Dr. Nkrumah mentioned it first. It caught the imagination of the delegates, then of all Africa. We in India who have been vexed with the problems of national integration were happy to read of this African experiment. Great things were expected. Here was a clear possibility of a United States of Africa emerging on the world scene to redress the ancient wrongs, to reduce the weight of Europe and America in world affairs and to be an effective barrier against Europe's encroachments on Asia. Asia, for long exploited by Europe and for years now the scene of imported Western wars, looked to Africa to strengthen the anti-colonial movement and, if possible, to destroy predatory capitalism by cutting off the sources of supply and forcing Europe and America to trade on honest terms. Today, we cannot say on which side Africa will be in the final reckoning.

The concept of African Personality was essentially a political one. But it was a skeleton. Dr. Nkrumah did not clothe it. Nor did others. But it was evident that it was meant for the world outside. There was a clear need to project an image of Africa and the African. It was not only Nkrumah who felt its need, but many others educated abroad who had seen their race vilified and known how the want of an African personality made them appear redundant and superfluous. But the Africans knew little of their past to defend themselves, perhaps little of the present, too, and thus arose the need to rediscover Africa.

Freud has said that history is a process of becoming mature and adapting to the reality principle. The "Discovery of India" for Nehru was such a process of rediscovery. The discovery of one's roots, one's own history, is an essential part of growing up. Nehru had said: "I endeavoured to make it (*Glimpses of World History*) a truthful record of my own mental development." The concept of African Personality was therefore to be clothed with a history, with a psychology and a creative imagination before it could take on a definite shape. This was partly supplied by another concept—Negritude, which had its origin earlier. Emotion is at the heart of Negritude, unlike African Personality, and emotion is Negro. It must have been bliss to be living at this dawn of African awakening even though the reality has turned out to be different today.

The image of a nation lies buried in its history and culture and negritude is essentially a process of rediscovery of this history and culture of Africa. But African history is fragmented. It presented a weird image to many. In fact, as James Joyce said of history, it was like a nightmare. As for culture, there was none that was uniform for the whole of Africa. There were as many cultures as there were tribes and traditions. It is said that Africa has no culture and that it is savage. Freud said that there is no "normal culture", and others have said that civilisation is a "disease" or that it is an "ever-increasing neurosis". These descriptions were of course of European civilisation and culture.

However, the African search for a common identity was a political necessity, which must be based on African culture, for Africa must present to the outside world a unity and purpose, and above all a personality in order to be heard, accepted and respected. Innocence was not enough.

What was common to black Africa was negritude, the Negroness. What its content should be is still a matter of exploration, discussion and assimilation. Today, these expressions—African Personality and Negritude—are transmuted from a rallying cry to a symbol of African worth. Their most precise expressions are to be found in the statements of the "Presence Africaine" group and the Society for African Culture which was founded following the First Conference of Negro Writers and Artists in 1956 in Paris.

Their objectives read : "Since 1941, in Paris, Africans, Medagascans, and West Indians have been preoccupied with offering the "presence" or ethos of the black communities of the world, of defending the originality of their way of life and the dignity of their cultures... They know that the problem was not only that of assuring between black and white the theoretical equality of individuals They know it concerned a fundamental recasting of the structures of European civilisation and African life, and the links which bind us should spring from the cultural level. In short, it involved the emergence of an African personality from the accretion of Western culture, which colonisation has thrown into disequilbrium and servitude."

The Second Conference of Negro Writers and Artists was held in Rome in 1959. There too the Society of African Culture tried to redefine negritude. The Society affirmed two objectives: (1) "Our culture patterns be first interpreted by ourselves" and (2) that "they express both our inner life and the universal vocation of our culture." Thus the negritude movement has helped above all in fostering studies in various fields of African life, both ancient and modern. This rediscovery has not only created an African image but corrected many prejudices and slanders against Africa.

One of the founders, the great African poet, Leopold Sedar Senghor, defined the concept of negritude as a "positive affirmation of the values in African culture." It has been said that the concept has overtones of racialism, black racialism. This has been rejected by Africans. African culture, rejected by Europe, "must be accepted if Europe is to retain the goodwill of Africans," Senghor said.

Political independence and cultural revival go together. In this the African experience is not different from that of others. The poet and writer must set the new mood, the historian must enlarge the vision of a people from a history of dynasties to a history of peoples, and the thinker must direct his gaze to the distant future, to the days of fulfilment of a people. The spring tide of Africa's cultural revival began in the early part of this century. The rediscovery was therapeutic for the African.

In its political aspect, negritude could be related to the concept of African personality. This was favoured by those who had shared the experience of the Pan-African congresses. But negritude embraces all Africa and all black people all over the world. The implications of these two concepts are clear. The more obvious one is that negritude was a term devised by those who wished to re-establish the dignity of African culture while African personality emphasised the validity of the African position on the international scene. Both were attempts to seek recognition for the universal values in African culture, to stress the "originality and dignity" of what African peoples had achieved. The less obvious implications are that negritude is a worldwide movement like the Jewish Zionist movement which can serve one day the political hopes and ambitions which lie behind the concept of African personality. There may be anything like 50 million Negroes outside Africa and it is more likely that negritude may inspire them to seek political objectives in favour of Africa. The Black Muslim movement in America is a case in point.

But let us not fall into another error, that of romanticising the negritude movement as has happened in Paris and Harlem (New York). Negritude appeared as a problem first among those Negroes who were partly assimilated, as in the West Indies, America and French Africa. Here, again, it was not a mass movement among these people. The American middle class Negro wants greater assimilation, not less, and the West Indian wants to shed his Negro-ness and pass to the ranks of the white community.

It is true that colonialism has alienated the educated Africans from their native culture just as in other parts of the colonial world. However, in Africa there is no sense of regret or self-pity among them. The problem of alienation has become universal. Dan Jacobson, a South African writer, says: "It is true that nowadays nobody can know who he is and what he is... What we are all alienated from...we do not know what is going to become of us, we cannot imagine the world our grandchildren will be living in..." The non-African intellectual may not know what he is alienated from, but the African intellectual knows that he is alienated, first, from his own native culture. Till he is healed of this alienation and in the process acquires the full measure of his patrimony he cannot be truly involved in that universal problem which Jacobson is talking about, for as Rabindranath Tagore has said it is the greatest humiliation of a people to go empty-handed before other people. Surely the African commitment is greater than this alienation?

Every artist must go through the agony of purging his art of imitations and false notes before he strikes an individual medium. "Leave the artist to this process of evolution; let him sweat it out and be emancipated by his own art," says an African writer. Happily, the African intellectuals are not concerned with this problem of alienation of the modern man of the West.

The African intellectuals have hardly been concerned with any other problems except those of Africa. And they try their hand not only at poetry and drama, but also sociology, economics and politics. And close ties link the African writers, researchers and politicians. Thus what they project is bound to be a unified vision of Africa. This ultimately must help in the rediscovery of Africa and therefore of African personality.

What kind of African personality has emerged from their labours and what are the unique values discovered in African culture after this great self-evaluation?

Above all, a single quality which the Africans personify is the quality of innocence as against the high sophistication and sophistry of Western culture. This innocence makes them free from pride and prejudice, pride in their own to the extent of holding in contempt all others, and prejudice against accepting what is good in other people. A sense of mission, a strong dedication, and a search for the human worth—these characterise the African's attitude to the world and his problems today. These were born from their own experience, and not from ethical formulations. Europe talks of the human worth, but it took away the humanity of more than half the world's peoples. The Europeans evolved the ethic of human fellowship and yet when it came to testing it they were found wanting. But in Africa, the community is everything and the individual secondary. The African is still committed to this tradition. Moreover, it is more likely that he, having suffered from his exclusion from human fellowship, may want to ardently bring it about.

No ideology seems to have greater and more widespread attention among the masses in Africa than socialism, may be a vague one. This has its reasons. Individualism of the European type has not been fostered by traditional African society with its emphasis on duties. This fits in with socialist ethics and the collectivist principle.

Sheikh Anta Diop's ethnological study, *L'Unite Culturelle de L'Afrique Noire*, is an important work. His study is confined to ancient Africa and his comparisons are with Rome, Greece, the Germanic race, Assyria and India. An important aspect of his study is about the basic differences between the cultures of Africa and Indo-Europe due to the institution of matriarchy in Africa. Diop summaries the nature of this African society thus: "In conclusion, the southern cradle of society, particularly as confined to the African continent, is characterised by the matriarchal family, the creation of a territorial state as opposed to the Aryan city state, the emancipation of women in domestic life, zenophilia, cosmopolitanism and a sort of social collectivism whose corollary is quietism, extending to heedlessness of the morrow, a material solidarity of rights for each individual which means that moral and material need is unknown to our day. These are poor people, but no one feels alone, no one is distressed by it. In the moral sphere, there is the ideal of peace; justice, goodness and optimism which precludes all thought of guilt or original sin from religious and metaphysical concepts. Favourite literary genres are the novel, short story, tale and comedy."

As against this Diop has this to say of Europe, of Greece and Rome: "Clearly it is through contacts with the south that the people of the north have widened their conceptions of a state to the level of a territorial state or empire. The special character of these city states, outside which man was an outlaw, developed internal patriotism, as well as xenophobia. Individualism, moral and material solitude, world-weariness, all the stuff of modern literature which even in its philosophical aspects is merely an expression of the tragedy of a way of life inherited from the past: such are the attributes of this cradle... An ideal of war, violence, crime and conquest left over from the nomadic life, with the corollary of guilt and the concept of original sin giving rise to pessimistic religions and metaphysical systems, is characteristic of this cradle...The outstanding literary genre is tragedy."

African customary law differs widely from European law. While the African laws have a religious content and are designed to protect the tribal collectivism, and therefore family collectivism, European laws are made to foster individualism.

African religions are not just fetishisms as some say. They have a clear concept of God as "the creator and giver of all things." There are any number of studies to compare African religious beliefs and Christianity. However, no one asserts a strict analogy.

The African does not accept the faith and customs of others without subjecting them to a synthesis. Thus Negro Islam is different from Arabic Islam. The African churches broke away from the rigid control of European missions and asserted their independence. One author has listed 39 different Islamic movements in Africa. Similarly with Christianity. This shows the continuity in the psychological resilience of African peoples, their flexibility and freedom from dogmas.

There is enough evidence to show that even the paganism of the earlier ages was evolving continually. Thus there is a dynamism in African belief; the universe is conceived as being in a continuous process of change, where the supernatural powers can be swayed by man or even challenged.

Invariably the African has reacted to outside control or pressures by a schismatic movement which has given him freedom of action.

James Baldwin, the famous American writer, talking of his loss of faith in Christianity, says: "I realised that the Bible had been written by white men. I know that, according to many Christians, I was a descendent of Ham, who had been cursed and that I was therefore predestined to be a slave." Christianity has discredited itself by its close association with the colonial masters and African humiliation. Jesus is no Redeemer to the black African. Mistrust in the 'god of whites' is now well advanced. But Islam is gaining rapidly all over Africa. It offers a real alternative, a system of values, a highly developed conception of social life and a modified form of Islamic civilisation. Above all it offers the sword of victory and self-confidence and not the cross of suffering.

All these demonstrate the power and persistence of the indigenous world view. Even though early Islam and Christianity suppressed many tribal beliefs and practices, they soon appeared in other garbs. This is another facet of the flexibility of the African psychology in the face of innovations.

We have also to study the personality of a race or people in their creative expression—carving, painting, literature, music, drama and dance. The first reaction of European creative life was to characterise them as childish, childlike or savage. Today, there is an effort to romanticise them.

What we witnessed in other fields we notice in the creative field. The spirit of creative activity was renewed after Africa discovered itself in this century—its old wood-carving and music. The dynamic changes in these fields show the adaptability of the African to other cultures and his capacity to retain the essential African elements.

Though Africa has no philosophic tradition, it has a rich folklore of stories, legends, proverbs, etc. Bernard Dadie maintains that they are "a lesson in prudence, generosity, patience and wisdom, indispensable to the guidance of mankind and the stability of society."

A few words on one of the more advanced religious beliefs of Africa—the Bantu philosophy—is called for here.

The Bantu looks at his being as dynamic. "Force is being, being is force." But there are different forces—divine, terrestrial, celestial, human, animal, etc. The Christian conception of being is static.

There is no dualism in Bantu philosophy—that of good and evil—as two opposing forces. For them all being is force. They make a distinction between what is perceived and its inner nature. They say "in every thing there is another thing; in every man a little man," meaning an inner force.

Thus, for the Bantu existence is a thing of variable intensity depending on the vital force. Creation is the work of god. He creates (or evokes from not being). No force can destroy another force. They all exist, influencing one another. While in Christian philosophy, there is only a relation between God and man, the creator and the creature, there is none between the creatures. For the Bantu this relation between the creatures is very important. Magic in popular understanding is the means by which the spirit intervenes. This is a European interpretation. In fact, the intervention of spirits changes nothing. The interaction of forces and the exercise of vital influences occur according to determined laws. The Bantu universe is not a chaotic tangle of unordered forces.

God knows all the forces and their interaction. The philosophy of force is a theory of life, Weltanschaung. But not so with the Bantu. For them, there is interaction between being and being, that is to say, between force and force. This is an ontological relation. One force will reinforce or weaken another. This interaction is denoted by the word "magic". But this word is not to be confused with its popular meaning. Forces are not independent. They influence each other. All creatures are found in relationship according to the laws of hierarchy. This hierarchy is a fundamental concept which has a ramified influence on the sociology of Africa.

The main consideration is whether the African's mental topography has changed by the Islamic and Christian advent. This is not so.

The African personality is not the same everywhere. In South Africa it is helpless, in other colonial areas it is still struggling for the breath of freedom and for self-expression. This is not so in other parts of Africa. If there is oppression there, Africa is a large continent able to accommodate everyone; if there are social and economic oppressions then there is the possibility of revolution. In other words a self-confident personality is emerging in free Africa.

Now let me turn to a brief analysis of Western culture. The atomic age looms larger over Europe and the West. Fear is the dominant motive. The subliminal reaction is to forget the prevailing threat.

Western society is in a crisis. But which society? It is only a part of it—the ruling classes. Others have not even a vague idea of this crisis. But there is also a growing section which has grown cynical and hostile to the civilisation of their elders. They are the outsiders. This is the final and better fruit of Western individualism, the individual's decision to opt out of society because he cannot change it or find salvation through it.

The might of the West is at its very apex today and yet its political and moral influence is suffering a profound crisis throughout the world. The West cannot pick up a dialogue with the rest of the world which it has subjected to the worst injustices. There are continuous inner tensions within the Western culture—knowledge without conscience, laws without morals, convictions without corresponding action. In fact the Western technological civilization has grown into a moloch which has eaten up most of the human values.

Oswald Spengler in his "Decline of the West" writes: "The machine with its human retinue, the real queen of this century, is in danger of succumbing to a stronger power. But with this, money, too is at the end of its success and the last conflict is at hand in which the civilisation receives its conclusive form—the conflict between money and blood." And blood has flowed freely for money all over Europe, also in Europe's erstwhile colonies.

In September 1957 a conference of 100 eminent personalities from both sides of the Atlantic gathered at a conference to define the values of the Atlantic community. These values were defined as: (1) an intrinsic value of the human person; (2) freedom inseparable from moral responsibility; (3) freedom inseparable from human solidarity; and (4) civilisation as a civilisation of dialogue.

It is not necessary to rebut these assertions. Others have done it in greater detail before. But it is relevant to examine this pretension in the light of the African experience of Western civilisation. The West's humanity towards the African—it enjoyed its freedom of the seas and trade without exercising moral responsibility, its practice of racialism denies human solidarity and human freedom and the form of civilisation it tried to impose on Africa and continues to do so even today is not a civilisation of dialogue. It is clearly conceived as an imposition.

Apart from the spiritual crisis, there is the economic crisis—the fear that the West may be thrown back on its own resources. This fear is real. Europe's reaction is not to enter into better relations with the under-developed world, but to introduce relations based on a new form of colonialism.

The West continues to talk of the benefits of Western technological civilisation bestowed on others. Who are to be the judges of this? Now, in Africa European technology has hardly entered the rural areas after all these years of European rule.

The West does not represent the only possible cultural or political type. It is just one among others. It has no panaceas to sell.

To the European hypocrisy of a "mission civilisastrice" in Africa, Aime Cesaire had this to say: "It must be admitted. once and for all, without flinching at the consequence, that the decisive action here is that of the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer, and the armourer, the gold digger and the merchant, greed and force..." This is Africa's judgment.

The congress of Negro writers, therefore, saw any cultural assimilation with Europe as suffocation of the Negro personality.

Whither Africa—Afro-Asia or Afro-Europe?—this is the question posed. But it is a false dilemma. There is of course a third alternative—that of an independent Africa, perhaps with an isolationist spirit.

Yet it may be useful to answer this question, more to rid ourselves of our illusions. My answer is: Africa is not with Asia. Whether it will be with Europe is not certain yet. But one might say that Africa will much rather be with Europe than with Asia. There are several reasons for this. The African's dialogue about his culture and about his status in the world is with the West, not with Asia. Asia can offer him praise for his culture (He knows that we are not qualified to do so yet), but not a status in the world. In this process of the dialogue with Europe, both the African and European will make accommodations. Asia's conservatism cannot attract Africa which is dynamic and out for for change.

In 1937 the great Indian poet, Rabindranath Tagore, wrote:

> In that early dusk of a distracted age,
> when God in scorn of his own workmanship,
> violently shook his head at his primitive efforts
> an impatient wave snatched you away, Africa,
> from the bosom of the East,
> and kept you brooding in a dense enclosure of niggardly
> light guarded by giant trees.

This poetic imagery of an Africa as part of Asia may be good as poetic fancies go, but it is not part of the reality of today. There are no common ethos between the two great peoples, Asians and Africans, except their common suffering under European subjection.

Islam cannot provide a focus for the African away from Europe. Mecca cannot be a Rome or Paris or even London or New York. This is the failure of the Islamic civilisation.

But there are resistances too to this process of cultural assimilation by Europe. We are now familiar with the so-called Eurafrican policies advocated by some European powers. Many African thinkers see in this a glaring form of neo-colonialism. But the idea has attracted many by the contrite manner in which it is presented by Europe, namely, that "the West wants to atone for its sins against Africa" by now raising it from degradation. Some Africans genuinely believe in this, but others see it differently.

Albert Teroedjre asks whether it is in the African interest "to associate, in an as yet ill-defined inter-continental federation, a dependent and divided Africa and a technically more advanced Europe, mistress of its own destiny," and he answers in the negative. He goes on to say that "it will easily be understood that our first task today is to build an African community and not to take part in some doubtful crusade in defending a civilisation and interests of which we have been the victims rather than the beneficiaries."

Sekou Toure has characterised the Eurafrican idea as the association of the jocky and horse.

Perhaps our discussions are based on the problems and aspirations of the elite class of Africa. But this is the age of the masses, not only in the West but in other parts of the world. A mass culture exists not only in America but in Europe and in the USSR. It is based on economic plenty, music and sports. These have an irresistible attraction for the masses all over the world, no less in Africa. And it is more likely that the African masses will liberate themselves from their poverty much earlier than Asians. And then they will look for the mass culture of the West or create a similar one, and it is more likely that they will take up in the process the values of the mass culture of the West, perhaps what are called the proletarian values.

Sartre has noted that most of the poets of the negritude movement have turned to Marxism or were confirmed Marxists, and have turned their attention to the Negro proletariat. They see capitalism and colonialism as synonymous ills. Sartre looks at negritude as a temporary phase. He says that African intellectuals must transcend it to join the international proletariat in their common struggle for total liberation from all human exploitation. He writes: "Negritude is a low ebb in a dialectical progression. The theoretical and practical assertion of white supremacy is the thesis; negritude's role as an antithetical value is the negative stage, but this negative stage will not satisfy the Negroes. They know that they are aiming at human synthesis or fulfilment in a raceless society. Negritude is destined to destroy itself; it is the path and not the goal, the means but not the end...."

However, the process of rediscovery of Africa may be a political and intellectual necessity for the African elite, but this is only a stage.

The masses of Africa are not in this process. In fact, all societies which were once dominated by the West and which have suffered more by their age-old inertia and traditions want a total break with the past. In this it is not only China which is engaged. Even in many Asian countries there is a growing feeling that the heavy crust of tradition is a hindrance to progress. If the past has done its work, it may disappear—this is the attitude of many people. This problem of how much to carry one's past and how much to assimilate the foreign will be a continuing problem and perhaps will be an important aspect of the international dialogue of the future.

Western writers continue to predict the worst future for Africa—that it will relapse into tribalism and terror, but others see Africa as the continent of the future, as the centre of a "universal world empire". This universal world empire of Africa may then truly have an African personality and independent values. Carthage shall then rival with Rome in a true sense.

Canada and the Commonwealth in Africa

AHMED M. MOHIDDIN

THE Commonwealth meeting held in Lagos in January 1966, the first outside London, indicated yet another significant landmark in the evolution of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meetings had always been held in London, and at the initiative of the British Prime Minister. The Lagos meeting, specially convened to discuss the Rhodesian crisis, was held on the initiative of the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa. The Commonwealth is no longer "the little group of white graduates from colonial states sitting around the fireplace at 10 Downing Street at periodic clubby meetings, and listening to the old headmaster discuss the imperial problems"[1]. It is now a multi-racial association with Africans, in terms of number of states, dominating. Canada played a significant role in the transformation of the old Commonwealth into the new one. This paper attempts to bring into focus and evaluate some aspects of this role, with particular reference to the Commonwealth in Africa.

Undoubtedly 1960 was the greatest landmark in the history of African political emancipation. It was in February of that year that Mr. Harold Macmillan delivered his famous "wind of change" speech in the South African Parliament. It was during that year that the largest number, as yet or perhaps ever, of African colonies achieved independence. The year witnessed the coming of age of one of the least prepared countries for self-government—the Congo—and welcomed to full sovereignty one of the best groomed and tutored countries to assume its own responsibility—Nigeria. This was also the year of the Langa and Sharpeville tragedies. Significant as these developments to the former colonial Africa were, nonetheless in so far as the Commonwealth in Africa was concerned, it was the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting of May of that year that emerged as the most important single event not only of the year but in the history of the Commonwealth.

Although the racial composition of the Commonwealth had drastically changed in favour of the non-white former dependencies of Britain before 1960, it was not until 1960 that the prospects of rapid enmancipation of the British African colonies and the implications of these for the survival of the Commonwealth had to be realistically faced. The Commonwealth was no longer going to be the close-knit association of kith and kin; it would either have to be a multi-racial community of nations or perish. Once this fact was grasped, it became obvious that certain important questions had to be faced, including that of racial equality. Can the Commonwealth as now constituted include in its membership those whose official policy is racial discrimination? To be more precise, is the South African policy of apartheid compatible with the new Commonwealth? Whereas in the past a substantial part of the African membership of the Commonwealth was by virtue of the fact that the colonies were part of the British Empire, now it was obviously not going to be so. Membership was now a matter of choice. Will the African colonies on attaining their independence freely choose to affiliate themselves with an association which includes those who discriminate against their kith and kin? For a time it seemed as if the whole future of the Commonwealth hinged on this question. Is the unequivocal and formal acceptance of this principle by all members more important than the retention of a senior member of the association, South Africa? For this was in fact the choice, and all the Commonwealth leaders were aware of it well before Mr. Julius Nyerere, the then Chief Minister of Tanganyika, and other African leaders who were then full members of the Commonwealth raised the question later in 1961. And should this principle be accepted, what would be the next logical step?

There were suggestions that the parliamentary system of government should be made a basic principle of the association. But how many of the then existing members could qualify for membership by this criterion? Certainly not Ghana or Pakistan. There was also a somewhat inaudibly expressed anxiety of some of the older members of the Commonwealth that this whole business of race was precipitated by the excessively sensitive and altogether new entrants to the world of international relations, the Africans. These critics believed that the problem would solve itself in due course. The Africans are too impatient, the critics said. Asians had been members of the association for a considerably longer period and not one threatening voice had come from them, but now with the Africans on the ascendancy the situation had changed considerably. This was the voice of the white man criticising the black man for his excessive sensitivity and impatience. The atmosphere was an extremely critical one for the future of the Commonwealth. And this was the background to the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting held in London in May—a meeting which was very much dominated by the racial issue. South Africa was the main question. It was at this meeting that Canada, in its bold effort to preserve the Commonwealth, contributed immensely to the firm establishment of the Commonwealth in Africa.

The Union of South Africa was then contemplating to become a Republic. According to the precedent set by India in 1949, a formal application for re-admission to the Commonwealth is needed following a change in the system of government in a member-state. Although South Africa, represented by Mr. E. Louw, Secretary of External Affairs, was not then formally applying for re-admission, he took advantage of the occasion to sound the Premiers on this question. During the 1960 meeting, Mr. John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada, emerged as the most uncompromising advocate of a multi-racial Commonwealth and, as such, a bitter critic of South Africa's policy of apartheid. The

Canadian Prime Minister, a lawyer by training and the architect of the Canadian Bill of Rights of that year, urged his Commonwealth colleagues that unless they openly practised what they individually preached, namely, that racial discrimination was incompatible with freedom and human dignity, and that unless equality of race became the fundamental principle of the new Commonwealth, the association would have no future. Mr. Diefenbaker left Mr. Louw in no doubt that Canadians had "no sympathy for policies of racial discrimination, on whatever grounds they might be explained and that such policies are incompatible with the multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth".[2]

A few days later, the London *Financial Times* echoed Mr. Diefenbaker's pronouncements in its editorial columns. "More important even than these constitutional considerations is the simple truth expressed by Mr. Diefenbaker last week that a Commonwealth in which the majority of the population is coloured must unequivocally accept racial equality". The editorial continued:

> The seriousness of racial problems varies widely from member country to member country. Not all of them have an untarnished record. Yet the position today is that the truth of Mr. Diefenbaker's proposition is accepted in theory at least everywhere in the western world, except in South Africa.[3]

The significance of the 1960 Prime Ministers' meeting was the fact that for the first time multi-racialism was recognized as an essential feature of the new Commonwealth[4] and, as a corollary, racial equality, not only between member-states but also between peoples became part of this new outlook. It was not, however, until 1961 that Commonwealth leaders began to practise what they had always purported to preach. This happened at the Prime Ministers' meeting held in March that year. But let us first look at the immediate background to the meeting.

In late October 1960, two events took place in Africa which had a profound effect on the Commonwealth in Africa. The first was the achievement of independence by Nigeria, the most populous state in Africa, and the second was a referendum on the republican status of South Africa which was adopted by the all-white electorate. To the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. H. Verwoerd, who was to attend the next Commonwealth meeting for the first and last time, Nigerian independence meant the birth of yet another critic of his racial policies. However conservative in their foreign policies the Nigerians might be, on the questions of racialism and apartheid they were one with the rest of Black Africa. And so for Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, the March meeting, his first, was an opportunity to prove himself the leader of the African people, a position Nigeria assumed by virtue of its immense population. The atmosphere surrounding the 1961 meeting, with the background of the 1960 communique, was one of anxious expectation. South Africa was an older member of the Commonwealth; would it modify its racial policies and remain in the association, and thereby help preserve it, or would it refuse to change its policies and face 'expulsion' and possible disintegration of the Commonwealth?

We are not here concerned with the role of the African members; our primary interest is in the part played by Canada. Afro-Asian opposition can be taken for granted. From the beginning of the meeting it became evident that three of the older members—Britain, Australia and New Zealand—would, in the words Colin Legum, "do everything within reason to facilitate South Africa's continued membership".[5] From the beginning these three members were resolved to resist any attempt to expel South Africa. In their determination to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth, Australia, Britain, and New Zealand were willing and used persuasion to separate the issue of South Africa's application for re-admission from that of its racial policies. It was on this crucial aspect of the meeting that Mr. Diefenbaker differed from his white colleagues and insisted that the application of South Africa for re-admission could not be considered in isolation from its apartheid policies, and further urged the meeting that the Commonwealth must have a moral basis for its association. The Canadian Prime Minister emerged as the "greatest examplar of the new Commonwealth"[6] and as such won the respect of his Afro-Asian colleagues. Mr. Diefenbaker's stand was both moral and realistic. Moral because it was consistent with his position at the previous meeting that racial discrimination was wrong, and at any rate incompatible with the new Commonwealth. Realistic in that for the Commonwealth to continue to exist, it must accommodate the anxieties and aspirations of its non-white members who were in the majority.

The Canadian Prime Minister's concern with the racial issue was not confined only to the Commonwealth, although it was here that much could be done to alleviate the problem.

> We have to realize that the African and Asian races today are taking their rightful and enlightened place on the world stage. Any association that hopes to play an effective role in the world must take cognizance of the fact and endeavour to bring about cooperation and understanding between races.[7]

Alone among the white members of the Commonwealth, Mr. Diefenbaker stood up for a multi-racial association, even though it meant antagonising an old friend to the point of no-return. For this is in fact what happened. As a result of bitter criticism of its racial policy, South Africa decided to withdraw its application for re-admission rather than change its ways.

But what is the meaning of all this? Could one really argue that Mr. Diefenbaker's actions were in any way related to the development of the Commonwealth in Africa? Does the truth not lie in the fact that all that Mr. Diefenbaker was attempting to do was to save the Commonwealth? This is only half the truth. For Mr. Diefenbaker—as well as the rest of the white dominions, although they were not prepared to face its implications—realised that the centre of power in the Commonwealth had shifted significantly in favour of the non-white members. In terms of population, the Asians predominate but in numbers, then as members and as potential members, Africa was to be the centre of power. And it was in

Africa primarily that the main racial issues had to be faced if the new Commonwealth was to survive. Hence the Canadian Prime Minister's role must be viewed not merely as an attempt to save the Commonwealth as a whole, though this in itself had the implication of 'racial equality'. Being a white man—and Canada being a founder member of the association—Mr Diefenbaker, in speaking unequivocally against racial discrimination, blurred the issue, concerned less with the white-non-white conflict within the Commonwealth and more with basic principles. "Canada's huge contribution", as one African delegate put it, was "to keep this conference from developing into a disastrous, straight fight between white and coloured members of the Commonwealth".[8] A somewhat similar tribute was paid by the London *Observer*: "Mr. Diefenbaker's role was of decisive importance. Not only did he provide a bridge between the old and white dominions; he also demonstrated the importance of somebody giving a lead"[9]. Indeed, the extent to which Mr. Diefenbaker played this role most effectively was indicated by the intensity of anger it evoked from Mr. Eric Louw who made outcries of "political expediency" as the motive behind the Canadian Prime Minister's behaviour. Employing the familiar South African technique against his critics, Mr. Louw said Mr. Diefenbaker was "losing ground in Canada and (was) pandering to the anti-South African campaign carried on in the Canadian press as well as in clerical and ultra-liberalistic circles".[10]

It would be totally unfair, and indeed dishonest, to the rest of the Commonwealth leaders to attribute the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth entirely to Canada. Mr. Diefenbaker was alone neither in his opposition to racial discrimination nor in his criticism of apartheid and insistence that these precepts were incompatible with the Commonwealth. The important point is that of the four senior Commonwealth leaders, all of them white, it was Mr. Diefenbaker who had a clear vision of the future course of the Commonwealth, and had the courage of his convictions to stand by the non-white members of the association, with Mr. Nehru, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Dr. Nkrumah. This action not only boosted the Afro-Asian image of Canada but, and this is relevant to our discussion, convinced the existing members of the Commonwealth and those about to join it that the Commonwealth was a truly multiracial association in which there was no room for racial bigotry. As Professor Douglas Anglin put it: "It is not enough simply to believe in the Commonwealth. It is also necessary to understand it".[11] Inasmuch as a majority of future members of the Commonwealth were to come from Africa, this singular action contributed immensely to the secure establishment of the Commonwealth in Africa.

There is no doubt that Mr. Diefenbaker's hardened attitude to the South African question was greatly influenced by the thinking of the African leaders. His antipathy towards apartheid was unquestioned. But there is evidence to suggest that he was 'forced' to take a more decisive step because he was convinced that the survival of the Commonwealth was in peril. Shortly before the meeting began, Mr. Julius Nyerere, the then Chief Minister of Tanganyika, wrote an interesting article in the London *Observer*[12] in which he unequivocally stated that Tanganyika would not apply for membership of the Commonwealth if South Africa remained in it. And in the course of the meeting, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth if South Africa remained there with its apartheid policies unchanged.[13] It was not a conversion to an anti-apartheid posture that Mr. Diefenbaker underwent, but a transformation. He gave up the usual Canadian technique of "quiet diplomacy" and adopted an open and aggressive policy.

The question of racial equality did not disappear with the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961. What happened then was a mere shift of the battleground from the south of the Limpopo to the south of the Zambezi. Since the dissolution of the ill-conceived Central African Federation in 1963 Southern Rhodesia has presented Britain and the Commonwealth in Africa with the most challenging problem. To the white minority who effectively controls both economic and political power, Southern Rhodesia is not like any other colony. It has consequently demanded a different treatment from Britain—independence on the basis of minority rule, contrary to the traditional British colonial policy. The African countries of the Commonwealth, which were once colonies themselves, recognize no such distinction and thus expect, and have demanded from Britain, that Rhodesia will be treated like any other British colony. Caught up in a conflict of loyalties to kith and kin on the one hand and to the principles underlying the Commonwealth, namely, racial equality which Rhodesia does not effectively subscribe to, on the other, Britain has had its capacity, though possibly not the will, to solve the Rhodesian problem in the traditional manner greatly undermined. Thus with the European demand for independence on the basis of a minority constitution, the African insistence that independence should be granted only to a majority government, and Britain seemingly powerless to act decisively, Southern Rhodesia has posed a frightening threat to the continuance of the Commonwealth.

At the 1964 and 1965 Commonwealth meetings where Southern Rhodesia, and with it the Commonwealth in Africa, was the main subject, Canada again assumed the role of a most earnest champion of a multi-racial Commonwealth and an uncompromising supporter of racial equality within it. At both the meetings, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, the Liberal Prime Minister who succeeded Mr. Diefenbaker, reaffirmed the Canadian position on the racial issue and impressed upon his fellow leaders the implications of the challenge of racial equality within the Commonwealth and the threat it posed to the very survival of the association. At the 1964 meeting when the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Southern Rhodesia was a live possibility, he suggested that "it might strengthen the hand of the British Government" if the leaders present "let it be publicly known" that "unconstitutional action by a minority in Southern Rhodesia would gravely diminish Southern Rhodesia's international status, might lead to economic and political internal difficulties and might also lead to disaster and violence."[14] By 'forcing' other Commonwealth leaders to commit themselves before

UDI was declared, Mr. Pearson created the necessary atmosphere for further Commowealth action should such a declaration be made. One of the actions decided upon at the 1965 meeting was to withhold diplomatic recognition from Southern Rhodesia if it declared itself independent.

Mr. Pearson was not the only Commonwealth leader who expressed strong views on the racial question at the 1964 or 1965 meeting. Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda, countries which had suflered from racial discrimination (before independence), were also there, and they were extremely vocal and insistent on this point. Indeed, President Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sign that part of the 1965 final communique which dealt with Southern Rhodesia because he did not agree with it. But it was the performance of Mr. Pearson, as a senior white member of the Commonwealth, that seemed most impressive.

The declaration of UDI by Southern Rhodesia on November 11, 1965, and Britain's apparent unwillingness to deal effectively with it has severely strained the fabric of the Commonwealth in Africa. To Africans, Britain seems to have treated Southern Rhodesia unlike any other colony. And when the crisis of confidence between Britain and the African members of the Commonwealth rose to the point where two of its members, Tanzania and Ghana, broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, it was again Canada which played the mediating role. The Australians' support for the Commonwealth is passive rather than active, and New Zealand's voice is somewhat inaudible. The extent to which Canada was involved in the Southern Rhodesian crisis was clearly shown by the demand made on Mr. Pearson's mediation and diplomatic skills at the Lagos and London meetings last year. It is too early to assess Canada's role in this crisis, but available evidence does suggest that at least for the moment Mr. Pearson has been able to provide a bridge. The important question however is that while Britain persists in its present policy, will the bridge be able to sustain the weight of the potentially disruptive reverberations of the Southern Rhodesian issue?

At first sight it might seem surprising that so much attention has been given to the principle of racial equality within the Commonwealth and the part played by Canada in firmly establishing it. The question of racial equality is one of the most emotional—and important—issues in the Commonwealth in Africa. With its immediate colonial past and with some parts of Africa still under colonial rule with European minorities in power, this sensitivity is understandable. "We mustn't take (the Commonwealth) for granted. We could easily break it up or throw it away". These were Prime Minister Macmillan's words addressed to the British people when he returned from his tour of Commonwealth Africa.

Canada's special relationship with the Commonwealth in Africa is a logical outcome of the Canadian image of the Commonwealth as a whole, the role this association can and must play in the development of mankind in general and racial relations in particular, and, more important, Canada's own image of its role within the Commonwealth.

As a bilingual and bi-racial nation itself, with many cultural groups within it Canada is acutely aware of the political significance of racial sensibilities which can easily disrupt peace, order and good government. The political and constitutional history of Canada is in an important sense the story of two races, the Anglo-Saxon Protestants and French-Canadian Catholics, trying to live together amicably. And the process is still continuing. Canadians are committed to the ideal of the Commonwealth and they genuinely believe that they are well suited to —and can—play an important constructive role in the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is only within the Commonwealth that Canada can assume an active role which it considers commensurate with its international status. In other international organizations Canada is dwarfed by either the United States or Britain. The Commonwealth, particularly in Africa where the member-states are weak economically and politically, offers Canada an ideal environment for exercising its influence.

Thus, among the senior Commonwealth members, with the exception of Britain, Canada has made the greatest contribution to making the Commonwealth a truly multi-racial association. Canadians have done even more: they have responded admirably to the needs of their colleagues in Africa. Without the Commonwealth in Africa there cannot be a Commonwealth worth having; but a poor, racially-oppressed and insecure Commonwealth in Africa is the Achilles Heel of the association. Successive Canadian Prime Ministers have striven to maintain the viability of the Commonwealth even at the cost of purging it of one of its senior members.

REFERENCES

1. Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, addressing the Canadian Club of Ottawa, February 10, 1965. See Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Statements and Speeches, No. 65/3, mimeo, p. 2.

2. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, May 16, 1960. Mr. Diefenbaker gave an indication of the position he would take before the meeting itself was in full swing. "I hope we shall be able to achieve that basic foundation upon which the Commonwealth rests—the equality of all peoples, brothers in the fatherhood of God, which denies the principles of discrimination and abhors those practices anywhere in the world".

3. *Financial Times*, London, May 14, 1960.

4. Part of the 1960 final communique stated, "...The Ministers emphasized that the Commonwealth itself is a multi-racial association and expressed the need to ensure good relations between all member-states and peoples of the Commonwealth". See *The Times*, London, May 14, 1960.

5. *The Observer*, London, March 5, 1961.

6. *The Hamilton Spectator* (Canada), March 14, 1961.

7. Mr. Diefenbaker speaking at Belfast, Ireland, reported in *The Observer*, London, March 5, 1961.

8. As reported by Jeannine Locke of the *Toronto Daily Star*, March 16, 1961.

9. *The Observer*, London, March 19, 1961. A similar view was expressed by the editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 29, 1961, one of Canada's leading newspapers: "Mr. Diefenbaker's importance was in providing a bridge between the old white dominions and the new non-white members." The editor said that Mr. Diefenbaker's particular contribution was in "putting the South African problem in the context of the Commonwealth moral basis for association". Mr. Tom Stacey also sees this moral crusading in Mr. Diefenbaker, who, as Stacey said, "moralized more prolixly and piously than any of the Afro-Asians". See *Sunday Times*, London, March, 19, 1961.

10. See Toronto *Globe and Mail*, March 20, 1961.

11. Douglas Anglin, "Canada and Apartheid," *International Journal*, Vol. 15, 1959-60, p. 135. In this article Prof. Anglin is rather critical of Canada's lack of vigour in its opposition to apartheid.

12. On March 21, 1961.

13. See *New York Times*, March 19, 1961.

14. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, July 17, 1964.

Education in Uganda

E. B. CASTLE

UGANDA was formerly a British protectorate. In 1962 it became an independent state within the British Commonwealth. The population of Uganda is 8 million, of whom about 75,000 are Indians, Pakistanis, Sikhs and Goans; only 10,000 are Europeans and 2,000 Arabs. The economy of Uganda is predominantly agricultural, only about 7 per cent of the population living in urban areas. The Ugandan African is essentially a farmer, producing his subsistence crops—banana, maize and millet—and his three export crops—coffee, tea and cotton—on which the national economy largely depends. The Asians and Europeans are mainly engaged in commerce, the law, education and medicine. Great efforts are being made to stimulate industrial development with some success, especially in cotton textiles. Extensive sugar plantations have been developed by Asian enterprise. Nevertheless, although there is considerable scope for economic growth, Uganda's gross national product remains obstinately at the low figure of £20-£25 per head and presents a grave obstacle to educational advance.

Uganda has her tribal and racial problems. Tribal, because of her many tribal divisions and languages; racial, because the dominant African population tends to view with distrust the disproportionate Asian influence in trade and the professions. Europeans present no fundamental racial problem today as they have no deep roots in the country and have never been allowed to own land; but the Indian communities have been established in East Africa for generations and their children know no other home. For these the future will not be easy. The Asian communities have always made good provision for their children's education, but today all schools are racially integrated and Indian children will be outnumbered and outclassed by the 10 per cent cream of the African primary schools who are selected out of hundreds of thousands, not thousands, for entry to the secondary schools. Until recently school segregation has kept the races apart; it will be interesting to see how far integration helps or hinders racial understanding. Racial relationships between the upper and middle income groups where both races tend to adopt a western pattern of living are superficially good and education as a social solvent operates helpfully among the professional groups—teachers, doctors, social workers—but it is at the lowest income level that racial and tribal division becomes most marked. Here language diversities, ignorance and poverty become useful weapons in the hands of the African demagogue and local politics become an easy means of exacerbating racial and tribal differences.

Population versus Education

Before proceeding to a discussion of Uganda's educational problems reference must be made to the major obstacle, apart from poverty, that inhibits educational development. This is the population explosion which Uganda and East Africa share with the rest of the world. The population of East Africa is increasing by 3 per cent per annum. In 15 years from now the population of 27 million will have increased by 15 million and by the end of the century it will be 50 million. Even more significant for those who plan education is the fact that in 1967 half the African and Asian population was under 15.0 and half of these were under 5.0. This is a situation familiar to Indian planners. Uganda finds herself confronted with the double task of providing not only for the 50 per cent children of school age who are not in school, but for a rapidly increasing school age population clamouring to enter classrooms and to be taught by teachers that do not exist. In other words, if Uganda were to build hundreds of new schools, as she is in fact trying to do, which absorbed tens of thousands of children there would probably be still no more than 50 per cent of her children of school age in school.

It is indeed difficult to see how school provision can catch up with population growth, how teachers can be trained in sufficient numbers, and where the money is going to come from in a country that already expends 27 per cent of her national income on education. We see too few people producing more per head than their fathers did because Uganda's economy cannot be geared soon enough to a rate of economic production that exceeds the rate of human reproduction. As this century approaches its close, the combined economic, educational and demographic problem for Uganda will be how to enable 16 million to produce more *per head* than the present 8 or 9 million so that Uganda has enough resources to educate 3 million children where she once educated one million.

To these obstacles to rapid development must be added unemployment on a wide scale and workless prospects for a large proportion of the juvenile population. Unfortunately young people turn away from their ancestral land, where they can see no future but one of rewardless toil, and flock to the towns in search of work other than manual labour. But there is evidence that this trend away from the land can be arrested if the right incentives are provided, particularly the assurance that good wages can be earned by better land use. Improved methods of agriculture and agricultural training must be accompanied by radical social and economic changes in land tenure that provide an outlet for youthful enterprise. Indeed, the problems of agricultural education are not primarily educational but social. Beyond this there is need for change in the aspirations of young people, away from the mistaken view that education brings release from the social stigma of manual work towards the conviction that educated people can worthily work with their hands in remunerative technical occupations and on the farms. The great need in Uganda is not for more clerical workers but for skilled artisans and good farmers, that middle group of workers who are the backbone of a progressive economy.

The Schools

Uganda's African primary and secondary schools and teachers colleges are mainly but not exclusively a product of Christian missionary enterprise over the last half century. The Asian schools owe their establishment largely to the concern of the various Indian communities for education. For over forty years there was a useful working partnership between these voluntary agencies and the colonial government. In the years immediately preceding Independence two significant trends appeared in the organization of the educational system. First, new schools and colleges were founded on government initiative; secondly came the recognition of the principle that in a multiracial society there can be no schools confined to the education of one race or one religion. With Independence this principle was established by requiring integration in all schools, which are now open to all Ugandans without any racial or sectarian test. For many years the cost of staffing schools had become a government responsibility for the voluntary agencies were quite unable to meet this expenditure. Today the logic of government maintenance has ended in complete government control, through local authorities for the primary schools and boards of governors for the secondary schools.

The number of children in the grant-aided primary schools doubled between 1952 and 1962 and the proportion of girls enrolled increased from 24 per cent to 34 per cent. But wastage is far too common in most areas in the cases of both boys and girls. Today the total primary school population in Uganda's aided schools is about 500,000, the vast majority Africans. This represents about 50 per cent of the primary school age range in the nation. But this is an average figure; the proportion may be as high as 80 per cent in some areas and only 20 per cent in others. The Education Development Plan for the period 1964—1970 optimistically aims at universal primary education by 1980—a vain hope.

For Uganda, as for the other countries of East Africa, the term 'secondary' education needs some definition. It includes academic schools, named Senior Secondary, preparing for the Overseas Cambridge School and Higher Certificates, but also a small group of technical schools and a much larger group of sub-standard secondary schools providing two or three years post-primary education. The present aim is to increase the intake of academic schools to 4 per cent of the primary school leavers and to provide for 15 per cent in the other post-primary sectors. We discuss first the senior secondary schools because they are the key to Uganda's educational development. As the School Certificate is taken in Senior IV the figures indicating growth are best seen in this context. In 1955 there was a total of 515 pupils in Uganda's Senior IV classes. In 1965 about 2,500 and the estimate for 1970 is 5,800.

More striking is the development of Sixth Forms preparing for university entrance. Ten years ago these forms for advanced studies hardly existed; today they provide for many hundreds of pupils preparing for the coveted place at a university, although about two-thirds do not make the grade. Nevertheless they have had two years sixth form study and add to the general level of education in the community.

This then is the story of educational progress since Independence. But poverty dogs the footsteps of the planners. The poorest of parents have to pay fees in all sectors of schooling and thousands make family sacrifices to do this. School housing varies from first-rate modern buildings to dismal slums, and equipment in apparatus and books varies from good to nothing at all. Children go hungry to school and the Castle Report had much reason for observing that 'No single reform in this country could have a more beneficial effect on its children's education than the institution of school meals in day schools'. All primary schools are day schools and this is where deprivation is seen at its worst.

Priorities.

In this setting what should be the order of priorities in Uganda's educational planning? No aspect of the impact of independence has been more impressive than the people's demand for education. Poor as they are, there is no poverty of enthusiasm about the education of Uganda's children. It was part of the task of the Uganda Commission on Education 1963 (The Castle Report) to sort out priorities. The task was not easy, as the following excerpt indicates:

> 'The problem for those who plan educational policy, then, is this: when over half the nation is illiterate and the people rightly clamour for education, when teachers are in short supply and inadequately trained, when government and industry demand trained recruits, when unemployment is widespread and increasing, when the nation is poor—what policy should the government pursue? If the government decide first to educate the neglected 50 per cent it would fail to find teachers to teach them; if secondary education is neglected, the potential supply of teachers would diminish. Moreover, schools can be built in months, but it takes many years to make a teacher. Here is a real dilemma, for behind all these considerations remains the stark fact that the country cannot at present afford to make all desirable improvements in a general advance on all fronts.' (Paragraph 235)

The Castle Report pointed out that the progressive development of educational resources inevitably assumes a cyclic pattern. The teacher training system depends on the senior secondary schools, the secondary schools depend on the *quality* of the basic education in the primary schools, and all schools depend on an adequate supply of qualified teachers. These obvious comments were necessary in order to stem the popular demand for universal primary education which, quite apart from the utter inadequacy of teacher supply to cope with so vast an expansion in the primary sector, would have cost nearly twice as much as the total educational budget of Uganda. Faced with this dilemma the Commission recommended the following order of priorities:

1. Development of senior secondary schools with Sixth Forms and a parallel development of teachers colleges. These are first and equal priorities.

2. The establishment of about 8 technical and farm schools of equal standing with the senior secondary schools whose object would be to produce skilled artisans and farmers of the 'foreman' type with a good general education.

3. Replacement of the existing shapeless 'system' of sub-secondary schools with a well articulated system of post-primary education having a vocational bias—agricultural, technical, commercial, home economics—but at a lower standard than that provided in No. 2 above.

4. The expansion of girls' secondary education at all levels.

5. In primary education to reduce the period of schooling from 8 to 7 years and to concentrate on eliminating wastage, improving the standard of teaching and equipment, and drastically revising the syllabus towards greater simplicity and emphasis on the African background. Later expansion to be geared to teacher supply.

6. To give attention in youth services to the further vocational education of primary school leavers and to provide better adult education, especially in the use of land, through the community development agencies.

It is along these lines that progress is being made. Since 1965, 30 new senior secondary schools have appeared, either new foundations or extensions of former sub-secondary schools. In addition, well established senior secondary schools have been greatly enlarged. Lack of funds and teachers is limiting the scope of some of the newer foundations to the first two or three years of the school certificate course, but they are poised to go forward when better conditions prevail. The proportion of examination successes has increased and it is reported that the standard of English of entrants to teachers colleges is higher than it has ever been. The teaching of mathematics and science is hindered by lack of staff but in-service courses in these subjects, including courses in the 'new mathematics', are improving the situation slowly. Least progress has been made in technical education for here, more than in any other branches of instruction, teachers are hard to find.

One of the sources of frustration among parents, teachers and pupils is the perennial problem of selection for secondary education. At present this selection is made by written examination at the end of the primary course. Owing partly to an increasing primary school population and partly to improved standards in many primary schools, far more primary pupils qualify than can possibly be accommodated in the secondary schools. In 1966, for example, there were 76,000 qualified entrants for 6,000 places. This was an exceptional event for this was the year in which the seventh and eighth year primary pupils all entered the competition. But it serves to illustrate the narrowness of the bottleneck. When one realizes that the unsuccessful candidates will have little chance of paid employment or of further education, except in substandard but high-feed private schools, the extent of the juvenile social problem can be imagined.

Staffing

There is a grave shortage of African teachers in both the primary and secondary sectors. Nearly one-third of primary teachers are untrained and most have received a meagre general education. In 1964, of the 17,000 members of the primary teaching force one-third were 'vernacular' teachers, i.e. capable only of teaching in the vernacular and having only 6 years of primary school followed by 2 or 3 years of training. This grade is now abolished in the training system. As far as African teachers are concerned the secondary schools are no better off; for when Independence arrived the teaching profession provided the largest pool of educated Africans for employment in the public services and it was inevitable that these men, and a few women, should be drawn off into government service. In 1964 there were fewer than 100 African graduates in the whole of East Africa serving in senior secondary schools. Had it not been for the 400 expatriate teachers secondary education would have collapsed in 1963. Uganda needs at least 1,000 graduate teachers by 1970 if her secondary schools are to be adequately staffed and it is inevitable that a high proportion of these must come from overseas. In spite of the pressure for Africanization in all spheres of public employment there are today fewer Africans in the teachers colleges and senior secondary schools than in 1962. There are several well established schools which before Independence had five or six African staff which are now staffed entirely by white men.

Clearly the teachers colleges and the university departments have a formidable task to remove these obstacles to educational advance; but they are proceeding with new and promising plans. As we have noted, the training of 'vernacular' teachers has ceased: the minimum entry standard for teachers colleges is 8 years' schooling to be followed by 2, 3 or 4 years' further education and training. The ultimate aim is to recruit only from candidates possessing the School Certificate. In one college, Kyambogo, this standard of entry already operates; this special case is referred to later. Before Independence the teachers colleges were too many and too small, largely owing to wasteful duplication based on sectarian grounds. The Castle Report recommended the reduction of the 31 colleges to 18, aiming at sizes of 300-400, and amalgamation where necessary on a non-sectarian basis. This recommendation is being carried out even more enthusiastically than the Uganda Commission thought wise, for there are now government proposals for reducing the present number to four large colleges of 700-1,200, each sited in one major tribal region. It is doubtful whether this would be a sensible move in a country where good principals are scarce, communications poor and distances great for the proper organization of teaching practice. Smaller colleges of 300-400 would not only prove more efficient but would reduce the danger of depersonalizing the training of immature people whose growth to maturity demands close personal contact between tutor and student. But whatever be the size of each college the most pressing need is for a higher quality of tutor if better trained teachers are to be produced. Hence expatriate assistance will be essential for many years to come. This is at present forthcoming from both British and American sources; but not in adequate quantity. A measure of the need may be assessed by the fact that in 1964 there was only one African graduate in the colleges of Uganda and in 1965 he departed for a university post.

The expansion of secondary education has necessitated an increased use of non-graduate teachers. At Kyambogo College of Education courses for non-graduate teachers have been established at a higher level than those prevailing at other colleges. There are two types of training: for students possessing a School Certificate three years of further education and training; for those possessing a Higher Certificate, or a pass in prescribed subjects at this level, a two-year course of training. These qualify for entry to the highest category of teacher below graduate level, and are directed to teaching in the lower classes of the senior secondry school. A most promising programme for increasing the supply of graduate teachers has been the establishment of the B. Ed. degree at Makerere University College and at the sister university colleges of Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. This is a three-year course including two academic subjects and the theory and practice of education as a third part of the degree. How far these innovations will step up the supply of African teachers to the secondary schools remains to be seen, for the blalndishments of higher pay outside the teaching profession still tempt all but the professionally devoted student. It is, therefore, difficult to see how Uganda can dispense with expatriate teacher assistance before 1980, and even that date is an optimistic forecast. At present the Teachers for East Africa scheme organized by the British Government, the Voluntary Service Overseas run by British voluntary bodies and the American Peace Corps are essential sources of supply for the teachers colleges and the secondary schools. Without this aid the educational future for Uganda would be obscure.

Within the teaching service there are in-service courses for the upgrading of teachers and refresher courses for the improvement of teaching in both primary and secondary schools. The opportunities provided by such courses have been greatly stimulated by the foundation of the National Institute of Education, centred on Makerere University College, of which the graduate Department of Education is a part. The primary function of the Institute is to co-ordinate all the agencies of teacher education within the country—the Faculty of Education at Makerere, the teachers' colleges, research, library and visual aids—and generally to constitute a focus for the study and practice of education in Uganda. The Institute organizes further training and refresher courses in the field and at Makerere assists in the preparation of new syllabuses for the schools and teachers' colleges, and establishes equality of standards in teacher qualification. In brief, it is a central source of advice and information to assist teachers in their work.

University Education

The University College of Makerere is one of the three constituent parts, and the oldest, of the federal University of East Africa. The other two are the university colleges of Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. All three are residential and housed in modern buildings of high quality and charm, heavily subsidised by British and American money. Whether nationalist pressures will ultimately result in three independent universities remains to be seen. The total resources of the University of East Africa provide a comprehensive university education including, besides the usual arts and basic sciences, faculties of Medicine, Law, Education, Fine Art, Sociology, Agriculture, Veterinary Science and Engineering. The three university colleges prepare for the degrees of the federal university. Student numbers at Makerere are about 1,200 of whom 100 are women ; recurrent expenditure runs at about £900,000 per annum and the cost per student on a staff-student ratio of 1:6 is about £1,000 per annum. For the purposes of this article it is worthy of note that the Department of Education receives each year about 100 graduate students from the U. K. who take a one-year diploma course in education, directed towards East African needs, before proceeding to teach for two years in East African schools.

Language and Communication

In the most westerly province of West Nile I once saw a young African teacher attempting to teach arithmetic simultaneously in three languages to the same class. He said he would prefer to teach in one language and that it should be English! This is the primary school language problem in a country with many African vernaculars and also Asian languages. Uganda has chosen English as her official language; Kenya uses English and Swahili with a preference for the former; Tanzania has prescribed Swahili. But whatever the choice for a workable lingua franca may be, the over-riding fact remains that in all three countries English must remain the teaching medium for secondary schooling and all higher education. The necessity for learning English as early as possible is now acknowledged. But when should the change-over from the vernacular to English take place?

There is a widely accepted view, supported by the pundits of UNESCO, that literacy should be established in the home tongue, that early learning of a foreign language results in emotional trauma, retards general progress and encourages rote learning, the curse of both African and Asian education in East Africa. Extensive and prolonged experiment in Kenya and Uganda in the use of English as a teaching medium has convincingly shown that a child's progress can be stimulated rather than arrested by introducing a foreign language, properly taught, into the learning situation, that emotional difficulties and rote learning are the products of bad teaching and that the change-over can take place much earlier than was once supposed. The linguistic specialists engaged in the experiment attributed the absence of meaningful communication largely to neglect of the spoken word. In Kenya the experiment has been based on commencing English as a teaching medium in Primary I, but the vernacular is taught methodically as a language; in Uganda English is taught as a foreign language in Primary I, retaining the vernacular for the first half of the primary course and transferring to English as a teaching medium in Primary V. But in each case the principle of English teaching is the same: the first year is devoted entirely to developing facility in the spoken word through the medium of play and activity methods. When reading and writing are taught in the second year children now understand what they read whereas before they made noises out of meaningless words. And there are interesting side results: children are eager to learn; teachers are more interested in their work and the activity methods used in the learning of English are quite naturally transferred to other subjects. Even more significant, it was noted that when a teacher relapsed into teaching in the vernacular, whether of an African or Indian language, he tended to use the old rote learning associated with it. There are today over 700 English medium primary schools in Kenya, and in Uganda the new English teaching is required in all schools where there are teachers capable of providing it.

The extension of this approach to English teaching depends on the training and retraining of many teachers, continuous supervision of the teaching in the schools, and the complete re-writing of school reading texts. Great progress has been made in providing this last need. It is hoped that just as this new approach has brought light into the sometimes gloomy life of the African primary school, so it may ease the burdens of the secondary school pupil by increasing his facility in the language as a means of study and communication between teacher and pupil.

Creating a New Society

It is inevitable that education in the new nations of Africa should be closely geared to the manpower needs and technological development of new economics. Dr. K. A. Busia, for long an exile from Nkrumah's despotism, once said that 'education is primarily concerned with what sort of persons people become'. Throughout the webb of community life, in the village, in commerce, in the public services, and in the conclaves of the rulers there is a call for educated and honest men and women. To produce such citizens is partly the task of education. I conclude, then, this brief outline of Uganda's educational effort with words I have used elsewhere:

> 'The creation of new societies out of the African past and the African present, out of the racial and tribal conflicts that still divide, out of conservatism and ignorance and western glamour, will not come about by the substitution of the tractor for the hoe, but through the operation of reason, cooperation and responsibility. The school of Africa must cultivate these virtues, for education is an investment, not in machines but in men'. (*Growing Up in East Africa*, Castle, E.B., p. 106, Oxford University Press, 1966)

India's Fourth General Election*

N. S. JAGANNATHAN

THE Indian general election held last February, the fourth since India gave itself a new Constitution after the British left these shores, has roused tremendous interest at home and abroad. That it marks a decisive stage in the evolution of the Indian polity is readily enough conceded by everyone. But the precise significance of the change it has brought about and what it protends for the future are matters of furious argument.

The central fact about this election is that it has put an end to the "one-party dominance" of the political scene. This formulation needs to be qualified in several ways to be discussed presently, for it exaggerates both the past dominance and the present fall from grace of the Congress party. But the statement does enshrine the vital truth that in areas in which about two-thirds of the country's total population resides, there are now non-Congress Governments. At the Centre, the Congress has had its wings clipped considerably.

In the House of the People, the Congress party has managed to win 281 out of the 510 elected seats, thus retaining an absolute majority. This may seem a comfortable enough majority. Governments elsewhere—the Labour Government that came to power in Britain in October 1964, for example—have survived with far more precarious majorities. But compared to the past record of the Congress (364 out of 489 in 1952, 371 out of 494 in 1957, 361 out of 494 in 1962) this is a distressingly low margin. Moreover, in the light of current developments in India, this could be a quickly dissolving majority. There have been, as will be explained presently, some quick-changing of loyalties in the post-election scramble for power in the States; some erstwhile members of the legislatures elected on the Congress ticket have crossed the floor. If only 23 members were to do what some members of the legislatures elected on the Congress ticket in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh did, the Congress may be out of office at the Centre. Moreover, with the present majority, the Congress cannot push through, as it has done often in the past, special legislation like constitutional amendments.

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*The Indian electorate, consisting of all persons over the age of 21, elects, normally every five years, representatives for the House of the People (Lok Sabha) at the Centre and for the State legislatures (Vidhan Sabhas). The electorate in 1967 consisted of 251 million voters, roughly half the population of the country, probably the largest electorate in the world exercising a genuine choice. Nearly 150 million, voters in the fourth general election were between the ages of 21 and 40 and nearly 120 million were women.

Apart from local parties (the most important of which is the Dravida Munnetra Khazhagam of Madras, which has displaced the Congress) there are seven important national parties. These are the Indian National Congress, Swatantra, Jan Sangh, Communist party of India, Communist party of India (Marxists)—these two are conveniently referred to as right and left communists in public discussion after their ideological professions mainly in the international communist context, Praja Socialist party and Samyukta Socialist party, the latter a splinter of the former, both of them professing a socialism singularly free from international colouration and roughly corresponding to the non-communist socialist parties of the west. Swatantra is self-consciously and ever aggressively rightist, Jan Sangh less so, but still rightist in any reasonable classification in the Indian context. The two communist parties are, of course, leftist. The other parties are more difficult to describe in terms of right and left but would consider themselves the champions of the "people" against the privileged. The Congress of course is *sui generis* and defies description.

The humbling of the Congress is even more convincing in the results of the elections to the State legislatures. There are now non-Congress Governments in eight out of the 16 States, not to mention the fact that Delhi, which is one of the four "Centrally Administered Areas", has a non-Congress Administration. These States are: Kerala, Madras, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. In Haryana, the Congress had an absolute majority in the legislature to begin with and had actually formed the Government. But within a fortnight this government fell as some of the Congress legislators defected to the Opposition because of dissatisfaction over the sharing of the spoils. In Uttar Pradesh (where, however, the Congress, to begin with, did not have an absolute majority) a Congress government was installed with tacit support from some independents. Within 18 days, the ministry fell and was replaced by an opposition coalition led by a defecting Congressman. In Rajasthan, where the Congress and the non-Congress legislators were roughly equal in number, there were unedifying wrangles accompanied by violence about who had the right to form the government. This led to the imposition of President's Rule under controversial circumstances. Eventually, however, a Congress ministry was formed in Rajasthan and is now functioning. The States in which the Congress has an indubitable majority are: Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.

In form, then, the Congress has lost the exercise of political power through the Administration and legislative majorities in large parts of India. This is a development that would have been unthinkable some years ago. But granted that the Congress has been cut to size and is now one of the many contenders for political power, the change brought about by the election is a qualitative rather than quantitative one, despite the all too evident erosion of majorities. In fact, it is possible, in one sense, to exaggerate the change in Congress fortunes. For one thing, it is not as though the Congress has never in the past been defeated as a party in elections. In five of the eight areas in which it has been unable to form a Government this time, the Congress has failed to secure a clear majority.

In the first general election, the Congress failed to get an absolute majority in Travancore-Cochin (part of the present State of Kerala), the composite State of Madras (comprising the present State of Madras and part of the present State of Andhra Pradesh), and PEPSU (part of the present State of Punjab). In Rajasthan, the Congress has always had a wafer-thin majority, at least to begin with. In the second general election, the Congress failed to secure an absolute majority in Kerala and Orissa. In the third general election in 1962 the Congress failed to get an absolute majority in Madhya Pradesh. In other words, it can hardly be said that the defeat of the Congress in some of the areas where it failed this time comes as a bolt from the blue. though, of course, there are parts of the country like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where it has failed for the first time in the general election. On the other hand, in Madhya Pradesh, where it has failed in the past, it has, much to the surprise of many who confidently predicted its discomfiture, won by a comfortable majority.

Secondly, though the Congress has failed to win an absolute majority in many States making it impossible for it to form a government on its own, it still remains the largest single party in the legislatures in 13 out of the 16 States. The exceptions are Kerala, Madras and Orissa. But even here, Madras is the only State in which there is a single non-Congress party with a majority big enough to be able to hold its own against any coalition to which the Congress may care to be a party. Elsewhere, the non-Congress governments are a coalition of several parties. Many of these are uneasy marriages of convenience under varying degrees of strain of incompatibility: such strains are least in Kerala and Orissa because of the presence of a dominant partner, leftist in orientation in Kerala and rightist in Orissa. All other coalitions are potentially highly unstable. Those in Haryana and Punjab are kept going only by the blandishments of office being blantantly held out to the prospective defector. In West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the internal strains are quite severe but have not reached the breaking point yet.

An analysis of the percentage of the valid votes polled by the Congress would again set right any tendency to exaggerate the extent of its loss of popularity on the basis of the erosion of its legislative majorities. As Annexures I and II show, between the third and the fourth general elections, the Congress has dropped only 3.7 per cent of the valid votes cast for the Lok Sabha and 4.3 per cent of the valid votes cast for the State legislatures. In the past, the Congress has had an *upward* swing of nearly the same order. Thus between 1952 and 1957, the Congress picked up 3 per cent more of the valid votes for the Lok Sabha and 3.4 per cent more of the valid votes for the State legislatures.

Again, the Congress is still the party with the largest percentage of the total votes validly cast for both the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabhas. It is true that this is in part explained by the fact that the Congress fielded the largest number of canditates, spread more or less uniformly all over the country. Opposition parties, on the other hand, had a more localised ambition and success. Nevertheless these figures indicate that a single viable national alternative is yet to come into being. Developments since the elections may eventually provide it, but the election has not thrown up such a party.

The percentage of valid votes polled by the Congress has interesting regional variations. It has been largest (50.52) in Jammu and Kashmir and lowest in Orissa (33.32) for the Lok Sabha. For the State legislatures, it has varied from 52.49 per cent in Jammu & Kashmir to 30.65 in Orissa. Even in States where it has not been able to form a Government, the Congress has had the largest percentage of valid voted polled. Most interestingly, even in States like Kerala, Madras and Orissa where it has to take a second place—and even a worse position in Kerala—in terms of the number of seats, the Congress has won the largest percentage of valid votes polled. In Kerala, it has polled 35 per cent of the valid votes, a percentage much higher than the 23.5 per cent polled by CPI (Marxist). And yet the relative seats won were: Congress 9 and CPI (Marxist) 52.

Most instructive is the case of Madras: the Congress has marginally the *larger* percentage of valid votes polled (41.52 per cent against 40.82 per cent of the Dravida Munnetra Khazhagam, the party with predominantly local interests and roots and organisationally as well entrenched in Madras as the Congress). But despite leading in the percentage of valid votes polled, the relative strength in number of legislators are: Congress 49 and DMK 138. It is true that the Congress fielded some sixty-one candidates more than the DMK and the votes polled by the defeated Congress candidates tend to swell the Congress percentage vis-a-vis the DMK. Nevertheless, the uniform spread of Congress influence cannot be gainsaid.

The discussion so far has tended to be in terms of the change in the fortunes of the Congress party, which indeed is the most important fact of the election. Of the consequences for the opposition parties of the wind of change that the fourth general election let loose, it is difficult to speak with equal assurance. There is no discernible pattern of a uniform swing to the right or left in the conventional sense. In the opportunistic coalitions based on nothing more substantial than an anti-Congress stance found useful because of widespread disillusionment with Congress performance (especially in the economic sphere), it is difficult to discover a single unified orientation. On the basis of the known predilections of the dominant partner whose effectiveness in the inter-party struggle within the coalition is undisputed, Kerala might be termed leftist and Orissa rightist. In West Bengal, the situation is more fluid, though if a name should be at all given to its effective direction, it should be called leftist. But it is leftism that is far from assured and constantly feels itself at bay. Bihar and Uttar Pradesn are frankly "populist" in tone and temper: both in their composition and style of functioning, they make nonsense of facile polarisations like left and right. Punjab and Haryana have ministries that have no ideological colouration whatever and provide the readiest example of unprincipled coming together of disparate elements (that do not even have the merit of different political commitments and persuasions). It is alliances such as these that make plausible pessimism about the prospects for political stability in the country after the end of one-party dominance by the Congress.

Perhaps the most interesting result of the election is the emergence of the DMK in Madras as a viable alternative to the Congress. The DMK is a local party with local interests. Its ideological hue is difficult to identify, though its mass base will prevent it from ever being overtly committed to the interests of the privileged classes. Its leadership, however, is pragmatic. Mr. Annadurai, the Chief Minister of Madras, enjoys something of the charisma of Mr. Nehru and shares some of the latter's capacity for compromise.

Indeed, in many ways, the DMK is like the Congress of old. Whether the fate that overtook the Congress will also be the DMK's eventual lot and for much the same reasons, it is difficult to predict with confidence now. As of now, however, it is the only party and Madras is the only State where a viable single party alternative to the Congress has emerged. The implications of this circumstance are incalculable. The DMK has formally abandoned with every appearance of sincerity and finality its former demand for a separate Tamil country. But stresses and strains in the relationship between the Centre and the constituent units in a federal set-up are obviously much more likely now than ever before. This in fact is one of the most important, if not the most, consequences of the general election. Should these strains ever reach a breaking point—as of now, there is little evidence of this happening in the near future—it is difficult to predict what the consequence will be.

Barring such imponderables, the DMK's position as a viable and actual alternative to the Congress and its responsible mode of functioning so far is encouraging and points to the possibility of a two-party parliamentary system functioning smoothly in India. But this fact itself has no national significance. The DMK can never be the nucleus of an All India alternative to the Congress because of its frankly regional character which is avowed even in its name. But efforts to weld a single alternative to the Congress are being made at the Centre, so far without conspicuous success. It is true enough that all kinds of possibilities are thrown up in discussion. But none has yet jelled enough to be taken as the beginning of a viable parliamentary democracy with the minimum number of alternative contenders for political power.

This however is not to say that there is no prospect of its ever emerging. Foreign comment that dolefully predicts a period of acute instability and eventual chaos is not only lacking in a feel for Indian politics: it is actually illogical, coming as it does after a period of cynicism about the reality of Indian democratic pretensions because of the alleged one-party dominance all these years. It does seem odd that these commentators should be distressed at the first sign of the end of what they have all along deplored and of democracy at long last becoming real in the sense they would wish it.

Not that the original notion about Congress dominance was wholly accurate. The Congress was not dominant in the sense that it had clear ideas of what it wanted to do and did it in disregard of public opinion. In fact, the so-called factionalism within the Congress indicated the phenomenon of the Congress providing its own opposition in the absence of a viable opposition outside the Congress. In other words, it is even arguable that the Congress was the "dominant party" these last nineteen years merely by being ineffectual. Though the Congress is still far from having achieved a coherent purpose of a definitive ideological identity—it is doubtful whether it ever will or even whether it ever should. But what the election has done is to articulate a little more clearly the party-political pattern of shared power the spectrum of political power in the country instead of the Congress itself containing within itself all the shades of the opposition to itself.

As stated earlier, foreign comment that laments this emergence of a multi-party political spectrum would appear to view with dismay something whose absence in the past it has deplored, and something it would approve and even take for granted in its own milieu. There is no reason to consider such dismay as condescending, simulated, or even lacking in objectivity. Insofar as these fears stem from a realisation of the hazards of an excessive number of parties and from a concern about the strains on the federal principle in a situation in which regional pulls will be the stronger because of the newer multi-party political configuration drawing its sustenance partly from regional loyalties; they may be even said to be perceptive and are indeed shared by thoughtful Indians.

But there are two reasons why such fears may be misconceived. First, if unshared political power, even when it is exercised as democratically as the Congress did—even the most severe critic of the Congress will not say that it used its "dominance" to eliminate its political opponents as other dominant parties have been known to do elsewhere—is intrinsically bad for the political health of a country, then end of such monopoly must in itself be welcome to every democrat. Secondly, the real key to the Indian situation is the prospects for its economy and a mechanistic assessment based on political forces thrown—or, more precisely, made manifest—by a general election may well miss the point.

ANNEXTURE 1

House of the People Trends

	1951-52			1957			1962			1967		
	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid votes	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid seats	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid votes	No. of seats	% of of seats	% of valid votes
Congress	357 (7)	74.5	45	359 (12)	74.5	47.8	358 (3)	72.9	44.7	276 (5)	54.6	41.0
Socialist	12	2.5	10.6	19*	39	10.4*	12	2.4*	6.8*	13	2.5*	3.0*
KMPP	8 (1)	1.7	5.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	23**	4.5	5.0**
CPI	16	3.4	3.3	27	5.6	8.9	29	5.9	9.9	23	4.5**	4.8
CPI (M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	3.7	4.5
Jan Sangh	3	0.6	3.1	4	0.8	5.9	14	2.9	6.4	35	6.8	9.4
Swatantra	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	3.7	7.9	42	8.1	8.5
Independents including others	83 (2)	17.3	32.2	73	15.2	27.0	60	12.2	24.2	79	15.3	24.2
Total	479 (10)	100	100	482 (12)	100	100	491 (3)	100	100	510 (5)	100	100

Figures in brackets are uncontesed returns. *PSP **SSP

ANNEXURE II

Legislative Assembly trends

	1951-52			1957			1962			1967		
	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid votes polled	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid votes polled	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid votes polled	No. of seats	% of total seats	% of valid voted polled
Congress	2207 (39)	68.3	42.2	1850(43)	64.8	45.6	1759	61.9	44.4	1690	50 6	40.1
Socialist	122 (3)	3.9	9.7	195*	6.8*	10.0*	149*	5.3*	7.0*	106*	3.2*	3.3*
KMPP	77	2.3	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	176*	5.3*	5.1*
CPI	106	3.3	4.4	161	5.6	7.7	153	5.4	8.6	121	3.6	4.3
CPI (M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	127	3.6	4.6
Jan Sangh	34	1.1	2.8	46	1.6	4.0	116	41	6.1	264	8.0	8.8
Swatantra	—	—	—	—	—	—	166	5.8	7.4	255	7.7	6 6
Independents including others	683 (9)	21.1	35.8	606(5)	21.2	32:7	499	17.5	26.5	600	18.0	27.2
Total	3229(5)	100	100	2858(48)	100	100	2842(13)	100	100	3339	100	100

Notes : **SSP *PSP Uncontested returns in brackets.

ANNEXTURE III

GENERAL ELECTIONS: 1967

Congress percentage of valid votes

State	Lok Sabha		Vidhan Sabha	
	Per cent 1962	Per cent 1967	Per cent 1962	Per cent 1967
Andhra Pradesh	47.96	46.86	47.25	45.60
Assam	45.16	45.89	48.25	43.55
Bihar	43.89	35.12	41.35	33.12
Gujarat	52.56	49.38	50.84	45.89
Haryana	—	44.06	—	40 0
Jammu & Kashmir	—	50.52	—	52.49
Kerala	34.28	36.16	33.58*	35.4
Madhya Pradesh	39.55	40.69	38.54	40.66
Madras	45.26	41.69	46.14	41.52
Maharashtra	52.89	48.59	51.22	47.91
Mysore	52.67	48.76	50.22	49.56
Orissa	55.53	33.32	43.28	30.65
Punjab	41.30	37.12	43.72	37.42
Rajasthan	37.58	39.26	40.02	41.44
Uttar Pradesh	38.20	33.53	36.33	32.10
West Bengal	46.78	39.80	47.29	40.24

*1965 results

ANNEXTURE IV

GENERAL ELECTION - 1967

Party Position: LOK SABHA

State	Seats	Con.	Swa.	CPI	CPI (M)	PSP	SSP	JS	Rep.	Others	Ind.	Total
All India Total	520	281	42	23	19	13	23	35	1	37	41	515
Andhra Pradesh	41	35	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	41
Assam	14	10	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	1A	—	14
Bihar	53	34	—	5	—	1	7	1	—	—	5	53
Gujarat	24	11	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	24
Haryana	9	7	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	9
Jammu & Kashmir	6	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1B	—	6
Kerala	19	1	—	3	9	—	3	—	—	2C	1	19
Madhya Pradesh	37	24	1	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	2	37
Madras	39	3	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	25D	1	39
Maharashtra	45	37	6	2	—	1	2	—	—	2E	1	45
Mysore	27	18	5	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	1	27
Nagaland	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1F	—	1
Orissa	20	6	8	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	1	20
Punjab	13	9	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	3G	—	13
Rajasthan	23	10	8	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	2	23
Uttar Pradesh	85	47	1	5	1	2	8	12	1	—	8	85
West Bengal	40	14	—	5	5	1	1	—	—	2H	12	40
Andaman & Nicobar Islands	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Chandigarh	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Dadra, Nagar Haveli	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Delhi	7	1	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	7
Goa, Daman & Diu	2			(Election to be held on March 28, 1967)								
Himachal Pradesh	6	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi Islands	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Manipur	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Pondicherry	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Tripura	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2

A. All Party Hill Leaders Conference. B. National Conference. C. Muslim League. D. Dravida Munnentra Khazagam. E. Peasants & Workers' Party. F. Naga Nationalist Organisation (affiliated to Congress). G. Shromani Akali Dal (Sant group). H. Forward Bloc.

ANNEXTURE V

GENERAL ELECTION 1967

Party Position: Assemblies

State	Seats	Com.	Swa.	CPI	CPI (M)	PSP	SSP	JS	Rep.	Others	Ind	Total
Andhra Pradesh	287	165	29	10	9	—	1	3	2	—	68	287
Assam	126	73	2	7	—	5	4	—	—	9*	24	124
Bihar	318	128	4	24	4	18	67	26	1	—	46	318
Gujarat	168	92	64	—	—	3	—	1	—	—	7	167
Haryana	81	48	3	—	—	—	—	12	2	—	16	81
Jammu & Kashmir	75	58	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	8**	2	71
Kerala	133	9	—	19	52	—	19	—	—	19***	15	133
Madhya Pradesh	296	167	7	1	—	9	10	78	—	—	24	296
Madras	234	49	20	2	11	4	2	—	—	138	7	233
Maharashtra	270	202	—	10	1	8	4	4	5	19	16	269
Mysore	216	126	16	2	—	20	6	4	2	—	40	216
Orissa	140	30	49	7	1	21	2	—	—	—	29	139
Punjab	104	48	—	5	3	—	1	9	3	26	8	104
Rajasthan	184	89	49	1	—	—	8	22	—	—	15	184
Uttar Pradesh	425	198	12	14	1	11	44	97	9	—	37	423
West Bengal	280	127	1	16	43	7	7	1	—	13****	65	280
Delhi (Metropolitan Council)	56	19	—	—	—	—	1	33	2	—	1	56
Himachal Pradesh	60	33	—	2	—	—	7	—	—	—	13	55
Manipur	30	16	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	9	30
Tripura	30	27	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	30

*All Party Hill Leaders' Conference 9; **National Conference 8; ***Muslim League 14; Kerala Congress 5; Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 138; Peasants' and Workers' Party 19; Shiromani Akali Dal (Sant Group) 84; Shiromani Akali Dal (Master Group) 2; ****Forward Bloc 13.

Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

TWO Heads of State visited India: President Sayed Ismail el-Azhari of the Sudan and President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia. The first came in May and the second in June. Both got a rousing welcome on their arrival in Delhi. Soon after his arrival, the Sudanese leader affirmed that relations between the two countries were guided by "the lofty ideals of the Bandung conference and governed by genuine and sincere friendship". The distinguished African leader, who was replying to the welcome address by President Radhakrishnan at the airport, said his country wanted to preserve and maintain those principles and sustain them to achieve the ultimate goal "not only for our own people but for humanity as a whole". Dr. Radhakrishnan told him that both India and Sudan were bound by the same ideals and experience of the same past and ideals for the future, which were more or less the same, bound the two peoples together. It was possible therefore, he said, to work together in both the domestic and international fields and India hoped to secure full collaboration of the Sudanese in all these matters.

Detailed talks were held between the visiting leaders and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who was joined by Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai, External Affairs Minister Chagla and Commerce Minister Dinesh Singh. An exchange of views was also held between the Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Ibrahim El-Mufti, who accompanied Mr. Azhari, and Mr. Chagla, on the world situation, specially Afro-Asian affairs.

The communique issued at the end of the week-long visit mentioned that Mr. Azhari had expressed his faith in the goodwill and ability of India and Pakistan "to reach an honourable and peaceful settlement of all the outstanding problems between them in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Tashkent Declaration". It was evident from the space devoted to this issue in the communique that the Sudanese leader had fairly detailed discussions on it with the Indian leaders. The communique recorded the satisfaction of both sides that there was complete religious freedom and equality of status among various communities in India and the Sudan. Among other issues on which the two sides had an identity of views were Vietnam, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, Palestinian Arabs and Southern Arabia. Mr. Azhari, who was also accompanied by his Finance and Commerce Minister, devoted considerable time to the promotion of trade between the two countries. The Sudanese leader showed considerable interest in the use of indelible ink during elections here and said he would introduce it in his country in order to avoid impersonation and other malpractices.

Among the places Mr. Azhari visited were Bombay, Bangalore, Aligarh and the Nagarajunasagar dam. He received the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Aligarh University, in Bombay he attended a reception by the Indo-Arab Soiety and Indo-African Friendship Society and at Nagarajunasagar he was accompanied by Mr. M. A. Rahman of the Central Water and Power Commission who explained to him details of the project which is designed to irrigate 3.2 million acres besides generating power.

President Kaunda was accompanied by his wife and some Cabinet colleagues. The delegation comprised 30 members, an evidence of the importance he attached to his first visit to India after becoming head of the Central African nation. Dr. Zakir Husain, the President, who received the African leader, described him as the "African Gandhi" and his government a forward-looking one and dedicated to the ideals of a multi-racial society. While Dr. Husain was offering India's fullest cooperation for the attainment of the political goals and economic development of Zambia, a group of African students shouted "India—Zambia friendship zindabad".

Dr. Kaunda paid handsome tributes to Indian leaders like Nehru and Gandhi and said his country had emulated their example during its own struggle for independence. Soon after their arrival, the Zambian leaders visited Rajghat and Gandhi Sangrahalaya. In the visitors' book at Gandhi Samadhi, Dr. Kaunda wrote: "We all pray that the work of this great man may live for ever. Let his dedicated workers remain true to the cause of humanity and the cause of the common man for which he so clearly stood; physically he is not with us, yet he lives for ever".

At a civic reception in honour of Dr. Kaunda, Mrs. Gandhi said a country could become strong and powerful if its people were allowed to live and work together disregarding considerations of race and religion. The Mayor of Delhi said Dr. Kaunda was a great champion of African unity and of the people fighting colonialism in Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. Dr. Kaunda in his reply said Zambia believed in a non-racial society where people of diverse races could live and flourish. His government was working hard to bring about unity in diversity. Making a passing reference to the civic administration of Delhi he said local self-government was a most important institution in a democratic society. Dr. Kaunda, who later visited Peking and Pakistan, also discussed India's relations with those countries.

At separate meetings with Mrs Gandhi and other Indian leaders, including Mr Chagla, the Zambian President also discussed the West Asian situation. Other important problems they discussed included Rhodesia, Vietnam and greater economic cooperation between India and Zambia. The Zambian team conveyed its desire to the Indian leaders that Zambia wanted India's cooperation in nationalising its defence forces. Zambia wants some Indian personnel to replace the white men in its defence forces until the Africans get the requisite training. The Zambian leaders recorded their appreciation of the help given by India to the railways and for the rehabilitation of Africans who have come to Zambia from Rhodesia.

In the joint communique issued at the end of the talks, India and Zambia condemned all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism and lent their full support to people still struggling to achieve and consolidate their freedom. They also condemned South Africa's policy of apartheid and hoped that friendly countries all over the world would support Zambia in its efforts to meet the challenge posed by the alliance between colonialism and racialism in South Africa. They called for an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and viewed with concern the unabated arms race which posed a threat to international peace and security. They emphasised the serious danger in the spread of nuclear weapons. They called for an early treaty of a comprehensive nature on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principles approved by the United Nations General Assembly and reaffirmed in particular the principles of an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers and the principles relating to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The two governments welcomed the cease-fire in West Asia and hoped that this would be followed by the withdrawal of forces to positions before the hostilities between the Arab States and Israel began. They urged that there should be no denial of human rights to the civilian populations in the areas which were the scene of the conflict. They expressed the hope that peace would prevail in West Asia and a just and lasting solution would be found.

Dr. Kaunda hoped that India and Pakistan would reach an honourable and peaceful settlement of all outstanding problems between them in accordance with the Tashkent Declaration. The communique said India was determined to continue its earnest efforts for the implementation of the Tashkent Declaration. Dr Kaunda later paid a four-day visit to Pakistan. He and President Ayub Khan called on all parties to the Middle East fighting to withdraw their forces immediately to positions they held before the outbreak of the war. They called for the enforcement of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the Rhodesian regime. They agreed that a serious danger was posed to mankind by the nuclear arms race and declared themselves in favour of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Later Dr. Kaunda is to visit China where he will negotiate a £6 million Chinese loan for his country. But it was regarded here as significant that he began his Asian trip with a visit to India. India has already given substantial help to Zambia and recently a Zambian team here recruited 100 Indian railwaymen to replace British and Rhodesian personnel in Zambian railways. Another 40 Indian accountants and economists will work in Zambia which has an acute shortage of trained people. India is also willing to supply rail sleepers and construction equipment for the 1,200-mile railway from the copper mining centre of Ndola in Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania if the £100 million Tan-Zam railway project gets off the ground.

Among other important visitors to India were the Mayors of Kampala and Jinja in Uganda, Mr. W. Y. Nega and Mr. S. N. Wanje. Both evinced great interest in the civic problems of the Capital, especially its unauthorised shanties. The Mayor of Delhi, Mr Hansraj Gupta. explained the problems of Delhi with special reference to its rapidly expanding population. The Municipal Commissioner explained to the visiting Mayors Delhi's Master Plan. Both of them were presented with material on the Delhi Corporation. The visits were sponsored under the cultural activities programme between India and Uganda. The Chief Justice of Tanzania, Mr. P. T. Georges, visited India as a guest of the Government. He called on Mr. Govinda Menon, Union Law Minister, and other Indian leaders. The Minister for Social Security of Mauritius, Mr B. Ghurbursun, visited India with his wife. Mr. Waruhiu Itote, popularly known as Gen. China (from Kenya) was also here to attend a conference. He is the leader of the National Youth Service in his country. A dauntless fighter against racial tyranny in South Africa, Mr Ismail Cachalia, was also here. He came to thank the Indian Government for its permission to open an office of the South African National Conference in Delhi. He brought with him letters which Mahatma Gandhi wrote to his father and said he would present them to the Gandhi Samark Nidhi. His father was a close friend of Gandhiji and the two were together when Gandhiji started his satyagraha movement in South Africa.

A four-member high-powered trade and industry delegation came from Libya at the invitation of the Federation of Indian Export Organisation. The delegation was led by Mr Mohamed M. Dakhil, Managing Director of the National Development Company, one of the leading firms of Libya. During its ten-day stay in India, the delegation visited Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and held discussions with leading Indian businessmen, government officials and members of export promotion councils to explore avenues for technical and economic collaboration between the two countries. Mr Dakhil said Libya would like to have a trade agreement with India on the lines of the one already entered into by this country with some other North African countries. He said his country's main requirements were building equipment, electrical machinery, sanitary ware, plumbing equipment, electrical and diesel pumps and agricultural equipment. He said Libya had invited Indian investments in the industrial sector and also for the general development of its economy. Libya was very rich in phosphates and India, which now imported it from countries like Tunisia and Morocco, could also import it from Libya. He also suggested that a trade delegation from India visit Libya towards the end of this year.

Among the prominent Indians who visited Africa were Lok Sabha Speaker Sanjiva Reddy who went to Kenya and Zambia. A three-man trade team visited Uganda. A group of four Panjabi artists went on a month's tour of East African countries. They were invited by Kamal Art, Nairobi. Mr. Krishna Menon was invited to attend a seminar on apartheid in Dar-es-Salaam.

It was a matter of pride for India that it was elected one of the eleven countries to form the UN Council for Southwest Africa. The others were Nigeria, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Zambia, Turkey, Guiana, Indonesia and Chile. India was not a candidate but was drafted at the last minute when the Soviet Union and East European communist countries refused to join the council and only one pro-West European nation, Turkey, agreed to do so. Yugoslavia was elected from East Europe and India and Chile were elected in secret ballot. Under a resolution the General Assembly adopted on May 19, the council is to "enter immediately into contact with the authorities in South Africa in order to lay down procedures for the transfer" of Southwest Africa to UN administration in preparation for independence.

Relations between India and Nigeria improved further when the two nations were linked by a radio telephone service. Nigeria is the first West African country to establish such a link with India and the 32nd in the world. The new service was inaugurated with an exchange of greetings between the Secretary of the Communications Ministry and the Permanent Secretary of Nigeria's Ministry of Communications, Mr. C.O. Lawson. The Nigerian High Commissioner in Delhi, Mr. G.D. Edwin, presented a cheque for Rs 2,10,000 to the Prime Minister for drought relief work in India.

Ghana placed orders for agricultural machinery worth more than Rs 5.6 lakhs at the Indian Pavilion of the First Ghana International Trade Fair in Accra. The farm implements included groundnut shellers, animal ploughs, animal cultivators, seed cleaners and rice thrashers.

It was announced that Air-India would operate from August 15 a fortnightly Boeing 707 service between Bombay and Port Louis in Mauritius. When implemented, this long-standing proposal is expected to bring the two countries closer.

Kenya's Minister for Commerce, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, thanked India for providing Kenya with a team of experts which presented a comprehensive report on the working of industrial estates. He was speaking at a ground-breaking ceremony for an industrial estate near Nairobi. He noted India had made great progress in the field of small industrial ventures.

Tanzania promised full and fair compensation to the parties affected by the nationalisation of two Indian banks there. It would take some time to determine the amount of compensation. It was announced that many of the employees of the two banks—Bank of India and Bank of Baroda—would continue to serve the Tanzanian Government.

The Government of Malawi—Malawi President Hastings Banda is due to visit India in August—expelled seven leading Indian businessmen without assigning any reason for its action. Tanzania deported yet another Indian, a former policeman, Mr. M. L. Dhir. No reason was given for the order. In Ghana a gynaecologist, Dr. S. C. Bose, who was a medical adviser to the deported leader, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was deported. The charge against him was that he had assaulted a Ghanaian woman while she was giving birth to a child. He had lived in Ghana since 1956.

The question of Indians in Kenya figured in the Indian Parliament where the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Surendra Pal Singh, said India's policy about them was to keep the door completely open.

A report that the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, had offered to resume trade ties with South Africa was denied by a Government spokesman who said it was wrong that the Prime Minister had ever offered to place before her Cabinet any such proposal. He added that there was no plan to resume trade with that country.

Mr. Chagla told the Lok Sabha that India had protested to Britain against its decision to establish military bases in the Indian Ocean islands purchased from Mauritius. Such purchase, he said, was against the UN Charter. He said India would mobilise opinion against it and would also ask the UN to take strong action.

Sudan and Somali Crises

On account of the Sudanese President's visit to India, great interest was aroused in developments in that country. The constitutional crisis in Sudan took a new turn following the presidential council's approval of the Government's decision to ban the country's Communist Party. The party announced that the council's position reflected the anti-democratic policy of the "reactionary forces." The Sudanese Supreme Court took the position that the Government's decision was illegal and unconstitutional and accordingly it refused the police request for the prosecution of persons who had publicly declared that they were members of the Communist Party. Eight Communist members of Parliament were deprived of their seats. Prime Minister Sadik el Mahdi lost a confidence motion in Parliament and tendered his Government's resignation. A new premier, Mr Mohmad Ahmad Mahgoub, was elected by 111 to 93 votes. He is also a member of the Umma Party. He was Premier from June 1965 until about a year ago when he gave way to the Mahdi who in turn lost his position due to differences in his cabinet.

Another leader who was surprisingly voted out of office by the National Assembly was Somali President Abdullah Osman. In his place the Assembly elected Dr Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a former premier. This was the second election since 1960 when Somalia became independent. The election was quite unexpected because in a recent poll the ruling Somali Youth League with 95 Assembly seats had chosen Mr Osman as its candidate in preference to Dr. Shermarke.

The referendum held in French Somaliland in March had led to weeks of turbulence and violence. Peace was maintained by massive French security forces specially flown out. Several people were killed following disturbances in Djibouti when this French colony voted to continue its association with France. France proposes to grant an autonomous status to the colony. Somalia protested to the UN and said the result of the referendum was fake and must be investigated.

Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia also deteriorated and Somalia openly criticised its neighbour for accepting people of Somali origin thrown out of French Somaliland. The French Somaliland Liberation Front announced it would launch an armed struggle to drive the French out of the Red Sea territory. Ethiopia demanded more weapons from America and the latter's refusal reportedly strained relations between the two. Ethiopia was planning revision of the the treaty permitting Americans to establish a communications station at Kagnew. The treaty was signed in 1953 for 20 years.

East Africa Economic Community

In neighbouring East Africa, the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania decided to establish an East African Economic Community with headquarters in Arusha in Tanzania. The treaty was signed by the three heads of the governments. Under it an African Development Bank will be set up with its HQ in Kampala in Uganda. It will encourage industrial development mainly in Uganda and Tanzania which industrially lag behind Kenya.

The Kenya Government published details of the new immigration law which requires all non-Kenyan citizens to have entry permits or passes. The law, which has caused disquiet among Indians and other non-Kenyans, makes it an offence to employ a non-citizen without a valid permit or pass. It is feared that many thousands of Asians will be forced to quit Kenya when their jobs are taken over by Africans and they are denied permits to stay on and work in Kenya. The Kenya Government also announced steps to Africanise industry rapidly to offset the "extremely disappointing" progress made so far. Attacks on Asians by politicians and others continued. Their business was affected by new stipulations requiring them not to trade at all on Sundays.

The Kenya Government found itself in a most embarrassing position when one of its best friends published a book allegedly revealing top official secrets. He was a former American ambassador, Mr. William Attwood, whose book, "the Reds and the Blacks", was described as most shallow by the ruling Kenya African National Union. Attorney-General Njonjo also criticised the book for revealing private conversations between President Kenyatta and Mr. Attwood.

In neighbouring Uganda, Obote reshuffled his cabinet once again. But he brought only one new person into it. India-educated John Kakonge became Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Co-operatives. He took over these portfolios from Mr. Cuthbert Obwangor, who visited India last year. Mr. Obwangor now holds Planning and Economic Development.

In Tanzania about 500 Indian who were under orders of expulsion left the country without taking advantage of President Nyerere's offer to review their cases "because a lot of injustice has been done to them". They said they had applied for citizenship over three years ago but nothing was done.

Tanzania criticized Britain for its decision to establish military bases in the Indian Ocean in violation of the resolutions of the UN

General Assembly. President Nyerere visited the UAR where he told the UAR Assembly that some African states were cooperating with the bitterest enemies of Africa. Addressing the Assembly, President Nasser warned that African wealth was being usurped by foreign capital. He agreed with President Nyerere that Africa could never be free without an economic transformation.

New Talks on Rhodesia

The directors of the Mozambique pipeline to Rhodesia decided to sell it if the British Government did not resume compensation payments instituted after the blockade of Rhodesia. The decision to sell the pipeline, which links the port of Beira in Mozambique with the Rhodesian refinery in Umtali, was taken by a majority of the Portuguese directors of the company with all the British directors voting against it. The pipeline, partly owned by a British company, has been in disuse and has lost an estimated revenue of £750,000.

There was a move by Prime Minister Wilson to reopen talks with rebel Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith by sending a former Conservative Minister to Salisbury to see if the 18 months old deadlock could be broken. The man chosen by Wilson is Lord Alport who was for a time British High Commissioner in Salisbury. This is Whitehall's first move to reopen talks since December last year when Wilson successfully asked the UN to impose mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. There was no direct response from Smith but a British newspaper reported that Smith had offered to begin fresh talks "anywhere, any time." He had reportedly conveyed this through Rhodesian "Governor" Humphery Gibbs. The move to make Rhodesia a republic fizzled out at the ruling Rhodesian Front's secret congress in Salisbury. A British Minister, Mr. Bowden, said even if Smith proclaimed a republic, it would have no effect since Rhodesia continued to be part of Her Majesty's dominions.

A UN report published in April said the first sanctions against Rhodesia recommended by the UN Security Council (before the mandatory sanctions of December) had had no real effect on the Rhodesian economy up to June 1966. No statistics were available after that date. The effect of the sanctions, the report said, was in fact to improve Rhodesia's trade balance by forcing it to cut down a large part of its imports and reducing its exports slightly. Petrol continued to flow into Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique. UN Secretary General Thant said he had not yet been able to get a clear picture of what was being done to comply with the UN resolution calling for mandatory sanctions against the Salisbury regime. He lamented that a number of governments had not yet replied to his own communication asking for information about the steps taken by them. Certain countries like Botswana told Thant that compliance with the resolution would pose special problems for them.

Dr. Banda's call for a new approach to the problems of apartheid, Rhodesian independence and Portuguese colonies is likely to cause a flutter among African leaders who have been urging stern measures, including the use of force, to solve them. Dr. Banda, who was speaking to journalists in London on June 12 after his talks with Mr. Wilson, was aware that he might be called a stooge for suggesting that African leaders establish contacts with the leaders of the white-ruled States south of the Zambezi. He tried to defend the moderate course of action he was recommending to solve the Rhodesian problem by saving that Britain would not use force and Africans did not have it. A deeper inking into Dr. Banda's mind was however provided by his statement that his Government had made joint plans to build a new 140-mile railway to connect the Malawi system with the port of Nacala in Mozambique by 1969, to handle the prospective output of bauxite from Mlanje and pulp from Bolaka. The line could be ultimately extended to the Zambian Cobbcrbelt. Dr. Banda considers that this would be better than existing links to Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, in Tanzania. It is not yet known what Dr. Banda's ministers, whom he had sent to South Africa, have achieved.

King Sobhuza's Victory

In Mbabane, Swaziland, a jubilant King Sobhuza II celebrated his poll victory giving his Royalist Party all 24 seats in the new Assembly which will lead the High Commission territoy to independence in 1970 (Botswana and Lesotho, the other former High Commission territories, are already independent). Swaziland, with 270,000 people, is the third and last of these territories in Southern Africa to reject pan-Africanism and choose a government favouring normal relations with South Africa, while rejecting the policy of apartheid. After being inducted Head of State, the King named his kinsman, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, his Prime Minister.

In South Africa the Government announced that it was moving swiftly towards the attainment of the ultimate goal of apartheid—creation of several small black States within white South Africa as future homelands for the country's 13 million Africans. Transkei was the first of these "separate nations with separate freedoms". One of the reasons for going ahead with the policy of separate homelands with greater speed is the recent emergence of Mr. Michael Botha, Minister for Bantu Development and Administration, as one of the most dominant figures of the Vorster Government. Mr. Botha is a well-known apartheid theorist.

There was no change in South Africa's line over the future of Southwest Africa and its ministers ruled out any dialogue with the UN. They described the UN resolution as "illegal, illogical, ridiculous and impractical". South Africa reaffirmed its desire to balkanise Southwest Africa into small areas like Ovamboland based on the wishes of tribal chieftains.

South Africa stepped up its efforts to purchase military hardware in European countries, notably Western Germany. The Government in Pretoria must have been greatly heartened by the finding of a top American nuclear scientist that South Africa had the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons. A report from Johannesburg said South Africa was going to spend about £1¼ million a month stockpiling strategic materials as a precaution against any international boycott. Among the items being stockpiled are rubber, synthetic rubber, wood, cork, chemicals, plastics, synthetic materials, precision instruments and electrical goods.

Undeterred, the UN General Assembly set up an 11-member Council for Southwest Africa to take over and administer the territory and prepare it for full freedom. Many consider it to be an academic exercise in view of South Africa's defiance. U Thant has estimated that the cost of administering Southwest Africa for a 13-month period would be between $298,160 and $334,880, depending on the size of the council. The formation of the council was however hailed in most parts of the world as an entirely new move by the world body against white Africa.

Peace Returns to Congo

Now to a happier note: the UN reported for the first time that there were "distinct signs" that the Congo had recovered from past turbulence. Political stability and calm prevailed throughout the country, except in a few limited rebel pockets. Thus the fundamental condition for economic recovery has been achieved. These comments were contained in a report on UN aid operations in the Congo during 1966. It was prepared by Mr. B. Osorio-Tafall of Mexico who is the resident representative of the UN development programme in Kinshasa.

President Mobutu gave the Congolese a new constitution after a nationwide referendum on June 4. Former Prime Minister Tshombe was put on trial in absentia and sentenced to death. The court ordered that all his possessions should be confiscated. Several others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment ranging up to 20 years. Arrests of "anti-national and subversive elements", including former Ministers, continued.

Eastern Nigeria Secedes

The most significant development in Africa was the secession of Eastern Nigeria under the new name of Biafra. After its breakaway, Lagos warned the world that any attempt to recognise Biafra as a sovereign State would be an unfriendly act against Nigeria. Col. Yakubu Gowon, military ruler of Nigeria, declared that Col. Ojukwu's act was an act of rebellion which would be put down firmly. Within hours of the secession announcement in Enugu, Col. Gowon broadcast a statement ordering general mobilisation of troops. He imposed a blockade by land and sea of the seceding region.

A few days earlier, his decision to spilt Nigeria into 12 States had almost gone unnoticed. At present, the "independence" of Biafra seems to be an accomplished fact.

In neighbouring Ghana a coup bid by two young army officers was foiled on April 17. The new junta seemingly held power for a few hours. In May two coup leaders, Lt. Arthur and Lt. Reboah, were executed for their part in it. A second lieutenant was jailed for 30 years. Earlier, the government announced that the man who led the original coup last year against Kwame Nkrumah, Lt. Gen. Kotoka, was killed in the foiled coup. His death was widely mourned in Ghana.

In Sierra Leone, the military government released the country's two rival political leaders, Sir Albert Margai and Mr. Siaka Stephens. They were detained during a military takeover in March after Sir Albert, the then Prime Minister, challenged the general election results which gave Mr. Stephens a slight majority in Parliament.

Activities of the Council

THE following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

Meeting in Honour of Dr. Kaunda

The Council, in association with several other voluntary organisations, held a meeting in honour of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, at AIFACS Hall, New Delhi, on June 17. The large hall was full to capacity and among the audience were heads of African diplomatic missions, members of Parliament and political parties, students of African affairs, Government officials and people from almost all walks of life. The distinguished visitor on his arrival at the hall was received among others by Mr Asoka Mehta, Minister for Planning, Petroleum and Chemicals and Social Welfare and President of the Council, Mr. K. C. Pant, Minister of State for Finance and General Secretary of the Council, and Mr. Harish Mahindra, Treasurer.

Mr. Mehta, who presided, described Zambia as the sentinel of freedom in Africa. He said economic ties between the two countries were slowly developing and he hoped they would grow. Railway transport was one of the major problems facing Zambia. This was one field in which India had much experience and would be willing to help Zambia.

Addressing the meeting, Dr. Kaunda warned that if the Western powers did not act swiftly in checking racialism in Southern Africa an explosive situation which would make the Vietnam conflict look insignificant would develop. He said Zambia was trying to follow a policy of non-racialism. But she was surrounded by countries which practised apartheid. The leaders of these countries were carrying on propaganda in Western capitals saying they were the champions of Christianity and of Western civilization. Young men and women in these countries were growing up in an atmosphere of hate based on racialism and many of them were going to Communist countries like China and the USSR for training in the use of dangerous weapons. Alienation from the West would create a vacuum in the power structure of Southern Africa and as a logical consequence the Communist powers would move into this vacuum. Southern Africa was helplessly moving towards a catastrophe. Even leaders "like myself" could not help in the situation. There was, however, still time for the Western Powers to help crush apartheid in the area and thus avert what might be one of the biggest catastrophes in history.

Dr Kaunda said the masses were seething with discontent and had now realised they would not be able to improve their lot without the use of force. A saddening feature of the political scene was that most African leaders were aware of the grimness of the situation but could do little to avert a crisis. The big powers were adding fuel to the fire by lending support to the colonial regimes.

Replying to a question Dr Kaunda said Asia could do little for Africa to help avert a showdown at this stage. However, the countries of the region, especially India, could send more teachers, doctors, technicians and other trained personnel to impart education as well as man the essential services.

Mr Pant, proposing a vote of thanks, said Dr Kaunda had good reason to be bitter, but he had spoken without rancour as Gandhi did. By upholding the Gandhian principle that morality and politics were not separate fields, he had struck a sympathetic cord in Indian hearts.

Seminar on Recent Developments in Africa

About 40 scholars belonging to different academic disciplines, including political science, economics, history and the arts, journalists public men, and students of African affairs took part in the Seminar on Recent Developments in Africa organised by the Indian Council for Africa at Vithalbhai Patel House, New Delhi, from April 23 to 26. Parliament being in session, not many Members of Parliament could attend the daylong sessions of the seminar. However, two of them, Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Lower House), and Mr. S. N. Mishra, Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, took keen interest in the seminar—the former, who was about to leave on a tour of Africa, inaugurated it and the latter ably presided at the third session of the seminar which discussed India's interests in Africa. Two others, Mr. Diwan Chand Sharma and Dr. Anup Singh, participated in some of the discussions.

Among the other distinguished participants were the Acting High Commissioner of Ghana in Delhi, and Mr. Jagat Mehta, Joint Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, who made some lively interventions in the discussions.

The Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, and the Indian Council of World Affairs were represented in strength at the seminar. Mr. S. L. Poplai, Secretary-General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, who is also a member of the Executive Commitee of the Indian Council for Africa, besides delivering the welcome speech, guided with great dignity the deliberations of the first session dealing with Recent Developments in Africa. Dr. M. S. Venkataramani of the Indian School of International Studies, ably presided over the deliberations of the second session on the Role of Great Powers in Africa.

A few institutions outside Delhi were also well represented. From Rajasthan University came Dr. S. P. Varma and Dr. B. Maheshwari, from Kurukshetra University in Punjab came Dr. Vijay Budhraj and from the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad, Dr. Jitendra Singh, who was a participant and chairman of the fourth session which discussed Wither Africa : Afro-Asia or Afro-Europe ? Among the prominent journalists was Mr. Girilal Jain, Assistant Editor of the Times of India, who has had a close look at British policy towards Africa. Delhi University and some of the colleges affiliated to it were also represented as was the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.

The inaugural session was attended, besides the participants, by a large number of people interested in African affairs, including diplomats from Africa and other countries and African students. In his inaugural address Mr. Reddy said Africa like India had hundreds of problems and as such the two should join hands and try to solve them. There should be a livelier relationship of give-and-take between them. He hoped Africa would learn from India's mistakes. Of late the trend in African States was towards the one-party system. Whether it was good or bad, these countries did not want to waste time in theoretical disputes. They should not be blamed for not adopting democracy as understood elsewhere, because democracy itself was of various types and even included a system where there was one-man rule. The African States were going through a process. He hoped they would come out with solutions to their problems. Mr. Assefa Gabre Mariam, Ambassador of Ethiopia, said African countries had bigger problems than India and looked to countries like India for technical and other help.

The participants had a close look at recent changes in the vast, self-conscious continent of Africa. These had been experienced earlier by other developing or developed countries and were generally found among peoples who had undergone a revolution—political, social or economic. The leaders in power in African countries were coming to grips with the real problems and trying to evolve new techniques and methods of solving them. These problems were at three levels: modernisation of society, administration and what might be called ideology. An interesting point discussed was whether the army could play a modernising role in Africa. It was suggested that military rule had brought about stability in some countries. In this regard there was not much difference between military rule and one-party rule, the latter sometimes giving way to the former. Army rule meant that the task of modernisation passed into the hands of technocrats who understood the problems of their countries. It became a democratic form of government in the sense that it encouraged greater participation by people from all classes. Most of the participants however came out openly against military rule. After analysing the political scene in Africa, they came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the military rulers would be able to do what the politicians had failed to achieve. Although military rulers were not conservative, and might be modern in their personal lives, the record of army administrations, specially in Nigeria, showed that they could not play a modernising role. They could however play an effective role against traditionalism. The participants saw little evidence of foreign intervention in military takeovers though they did not rule out foreign influence.

The seminar examined at length the causes of the coups in Africa which varied from country to country. The participants felt that there was a great degree of political immaturity in these countries. The political parties had failed miserably and the opposition had tried to build up its power merely on the frustration that had been generated. The masses were guided more by the expectations held out to them than by socialisation. The crumbling down of the democratic processes showed that democracy had not been given a fair chance in Africa. The problems created by democracy could be solved by a greater measure of democracy.

Turning their attention to the role of the major powers in Africa, the participants came to the conclusion that it was of a marginal character. The United States has had little to do with the continent though since 1957-60 its direct interest in Africa has increased. Russia and China have sought to promote their own special propaganda ends; each in its own way has been a failure. The two super-powers, Russia and America, had the same basic postulates. They wanted to establish themselves in a position of pre-eminence, to counter the establishment and growth of each other's influence, to foster the development of the free world idea and the neo-colonialism concept, as it suited them, among the rulers of Africa and to ensure that the major countries of Africa did not develop in a way that might endanger the interests of the big powers.

The participants agreed that Chinese influence in Africa had increased though it was not so much as had been made out to be. It was argued that the total objective of the Chinese policy was to try to become an equal of the super-powers and even surpass them. China wanted to weaken the status quo as represented by the super-powers and consolidate the have-not world. They were trying to adopt some striking postures to win the African's goodwill and establish their indentity with them.

It was pointed out that the Chinese operated in a broad framework; they wanted to exploit the struggle against imperialism in order to embarrass the West. But unfortunately for the Chinese, this framework did not work because the anti-imperialist struggle had petered out and because the newly-freed countries of Africa were interested in stability and not the airy-fairy thesis of revolution.

It was argued that the attitude of Russia towards Africa was primarily motivated by a desire to use African countries in its anti-western drive. One of the participants attributed Russia's insignificant role in Africa to its not being a super-power. Others contended that this was due to historical reasons, such as African institutions and the elite, and the absence of a working class movement.

A reference was made to the British dilemma of reconciling its interests in the Commonwealth and the EEC. This was followed by a lively discussion on the distinguishing features of French and British colonial policies. The consensus was that the French policy of assimilation had succeeded.

At the third session, the participants attempted an evaluation of Indo-African relations. The consensus was that the time had come to establish Indo-African relations on a sounder basis by laying greater emphasis on economic and cultural relations. On the question of Indian settlers in Africa the participants felt a balance should be struck between India's national interests and her international responsibility. However, the consensus was in favour of India taking up their case more vigorously. It was suggested that the Indian Government should negotiate with African countries to ensure the safety of Indians who had opted for local citizenship. For others steps should be taken to bring them home within, say, two years.

One of the participants welcomed the recent shift in India's African policy from a "repetition of slogans" to efforts for economic cooperation with African countries. He drew attention to the importance of our forging a united front with African countries at the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development scheduled to be held in New Delhi next year.

The view was expressed that India had been right in joining hands with African countries on issues such as Rhodesia, South Africa and Angola and Mozambique, without trying to assume leadership.

In a general working paper, the main areas of Indian interest in Africa were identified as freedom of colonial areas, elimination of racialist regimes and practices, the welfare of people of Indian origin, cultivation of special relationships with selected African countries and keeping the Indian Ocean free from domination by others. Emphasis was laid on the limitations of India playing an activist role in Africa. The major foreign policy problems of India were: (i) relations with the super-powers, (ii) relations with our immediate neighbours and (iii) relations with our neighbours in West and South-east Asia. It would be an unreal posture on the part of India to claim that it could play a major role in Africa when more determined powers like China were finding it hard to do so. Two areas of indentity of interests between India and Africa were: (i) their common concern for promoting and strengthening the UN, (ii) their common desire to articulate and press the demands of the developing areas at a time when the division between the rich and the poor countries is becoming sharp.

The dominant view expressed during the fourth session was that Africa is getting closer to Europe than to Asia in its economic and cultural relations. Africa's dependence on Europe was considered logical in the context of its attempts at diversification of its trade. The African States are dependent on more affluent nations for economic assistance and sometimes even for balancing their budgets. Here Europe's influence was preponderant. This African dependence on the more affluent countries is further enhanced by the fact that international aid-giving agencies are under the influence of these countries.

Angolan Students' Visit

The Council looked after the welfare of a group of Angolan students during their visit to the Capital. The students, Domingos Joao Miranda (leader), Andre Monteiro Londes, Elias Do Amrral Gourgel, Cesar Quissanga, Garcia Feliz Rana, Sansao Manuel Janota, and Manuel Fernandes Batito, were on their way to Dehra Dun to join the Indian Military Academy. The Council arranged for them a visit to the Faridabad Industrial Estate, home hospitality through the Experiment in International Living, and a reception at the YMCA tourist hostel through NCUSI. The students met the President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, the General Secretary, Mr. K. C. Pant, and a member of the Executive Committee, Mr. I. K. Gujral, and exchanged views with them.

Dinner for Mauritius Minister

The Executive Secretary represented the Council at a dinner Dr. Phulrenu Guha, Minister of State for Social Welfare, gave in honour of H. E. Dr. B. Ghurburrun, Minister for Social Security, Mauritius, and Mrs. Ghuruburrun.

Lunch for Sudan President

Dr. Gopal Singh, a member of the Executive Committee of the Council, and the Executive Secretary attended a dinner given by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in honour of the Sudan President.

Newspapers and Books

The Council library will soon start receiving a Tanzanian newspaper, The Nationalist, through the courtesy of the Tanzanian High Commissioner, Mr. S. A. Salim. The Council has received a valuable gift of books from the United Arab Republic Embassy. The books are listed in the feature Books Received.

Greetings to OAU

On the occasion of Africa Liberation Day, the President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, sent a message of greetings to Mr. D. Telli, Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, and all members of the Organisation.

Book Reviews

Accelerating Development: The Necessity and Means

Lauchlin Currie, McGraw-Hill Series in International Development, McGraw Hill Company, New York, 1966, pp. XIV—255 (with index), $7.50

THE book, prize-winner in a contest open to all citizens from developing countries, is a significant contribution to the growing economic debate on development of the developing countries. Part I of the book gives a general statement of the strategy while Part II is its application to Columbia, the home state of the author.

Starting from a rather bold assertion that there is no such independent thing as the science of development economics, the author considers the 'degree of control of economic environment' as a satisfactory criterion of development. The failure of the underdeveloped countries in gaining assured control of the economic environment (in terms of acceptable levels of well-being of the masses, or in terms of sufficient fall in the birth rate) despite the borrowing of some $30 billion is, in his opinion, due to a wrong approach to the problem of under-development.

The book, though skeptical about a number of other prescriptions (e.g. the Sprinkler Approach adopted by Alliance for Progress or the Agrarian Reform Approach), is basically an attempt to rebut the widely accepted capital formation approach. The author has thus joined, though in a different way, the ranks of Viner and Haberler, as against the Myrdal-Nurkse Group.

The author has given his own diagnosis of the economic backwardness of the developing countries. Gross inequalities (both traditional and those between the urban-industrial worker on the one hand and self-employed and rural worker on the other) have harmful effects not only on well-being but on development itself. They foster imperfect competition, lack of mobility and a faulty working of the price system, an excessive rate of population growth, misallocation of physical resources and shocking under-utilization of human resources (p 31).

Gross inequalities in incomes keep the population pressure growing. The growing population,in its turn, serves as a serious drag on economic development. The generally accepted (and in the author's opinion mistaken) way out of this proverbial "vicious circle" is greater savings (and borrowings) and investment.

The author argues that the agrarian problem in the developing countries is not inadequate agricultural production but indequate agricultural incomes (p 33). There is too much land under cultivation, there are too many people dedicated to agriculture, and their average income is low.

Under these conditions the quantitative objective of a higher rate of GNP (the objective which automatically flows from the saving-investment approach) is entirely misdirected. "The objective of a rate of growth in the GNP...tends to subordinate human values to arithmetic......Consumption loses its place as the goal of production and production and investment themselves become almost the final goals of economic activity." (p 20).

The author suggests a reversal of investment-income sequence. He stresses the necessity of increasing consumption. "What is most urgently needed to break the vicious circle," he declares, "is an *immediate* and *substantial* rise in the levels of consumption of the poorest people.." (p 137).

The whole analysis and prescription appear highly attractive from the point of underprivileged masses because of its direct emphasis on full utilization and proper allocation of resources with a view to satisfying the demand for consumer goods and services by the lower income groups of the population.

Such an economic policy, however, implies a prolonged dependence on imports of capital goods from the developed countries. This the developing countries have decided to end. Between the two alternatives—less well-being now and large-scale and prolonged dependence on foreign supplies of capital goods—they have made their choice both for political and theoretical reasons. However, it is not the theoretical validity alone of the 'balanced' pattern of growth (which the developing countries have in practice adopted) but adequate resources for pushing on both the fronts—consumption and investment—ahead with sufficient pace which will decide the outcome.

S. N. TAWALE

AFRICAN WRITING TODAY

Edited by Ezekiel Mphahlele. Penguin, pp. 347. 7s 6d.

"African writers, whether they use a metropolitan or an indigenous language, have assimilated many of the mannerisms and assumptions of their particular medium; to say nothing of the social, economic and political system and technology of the West which the African has absorbed. The reverse has not happened. No doubt, the black paint has rubbed off on to the white man in Southern, Central and East Africa—more than he would be prepared to admit. But this is only subtly reflected in the literary style of white Africans."

The book deals with three branches of literature: fiction (short stories, extracts from novels), poetry and criticism.

Bad Blood is the story of a girl who does not recognize her mother as mother and is a problem girl for the entire town. It is romnatic at some places and completely earthly at others. Lines like: "I hate men who get rough and soon he began to demand me free of charge as though I were a drink of someone's beer!" "She is a characterless girl who can sell herself for a few coins, whoever the man may be, but she will not let anyone touch her without paying." "Promise me never to see him again", he said slowly, "him or any other. If you do that I will give you all the money I ever earn and we will live together in Mombasa. Forget this filthy existence. My pay is enough for both."

Oscar Wilde's lines "I didn't say I liked him: I said I was fascinated by him" give us an idea of the story of *The Dark Room* which is poignantly emotional and at the same time pathetic. The main character, an African, does not like the city of Paris, and finds it "a dismal, dirty sky and sad-looking walls". "Then he conceived a passion for the Metro. He saw it as a symbol of physical love and pictured Paris in an indecent posture".

The Wages of Good is a witty dialogue based on the traditional proverb—Do evil and look for like. The writer stresses the point that one should be paid back in kindness and not by evil deeds.He narrates the story of a child and an alligator. The child takes pains to save the alligator and the alligator in return wants to eat the child saying that a good deed is never paid back in kindness.

The stories do not bore the reader as some modern stories dealing with personal experiences do. They are traditional. Some of the better ones are *Flowers! Lovely Flowers!, The Fetish Tree, Dagga-Smoker's Dream, The Urchin, and The Prisoner.*

There are not many poems in the book. Hardly one or two from each African country. Not many of them are realistic or original; they use conventional images and metaphors. There is a difference between these and the poems in *Modern Poetry from Africa,* edited by Gerald Moore and Ulli Beier which are more intense and reflective. Certain countries have been represented only by one poem or a short story. The poem representing Gambia, *After they put down their overalls,* is perhaps the best. The images, though not many and very new, are handled properly so as to effectively intensify the total impression:

After they put down their overalls
And turn off the lathes
They do not return to the women
After they have bathed
Instead, with Hyena's thirst
They turn to the open-air bar
To swallow the hook of imported liquor
As they sit reckless across the log
Hypnotized by the bees.

New Life is another outstanding poem in the collection and has a noble eloquence not commonly found in the contemporary verse of Africa. Lines like:

> It comes heaving, tearing, bearing down,
> Surging in impatient billows to drain its source,
> Till unable to bear its own forces
> It settles to a timeless steady flow
> Endless.
> There is calm in the air
> And greater calm by my side.
> Tomorrow the village women go planting
> Their seed in the hungry ground:
> And life is born anew.

SURESH KOHLI

African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy

Edited by Vernon Mckay, Frederick A. Praeger, New York. pp. 218 $1.95

In the fast-changing scene of Africa, where the complexions and characters of governments change overnight, it is a risky job to determine the principles and precepts governing foreign policies of individual African countries. If however an attempt of this kind is made, specific situations must be sifted from generalisations and care must be taken to lessen the risk, if not to eliminate it altogetner The risk involved is that what may be relevant today in Africa's situation can become unbelievably irrelevant or even wholly untrue tomorrow. Analysts and scholars have therefore necessarily to stop at some static point of history and review the foreign policy determinants in the context of the situation then prevailing.

It was in June 1965 (the situation has radically changed since then) that a three-day conference of some 40 specialists was convened at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The book is the outcome of the deliberations of the conference.

The authors of the papers presented at the conference belonged to a variety of academic disciplines—anthropology, economics, history and political science—and the study obviously concentrates on the economic, cultural, military and political determinants of African diplomacy.

In his opening paper on international conflict patterns in Africa, Vernon Mckay, the editor, picks up the cue from the Gold Coast educator J. E. K. Aggrey to support his own conviction that "radicalism is inherent in the new Africa. The African eagle, long kept on the ground and tamed as a chicken, has at last stretched forth its wings to fly." Mckay then sets out to examine the general nature of the environment in which African diplomacy operates. Assuming that the African diplomat has a sense of mission in the conduct of international affairs and that he speaks in the genuine belief that he is advocating the cause of the underprivileged of the world—as Indian diplomacy did in the 1950's—he remarks that African diplomacy operates "in a milieu of internal stress and strain compounded by a multitude of external pressures." While therefore maintenance of stability in African states occupies a major part of African leaders' attention, they have to be equally aware of the related involvement of the great powers in Africa. The danger, according to Mckay, lies "in the combination of the two"—the Congo being an unsavoury instance of such a combination.

The author outlines four types of international conflict patterns evident in Africa—conflicts inside each state; conflicts among or between African states; conflicts among or between great powers over Africa; and conflicts among or between African states and the great powers. The first pattern has been included—though essentially an internal one—primarily because of its interaction with the other three types.

After a fairly comprehensive assessment of these conflicts, Mckay reasserts that the underlying fact is that "all African states are revisionist" and quotes a Tunisian leader to suggest that they are so "by necessity, not by ideology." He then enlarges his argument by adding that the "basic pattern is one of neither necessity nor ideology but simply the struggle of the new men to induce their countrymen to change their ways." And since the world has to deal only with the leaders at the top, the complexions of governments, whether radical or conservative, and their international relations must be judged on the basis of how the ruling elite feel or act.

I. William Zartman's paper on national interest and ideology as determinants of foreign policy points out that the national-interest approach to international relations is a product of the situation in which African leaders find themselves. The situations there might demand of the African national leadership to justify its actions in terms of national considerations; also it might involve a national leader into inter-African conflicts. Zartman alleges that the technical intelligence that is available "is put in a bad operating environment by the penchant of African heads of state for handling foreign policy personally." This results in gross misinformation of details "inherent in summitry." Another flaw in the national-interest approach in Africa is that policies are often adopted on "an ad hoc basis, with decisions made only as problems are posed and with little consideration given to the future consequences or to the implementation of details."

Zartman enumerates six distinct functions of ideology with reference to external relations. These are the use of ideoloy to perceive events and explain their meaning; the role of ideology in identifying friends and enemies; ideology as an instrument of making justifications; ideology as a power for creating solidarity among different states; ideology as a basis for creating limited options in international relations; and ideology's power in limiting others' policy choices.

Underlying the basic difference between national-interest and ideological policies, Zartman observes: "The foreign policy based on interest seeks to achieve a place within the state system; it accepts its environment and seeks to fit within it." On the contrary, ideological policy "works to create a new environment because it can find no secure place for itself within the existing state system." The author applies both these determinants to specific African situations and provides the proof of his convictions. But he also reaches the same conclusion as Mckay does—that all African states are revisionist and all share some attachment and susceptibility to ideological myths.

Economic factors too play a dominant role in shaping a country's domestic as well as foreign policies. But in the case of developing countries, they have an overriding impact. Andrew M. Kamarck, in his paper on economic determinants, cites examples of Malawi and Morocco to suggest the implications of the impact of economic factors. The economic forces affecting politics and foreign policies, according to Kamarck, stem, in the first instance, from the structure and nature of a country's economy and its external economic and financial relationship. Secondly, it arises from the objectives of the Government and people as to the kind of economy and external economic relations they want. And, lastly, from the tension between the first and the second of these.

This tension generates from the fact that the modern elites in Africa are faced with a great demand for the benefits of the Western economy, but with a people not yet conscious of the costs that must be paid to get an economy that can produce these benefits.

The author observes conclusively that in this predicament it is not at all surprising that African leaders turn to the developed countries for sympathy and help and that "the pressures upon them and the impatience that it engenders easily become the dominant factors in their relations with the rest of the world."

William J. Foltz's dissertation focusses attention on the influence military requirements and techniques cast on a country's foreign policy. While the military material and strategic requirements or preferences may "impose special alliances or *rapprochements* other than would normally be desirable, military weakness may decisively limit the flexibility and credibility of other foreign policy instruments."

After a general survey of the military potential of Africa and the dramatic examples which armies have set through coups in various parts of Africa, Foltz observes that "African military establishments have on the whole exercised surprisingly little of their potential influence on national policy, whether foreign or domestic, particularly if one compares them with their counterparts in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America." He further remarks that the African soldier is generally conservative—avoiding any wild talk of adventures against neighbours—and that "it is the politicians who rattle sabers in Africa, not the soldiers." Foltz sums up his point by saying that "today such limited influence as the military establishment exerts over foreign affairs is primarily of a restraining and conservative nature."

Robert A. Lystad bases his thesis of how cultural and psychological factors affect foreign policies on the assumption that hostility and aggressiveness are latent in the foreign policies of all nations. He developes his point by arguing that the internal and external environments in which African nations and elites exist appears to be particularly conducive to the arousal and expression of these feelings in relatively greater intensity. These two elements he finds even in the statements of friendship and unity often made by Africans. How do these two elements arise? Of course from frustrations, which have three sources—personal acculturation problems among elites, the colonial nature of cultural contact and the persistent gap between the present national culture and what it ought to do.

But while this frustration and the resultant hostility and aggressiveness cannot be eliminated, these elements can be redirected to other purposes, for instance, through pan-Africanism, educational programmes and sophisticated intentions, even if expressed only in letter. Africans have done this with credit.

L. Gray Cowan, analysing political determinants, pinpoints the fact that the dilemma before African policy-makers, both in the context of internal as well as external policy, is that the dependence on outside economic aid for development simply cannot be squared with the goals of African revolution. These goals, enunciated by Dr. Nkrumah in 1958, "are shared to a large degree by all the independent regimes."

Dealing with political determinants specifically, Cowan singles out the most important of them as the degree of commitment on the part of individual leaders to African unity and to the African revolution as it is embodied in the ideology of African socialism. Another major determinant is the commitment to neutralism. Then there is also the need to preserve the *status quo*, which increasingly becomes the key to the foreign policies of the conservative states.

The last paper, by C. T. Thorne Jr, discusses the influence of external political pressures on foreign policies and examines the relations of Africa with the West, the Communist countries, the Afro-Asian world and the United Nations. The external pressures on African nations arise from the reshaping of the international political scene after World War II, Africa's material dependence on the outside world, its political dependence on the outside world, the outside influence on African state system, and the new leverage that African countries now possess in exploiting the situation created by East-West and Sino-Soviet rivalries. While acknowledging the deep impact of all these factors on African foreign policies, Thorne makes a very pertinent remark: "Africa also is a determinant of the foreign policies of non-African countries."

African Diplomacy thus views African foreign policies from all conceivable angles. There is in addition a very interesting discussion on the papers appended at the end. Although significant changes are constantly taking place in Africa, the observations and conclusions made in the papers will have currency for many years to come. The rich fund of material this work provides will be of much utility to scholars, social scientists and professors, and other students of African affairs.

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Note to Contributors

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Background to Breakdown in Nigeria: The Federal Election of 1964-65*

MICHAEL VICKERS

THERE is a great deal more to the current intra-national conflict in Nigeria than the obvious dimension of physical violence. It is a struggle which has arisen from basic and unresolved tensions; tensions which periodically have been vented with greater or lesser intensity since the formation of the Nigerian federation in 1954.[1]

While regional governments have suffered their crises[2] the fact that the conduct of regional affairs has been kept largely "within the family"—that is, within the authority of the dominant tribe in each region—has permitted the act of governing to be carried out in an effective, if not entirely stable, manner. Government at the federal level, however, has progressed less satisfactorily and has been brought to its current demise largely because it is suffering from what Reginald Green has termed "socio-political bankruptcy."[3] Hopes of federal success in Nigeria have rested on the growth of co-operation among regional "families"; this co-operation has not been forthcoming.[4]

The political institutions with which Nigeria has been endowed have done little to improve regional co-operation in the federal sphere. These institutions have provided a Western-oriented frame within which to conduct the government of a federal state[5]; Nigerian participants, however, have shown little understanding of or inclination to work within the constrictions these institutions create.[6]. Thus, with neither tacit nor explicit consent to adhere in practice to these formal institutions of the federal polity, their effectiveness from the beginning has remained undermined at the most basic level.[7] Nor is force the likely answer to ensuring adherence of participants. Crane Brinton has emphasised that ".. if force has in the past usually begun the process of political integration, no abiding new unit has ever been held together by force alone."[8]

The federal election of 1964-65 stands as probably the last major point at which an attempt was made to carry forward the developmental stages requisite for the creation of an integrated Nigeria. The extent to which integrative steps made headway at this time in the face of massive

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*This article is based on a paper given to the graduate seminar series on *Nigeria: The Politics of Disintegration?* held during May-June 1967 at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. The author is indebted to Mr. Dennis Austin for his encouragement and for the opportunity to present this paper in its original form; also, the author is grateful to Mr. K. W. J. Post, University of the West Indies, for his revision suggestions.

disintegrative stresses will be noted elsewhere. Such observations, it is felt, lend an added dimension to standard considerations about ways in which national integration may be achieved,[9] even if in the case of Nigeria these fell far short of their objective.

The brief study of the federal election of 1964-65 which follows provides a micocosmic view of the Nigerian political system in operation at a period when the federal polity hovered as close to the brink of disintegration as at any time prior to the January 1966 coup. There are, however, other reasons for looking back at this election. An election period covers a relatively short time span and can be the subject of a compact study which helps to portray graphically the most urgently felt stresses in a political system.[10] This point is put clearly by Professors Mackenzie and Robinson in their book, *Five Elections in Africa.* "No human observer can grasp the whole life of a political system in action, but more can be learned in a space of about three months during an election than in any comparable period."[11] Within such boundaries one can not only describe events, but critically re-think key concepts central to any analysis of the current political situation.

I. Old Concepts and New Events

Part of the difficulty in assessing Nigeria's struggle with the forces of disintegration is that it is too often assumed implicitly that national unity is what should, at all costs, be maintained. Little thought is given to the considerable body of evidence which suggests that the breakdown of Nigeria into autonomous or semi-autonomous units may be the most logical and realistic step.[12] It is possible that only when these units have been satisfactorily resolved can confederal groupings be expected. Perhaps the early constitution builders looked through the wrong end of the political telescope. Okoi Arikpo observes that "many federations come into existence by agreement among a number of hitherto separate and independent authorities which decide to transfer some functions and services to a newly created general government. In such cases there is little difficulty in deciding the limits of the new federal authority. The Federation of Nigeria came into existence by the reverse process ..".[13] In view of this, it seems perhaps we should be stressing the positive rather than the pejorative meaning of "political disintegration"; an artificial and unstable unity is necessarily disintegrating into stable, more viable, transitional political units.[14]

On considering modern concepts of political stability, one is challenged to re-assess and re-focus analytical concerns. Rather than seeking patterns of stability at the formal level, one is led to ask whether apparent continuing processes of change at more basic levels of Nigerian society are in fact symptomatic of devolution to ultimately more stable political structures and institutional forms. Indeed, as this thread of reasoning is followed, the question arises whether apparent tribal-regional rifts represent anything much greater than the exaggerated disputes of their leaders. Is what one today is witnessing really a conflict of sharply differing peoples resolved to assert their own identity in the form of separate, autonomous political units, or is this turbulence the product of competing elites operating behind the guise of formidable ideological fronts? Before appropriate structures can be formulated, it seems real stresses must be identified and their effect on the political system probed.

Violence, a sizable element in Nigerian political life, must be included in any deliberations on the nature of stability. In the future when Nigeria may be equipped with sound basic political structures, perhaps violence and other forms of unconstitutional challenge to those in the cockpit of governmental power will not be the cause of almost universal lament, and instead be recognized as regularly recurring elements characteristic of Nigerian political expression. [15] At election time in modern Western nations party competition helps to clarify national issues, which will hopefully assist in mobilizing the forces needed to re-assert unity and provide a focus for national efforts. Such processes, transformed into participation at the ballot box, tend to be looked upon as constituting the sole legitimate means whereby those national goals can be realized. Perhaps, however, under circumstances radically different from those found in the nations of the modern Western world, these goals can be achieved through less sophisticated though still effective channels of competition. In such context, therefore, violence, inter-tribal and inter-regional strife may be looked upon as an anticipated element in the electoral expression. [16]

II. Structural Form vs. Political Reality

In studying the election, indications of disintegrative or devolutionary processes remained hidden at the formal institutional level. To observers unfamiliar with the turbulent nature of Nigerian politics, a superficial assessment might suggest that the electoral structures and procedures, within which the election was to be conducted, were more than adequate to contain disruptive elements exerting centrifugal pressures on the political system.

In February 1964, the Federal House of Representatives passed a Bill which outlined the provisions under which the election was to be conducted. This document gave little hint that balloting would be carried out under conditions any different from those affecting elections in the modern Western world. Indeed, all the ritual and procedures common to the Western Electoral model were adhered to. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), which was constituted with scrupulous attention to impartiality,[17] was empowered to administer and supervise the complex tasks necessary to fulfil the requirements for free and fair elections. The ticklish procedures of voter enumeration and registration, along with the nomination of candidates and the organization of adequate security, were all tasks placed solely in FEC hands. At less formal levels the electoral charade persisted. Parties set organizational machinery in motion well in advance of the beginning of the official campaign.[18] About two months prior to the election, the Southern Alliance [19] followed by the Northern Alliance [20] issued manifestos. [21] Indeed, the leaders of the opposing Alliances even signed pledges promising non-interference in the campaigns of rival parties. Even the campaigns themselves adhered in outward appearance to Western form. Tours were conducted, rallies held and speeches made; and in many cases there was a fair degree of freedom of activity for rival parties in hitherto difficult campaign areas.

That events did not follow the idyllic course these provisions implied is now, of course, history. Yet, a closer look reveals patterns of political activity and behaviour which suggested that a degree of integration persisted and that the electoral institutions did exert some effective centripetal pressures.

Early indications revealed that Nigeria's major parties, the NCNC and the NPC particularly, though traditionally regional in their scope of operation, were making determined efforts to broaden their bases of support, with the apparent goal of appealing to the electorate as a whole. The NPC took an active, if not conspicuous, part in backing the merger MDF [22] party as preparations were under way in the autumn of 1963 for the February 1964 election in that Region-designate. In March 1964 it aided the late Chief Akintola and his UPP machine in securing support for the latter's newly formed NNDP. [23] The NCNC, though less aggressive in its quest for allies, persisted in its association with NEPU (Nigerian Elements Progressive Union) in the North and later cemented relations with the UMBC (United Middle Belt Congress) through the common front of the NPF (Northern Progressive Front), which thereby united the two Northern opposition parties. Most of the NCNC's attention, however, was given to regaining its influence in the West and solidifying its position in the Mid-West. Intra-party conflicts within the UPGA, along with the challenge presented by the NNDP, used up much of the party's energies. In addition, bad feelings and traditional mistrust between Ibo and Yoruba, heightened by AG suspicions that they were being used for NCNC ends, made the Southern Alliance an unwieldy instrument for organizing effective electoral activity. None the less, the NCNC took great pains to solidify its interests nationally, even though this was largely achieved through the allies it managed to encompass within the unity of the UPGA.

Further evidence suggested that Nigerians now showed a greater willingness to work within the constrictions of their inherited electoral system. It seemed that the leaders of the major national parties were now more fully aware of the possibilities the Western electoral model had to offer. Both NPC and NCNC entered into alliances which extended the separate efforts made by each to build a base for national support. In 1959 an alliance had been effected between the victorious NPC and the major victor in the South (the NCNC) only after the election had been held. Alliances in 1964, however, were shaped well before the start of the official campaign with the NPC and the NCNC taking the leading roles. To the optimist, this development ignited a spark of hope that a contest between two competitors might focus on issues extending beyond the interests of a single region or tribe. Indeed there was now something more than a faint possibility that these competitors might face one another with discernibly different positions on an ideological spectrum [24].

The two major election issues reflected the nation-wide appeal each alliance was striving earnestly to create, although in a somewhat crude fashion. Both gave early attention to the plight of the imprisoned former leader of the AG, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and to the possibility of forming a National Government. [25] The fact that either issue should receive more than passing consideration from either alliance was an indication of their new interest in truly national politics.

It was to be expected that demands for the release of Awolowo from prison should be made by the UPGA. On the other hand, it became evident that support for this issue was sanctioned by the NCNC only because it was useful in holding the AG in alliance [26].

After ignoring the "Release Awo" issue earlier in the unofficial campaign period, the Northern Alliance eventually gave full verbal backing to demands for a pardon for the former West Premier [27]. The effect was to create an issue with national appeal and to which a great deal of attention was given.

The issue of a "National Government" was also raised. The Northern and Southern alliances sustained positions over the fairly lengthy three-month period from July to September 1964 during which the issue was current. And while the issue was far from new to Nigerian politics [28], its resurrection was timely. It suggested not only a possible channel through which interparty tensions might be eased, but also a possible way in which minority parties might escape the sustained oppression and possible extinction that they feared [29].

There was, finally, a body of fairly convincing evidence that an effective curb might be put on election violence and thuggery. Several steps, in addition to those outlined in the provisions of the election statute, appeared to ensure the possibility of much more effective checks than those employed in 1959. At a meeting of the Police Council in September 1964 [30] the question of integrating regional police authorities with the federal force was discussed. At the Summit Conference (All-Party Conference) held between October 22 and 23, 1964, it was agreed that the September proposal for the integration of police forces should be effected immediately. A number of other provisions towards a free and fair election were itemized in the document called the "Nine Point Plan" which resulted from the Summit [31]. Further preventive measures were taken on December 18, 1964, when Louis Edet, Inspector-General of the Nigerian Federal Police force, itemized eight provisions (dubbed the "Eight Don'ts" by the Nigerian press), to which all members of the Nigerian electorate should adhere so that orderly polling might be conducted.[32]

III. Political Reality: The Facts of Disintegration

It is not possible to point to any single factor as being the basic cause of the deluge of disintegrative activity which grew with the advent of election day and which held Nigeria at the brink of breakdown in the post-election turmoil of January 1965. The absence of the British as key administrators of the election; the national awakening to the hard facts of post-independence reality; the corrupt contriving of certain politicians without regard for consequences; these are the main factors which helped to fashion a political situation which was tense at best and potentially explosive at worst.

Still there can be little doubt that the national crisis of 1964 largely turned on the administration of the election. A reasonable case can be made that the absence of British "strangers" from the Nigerianized election administration of 1964 was the fundamental reason for the chaos which developed. In a sense it was an "administrator's election" due to the crucial role that election management was to play.

The election administration—those who ran it, the orders they gave and the actions they took—became the focus of vicious attacks by both Northern and Southern alliances. Neither the UPGA nor the NNA was willing to accept the role and position of the election administration as demanded by the Western Electoral Model. Each suspected the other would attempt to exploit such procedures in its own favour.

Reasons for these fears were well grounded. At the highest level there was logical ground in Nigerian eyes for suspicion. The commissioners of the FEC were appointed by their respective regional governments. Thus even on matters of broadest policy undercurrents of mistrust were present.

At the outset of its duties the decision of the FEC to use the results of the 1963 census to draw up new constituency boundaries was at first resisted and finally denounced by the parties of the Southern Alliance. As the census was the basis on which the federal constituencies were distributed the Southern Alliance parties considered that a population count which gave the North a majority of the population and, therefore, a majority of the constituencies allotted was equivalent to conceding the election to the NNA before a ballot had been cast.[33] It was for this reason that the Southern Alliance parties objected so strenuously to the censuses of 1963 and 1962, as well as to the proposed use of the 1953 census as the basis for constituency delimitation. In the end the UPGA was forced, at least tacitly, to accept the 1963 census figures. It showed relatively proportional population increases in all regions, while allowing for a loss of seven constituencies from the North and a gain of three constituencies in the South[34]. It is interesting to note the fantastic increase in population recorded (see Table I) for the one-year period between 1962 and 1963. Though there is some question as to what exactly the figures for the 1962 census actually were [35], as can be surmised by looking at two such estimates in Table I, (b^1) and (b) and noting the discrepancies between them, it is evident each of the Regions appreciated very well the importance of as high a population count as possible.

The other critical points in the management of the election included the decision of the FEC to accept the unopposed nominations results; the delegation of special powers of enforcement to the police forces; and the endless disputes which arose over duties carried out by electoral officials right down to ward level. The officials of the FEC faced further stress as a result of a decision to carry out the election despite Eastern threats of secession and boycott, and Southern requests for postponement.[36]

TABLE I

Regional Population Distribution as Recorded in the Nigerian Censuses of 1953, 1962, 1963

	1953 (a)	1962 (b)	(b^1)	1963 (c)
North	16,835,582	20,274,000	22.5 m	29,777,986
West	6,085,065	7,261,000	10.9 m	10,278,500
East	7,215,251	8,544,000	12.4 m	12,388,646
Southern Cameroons	752,724	NA **	NA	NA
Mid-West	NA *	NA	NA	2,533,337
Lagos	267,407	394,000	.675 m	675,352
Totals	31,156,029	36,473,000	46.5 m.	55,653,821

*The Mid-West region was not created until February 1964.

**The Southern Cameroons seceded from the Federation of Nigeria in 1961 and joined the Republic of Cameroon. The secession was peaceful and followed a plebiscite of residents of the area in February 1961.

Sources : (a) Post, *Nigerian Federal Election af 1959*, p.1., n.1.

(b) *West African Directory, 1964-65* (London, Skinner and Co., 1966), p. 272.

(b^1) Confidential (January 1965).

(c) *News from Nigeria*, Feb. 29, 1964 (Lagos Federal Government Printer), p. 23.

TABLE II

Censuses and Constituency Delimitation

(i) *For the 1959 Federal Election*

Region	*Enumeration at 1963 Census* (in millions)	*Delimitation of Constituencies 1959*
North	16.8	174
West	6.1	62
Lagos	.3	3
East	7.2	73
S. Cameroons	.8	NA
Totals	31.2	312

(ii) *For the 1964 Federal Election*

Region	*Enumeration at 1963 Census* (in millions)	*Delimitation of Constituencies, 1964*
North	29.8	167
West	10.2	57
Lagos	.7	4
Mid-West	2.5	14
East	12.3	70
Totals	55.5	312

IV. Swift Passage to Crisis

The final events which led to the constitutional crisis of January 1, 1965, were swift and decisive. By December 22, 1964, the FEC had confirmed (subject to court revisions) that the NNA had returned 63 candidates from constituencies where no UPGA candidate had registered to oppose them; on the same date 15 UPGA candidates were also confirmed returned unopposed[37]. Thus, before a ballot had been cast, it appeared the NNA had built a platform for victory which could not be undermined. To be assured of victory it needed only 91 seats, and these it could anticipate would be easily forthcoming from the North alone where opposition was token. Augmented by the seats in the West it could expect to win through its ally, the NNDP, the NNA had only to maintain its grip on the declared unopposed seats to win an easy victory.

With defeat facing them, the UPGA parties commenced a vicious assault both on the FEC and the Northern Alliance parties in a last-ditch attempt to find some way in which they could compete in the election with even a modest hope of winning. At various times between December 22 and 29, the UPGA leaders threatened, cajoled and pleaded with FEC and Northern Alliance officials. Headed by former Premier Okpara, the Southern Alliance pleaded with the FEC for postponement of the election on the basis that the activities preceding it had not been carried out in a free and fair fashion as earlier pledged by the leaders of all competing parties[38]. Okpara hinted at secession when he warned "this country is finished"[39] should the NPC continue to act in ways which undermined the unity of Nigeria. Describing the system of nomination of candidates as "a farce", he announced that the UPGA parties had reached the "limits of our endurance".

There was no positive response from the election authorities and Okpara turned his attention to President Azikiwe. In a series of talks with Azikiwe (a co-founder and former President of the NCNC), Okpara succeeded in persuading the President to take up the matter of postponement with the Prime Minister. Balewa was adamant, however, in his refusal to agree; and in this refusal lay the basis of the constitutional crisis which was to follow completion of the balloting on December 30. Prior to the President's meeting with the Prime Minister, the UPGA declared that it would boycott the polls if its demands were not met and postponement effected. When it was finally announced on the eve of the election that the balloting would go on as scheduled, the UPGA called for a boycott.[40]

On January 1, 1965, the President was prepared to broadcast to the nation his resignation rather than to give in to demands that Balewa be permitted to form the new Government. If Azikiwe had made his broadcast, Balewa was prepared to release a counter-statement asserting that he was adamant in his decision that the NNA should form the incoming Government[41].

Fortunately neither broadcast was released, and in an attempt to reconcile these two leaders, the Chief Justice of the Federation, Sir Adetokunbah Ademola, and the Chief Justice of the East Region, Sir Louis Mbanefo, drew up a plan which was submitted separately to the two men. The plan, known as the "Six Point Plan", called for the President and the Prime Minister to consider that "bloodshed, violence and national disintegration"[42] could only be prevented if a compromise position was reached without delay.

Balewa gave his assent to the terms of the Plan "in principle". UPGA approval, however, was not so readily forthcoming. Okpara was profoundly dissatisfied with the Plan's provisions. He insisted that the cases of candidates who were returned unopposed should be reviewed by a special tribunal and that fresh elections should be ordered in constituencies where the number of votes cast was less than 30 per cent of the registered electors[43]. Okpara's initial resolve was, however, loosened by the pleas of the intermediaries on the following day, and he finally gave his grudging assent to the "Six Point Plan". Thus on the evening of January 4, 1965, the President announced that Balewa would form a "broad-based Government" which would provide for representation from the leading parties in the Federation.

Though the provisions of the "Six Point Plan" continued to arouse a good deal of suspicion among UPGA supporters, it had none the less served its purpose. By effecting the basis for a compromise between the alliances it had served as the primary vehicle in easing the country back from the brink of constitutional breakdown.

V. Voting Patterns

It was not until late in January 1965 that detailed results of the December 30 polling were released. The figures provided no real surprises. The NNA, as expected, scored a resounding victory. The Northern Alliance parties captured about four times the number of seats won by the parties of the UPGA. A *Special Gazette* stated that a total of 257 elected members had been returned to the House of Representatives[44]. This figure comprised 202 NNA and 55 successful UPGA candidates.

TABLE III

Regional Breakdown of UPGA and NNA Victories at the Federal Polling, December 30, 1964

Region	NNA		UPGA		Total Victories	Total Regional Constituencies
	A	B	A	B		
West	36	3	18	—	57	57
North	100	63	4	—	167	167
Lagos	—	—	1*	—	1	4
East	—	—	0	19	19	70
Mid-West	—	—	13	0	13	14
Totals	136	66	36	19	257	312
	202		55			

A contested — The number of victories won through contest at the December 30, 1964, polling is listed under this sub-heading.

B uncontested — The number of victories won through the "uncontested nominations" return is listed under this sub-heading.

*Though the winner, Benson, ran under the banner "Independent UPGA", he was more "independent" than "UPGA".

SOURCE : *Special Gazette on Official Results of the Nigerian Federal Election of December 30, 1964 ;* and the *Daily Express,* January 27, 1965.

This regional breakdown gives some idea of the strength of the Northern Alliance in the North and West regions. It also indicates the degree to which the Southern boycott failed in both the West and Mid-West regions. Even in the East, 19 members of the UPGA who had been returned unopposed (as a result of the uncontested nominations) did not heed the party call to re-contest their constituencies. The result was that only the NCNC in the East Region carried out anything approaching an effective boycott; of the 51 of the region's 70 seats up for contest, all were boycotted. The extent of non-participation of UPGA allies in the West and Mid-West in the boycott provides an interesting reflection on the degree of non-confidence in each other that these parties had in the NCNC-dominated Southern Alliance.

Little explanation is necessary about these party victories at the polls. The NPC won without difficulty, while its ally, the NNDP, won a comfortable margin of seats in the West. The sparse number of seats won by each of the UPGA parties showed the degree to which the boycott had backfired on them, and particularly on the NCNC; it indicated the difficulty that the South Alliance parties would have in trying to

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TABLE IV

Party Victories Won at the December 30, 1964, Polling

NNA	*Victories*	*UPGA*	*Victories*
NPC	163	NCNC	38
NNDP	39	AG	13
MDF	00	NPF	4
	202		55
	Total Victories—257		

Source : D. G. Anglin, "Brinkmanship in Nigeria. The Federal Election of 1964-65", *International Journal* (Spring 1965), p. 187.

TABLE V

Voting Breakdown by Party at December 30, 1964, polling

NNA	*No. votes cast*	*UPGA*	*No. of votes cast*
For NPC	2.00 million	For NCNC	.38 million
,, NNDP	.85 ,,	,, AG	.35 ,,
,, Minor Parties	.15 ,,	,, NPF	.25 ,,
		,, Indep.	05 ,,
Totals	3.00 million		1.03 million

Source : *Africa Research Bulletin*, January 1-31, 1965, p. 224. (Figures recorded in the Bulletin are approximate).

Of the more than 20 million voters registered for the 1964 federal elections only approximately four million participated in the ballot on December 30. In 1959, seven out of nine million federal electors cast their votes. Of the four million votes cast on December 30, about three million were polled by the NNA and about one million by the UPGA. The NPC gathered the largest number of votes. It polled about two million, while its major alliance partner, the NNDP, polled about 850,000 votes. The balance of the Northern Alliance votes went to the MDF and minor partners. The vote distribution among the parties of the UPGA was fairly even. The NCNC, AG and NPF scored almost the same number of votes.

The "Little Election" held on March 18, 1965, to elect federal representatives from the East and Mid-West constituencies, which had been boycotted on December 30, was a relatively quiet affair by Nigerian standards. The electoral alliances through which the December election had been effected remained unchanged. Most active were those parties of the two alliances which were based in the South. Leading the contest for the UPGA was the NCNC, backed by the AG; the NNDP, assisted to a considerable degree by the NPC, attended to NNA interests.

The Southern Alliance parties were on their good behaviour. Allotted two positions in the Balewa cabinet following the December polling, and with the promise of more positions to come on completion of the March "Little Election", the UGPA did not seek to antagonise the Northern Alliance or its leaders. The divisive issues over which the first round of the federal elections had been contested were avoided in the preliminaries to the March by-elections.

Once the "Little Election" had been completed and the nation's 312 federal seats filled[45] politics resumed its customary heated pace. Even before the Southern Alliance had been issued with its promised cabinet posts[46], North-South hostilities, triggered off by the actions of resentful UPGA followers, came to the fore. Prospects for a stable government were threatened by pressures created by Southern charges of NNA election rigging. Resentment over campaign tactics employed prior to the December election nurtured feelings of traditional mistrust and suspicion.

The returns from the "Little Election" provided a resounding victory for the UPGA. Of the 54 seats contested, it captured 52. The seats were won by Independent candidates standing in the East Region. With the completion of the "Little Election" a full complement of representatives was now returned to the Federal House in Lagos.

TABLE VI

Total Victories Breakdown by Alliance

Alliance	*Dec. 30, 1964*	*March 18, 1965*	*Totals*
NNA	198	0	198
UPGA	53	52	105
Independents	4	2	6
Totals	255	54	309*

*Three seats earlier declared uncontested for the NNA in the North were to be contested as the result of a court ruling.

Source : *Daily Express* (Lagos), March 20, 1965, pp. 1-2.

The member parties of the UPGA were, of course, delighted with the voting results. Immediately, however, both the AG and the NCNC members began making abusive statements directed at their NNA rivals. Such was the position when Parliament began its new session on March 24, 1965.

VI. Conclusions

It is unlikely that another federal election will be held in Nigeria in the foreseeable future; it is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that with the conclusion of the 1964-65 federal polling, the finale also was marked for the set of electoral institutions with which Nigeria was endowed by its former colonial rulers.

There is no reason to doubt that elections will again be held in Nigeria; the institutional and structural frame within which they are conducted and the assumptions on which these are based may, however, be very different from, if reminiscent of, those within which federal polling formerly was conducted in 1954, 1959 and 1964-65.

Federal elections in Nigeria have, in essence, come close simply to fulfilling the functions of providing electors with a sense of participation in the political system, which, like people in other new states, they have come to expect as a significant portion of their share in the post-independence "payoff"[47]. For, rulers of Nigeria these exercises have provided a legitimate, though somewhat less than firm, base on which to extend their rule-making activities and exercise of authority.[48] To ensure consolidation of their ruling positions, members of Nigeria's federal political elite did, particularly in the 1964-65 election period, many extreme and arbitrary acts which may be classified under the general heading of intimidation, to *enforce* partisan participation. These acts in their excess provoked a cumulative reaction and growing resentment, at least among electors in the South, which undermined not only the authority of the elected rulers and credibility of the participation myth, but also minimized the remaining effectiveness of the federal electoral institutions.

The critical pressures created by the fiercely competitive nature of post-independence politics and traditional tribal-regional hostilities were obvious enough. It is not solely, however, the above-named pressures which have brought Nigeria to its current demise, pressures which earlier carried it to the very brink of national breakdown during January 1965. The frame within which the above study was carried out permitted a microcosmic view of the complex working of the Nigerian political system. Specifically, what this generally descriptive presentation showed was the failure of electoral institutions, structures and procedures to resolve the chronic stresses under which Nigeria functions; it showed its failure also to produce a government backed by sufficient acceptance of the nation's electors to enable it to carry out necessary tasks with some degree of effectiveness.

Basically, Nigerians, due either to a lack of understanding or lack of inclination (or a combination of both), did not accept the fundamental "rules of the game" on which their electoral institutions were founded.

If it is possible that this point previously has not been stressed sufficiently, the activities preceding and following the 1964-65 election made it graphically clear. This is not to say that Nigerians *should* accept these "rules," for certainly they seem largely irrelevant to Nigerian electoral politics. Without minimal consensus on these "rules," however, the electoral structures and institutions, which are constructed on the "free and fair" libertarian assumptions from which these institutions derive, are rendered void of authority and hence effectiveness. For instance, Nigerian concepts of party, issue, campaign and administration bear little resemblance in nature or function to their respective Western counterparts.[49]

While it is evident that political parties and their leaders showed a considerably greater propensity in this than in previous federal elections to adhere to the *form* of "free and fair" elections, in *practice* intimidation of varying degrees and political obstructionism was even more the rule than before. Indeed, the West regional election which followed in June 1965, three months after completion of the March federal "Little Election" balloting, saw such practices carried to excess. While *formal adherence* to the "rules" gave some promise of seeing the elections assist to a minimal degree the task of national integration, the *practice* of violence and intimidation negated any positive influence these advances might have produced, by nurturing the growing forces of political disintegration.

REFERENCES

1. The most notable "tension venting" took place during the periods immediately prior to the federal election of 1959 and to a significantly greater extent in 1964. Inter-tribal and inter-regional suspicions and mistrust were expressed in the form of "rigging" (a term used by Nigerians meaning illegal alteration of administrative procedures to influence the election outcome), and "thuggery" (a term used to describe killings and beatings).

2. See particularly J. P. Mackintosh, "Politics in Nigeria : The Action Group Crisis of 1962," *Political Studies,* Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1963); also see K.W.J. Post, "The Crisis in Nigeria", *World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7 (February 1966), p. 44.

3. Reginald H. Green, "Nigeria: Politics of Socio-Economic Bankruptcy—Part 2," *New African,* Vol. 4, No. 7 (1965), p. 150. Green maintains that the crisis Nigeria faced in the early months of 1965 was not basically economic but rather the product of socio-political bankruptcy in which accentuated tribal and material self-interest made up the basic motivation for federal competition.

4. This is not to imply that other factors fostered by the fierce post-independence competition for power and resources, namely, greed and corruption, have contributed less significantly to federal dysfunction; rather it is that these factors have been common to power struggles both at regional and federal levels. It is the additional element of inter-regional and inter-tribal hostility which characterizes federal politics and differentiates it from politics at the regional levels. For examinations seeking reasons for the intensity of inter-tribal and inter-regional hostility, see Richard L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," *Government and Opposition,* Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1967), especially pp. 526-529; see also his "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 3, No. 2 (1965). B. J. O. Dudley, in his article, Federalism and the Balance of Power in Nigeria," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,* Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1966) deals perceptively with the aspects of economic and political power shifts which conjointly have undermined initial constitutional intent by subordinating the regions to central authority; see especially pp. 20-27. For a general assessment of pessimistic views expressed by Henry L. Bretton in his book, *Power and Stability in Nigeria,* (New York, Praeger, 1962), see Morton S. Baratz's review article, "Power and Stability in Nigeria," *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (November 1964), especially pp. 315-319. Baratz suggests a greater likelihood of change through "evolution than revolution." (p. 316). A series of articles in *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (July 1964) on a Marxist interpretation of the conditions for development and change in Nigeria present a well-argued case for the essential conflict in Nigeria being between *horizontal strata* in Nigeria's national society, rather than between vertically divided "families" (tribes and regions). The articles by K. W. J. Post, "Nationalism and Politics in Nigeria: A Marxist Approach," and B. J. O. Dudley, "Marxism and Political Change in Nigeria," are most pertinent to the "centre-regional" considerations with which we are dealing here.

5. See David P. Currie (ed.), *Federalism in the New Nations of Africa,* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964), *passim.* Currie points to the institutional heritage left by departing colonial powers and the repercussions of this heritage on the development of viable political institutions for new African states. See also Donald Rothchild, *Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa* (Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1960); also by Rothchild, "From Federalism to Neo-Federalism in East Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 4, No. 3 (1967). The latter article presents provocative views relevent to the current Nigerian situation; the best foundation from which to build inter-regional co-operation is seen to arise from low-level "Development Front" institutions created for joint administration in selected and agreed activities. See A. H. Birch, "Opportunities and Problems of Federation," in Colin Leys and Peter Robson, *Federation*

in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1965), for formal-legalistic along with psychological considerations requisite for federation-building.

6. For a detailed breakdown of constitutional failings which have contributed to federal-regional conflict see Kalu Ezera, "The Failure of Nigerian Federalism and Proposed Constitutional Changes," *African Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1966); for considerations on institutional adjustments see Shankar S. More, *Remodelling of Democracy for Afro-Asian Nations*, (Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1962), *passim*.

7. See Donald Rothchild, "Force and Consent in African Region-Building," *Makerere Journal*, No. 11 (December 1965), p. 37. One might add here that it is interesting in the Nigerian crisis (June-August, 1967) to note how Lt.-Col. Gowon has employed a combination of *force* and *persuasion* in order to augment the chances of his regime persisting. *Force* is being used to bring back the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra into the federal fold; the concession of Gowon to create 12 semi-autonomous states within the confines of the Nigerian Federation can be interpreted as an attempt to hold the other sections by *persuasion*. See *The Times* (London), May 29, 1967, pp. 1 and 4 for details of the twelve-state creation.

8. Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 48.

9. For an overview of standard considerations on building national integration in new African states see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Greetz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, (New York, 1963); Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII (September 1964), pp. 622-663; Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Social Science*, Vol. 358 (March 1965), pp. 52-64; J. S. Coleman, "The Problems of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. VIII (March 1955), pp. 44-57; Claude Ake, "Political Integration and Political Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (April 1967), pp. 486-499.

10. See K. W. J. Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.

11. W. J. M. Mackenzie and K. E. Robinson (eds.), *Five Elections in Africa*, (Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 2.

12. Gowon, of course, already has done this; see n. 7 above.

13. Okoi Arikpo, *The Development of Modern Nigeria*, (London, Penguin, 1967), p. 85.

14. See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York, The Free Press, 1958). Samuel Huntington, in his article, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), pp. 386-430, develops the implications. See also Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development: An Analytical Study* (Boston, Little, 1966) and his "The Political Context of National Development," in Irving Sverdlow (ed.), *Development Administration Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963); C. S. Whittaker, "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (January 1967), pp. 190-217; Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), *passim*.

15. It is interesting to note that as late as 1868 violence was an accepted element of British electoral expression; see Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* (London, Penguin, 1961), pp. 132-133 and H. G. Nicholas, *To the Hustings* (London, 1956).

William Stokes, in his article, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics," in John D. Martz (ed.), *The Dynamics of Change in Latin-American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 140-150, examines violence as one of a number of "alternate modes for the transfer of power." Stokes points out a number of instances where its use is an accepted fact of political life in effecting changes of government. He emphasises the minimal effect, in these instances, that violence has in altering the institutions and structures of the politics examined.

The recent attempted coup in Ghana (April 1967) suggests an African parallel as have struggles for power in the former Belgian and French African dependencies; Nigeria, however, with an imminent breakdown of existing structures and institutions, a process which is already well under way, does not fit this pattern. An article, "Violence in Developing Areas," *East Africa Journal*, Vol. III, No. 4 (June 1966), pp. 33-34, links economic levels with levels of intra-national violence. See also B.J.O. Dudley, "Violence in Nigerian Politics", *Transition*, Vol. 5, No. 21 (1965).

16. See Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*, in this article he presents a scheme for assessing stages of devolution.

17. Representation on the FEC was made up of five members; one from each Region and Lagos and a Chairman, E. E. Esua, who is an Easterner.

18. For purposes of clarity and convenience, I set the dates on which the competing Alliances issued their manifestos as the starting date of the "official" campaign. The UPGA released its manifesto on October 10, 1964; the NNA, October 30, 1964. The period prior to the release of manifestos but during which there was full campaigning under way I have referred to as the "unofficial campaign" period. Indeed, it is safe to say that the unofficial compaign had been going on in earnest for a year prior to these dates, and to a lesser degree from September 1963 when the NPC made its first attempts at encroachment into the South via election preparations in the Region-designate Mid-West.

19. The Southern Alliance means the UPGA.

20. The Northern Alliance means the NNA.

21. For dates of release of manifestos, see footnote (18) above.

22. The MDF (Mid-West Democratic Front) was a merger party formed in October 1963 from the Mid-West regional branch of the UPP and a faction split off from the Mid-West regional branch of the AG. The MDF also absorbed the MPC (Mid-West People's Congress); this lasted through the electoral period only.

23. The newly formed NNDP was officially created on March 10, 1964.

24. See M. Vickers' unpublished MS., "The Nigerian Federal Election of 1964-5" (Ottawa, Carleton University, 1966), p. 28, n. 1. After the formation of the NNDP in the West Region in March 1964 which resulted in renewed recriminations between the NCNC and the NPC, prospects for election issues dividing on ideological lines receded rapidly. Of course, in so far as Southern leaders referred to themselves as "progressives" and to their Northern rivals as "reactionaries", there was in a sense a basic ideological differentiation. The extension of party interests and activities, however, suggested something more than this. The inference was that a non-tribal and truly national appeal might be established.

25. The plan for the creation of a National Government called for an All-Party government in which all the leading parties in the Republic would be represented. It was an issue which caught the attention of many Nigerian leaders, as in theory it presented a possible solution to the problem of national representation in the Federal House. Under such a scheme parties would fill the dual role of government and opposition.

26. Most of those who remained members of the AG under Acting Leader Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro were militant supporters of Awolowo. They were the remnants left in the ranks of the AG after the final defections to Akintola's new NNDP in March 1964.

27. The NNA did not, however, like the UPGA include demands for the pardon and release of Awolowo as one of the provisions in its manifesto.

28. At various stages since 1958 the late Prime Minister, Balewa, had advocated similar plans.

29. Minority parties in Nigeria had watched with alarm the demise of the formerly powerful AG. Many felt a similar plight might be theirs if such a fate could befall an apparently prominent and secure party. NEPU, the tenacious North opposition party (along with the UMBC), and other minority parties which included Northern Alliance affiliates, EPC (Eastern People's Congress) and NDC (Niger Delta Congress) felt the National Government plan could offer them a measure of security.

30. This meeting was attended not only by regional and federal police officials but also by all the regional premiers and the Prime Minister.

31. See the *Daily Express* (Lagos), October 24, 1964, for the full provisions of the "Nine Point Plan".

32. See *ibid.* December 19, 1964, p. 1. for the "Eight Don'ts" prescribed.

33. For an excellent summary of facts, figures and interpretations bearing on the census controversies see S.A. Aluko, "How Many Nigerians: An Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1961-'63," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1965), especially pp. 381-385; see also Chukuka Okonjo, "A Preliminary Medium Estimate of the 1962 Mid-Year Population of Nigeria," unpublished paper given at the *First Annual Population Conference*, University of Ibadan (January 1966).

34. The figures in Table I show the regional distribution of population as recorded in the 1953, 1962 and 1963 censuses. The figures in Table II show in brief form the delimitation of constituencies in 1959 as governed by the 1953 census figures, and the delimitation of constituencies in 1964 as governed by the 1963 census figures.

35. S.A. Aluko, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-385 gives an additional two unofficial census estimates released after completion of the 1962 count. No official 1962 census figures were ever published (p. 384).

36. The decision to carry out the election as planned did not receive the support of the three commissioners from the South represented on the FEC. In fact the administering body for the election broke down on the announcement on December 29, 1964, by FEC Chairman Esua that the election would go on as scheduled December 30. The decision to carry out the election was not a decision the commissioners had agreed on; the members of the FEC representing the Mid-West, the East and Lagos resigned, as they contended they were unable to support Chairman Esua in his decision. For details of the resignations see the *Morning Post* (Lagos), December 30, 1964, p.1.

37. Later, the number of unopposed candidates returned was to grow to 85; 66 for the NNA and 19 for the UPGA.

38. As provided for in the "Nine Point Plan".

39. *Daily Express* (Lagos), December 22, 1964, p.1.

40. See Vickers, "The Nigerian Federal Election of 1964-65" *op. cit.* pp. 116-124 for details of the complex UPGA negotiations undertaken in attempts to procure nullification of the election during the week December 22-29, 1964.

41. For the full text of statements prepared for release January 1, 1965, by President Azikiwe and Prime Minister Balewa, see *ibid.*, pp. 194-208.

42. *Daily Express* (Lagos), January 6, 1965, p. 3. This article also specified the provisions of the "Six Point Plan". These may be found in Vickers, "The Nigerian Federal Election of 1964-65," *op. cit*, p. 146.

43. See Richard Harris, "Nigeria: Crisis and Compromise", *Africa Report* (March 1965), p. 30, for details of Okpara's objections.

44. See *Special Gazette on Official Results of the Nigerian Federal Election of December 30, 1964,* (Lagos, Federal Government Printer, 1965), p. 3.

45. Though 312 members had been returned, 3 seats were to be re-contested as a result of court rulings.

46. When these posts were finally announced on April 1, 1965, an additional 20 UPGA members were appointed to swell the number of the incredible "cabinet" of the broad-based government to a total of 76 M.P.s. The appointments brought the number of UPGA supporters in the government up to 22. See the *Daily Express* (Lagos) April 1, 1965, p.1. for details of the appointments.

47. For an interesting development of the "payoff" concept see the Introduction to Paul E. Sigmund Jr. (ed.). *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York, Praeger, 1963), especially pp. 3-28.

48. See Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (June 1967), p. 175; see also W. J. M. Mackenzie, "The Export of Electoral Systems," *Political Studies*, Vol. V, No. 3 (1957), and Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (Gravenhage, Mouton, 1962), pp. 38ff.

49. See Vickers, *op. cit.,* Chapters I, II and III for a full discussion of these aspects.

New Trends in Africa

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EVERYBODY agrees, I think, that the most epoch-making event in recent years in Africa was the Ghanaian coup d'etat which made Dr. Nkrumah's regime fall, although there are different opinions about the significance of the development. I remember visiting Ghana four times. My first visit was in 1960 when I had very interesting experiences. Once I was roaming around the suburbs of Accra city where ordinary people live. Every house had a yard surrounding it and there was no fence dividing one yard from another. Housewives were preparing the mid-day meal. I went near some housewives and said : "I am fed up with hotel meals. So I would like to eat what you are eating. Can you cook for me?" And I handed them two shilling coins. They laughed and said jokingly : "What a funny man." But at last they agreed. One of them went out and came back with a tin and some vegetables which they cooked for me. It was quite a nice meal. At least it was quite nourishing. This showed that the life of the people at that time was not so bad as in later days.

When I want to Ghana I had great admiration for Ghana, the first African country to gain its independence, and high esteem for Dr. Nkrumah, its brilliant leader. When I arrived in Ghana the election of the President was being held. Already the cabinet headed by Dr. Nkrumah had been constituted. But it was still a period of self-government and now for the first time the people were going to elect their President and the country was going to become a republic. Naturally Dr. Nkrumah was a candidate for the presidentship and it was almost certain that he would be elected. But still the opposition leader, Dr. Danquah, was also contesting. First I visited the Information Ministry and asked for information about the elections. The official there explained that the election had been conducted very fairly and that there was no interference from the government I had no reason to regard his explanation with suspicion. I went round the city of Accra, but being a new visitor could not find any sign of suppression by the government. At last I reached Parliament and, to my surprise, there already stood the bronze statue of Dr. Nkrumah. What did it mean? I could not understand. Although it was almost sure that Dr. Nkrumah would be returned, legally speaking he was still only one of the candidates. Parliament represents the country. For what reason was his bronze statue erected in front of it? At that moment I felt as if the sand under my feet was going to slip away. I wondered in what way the people understood the concept of democracy.

My third visit to Ghana was in October 1965 when the OAU conference was in session at Accra. Dr. Nkrumah was very keen to hold the conference at Accra. At the conference, foreign correspondents were lodged on the Legon University compound, well treated and served with good meals. So all my colleagues, the Japanese correspondents, praised the government, saying the Ghanaian government had made great preparations for the conference. But as I am a crank, I slipped out from my lodge and visited the town of Accra, and went towards the market. To my surprise, the streets were quite dead. The shelves of the shops were almost empty. At last I entered the market and found a small restaurant. There I sat and ordered a meal. The meal consisted of only two pieces of tapioka bread and soup with a few pieces of thin meat. It cost two and a half shillings. It was not enough to fill my stomach. It was the most miserable meal I ever had. I looked up and saw a splendid building named "State House" built for use of the conference and Dr. Nkrumah wanted to receive the 37 heads of African countries there as if he was entertaining kings. Somebody told me that it cost £15 million. As the total population of Ghana is about seven and a half millions, it means that every Ghanaian citizen was forced to pay £2 for the construction of the building. I thought it was too much of an unbalanced enterprise when we compare it with the miserable life of the people. I left Ghana unhappy about the country's future and after a few months was informed about the change of regime.

At the beginning of this year I got another chance to visit Ghana. I don't know what improvement has been made in the Ghanaian economy since the coup d'etat last year, but at least the outward appearance of the streets and the market has quite changed. The streets were full of market mammies selling everything, including soap, tooth-powder, clothes, etc. All the shops were full of goods. Outside the town I found many houses under construction. They were being built not by the government but by the common people.

From these four visits, I got the impression that the political change in Ghana came about not as a result of ideological differences but flowed from the intolerable economic suffering of the people. It was reported that on April 17 a coup was attempted in Ghana and Lt. General Kotoka was killed. Mr. Kotoka was one of the most important figures who had organised last year's coup. But I do not believe that there is any possibility of Nkrumah's regime being revived in the future, although I think the present regime will have difficult times or might be changed in some way. For many years Dr. Nkrumah was recognised as the top leader in the whole of Africa. So his influence was felt throughout Africa for some years. I feel the African people were too impatient to gain independence. So a cult which does not care for the means used to realise one's aim was popular among them. Dr. Nkrumah was a typical representative of this cult. It seems to me that he thought the end always justified the means. In order to realise the great aim of emancipating the whole of Africa quickly, it was sometimes necessary for him to show the importance and prestige of the African leaders. So when he went out, he was always accompanied by more than 40 cycle-riding policemen in brilliant costumes. And he thought that because he was aiming to emancipate the whole of Africa, he would be allowed to suppress any people who stood in his way. Thus the country became a deliberately organized police state. But still he failed.

Then, in Africa, for the first time, another cult was started to care for the means employed to realize one's aims. In other words, if one wants to go into politics, one should at first purify himself. The promoter of this cult is Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and other Zambian leaders. How simple a life Dr. Kaunda leads is well known. I am acquainted with Dr. Kaunda but as he is President I could not have a chance to know his private life intimately. But I dare say that I have a very intimate friend among Zambian leaders who is a very close co-worker of Dr. Kaunda. He is Maunza Chona, Minister of Presidential Affairs. Once at Livingstone, in Zambia, I wanted to see him but nobody knew where he was. I went to a local hotel where I knew I could stay most economically. The room was clean but small and they charged only 10 shillings for a night. I found, to my surprise, that the next room had been booked by Mr. Chona, Home Minister at that time.

Last December I met Mr. Chona at Nairobi. He said: "My salary is exactly three hundred and one pounds". He emphasized the last word *one pound*. Maybe he wanted to be exact. He continued: "I have been saving some money out of my income for a long time. Even when I got only £60 a month, I could save £20 out of it. So even now I save some part of my income. But still it is too much for my wife and seven kids. I don't want to get any more income at all. So I cannot understand why ministers of other African countries getting the same or bigger salaries than I try to get more income, becoming advisers of some firms or managing their private farms. I cannot understand their mentality". This is very strange thinking if we look at the life of the so-called politicians of the world, except some Indian politicians. I want to stress that in Zambia £301 is not so big a salary as it is supposed to be in India, because young European technicians easily get such a high amount every month.

Because Dr. Nkrumah advocated the emancipation of the whole of Africa, he is still esteemed in the far-away countries of Africa, like Zambia, although he is quite unpopular in his home country, Ghana. Many people in Zambia have the impression that last year's coup in Ghana was organized by the imperialists of England or America. Mr. Maunza Chona told me: "No doubt there was the imperialists' hand behind the coup of Ghana, but if our African Government itself is corrupt, it is very easy for the enemy to topple it". These words show how determined the Zambian leaders are to keep their life clean. Frankly speaking, it was not so very difficult for African leaders to gain political independence. Just after World War II big powers like Britain and France themselves calculated that it would be more profitable to give independence to their old colonies than to keep them. So, without taking much care about their own private lives, African leaders could guide the independence movements successfully. But if they wanted to get independence in the true sense, that is, from the economic point of view, it would be very difficult. If they want to achieve it, the most important thing is that the leaders themselves should purify their lives. This truth was realized by the leaders of Zambia. I think in Tanzania also at least President Nyerere has faith in it. Although I don't like the authoritarian attitude of Dr. Banda in Malawi, it is true that the Malawian leaders have a sense of austerity.

Many people think the main trend in Africa in these years has been African defiance of communist influence and the coming nearer to the western camp. But I don't think this is the basic trend. You must see developments in the Congo. When General Mobutu dismissed ex-President Kasavubu, who attended the OAU conference at Accra and tried to reconcile his country with the surrounding African states, many people anticipated a revival of the Tshombe regime. But in reality General Mobutu has deliberately followed the fundamental policy of reconciling the Congo with other African states.

General Mobutu has nothing to do with the leftists, but he has clearly demonstrated that he is also a staunch nationalist. So the new trend in Africa is to try to stand on one's own feet.

In Africa nothing is more real than the struggle of the South against the North and every other happening is merely phenomenal. The African people want to improve themselves and want to stand on an equal footing with the so-called advanced countries. The main political expression of this desire is the struggle to emancipate their brothers from the rule of the European minority in the southern part of Africa, the centre of which is in the South African Union, where the apartheid policy is stubbornly pursued by its government and its two wings stretching to Mozambique and Angola, still ruled by the Portuguese. The focal point of the struggle is to get rid of the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. On these problems Africa can unite, but other problems divide Africans among themselves.

Another remarkable trend in Africa in recent years is that Red China, which established considerable influence in Africa within a short time, has lost almost all of it within a very short time. Why did it happen? In my opinion, Red China was very clever in its minor tactics, but was very foolish in the big strategy it used. The main reason for its failure was its misunderstanding of the fundamental problem of Africa. As stated above, the African people did not kick out the ruling powers—Britain and France—by their own military force. The big powers wanted to retreat in their own interest and keep their dignity. So we can say that the main forces of European imperialism in Africa have been retreating. What remains is the so-called rear guard, not the avant-garde which prepares for invasion by the main troops. In these circumstances naturally the strategy of the African people to get independence should be changed. It should be sometimes fighting and sometimes using negotiating tactics. But Red China mistook the remnant, the rear guard, for the avant-garde, and inspired the fierce fight only. That did not fit in with the African circumstances. At the beginning, the Chinese strategy appealed to some of the sentiments of the African people. Because everywhere we can find weak-minded people who dare not say anything when under the mighty rule of imperialism, but who want to throw stones at the enemy when it is retreating. Chinese propaganda captured the mind of these people for a while. So for a short time Chinese influence spread, but it was not strong in reality. It faded away very quickly. The fact that the Red Chinese leaders misunderstood the fundamental trend in Africa is shown by the message of General Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of Red China, when he was about to leave Africa after the planned Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers failed in July 1964. He said: "We shall hold a conference in November, and the main items to be discussed will be, first, Vietnam, second Dominica and third Congo". Vietnam is no doubt the most important problem of Asia, but at the same time it is the most controversial one. Dominica is neither in Asia nor in Africa. He picked up the internal struggle of the Congo as the sole item from the vast continent of Africa.

But later developments clearly showed that the Congo rebellion was not deeply rooted among the people. True, among the people in the Congo there was widespread distrust in the central government because the late Patrice Lumumba was cruelly killed. But these were only pathetic sentiments and the rebellion had no practical constructive plan behind it. Once Mr. Tshombe, utilizing the menace of the rebellion, captured power, the rebellion could attract wide sympathy among the African nations because they did not like Tshombe's policy which relied on the armed force of white mercenaries. But the reality was that the Congo rebellion was started not after Tshombe got power but before he came into power. So by the dramatic appearance of ex-President Kasabuvu at the OAU conference at Accra, the Congo problem was dropped from the agenda unanimously by the African states. Why did Chinese Foreign Minister Chen not choose the South African apartheid or the Rhodesian white minority rule as the main problems of Africa and Asia? This is the fundamental reason why the Chinese lost Africa. But, at the same time, the western powers should realize that they could keep their influence in Africa only because of the Chinese failure, not because of any positive reasons.

Now I want to utilize this opportunity to express frankly my opinion about the future of residents of Indian origin in Africa. In Africa live about a million people of Indian origin—in South Africa about half a million, in East Africa more than three lakhs mainly concentrated in Kenya and in Zambia, Malawi, and Rhodesia a little less than a lakh. You also find many of them in Mozambique. In South Africa the Indians are severely suppressed as are the African people. So in that part of Africa we do not find any hostility between Africans and Indians. But in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, where the Africans have already got power, we see a big problem about the future of Indians. Most of the Indians in Africa are well established and are as a whole well-to-do people forming the middle class between the white and black peoples. They are mainly engaged in commerce. It will not be too much to say that all the commerce is monopolized by the Indians. This situation can be compared with that of the Chinese inhabitants of Indonesia. I think the Indians in East Africa were wiser than the Chinese in Indonesia. Some of them co-operated with the independence movement of the native people. But the Chinese in Indonesia were quite indifferent to the independence movement there. Between African leaders and Indian leaders in Africa there is still a friendly feeling although they are racially different. But I cannot say that the feeling between the mass of African natives and Indians will be favourable in the future. If we compare the East African people with the West African people, we cannot say that they are inferior to the West African people. But in West Africa there are no Indian inhabitants and so shops can be opened by African people even though they are very miserable ones. They have a chance to develop them. But to start a shop, for example, in Nairobi, is very difficult for the African native people. From the beginning they have to compete with the greater ability and bigger capital of the Indians. This fact no doubt hinders the development of the African people. The Indians traditionally employ only people of their own cast for responsible positions in their enterprises. This gives rise to a serious grievance in the minds of the African native people. I am afraid that in the near future this grievance may burst into an explosion.

On this point I want to give frankly two suggestions to the Indian inhabitants in Africa. The first will be well understood by them. Some of them have already started to act on it. It is that they should educate their children to make them not merchants but engineers or technicians or doctors. If the Indian inhabitants always take to commerce, it is almost certain that one day they will be kicked out by the African native people. But if they train their children as engineers or technicians, their position will be much stronger in the future. My second suggestion, I am afraid, might not be understood equally well. It is that they should promote racial mixture with the African native people. I understand well that it is very very difficult for the Indian people, who have deep-rooted traditions, to do this. I appreciate that the Indian people are well trained. Even after becoming well-to-do, they have not produced any illegal children of mixed blood. But if they want to settle for ever in East Africa, racial mixture is very essential even though the process might take a long time. African young men and women have the same qualities as the young people of other advanced countries. They are intelligent and even physically beautiful. What is hindering this racial mixture? I don't think it is tradition alone. We can sometimes see in a big city like New Delhi or Bombay Indian gentlemen proudly accompanying their European wives. But I have never seen a single Indian gentleman accompanied by his African wife. Does it show racial prejudice? I admit that among us Japanese the sense of racial prejudice is much deeper than among the Indian people. Only we are happy because we have never been in the position to make a big problem for the African people. That is because we do not have a big number of inhabitants in Africa. I don't want to blame only the Indian people. But all efforts should be made to eliminate racial prejudice against the black people from the world as a whole. The people who should tackle this deep-rooted racial prejudice not only by mouth, not only ideologically, not only by writing articles but in the midst of their own lives. The people of Indian origin in Africa are the people who should truly carry the cross on their back and climb up the steep hill. I want to conclude my poor article by expressing my hope for the future of the African native people and, at the same time, for the people who came to Africa to settle there from other countries.

As my last words I want to ask you, "How many legs are necessary to keep a table stable?" Everybody will reply: "At least three legs". But look at today's human civilization. How many legs has it? It has only one and a half legs to support it. One leg is made of the European race and the half leg of the Asian people. We should try our utmost effort to develop our Asian nations to become a leg of the same length as the one made of European nations. At the same time, I can't help expressing my sincere hope that the African people will develop themselves and form another leg in order to keep the human civilization stable for ever.

The Problem of Racialism*

KENNETH D. KAUNDA

SIR, you have touched among so many things the question of Indo-Zambian relations which is one of the many functions that this Council performs. You have also expressed the view that the efforts of the Council might meet with some success. Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, that in my own Central Committee or the Party, in my own cabinet we have three to four Ministers who were trained or educated here in India through this Council. We are under the impression that the efforts we have been making for such a long time have met with great success. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, there is much more to be done and therefore there is no room for any complacency. We have got to be on the road marching and toiling for the good of humanity as a whole.

Friends, our Chairman tonight has touched upon a number of very important points which I would not for a moment dream of trying to repeat. But I would like to take this opportunity to give my audience some idea of the type of thinking that makes the Zambian leaders teach wherever they go. Like this great country, as I pointed out yesterday in Parliament, we believe in non-racialism. It is wise for me to outline before a Council like this one the whole dispute a bit more than I did in Parliament, to try to find out precisely through which phase we have come. We preached this policy of non-racialism more realistically to see that it does not flourish among peoples of different colours, religious beliefs or creeds. We believed, as we do now, that a man must be judged not by artificial barriers but that he should be judged by his own character, his own behaviour. If a man must be castigated, if a man must be punished, he should not be punished because he is black, brown, white or yellow but because of his being against law.

This I would like to say to the members of the Council, to the members of the public here, that we were greatly pained at the time when our friend by the name of Roy Welensky was in control; he is a hefty man, in size, I think, a six-footer with a very big body but, I am afraid, rather empty upstairs. He divided all of us in our departments of life; black in their own department of life; yellow men in their own department of life and the Africans and the black in their own departments of life. Because this is the best way. I want to make this point, Mr. Chairman, because I want to show that our thinking has come out of miseries; it has come out of sufferings. We said to ourselves we would have no right at all after having won independence, after having gone through its oppressions and suppressions, to tell around a case against our fellow men who happened to be white, even though they were in a position of power, even when they oppressed us.

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*Being the text of a speech delivered at a public meeting held under the auspices of the Indian Council for Africa at New Delhi on June 17, 1967.

This would be wrong, politically as well as morally. To us morality and politics are inseparable. They are one and the same thing because they both pertain to man. Now with this background it would be realised by my audience how much pain we suffered in Zambia. We are now trying to create a non-racial society and yet we find ourselves surrounded by a group of men and women who do not believe in such principles as we do. They are ruling in what is called Mozambique, Portuguese colonies; they are against Zambia. They are in a country called Angola. These same people are ruling some of us in Rhodesia.

We can see that Zambia is like an island. Here we preach the importance of man regardless of his colour. People around us are preaching apartheid. They teach some men are superior to others. These are the people who are preaching the gospel of Christianity, the Christian Gospel. These men do what they do in the name of western civilization. The West is busy and waiting for what I do not know. The West is sitting behind watching the tragic scene and yet not denouncing the unfortunate Southern African barriers.

May I say that unless something is done quickly there stands a very real chance of an explosion taking place in that part of Africa, an explosion that, I think, will make the Vietnam war look very much like a beginning because this war would be fought on ideological as well as racial grounds. The problem of racialism has reached the saturation point but the time is not far when the situation might explode.

The young men and women of African origin, black, I should say black young men, were growing up in this atmosphere, an atmosphere of hate, hate based on colour, hate based not on behaviour but on colour. Those of us who believe in God know and all of you know that all of us are the creation of one God whether we are black, white, yellow or pink. We are children of one God and yet we see this is happening. Now such is the likely development and this is the point of my further emphasis, Mr. Chairman, a point which I would like the Council to take note of. I also tell you, Sir, we are facing a situation which, if not properly handled, may lead to not only an ideological explosion such as is taking place in Vietnam now but also a racial explosion. In other words, there are likely to be two explosions in one and therefore I feel it is going to be more serious than the Vietnam one.

Mr. Chairman, young men and women in Southern Africa are being oppressed by the respective white governments and we are just onlookers. A wall of hatred has been created between the black and white peoples. In this part of Africa young men and women have resigned themselves to the use of force but the western powers who are the masters of these racialists are keeping silent and a systematic confusion has been created in these countries. Now who am I to blame? I can't blame them; and every day we see these young people passing through Zambia, escaping the police from South Africa, the police from Rhodesia, the police from Mozambique and Angola to come to Zambia, to go to the eastern countries like China and Russia and such other countries in general in order to evade coercion and oppression by the police.

They are being trained in the use of weapons. I am not saying it is wrong; my audience should take note of it. I am merely describing a situation which is developing in Southern Africa. The young men and women are going to the East. They are to learn how to use dangerous weapons; they are not only being taught how to use dangerous weapons, they are also being taught geography.

Therefore, first of all, Africa, which preaches non-alignment, is in this context, in the present state of affairs, being aligned with eastern countries. Some are pro-China, some are pro-Russia, some got training in China, some got training in Russia and other eastern countries. So such is the development. What is the meaning of all this? I see Africa helplessly moving towards a catastrophe. Here I am one of the leaders of Africa and yet I am unable to do anything. I am completely helpless. I am unable to do anything about this catastrophe. They are preaching Christianity in the name of western civilization. When, therefore, this explosion takes place we will see here we are a mixture of black, brown, yellow, and black. This is the precise position in South Africa.

When this explosion takes place, like the one in Vietnam, it is going to be different. It is going to be also China vs. Russia in Southern Africa. I say it because of the West. More than that no one is going to decide on account of colour. You are black, you are the enemy, you go; you are white, you are the enemy, you go. Now who is bringing this about? I think the Western powers. This is their sole responsibility. These are the people who are preaching what they do in the name of Christianity and western civilization.

Now I may make an apology because I am a Christian but about Christianity I cannot say. These are the men who represent the West. The Portuguese in Angola and their oppressions, the Portuguese in Mozambique and their oppressions and others who represent the West preach the Christian faith. Friends, these people are so powerfully organised because economically they are supported by the West; they have got the capital, they have got the know-how. They are poisoning the minds of the uncommitted, innocent people of the racialist countries. Those people who are non-aligned are communist and nothing more; therefore, they must support these countries.

Friends, what is going to happen? I may be a pessimist. I live in that situation. I was born in South Africa, I have grown up there. It is my home and still I have a serious situation there. I have grown in it and I know precisely what is happening in South Africa. Unless something can be done quickly, this poisonous propaganda that Smith and Salazar, the whole trio, are conducting is poisoning the minds of those innocent and uncommitted masses of the West. That is happening. The West is going to be less and less forthcoming in terms of aid to the developing countries of Africa. These propagandists may take only the place of Hitler and others. These people will gather round and say, "Ah! you see a vacuum has been left". It is the most tragic area in this whole area. We will very soon see a vaccum being created because the western powers will not be interested in helping these developing countries because of their non-aligned policy and because of the propaganda of these powerful machineries led by the trio.

Friends, what is going to follow is that the vacuum must be filled. Then what happens? Again, the same powerful machinery is going to be more active in racialist capitals. Now, which of the Western powers are going to be committed to the side of this whole trio? These things we are explaining to the people to point out thât the path the Western powers are taking, so far as African developments are concerned, is a wrong one and the latest change we are going to face is a development which is going to end in a tragedy. I see the whole of South Africa almost like a boat in which a man is moving . . However, there is still hope and some chance because the African leaders, as I said, are truly uncommitted and although propaganda is going round and I would hope that Western leaders should wake up in time to stop this tragedy. If they do not stop it, if they do not do something, then, of course, history must hold them guilty.

Earlier, in his welcome speech, Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, said : The Indian Council for Africa and 27 other organisations have joined us this evening for this function. We greatly honour the privilege that our distinguished visitor has given us to hear him and be inspired by him. Those of us who are members of Parliament yesterday had the rare opportunity of listening to his words, to his moving words of great wisdom and deep humanity. The Republic of Zambia can claim the distinction of having the same birthday as the United Nations and His Excellency, perhaps, I do not know, deliberately chose that day. In a sense Zambia is today the sentinel of freedom in Africa because it stands at that midpoint in Africa where the division takes place between those countries of Africa where the freedom has been achieved and realised and those countries of Africa where people still remain enchained and enslaved.

This particular period of our century has witnessed the birth of a large number of nation-states. Many countries which for generations, for centuries, were under colonialism have asserted their freedom. Therefore naturally and necessarily all over the world we have an arresting array of founding fathers of new nations and republics, but among them Mr. Kaunda stands out as not just one among equals but someone who is outstanding because he is a man of great vision, great courage, courage which is always qualified by wide restraint.

Zambia has very well developed copper mining industries. It has also some highly developed plantations and these have enabled it to have a fairly developed economy, but there are other parts of the economy which His Excellency is trying to modernise and reorganise. Economic ties between Zambia and India are slowly growing, but I am sure that if His Excellency so desires we would be only too happy to be of further assistance in the development of Zambia and thereby strengthen the mutual ties between our two countries. Zambia is a landlocked country. I think in copper mining the country, in spite of its great achievements, is left behind mainly because of transport difficulties. I think His Excellency is just now broadly applying his mind even when he is here to the problem that he will have to face when the common railway system that has united Zambia with Southern Rhodesia will be scrapped by the end of this month and fresh burdens and fresh responsibilities will fall on His Excellency's shoulders. One of the most important things that Zambia, I believe, needs is the development of railways and in that we have a certain amount of experience. If we can be of any use, that experience is at His Excellency's disposal. Zambia has also tried to develop a whole variety of new industries. Here too precisely in those areas and in those sectors of economy where the Zambian people want to move forward we may be able to be of some assistance.

I would like to take this opportunity to introduce very briefly the Indian Council for Africa. It is a modest organisation that seeks to interpret Africa to India and India to our African brothers. We try to be of some service to African students studying here, try to make them feel at home to the extent it is possible for us and generally it is our endeavour to make the Indian people understand the richness, the wealth, the complexity and the excitement that the people of Africa feel today in the sphere of transformation. Likewise, we like to communicate to the people of Africa the effort that the 500 million people of India are making.

Planning in French-speaking Territories of Africa

J. C. SRIVASTAVA

PLANNING, often defined as determination of priorities, appears to have become a *sine qua non* of economic development. Almost all countries—developed or developing—have today adopted the concept of economic planning in one form or another. It has however assumed greater importance and urgency in developing countries endeavouring vigorously to liberate themselves from poverty, unemployment and under-development—main characteristics of their economies—and raise their level of living to that of the economically advanced nations as rapidly as possible. It is often argued that allocation and utilisation of scarce national resources, which are crucial determinants of the rate of economic growth, cannot be left in these countries entirely to the "trial and error" method of *laissez faire* or to the free play of market forces. They have to be invested in accordance with a pre-determined scheme of priorities consistent with the generally accepted objectives of "rapid economic development" and "maximam social welfare". It is for the realisation of these goals that planning is advocated for most developing countries.

In the continent of Africa too development planning has become "an accepted method of ordering the economic and social lives of the people."[1] The newly independent nations of Africa (numbering 40 today) which have broken the shackles of foreign rule only very recently are bristling with the "revolution of rising expectation" of rapid advancement of their economies in order to mitigate the disparities which separate them from the rest of the world. The leadership in these countries has accepted the challenge and formulated development plans and programmes to fight "the age-old afflictions of mankind, poverty, squalor, disease and ignorance"[2] which surround most of the people of the continent.

Although the adoption of economic planning and setting of goals for national development is a recent phenomenon in Africa which largely followed the attainment of freedom, the idea of programming or project formulation was not altogether absent in the pre-independence era. In many countries, such as those which were once French colonies, viz, the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Republic of Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta, some form of règulation was introduced as early as the inter-war period. The Great Depression of the thirties impelled the metropolitan countries like the UK and France to strive for economic recovery through the utilisation of dependent territories for the expansion of output, trade and overseas investments. France, for instance, convened the Imperial Economic Conference in 1934-35 and a Colonial Development Fund was created to be spent over a period of 15 years in the economies of the French Empire which was, for the purpose of execution of economic recovery programmes, integrated into one unit. This centralised character continued to be reflected in the formulation of post-independence development plans of some of the French-speaking countries.

This paper attempts to analyse some of the main features of planning in this part of the continent and outlines briefly the prospects which it unfolds for economic cooperation with India. While doing so, a brief reference to the economies of these countries would not be out of place.

Economies of French-speaking Africa

All the French-speaking countries, with the exception of Guinea, achieved independence in the year 1960. The Republic of Guinea i[illegible] perhaps the only country in the whole of Africa which won her freedom from France through a plebiscite in 1958. These Franco-phonic countries, though covering an area of 9 million sq. kms, which is more than three times that of India, are small and sparsely populated, the density ranging from 1 person for every 4 to 6 sq. km., as in Chad, to 20 persons per sq. km. as in Dahomey, etc. Their total population, estimated at 40 million, contrasts sharply with the 500 million population of India. The countries of this area are however economically underdeveloped and relatively backward compared to other parts of the world though the state of economic development varies from country to country. The countries situated on or near the Western Sea Coast, such as Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal etc, are economically better off than others situated in the hinterland and interior of the continent. For instance, a major part of Mauritania, Mali and Niger is desert. The Republic of Upper Volta, like Mali, is predominantly grassy and unsuited for settled cultivation. Hides and meat etc. are the principal products of this country. Ivory Coast and Senegal, on the other hand, are the two advanced countries of the former French Africa with a per capita income of between $150 and $200 (Rs. 1,125 to Rs. 1,500). Guinea is another country which has vast reserves of minerals such as iron ore, bauxite, diamonds etc. The per capita incomes of many of the other countries are less than $100 (Rs. 750) and for Chad, Central African Republic, Dahomey and Togo etc it is less than $50 (Rs. 375).

Agriculture, mostly on a subsistence basis, and extraction of minerals, mainly for export, are the chief sources of income and employment in these countries. Industrialisation in Franco-phonic Africa is in its very early stages although some advance has been made in countries like Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Senegal. The manufacturing sector in these countries consists largely of small units processing mainly primary products such as minerals and agricultural commodities. Efforts are however being made in these countries to set up new industries to produce a wide range of consumer goods and process some of the minerals.

Economically under-developed, the former French African countries are considerably rich in terms of economic potential. They have an important place in the world as producer[illegible] suppliers of agricultural and mineral products. Groundnuts, coffee, [illegible] products and cocoa are the chief products of the agrarian sector. In m[illegible]ls, Guinea, for example, produces over 6 per cent of the global output o[illegible] auxite. Gabon is the second largest producer of manganese ore in the continent and contributed as much as 7 per cent of the world output in 1964. Senegal and Togo are important suppliers of phosphates accounting for 4 per cent of the world output. Mauritania has one of the largest iron ore deposits in the world. Gabon, Upper Volta and Congo are important producers of gold. This provides a glimpse of the promising potential of the area which, if properly exploited, will boost its economic progress.

Development Planning in French-speaking Africa

Since the attainment of independence, these countries have undertaken the task of fighting poverty, underdevelopment and economic backwardness. Development plans and programmes have been formulated. The plans in each country however differ in perspective and period as well as in comprehensiveness and detail. The first plans in most of the countries are of a preliminary nature. In fact, many of them largely comprise a list of various projects in agricultural, industrial and socio-economic fields to be undertaken during the plan period by Government as well as private enterprise. Many plans however attempt to take a closer look at the "national resources, natural, human and financial, relate investment to expected output in various sectors, present balance of payments budgets and propose institutional and administrative reforms for executing the Plans"[3]. In brief, these plans show an improvement on the various programmes undertaken by the French authorities during the pre-independence era inasmuch as they recognise the need for systematic efforts for nation-building.

These transitional plans, as they are often called, have been formulated to prepare necessary conditions for more comprehensive and elaborate programmes. For instance, the Two-Year *Plan Intermaire* (1965-66) of Chad and the Three-Year Plan (1960-62) of the Central African Republic were launched to make basic studies of the economy and obtain necessary data in the fields of agriculture, industry, manpower as well as consumption and trade so that sounder plans could be drawn up for national economic development. The interim plan of Congo (Brazzaville) extending over a period of five years (1964-68) was inaugurated in 1964 with similar objectives although it aims at improvement of agricultural production, organised exploitation of mineral and forest wealth and create the necessary climate and conditions for rapid industrialisation and growth of the country. The proposed creation of an agro-industrial complex in the Niari Valley in the south-west of the country, the hydro-electric project at Kouilou and the industrial complex in the Point-Noire area during the plan period were undertaken with this aim in view. The Three-Year Development Plan of Gabon (1963-65) was designed to initiate projects in various fields and prepare the ground for a more comprehensive Five-Year Plan (1966-70). Similarly, Mauritania's Four-Year Development Plan (1963-66) was preceded by a Three-Year Interim Plan (1960-62) which was initiated with the main object of improving the economic and administrative infrastructures and eliminating the initial bottlenecks hampering the growth of the national economy and its resources.

In some countries the interim plans [illegible] undergoing extensive modifications and are being or likely to be substituted by more comprehensive and elaborate ones. For instance, Dahomey's Three-Year Plan, launched in 1962, has been revised by the country's new Government. Major changes have been introduced in Ivory Coast's Ten-Year Development Plan (1960-70) which is to be substituted by a Five-Year Plan (1965-69). Similarly, Niger's short-term Plan (1961-63) was later modified and made a part of the current Seven-Year Plan (1964-70) designed by the *Institute Des Science Economiques Appliques* (ISEA). Togo's Five-Year Plan (1966-70) has been revised and substituted by a new plan covering the period 1965-69. The Development Plan of Upper Volta is also undergoing considerable modifications in its objectives and targets mainly due to shortages of capital and feasible projects which became apparent soon after its inception. These modifications and revisions in the development plans are indicative of the preliminary nature of planning with which the Franco-phonic countries started after achieving their sovereign independent status.

Another significant point about planning in this area is that many of the plans have been formulated within a framework of longer perspective. It is recognised in these countries that the problems of economic growth which presuppose the existence of certain necessary conditions can be resolved only over a period of time. Cameroon's Five-Year Plan (1961-65), for example, was initiated as part of the Twenty-Year (1960-80) Plan with the aim of doubling the country's per capita income. The Four-Year Development Plan of Dahomey (1962-65) too had a 20-year perspective (1960-80) for industrialisation of the economy and raising the standard of living of the people. Senegal's First and Second Four-Year Plans (1961-64 and 1965-69) were initiated within a perspective of 16 years which set a target of doubling the country's per capita income. The Republic of Togo's Five-Year Plan (1965-69) has been formulated within the framework of a long-term perspective extending over a period of 20 years (1965-85) with the objective of diversifying agricultural and industrial production and making the economy self-sufficient in some of these fields. The Plan of Upper Volta (1963-67) has a perspective of 15 years (1963-78) during which it is envisaged to increase agricultural production, prepare the groundwork for exploration of mining and industrialisation of the economy so as to achieve the objective of raising the national income by two and a half times by the end of 1978.

A synopsis of the various development plans and programmes being initiated in French-speaking countries is given in Table I.

TABLE I[4]

Development Plans and Programmes in French-speaking Countries of Africa

Country	Year of Independence	Transitional Plans	Current Plans	Perspective Plans	Plans under Preparation
1. Cameroon	1960	—	1961-65	1960-80	—
2. Central African Republic	1960	1960-62	1964-65	—	—
3. Chad	1960	1964-65	1966-70	—	—
4. Congo (Brazzaville)	1960	1961-64	1964-68	—	—
5. Dahomey	1960	1962-65	—	1960-80	—
6. Gabon	1960	1963-65	1966-70	—	—
7. Guinea	1958	1960-63	1964-70	—	—
8. Ivory Coast	1960	1962-63	—	1960-70	1965-69
9. Mali	1960	—	1961-65	—	—
10. Mauritania	1960	1960-62	1963-66	—	—
11. Niger	1960	1961-63	1965-74	—	—
12. Senegal	1960	1961-64	1965-69	1961-75	—
13. Togo	1960	—	1966-70	1965-84	1965-69
14. Upper Volta	1960	1963-67	1963-67	1963-78	—

Development plans in most of the Franco-phonic countries have more or less identical objectives which stem largely from the similarity of the economic and social situations obtaining in this part of the world. All the countries in their plans have underlined the paramount importance of raising the standard of living of the masses by increasing the facilities for education, health, housing and other components of economic and social development. This, many of the plans emphasise, would be achieved through the process of rapid growth of the gross national product (GNP) and rise in the per capita income. It is perhaps with this aim in view that these countries have planned for a relatively higher rate of increase in national income.

The planned annual growth rate of these countries varies from 4 to over 9 per cent. A higher annual growth of GNP – 9.2 per cent—and a per capita income of 7.9 per cent has been envisaged in the Four-Year Development Plan (1963-66) of Mauritania, the smallest country in terms of population (1 million in 1965). Details of the anticipated annual growth rate, both in terms of per capita income and gross national product, in the plans of some of the Franco-phonic countries are given in Table II.

While deciding on the rates of growth of national income in their plans, many of these countries appear to have been largely influenced by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution which set out a target

TABLE II[5]

Planned annual growth rates in some of the African development plans

Country	Plan period	Annual growth rate in GNP	Annual growth rate in per capita income
		(Percentage increase by the end of plan period)	
Cameroon	1961-65	5.5	3.5
Congo (Brazzaville)	1964-68	7.3	5.1
Chad	1966-70	6.0	—
Dahomey	1961-81	6.3	—
Mali	1961-65	8.0	5.5
Mauritania	1963-66	9.2	7.9
Niger	1961-63	5.0	2.3
Senegal	1965-69	6.0	3.7
Togo	1966-70	5.6	3.7

for "a minimum annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent at the end of Development Decade".[6]

To what extent the growth rates planned in these countries are economically sound, technically feasible and financially viable is difficult to say, particularly in view of the non-availability of requisite information and data. Similarly, it is not possible to pass judgment on the rationality of the priorities laid down in the plans as also their consistency with the planned objectives. Judging from the progress of the plans, it may be said that many of the countries have failed to achieve their targets. For instance, the rate of growth of 3.3 per cant which Senegal realised during the first Four-Year Plan (1961-64) was far below the target of 8 per cent. Similarly, the actual growth rate realised by Mali at 5 per cent per annum during 1960-64 fell short of the target by as much as 3.5 per cent.

It may however be mentioned that despite the inconsistency between the targets and their achievement which is a characteristic of the initial stages of planning, these countries have demonstrated their resolve to make determined and organised efforts to bring about structural changes in their economies which are necessary pre-conditions for rapid economic growth.

Many of the French-speaking countries have planned to achieve the structural transformation in their economies necessary to realise higher growth rates chiefly by lessening the relative importance of agriculture and primary products and increasing industrial production. The development plans reflect the urge for an "industrial revolution" which is sweeping the entire continent of Africa and, for that matter, the whole of the developing world. Many of them have set targets for achieving considerably high rates of expansion of the manufacturing sector. For example, Ivory Coast's Development Plan (1960-70) aims at doubling industry's share in the national income from 12.4 per cent in 1960 to 25.8 per cent in 1970. Mali and Mauritania, on the other hand, have planned for the growth of their manufacturing output by more than 19 per cent per annum. In Senegal, while the gross industrial output was anticipated to rise by 86 per cent in 1961-64, the annual growth rate was expected to increase by 13 per cent. Similarly, in Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea industrial production is projected to increase by 10 to 15 per cent per annum during the plan periods. Except in Guinea, private enterprise is supposed to play a prominent role in achieving these targets in all the countries. Guinea is the only country in this area where the public sector has been assigned the major role due to the socialistic character of its planning.

In their industrialisation programmes, almost all countries of the franc zone have made deliberate attempts to provide domestic substitutes for imported goods, increase the value of their exports by processing those primary products, both agricultural and mineral, which till now used to be exported in crude raw material form and expand employment opportunities.

The products which feature in their import substitution programmes are mostly consumer goods including, among others, food beverages, tobacco, soap, textiles, clothing and footwear. The other import substituting enterprises which are planned to be set up largely in some of the relatively developed countries like Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Congo, Guinea, etc, are plastic goods industries, cement plants, sugar factories and units manufacturing a variety of items including light engineering goods. In most such cases imported raw materials will be used. Similarly, units processing agricultural commodities and minerals chiefly for export are also being established, for example, timber extraction and processing plants in Gabon, mills extracting vegetable oils from groundnuts palm kernels etc in Senegal, Mali, Niger, alumina plants in Cameroon, and Guinea, superphosphate plants in Senegal and Togo, and iron ore exploitation plants in Mauritania.

In some countries like Senegal, considerable emphasis has been placed on changing the structure of industrial output from consumer goods to capital goods producing heavy industries so as to create a favourable climate for rapid economic growth. The output of such industries is envisaged to increase four times in its current development plan (1965-69).

The urge for industrialisation is so great in these countries that notwithstanding the limitation and scarcity of capital, technical knowhow, entrepreneural and managerial skills, they have planned to establish many such industries simultaneously and within a given period of time. The problems inherent in such planning are being largely solved by seeking foreign collaboration and cooperation. Many of them have recently announced encouraging incentives to attract foreign capital and investment. A large number of industries have already been installed in partnership with foreign entrepreneurs.

Prospects of Economic Cooperation with India

From the above observations it is evident that there is considerable scope for economic cooperation between India and these countries. This, it must be underlined, has to be fostered with a view to assisting and participating in their efforts for industrialisation and economic betterment and sharing with them our development experience. It is often advocated that India, as a relatively developed country, can make an important contribution by undertaking joint industrial ventures in many of these countries. Of the 50 joint ventures approved by the Government of India, 23 are being set up in Africa alone. It may, however, be mentioned that no project has so far been initiated in the French-speaking countries.

Now is the time when our industrialists and businessmen could demonstrate their willingness to participate and assist in the industrialisation programmes of these countries which are interested in having Indian cooperation. The FICCI-sponsored Indian Businessmen's Goodwill Mission which visited some of these countries—Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon and the Central African Republic—under the leadership of Dr. Bharat Ram in 1965 reported that these countries had "trust and confidence in India's capacity and willingness to give honest advice in the many and complex tasks of socio-economic development". According to the Mission, opportunities for Indian collaboration exist broadly in the entire range of consumer goods industries which are planned to be set up in these countries. Similarly, there is good scope for Indian participation, particularly in the establishment of medium and small-size industries in countries like Ivory Coast and Senegal. This was the finding of another Indian Industrial Delegation sponsored by the FICCI which visited these countries under the leadership of Mr Kamalnayan Bajaj, MP, in 1965. Our initiative in the establishment of joint industrial ventures will go a long way in forging new links and strengthening our trade ties with this part of the world. This will also open up vast, growing markets for our products.

Although our trade with these countries has not been very significant in the past, amounting to just Rs. 3.4 million in 1965-66, the scope for our developing two-way trade is not inconsiderable.[8] This is true even at a time when import substitution programmes are in full swing in most of these countries. It must be said that import substitution, which has become an important feature of industrial planning, is likely to generate greater import requirements. While there will be considerable changes in the import structure, the overall value and volume of imports will rise as a result of the increase in demand for machinery and spare parts, intermediate products and industrial raw materials which is inherent in the process of industrial development. The Franco-phonic countries are not unaware of this economic reality. Attempts have been made in their development plans to project the anticipated growth rates of imports as well as exports. As relevant statistics are not available for all these countries, Table III indicates tentatively the projected rates of growth of imports and exports in the development plans of a few countries.

The comparatively high rates of growth in the exports of Mauritania have been envisaged in view of the anticipated exploitation and shipment of vast deposits of iron ore. The projected high rates of growth in the imports of Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mali are largely due to the greater emphasis on industrialisation in their plans.

TABLE III[9]

Projected Rates of Growth of Foreign Trade in Development Plans

Countries	Plan Period	Imports	Exports
		(Annual compound growth rates)	
Congo (Brazz.)	1964-68	3.3	9.5
Ivory Coast	1960-70	6.9	6.3
Mali	1961-65	12.2	9.0
Mauritania	1963-66	0.5	49.4
Senegal	1964-69	7.8	5.4

Thus, there is ample scope and opportunities for our developing trade with these countries. This of course presupposes a radical transformation in our trade pattern and policies. Our exports to this area, which primarily consist of traditional items like jute goods, tea and cotton textiles, have to be remodelled to suit the changing requirements. Engineering and metallurgical products are likely to find promising markets in these countries. This should not be too difficult a proposition for our exporters, particularly in view of the credit liberalisation for the export of these goods announced by the Reserve Bank of India on 31 July 1967. Similarly, the demand for new and durable consumer goods is also expected to increase with the rise in national and per capita incomes envisaged in the development plans of these countries. Therefore, continuous and systematic efforts should be made to explore the possibilities of enlarging commercial and economic relations with them. Some thought should also be given to meeting some of our import needs from these countries as the future of our trade will also depend on our efforts to balance our imports and exports. While forging economic and commercial links with the new nations of Africa, it is essential that we take note of the economic imperatives facing them. If necessary, adjustments should be made in our own economic policies and programmes in order to meet the challenge.

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East African Common Market

KEJAWA ASSAF

PERHAPS the most significant aspect of African politics is the work to which President Nyerere of Tanzania has dedicated himself in political and philosophical aesthetics. It includes the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO) and the recently created East African Community, which takes effect from next December, to strengthen the common services and common market. The leaders of the three East African states—Presidents Obote of Uganda, Kenyatta of Kenya, and Nyerere of Tanzania—signed a treaty in Kampala on June 6, 1967, to provide for establishment of the community and of an East African Development Bank. Under this treaty, the three states undertook not to discriminate against each other's manufactures; but they will be allowed to impose new transferable taxes on goods imported from other community members if their East African trade balance is a deficit one.

The Development Bank, with headquarters in Kampala, will be required to share 77 per cent of its investment between Uganda and Tanzania to enable their industries to catch up with Kenya. Arrangements have also been made to enable the common services the be generally decentralised to give more autonomy to regional headquarters in each of the three countries. Therefore the headquarters of the common services are to be shared among the three states instead of being concentrated in Kenya as had been the case with EACSO since its inception in 1963. The community headquarters will be situated at Arusha (North Tanzania) while the post office headquarters will move from Nairobi to Kampala. Kenya retains the EACSO headquarters which controls railways, air services, customs and excise, and the Central Legislative Assembly. The purpose of this article is to analyse the prospects of the East African community after its parent (EACSO) organisation was temporarily bogged down in political and financial morass during the last three years.

The economic relationship among the three mainland states has led to the formation of an East African Common Market which is concerned with such matters as the regulation of inter-territorial trade and the allocation of industries among its member states. The common services authority, consisting of three heads of governments and an elected Central Legislative Assembly comprising Ministers of the three Governments and members chosen by the territorial legislatures, has the power to legislate on specific subjects. Lacking a philosophical infrastructure, the EACSO functioned purely as a piece of economic machinery, devoid of any social context. Its immense potential had been dwindling with its constituent members pursuing conflicting policies. A desperate sense of national frustration, finding an outlet in xenophobia, forced Tanzania to withdraw from the East African monetary system in summer last year, followed by Kenya and Uganda. The East African currency of the EACSO, beset with crises and spurred on by the complexities of political involvement, gave scant comfort to Tanzania's clamour for rapid progress and industrialisation. The EACSO is purported to be the East African version of the EEC (European Economic Community) and portends harmony, but due to the divergent policies flowing from the dissimilar economic development in the three territories, the common market operates to the discomfiture of Tanzania in particular. While the institution sought to foster joint fiscal and monetary policies, external trade and industrial development, it lacked the planning mechanism required to implement them.

Tanzania has suffered a net loss through the displacement of non-duty paying imports from the other two countries by less expensive duty-paying imported goods and although its exports to the other two countries increased by about 45 per cent last year, the trade gap has widened to its disadvantage. Its trade deficit with the other two countries stood at £12 million during that period. The imbalance arose as a result of Tanzania's lower level of development and poorer state of communications. For example, an industry located in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania's capital, cannot be expected to serve the East African market on competitive terms because of the distance and poorly developed transport facilities. To compete with Nairobi or Mombasa (Kenya) or Kampala (Uganda) it will require tariff protection to meet extra transport expenses. So Tanzania's disadvantage within the EACSO tends to be permanent. Its attitude towards the market became gloomy when the other two countries refused to help underwrite a loan for the construction of a railway line to link Dar-es-Salaam with Zambia which would not only increase the importance of Zanzania's harbour as an entrepot centre but also open up some of the isolated and under-developed southern parts of Tanzania, thus providing a local market for Dar-es-Salaam manufactures.

In a flamboyant move, Tanzania suggested a merely political federation among the three states. Kenya accused Tanzania of fiscal profligacy and complained about being forced by her to adopt a separate currency.

The ideal of a single Central Bank responsible to three independent sovereign states was not a realistic one. Its creation would have required close coordination of the policies (budgets, etc) of the three member states. Failing this the creation of a separate currency was the only possible alternative. The budget differences between Kenya and Tanzania show why a common central bank could not have accommodated the policies of both. While the Kenya budget is one of confidence in its present situation and there has been no increase in personal taxation, Tanzania's budget is one of austerity. It increased taxation on petrol, airport services, customs duties, beer, corporation and individual taxes and imposed a new development levy of five per cent on incomes, crops and company profits refundable to foreigners on leaving the country. Through this levy, which has been in operation since 1965, Tanzania has been able to save £18 million to reinforce her new currency with other sterling assets (estimated at about £17 million) at present held by the Government and various public bodies. The Tanzania National Bank was thus provided with a secure foundation upon which development and expansion of the nation's financial institutions could be planned with assurance.

The separate Central Bank has an overall advantage over the previous EACB (East African Currency Board) system. It could pursue a cautious monetary policy because of its dependence on a limited range of exports but institute legislation to protect the flight of capital from the area. The Bank could also take a new initiative to organise a money and investment market in the country and develop institutional arrangements for medium and long-term industrial loans and at the same time help in pursuing Tanzania's interests abroad.

II

Although Tanzania's long-term aspirations seem to have been pursued shrewdly, its liberal litany demands complete socialization of the economy. The preamble to the provisional Tanzanian constitution contains the clause : "To see that the government exercises control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of the country". Tanzania has adopted a critical, stringent line under the Arusha Declaration. The Arusha Declaration (31/1/67) stipulates that the leadership, which includes everyone in the government or the party down to middle grade civil servants and their wives, is forbidden to hold shares in any company or directorships in any privately-owned enterprise or to receive more than one salary (which means that no wife can take a job) or to own a house for rent, or to employ farm labour for wages. That very day all official cars of more than a certain size were taken away from Ministers. Dr. Nyerere restated his faith in socialism and self-reliance as the only means of solving the country's problems. He said it is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development. "First, we shall not get the money", he said. "Secondly, independence means self-reliance". Independence cannot be real if a nation depends on gifts and loans from another for its development". Dr. Nyerere was inspired by Rene Dumont's thought in *False Start in Africa* which is critical of both the former colonial and the present African regimes.

In Rene's view, all resources should be concentrated on agricultural development since over 80 per cent of all Africans are poor farmers. Unless their standard of living and their output are raised, Africans can make no real progress. Rene stripped the present African rulers of their luxuries and privileges and closed the "excessive gap between them and the ordinary Africans". Hamstrung by this theory, Dr. Nyerere kept his neurotic eye on the Ministers' privileges and private property.

"On January 27, Dr. Nyerere arrived in Arusha and the meeting of TANU (Tanzania African National Union) national executive began next morning. For three days the members argued inconclusively. Then he decided to give a lead; still under the influence of the student trouble, economic difficulties and M. Dumont's theories, he wrote on 20 pages, in long hand, what came to be known as the Arusha

Declaration. This explains why even his cabinet Ministers were caught unawares; some who were abroad read about the new policy in the foreign press......Tanzanian leadership is profoundly divided ......"over the Arusha Declaration. Some members of Dr. Nyerere's present entourage approve it wholly but many who have worked with him since he founded TANU in 1954 are not"[1].

President Nyerere has scathingly pronounced on the contemporary phenomenon of what is popularly known as Orthodox Marxism. His apocalyptic vision is in fact the epitome of a plain man in an era of political extremes. It is common knowledge that every society inculcates into its members a stereotype of what is right and permissible. It does this by specifying what is tolerable and what is not. But because of the diabolical procedure with which the declaration was launched, it was ill publicised abroad and sowed seeds of internal dissension among President Nyerere's Ministers whose interests were disastrously affected by the new policy.

III

Kenya's political leadership regarded Tanzania's socialistic policy as an extreme ideology. But many Kenyan intellectuals are infatuated with the achievement the Tanzanian Government has made, rather than with the ideology itself, by narrowing the gap between the ruling class and the average Africans who played an active role in the administration. For this reason the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) had a long wrangle over the technicalities prescribed by the left and right-wing factions of the party on various issues. It later erupted into a flash of anger in the Executive Party meeting of 1964 and expressed again in 1965. Mr. Bildat Kaggia, then a Junior Minister in the KANU Government, tendered his resignation. His explanation, given in a lecture to foreign journalists and university students, was based purely on moral principles ; it included the gravity of the land apportionment scheme under which lands were to be paid for by Kenyans who had fought for freedom for seven years in the colonial period and had no means of earning a livelihood.

A large part of the land, he claimed, was bought by foreigners who had taken an active part in oppressing the Kenyans. He added that the Kenyans were leading a third rate life even after independence had been achieved. Mr. Kaggia was removed from Parliament.

Two months later, an angry unemployed mob seized KANU headquarters in Nairobi. This was followed by strikes by industrial workers, including employees of the EACSO. The union leaders described the administration as a "monstrous breach of faith" and spoke of Tanzania's progress. The Government resorted to "steam-roller" tactics and legislated against strikes.

The KANU had in its fold people of different political thoughts who did not agree on Government policies. The left-wing elements claimed that the KANU manifestos for socialisation and Africanisation had been discarded. This led to bitter resentment among the party executives culminating in the break of the left-wing faction of Ministers and Parliamentary members headed by Vice-President Karamogi Oginga Odinga. Although Kenya had been a one-party state, the breakaway faction managed to register itself as an opposition party—the Kenya People's Union (KPU). The ruling KANU party enacted the Preventive Detention Act under which a person or group of persons could be detained as long as the President wished without trial and began a swoop on KPU leaders.

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[1] Judith Listowell, "LISTONDER", June 8, 1967.

> "In a series of dawn swoops last week, Kenya Police arrested six key leaders of the country's opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, under detention without trial powers vested by Parliament recently in President Jomo Kenyatta. The KPU leaders were taken from their beds and driven off to unknown destinations. Those arrested were General Secretary of the Kenya Petroleum Oil Workers' Union, Mr. Ochole Mak-Anyengo, the General Secretary of the East African Common Services African Civil Servants Union, Mr. Patrick Ooko, Mr. Oluande Oduol, ...who was acting as Private Secretary to the KPU President, Mr. Oginga Odinga, Mr. J.M.. Onyangi, who was the leader of the KPU Youth League, Mr. Omolo Rading, former Executive Officer in Mr. Oginga Odinga's Office when he was Kenya Vice-President, and another KPU leader. Mr. Onyango Arigi. Three days later, the police swooped again and arrested the Secretary General of the Kenya Sugar Plantation Workers' Union, Mr. Denis Akumu, who is the KPU Administration Secretary. No explanation for the arrests was given. They were not even reported in the English services of the Government-controlled Kenya Radio and television services. The first news of them came from Oginga Odinga himself who called a news conference in Nairobi to announce the first arrests and to complain that his own Nairobi flat and home of KPU Publicity Secretary and former Information Minister, Mr. Achieng Oneko, had been entered by Police and searched..."
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> *Reporter (East African), August 12, 1966, cols 3 & 4.*

IV

There is a very slight difference between the structure of politics in Kenya and Uganda. Uganda had emerged as an independent state with five federal autonomous regions and Sir Edward Fredrick Mutessa II as President. There was a bitter feud between the President and the then Prime Minister, Dr. Milton Obote, as to who should rule the nation. It later developed into an armed clash between the Federal forces of the Prime Minister and the Royal Guards of the President. The Guards were defeated and Sir Edward escaped to Britain for refuge. Dr. Obote became Executive President. The Vice-President and many other regional heads were deposed.

> "After a month ef intensive compaigning by rival groups the Busoga Districts Council has approved a motion to depose

> the District constitutional head, Sir William Wilberforce Nadiope. The motion was carried with a one-vote majority. The ousting of Sir William which needs Government approval has surprised many local people. He was Uganda Vice-President until February 1966 when the 1962 independence constitution was abrogated by President Obote, then Prime Minister. Sir William also helped Mr. Obote found the ruling UPC in 1960 and unitl last April was the party's Busoga Region Chairman. In Busoga after leading the UPC to victory in the National Elections which preceded independence Sir William was elected Kyabazinga of Busoga by an overwhelming majority in the present council, known at that time as the Busoga Lukiko.... The reason for Sir William's sudden ousting is not clearly understood in Uganda. Observers believe the action may have stemmed from Entebbe, his dismissal being recommended following his ousting from Vice-Presidency and the UPC".

Reporter, August 12,1966, p. 9,10.

The Uganda Parliament passed a Bill on 22nd June 1967 to abolish the Federal constitution and the posts of Regional Chiefs. From the foregoing it is plain that none of these states have anything politically common or a common policy. How could the East African community foster unity and a common ideal among states that are committed to different power blocs? The recent meeting of the Central Legislative Assemby in Nairobi showed the predicament in which the new Community finds itself.

> "Protests twice halted a debate in the Central Legislative Assembly last night when a Kenya member—Mr. John Keen—criticised the three East African Governments and Heads of State over their handling of the unity question. The 'big fish', he said, were not keen about unity. I think it would be fair to say they have failed. There is no other word for it—they are failures. East Africa was moving further and further apart than at any other time in its history. He said early in his speech in the continued debate on the EACSO estimates of expenditure (general fund services) for 1967-68 : 'Let these territories become federated because it seems that left on our own we are not able to produce the unity that people desire'. 'The man in the street was never told what was happening upstairs. I think we have reached the end of the road towards unity. To continue to talk about an East African Federation would be to flog a dead horse. It might never be achieved in this century' ".

Excerpts from 'East African Standard', page 5, cols. 1 to 3
dated 23 May, 1967.

To reach a common ideal, the deeply rooted mistrust among the states has to be cleared, a joint foreign policy decided on and a comfortable niche for freedom of speech supported by inner cohesion carved out. A systematic approach to the problems of economic progress could lead to unity, the goal of the community.

Early Asian Protest in E. Africa Protectorate 1900-1918

ROGER K. TANGRI

IN 1895 when the British East Africa Protectorate was declared, the number of Indians was relatively small, about 7,000.[1] The trade opportunities open to them were not such as to encourage mass emigration from India. It was only when the British Government decided to build a railway from Mombasa, the ancient Afro-Arab seaport on the Indian Ocean, to the central lakes, that conditions were created for an organised large-scale Indian emigration. The need for a railway had become increasingly evident. If the interior regions were to be pacified, let alone developed, communications were essential. An even more important reason for constructing the railway was that the British wanted to maintain their rights in the new Protectorate and to prevent neighbouring Uganda from falling to the French or Germans[2].

The organised immigration of Indians was undertaken because when the construction of the railway was taken in hand, it became obvious that there was lack of abundant and suitable labour[3]. In Asia, however, there was a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of labour which had already been tapped by South Africa and a number of British dependencies. Some Chinese and Malay labourers were brought to Natal in 1858 to work on sugar plantations, but they had proved unsatisfactory. It seemed that India alone could supply adequate labour for the construction of the railway. Negotiations were set in motion with the Government of India, recruiting agencies were opened in India, and the requisite number of labourers brought over to work on the railway[4]. 31,983 coolies were finally employed on construction work, of whom 6724—nearly 2000 remained in the employ of the railway—chose to stay in East Africa at the end of their contracts.

The building of the railway created vast opportunities for trade in hitherto inaccessible areas. There was a further influx of migrants from India – traders, artisans, clerks, and storekeepers. A very small addition was made by discharged troops who had returned to India after service in East Africa and re-emigrated voluntarily. In 1901 the Indian population increased to about 25,000. With the return of the labourers there was a fall and in 1911 the figure was 10,651[5].

The construction of the Uganda railway provided a good pretext for the subsequent colonization of the upland areas of the East Africa Protectorate. It paved the way for the creation of the 'white' highlands—a development which led to racial discord throughout the colonial period. There was great concern at the Foreign Office over the cost of maintaining the railway and means were sought to make the line pay its way commercially.

Moreover, the British Government had been subsidizing the Protectorate's revenues since 1895, and the Foreign Office had to find ways of meeting the Treasury grant-in-aid. It was believed that the African system of farming, based on either subsistence agriculture or nomadic pastoralism, could not yield the revenue so urgently required to make the Protectorate and the railway pay their way or produce an economic surplus to help raise living standards. Only the immigrants, with their knowledge of a monetary enonomy and able to produce for export, could provide the stimulus for economic development. A solution to the economic problems of the Uganda railway and the Protectorate was found in the policy of alien settlement. Colonization of the highland areas came to be regarded as a desirable, indeed necessary, development.

The Foreign Office was however unable to decide the type of immigrants it should attract and the type of agriculture it should encourage. It considered various proposals for settlement of Europeans and even Jews. It doubted whether Europeans could settle permanently in the tropics. Up to then, European colonization had been confined to temperate areas.

It seemed sensible to many who knew East Africa to encourage Indian settlers. Explorers like Joseph Thomson and administrators like Harry Johnston and John Ainsworth believed the highland areas were unfit for European colonization. The Imperial British East Africa Company, through which the British Government initially chose to work, had also its doubts. According to George Mackenzie, the Company looked to India and not to Europe for "settling up"[6]. Indeed the only scheme for European settlement attempted during the Company period, that by the Freeland Association to found a colony in the 'African Alps' near Mount Kenya, ended in failure[7].

Most people who knew East Africa therefore looked to India. The Foreign Office had in the early years sought not only Indian troops, labour for the railway and subordinate clerical staff, but also traders for extension of the monetary economy to the subsistence areas of the interior – a prerequisite for economic development. It realised that the Indian trader was at this stage an indispensable element in opening up East Africa for trade and commerce. Early explorers and administrators testify to the indispensability of Indian traders who performed a function which Europeans could not perform and Africans were not qualified to discharge. A few European firms, Smith, Mackenzie & Co., and Bonsted, Ridley & Co., attempted to set up a chain of trading stores along the old caravan route—later along the railway— but were unable to compete with the ubiquitous Indian dukawallahs who soon established a monopoly in commerce[8]. By 1900, Nairobi, with its flourishing Indian Bazaar, was more of an Indian than a European township. Even in market gardening, Indians, who obtained small plots near townships, were soon able to compete with European farmers in the sale of fresh produce[9].

With numerous spokesmen in East Africa supporting it and the Foreign Office apparently favouring it, Indian settlement seemed virtually certain. As Sir Clement Hill, head of the Foreign Office Protectorate Department, commented : It was "rather looking to India for our East African system and for development". He suggested that the Treasury be asked to provide £1000 to assist the Indian settlers and this was later approved by the Lord Commissioners of the Finance Ministry[10]. Many other instances of Indian influence in the Protectorate were beginning to appear. Goans filled most of the clerical posts in the administration and also managed small stations along the railway line. The Indian legal codes had been introduced in 1898, Indian troops were deployed in all the major 'pacification' campaigns, and in many respects the Protectorate reflected a "province" of India, a development that was beginning to cause the Europeans considerable anxiety. Together with the few white settlers already in Nairobi, the new Commissioner of the Protectorate (who arrived in 1901), Sir Charles Eliot, launched vigorous opposition to Indian settlement and influence which proved decisive and successful.

With the turn of the century, pleas for European settlement began to be made with increasing confidence. Although some looked to India for a massive influx of settlers, this never developed into a real possibility. All the schemes for encouraging and attracting Indian peasants did not really materialise. The bulk of the Indians who came to East Africa were much more interested in obtaining lucrative openings in trade than in working as peasants. The failure of the colonial government to interest even the Patidars, who in Gujerat were renowned for their farming, was due to the superior attractions of trade. Even those settlement schemes which made headway received little response from Indians. When in 1903 the Treasury approved of a scheme for the settlement of 100 Indian families and sanctioned £1000 for the purpose, only £382 of the amount was drawn in the first year. Next year the sum allocated was reduced to £500 but still the Protectorate government was left with £200[11].

The Indians were interested in trade, not agriculture. Few of them were willing to devote their time and energy to farming and promote the exploitation and development of the natural resources of the Protectorate. They were concerned with making quick profits and were inclined to remit home their savings rather than provide capital for the development of Africa. In any case it was doubtful whether Indian settlement could have brought in sufficient capital for economic development. Above all, an influx of indians would have run counter to the whole pattern of events whereby Europeans had established a hold over Africa for their own ends. All these considerations, together with the desire of Eliot and the incoming white settlers to found a "white man's country", led officials in London to advance the doctrine of European paramountcy. The Indians were confined to the lowland areas or the humid coast or left to trade in certain parts of townships, while the highlands, containing the best agricultural land, were reserved for the Europeans. It was in this situation that the monster of racial conflict rose its ugly head.. The European occupation of the highlands meant the dispossession of Africans; the exclusion of Indians indicated racial segregation. Eliot's policies and programme had a decisive impact on the future relations among the Africans, Asians and Europeans.

With relentless vigour and determination, Eliot devoted his considerable intellectual ability to pressing the advantage of European settlement. He assumed the role of an immigration agent, prepared a pamphlet on settlement opportunities and sent his Chief of Customs to South Africa to advertise the favourable conditions prevailing in the Protectorate. In this zealous programme, Eliot was aided by the incoming European settlers. Although hardly more than 30 had arrived in Nairobi by 1902, they formed a Planters' and Farmers' Association to promote the welfare of the growing agricultural community. They pressed for reservation of the highlands for white settlement and attempted to discourage Indian intrusion. The first sign of restrictions against the Indians in the highlands appeared in a circular of August 1902. The Indians were granted small plots of land along the railway line, excluding highland areas between Kiu and Fort Ternan.[12] In September of the the following year, Eliot enjoined his Land Officer, Barton Wright, not to grant land in the highlands to Indians.[13] All these steps were taken without legislative sanction. At no time did Eliot receive authorisation from the Foreign Office for the implementation of such a policy. Thus racial discrimination in land came into effect in East Africa.

Protests against these restrictions began to be voiced by the Indians. In March 1904, the first complaint reached the Foreign Office in the form of a letter signed by a Proctor and forwarded by the editor of the English *Daily Mail*. It was alleged that coloured men were being unfairly treated and that the Foreign Office was "privy to these shady tactics". Although the letter was dismissed without any further inquiry, Sir Clement Hill's minute indicated that he knew something of the racial discrimation in land. It was only when Eliot resigned three months later that the Indian Association of Mombasa sent a cable expressing "universal satisfaction among Indians and His Majesty's coloured subjects". Subsequently, the Association asked the Foreign Office to remove the "colour test" which Eliot had prescribed for applications for land in certain districts.[14] Hill communicated with Hobley, the Acting Commissioner, requesting further information and was notified of Eliot's instructions to his Land Officer. Hill however seemed unimpressed and commented that the instructions were probably designed to prevent small Indian traders from acquiring land which was suitable for Europeans and that the instructions had apparently been taken to imply that "Indian gentlemen and merchants" could not obtain land within the limits laid down.[15]

Eliot's successor as Commissioner, Sir Donald Stewart, appointed in October 1904 a Land Committee to consider and report on land policy. It consisted of officials and settlers, with no African or Indian representation. Both Europeans and Indians gave evidence before the Committee. Indian representatives of various religious sub-communities complained that in the past assurances had been given to them that no distinction would be made between Europeans and Indians. Now, they protested, Indians were being debarred from the highlands which were being reserved solely for Europeans. The report of the Committee, no doubt the outcome of the dominant European settler opinion, came as no surprise to the Indians. It provided ample justification for their fears of unfair pressures by the Europeans. Ignoring the Indian pleas and siding with the views expressed by the whites, the Committee reported that considering that "only a comparatively small area of the Protectorate is suitable for European settlement it is desirable that the land within the area should be reserved for the support and maintenance of a white population".[16]

Stewart agreed with these proposals. Transfer of land, he declared, even if allowed between Europeans should be "absolutely banned to Indians or natives in the districts suitable to European colonization". Introducing the new argument of hygiene as a basis for discrimination, Stewart said that it was "owing to the insanitary habits of Asiatics and Africans that they were not fit persons to take up land as neighbours of Europeans". He could not see why Indians should be allowed to take up land in the highlands when there were "enormous tracts" elsewhere in the Protectorate "preferably suitable" for them and only "a comparatively small area" for Europeans.[17] The Colonial Office, which had in early 1905 taken over the administration of the Protectorate, agreed with this view. While appreciating the "delicacy" of the problem and acknowledging the important Indian contribution to the recent development of the Protectorate, Ellis, the leading official in the department, felt that the policy was a correct one. Scarcity of "suitable areas" for European colonization warranted such restrictions on the occupation of land.[18]

Indian discontent increased. In April 1906, the Indian Association of Mombasa called a meeting to discuss "the question of protecting the rights of the Indian residents in East Africa". One hundred and eighty Indians, mainly professional men and merchants, assembled under the chairmanship of A. M. Jeevanjee[19]. Complaints were voiced that whereas Indians had been in the country for over 100 years and had done much to develop trade and agriculture, Europeans, who had only recently arrived, were being granted the best land. Jeevanjee's demands were more moderate. He stated that they were not asking for "preferential rights", only that no "distinction be made between the European and Indian settlers". They demanded equality of rights and equality of treatment with Europeans and discussed ways and means of combating European threats. The Indians felt let down by Eliot and Stewart who had assured deputations of the Association that no distinction would be made between them and the Europeans. Although Indians often referred to these pledges, no official record of these has been found. McGregor Ross, however, relates a similar promise made by Acting Commissioner Jackson in a letter to the Indian Association in February 1902, that they were "in error in supposing that the Government has any intention of drawing a distinction between Europeans and Indians as far as rights of mining, settling and acquiring land are concerned"[20]. These promises had not been kept. The Indians therefore decided to follow the European example and take their complaints to the Home Government in order to press for their rights. A sum of Rs. 20,000 was subscribed in less than half an hour in support of the proposal for the presentation of their grievances to the local, Indian and British Governments.[21]

The response of Europeans to this move was indicative of their mood. A meeting was hurriedly called at which resolutions were passed opposing admission of Indians into the highlands. Europeans, they resolved, had an "exclusive right" to this area because the deficit in the Protectorate expenditure was largely borne by the British taxpayer. Further, numerous settlers had come to East Africa on the understanding that the highlands would be reserved solely for them. At the Colonial Office, Ellis realized, however, that if they gave way in East Africa and assented to racial segregation in land, the British Government would have little hope of dissuading British colonists elsewhere from introducing similar restrictions. Yet, in the East Africa Protectorate only a small area was "eminently suitable" for Europeans. An ingenious compromise was worked out and accepted by the Secretary of State. Ellis suggested that the Commissioner, Sir James Hayes Sadler, be instructed that "it would not be in accordance with the policy" of the British Government "to exclude any class of ... subjects from holding land in any part of a British Protectorate", but that "a reasonable discretion" should be used "in dealing with applications for land, having in mind the comparatively limited area suitable for European colonization".[23] The creation of the 'white' highlands was thus virtually complete. A policy of restrictions on land grants to non-Europeans had been initiated.

But the white settlers still felt insecure. This was evident when Winston Churchill, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited the Protectorate in late 1907. He was presented with demands for the total exclusion of Indians from the country and warned that when Europeans gained self-government Indians would be "got rid of" altogether.[24] An Indian representation to Churchill stressed the need for equality of treatment for all British subjects. But despite Churchill's enlightened thinking[25] the country was increasingly heading towards bitter racial discord. The Europeans, fearing economic competition, took every advantage of their privileged position. The European members of the Land Board passed a resolution calling on the government to prevent further Indian immigration and to prohibit land grants to Indians in any part of the Protectorate.[26] Sadler's covering despatch on the Land Board's report dwelt on the growing racial conflict. "There is a growing tendency amongst the white settlers in the Uplands to keep the Indians not only out of the Uplands, but out of the country altogether". The spirit was "akin to that prevailing in Natal" and was "due to the fact that the whites cannot compete in the least with the Indian shopkeeper for supplies of provisions and articles in daily use, or as a petty trader".[27]

The Colonial Office was again being forced to make a statement. After careful discussion (the problem was referred to the Colonial Office Land Concessions Committee) it made the famous Elgin pledge of March 1908, which said that although it was "not consonant with the views of...

Government to impose legal restrictions.. as a matter of administrative convenience grants in the upland areas should not be made to Indians". Once again, the Colonial Office had solved its purpose of refusing Indians land in the highlands without legislative sanction.

Sadler's successor as Governor was Sir Percy Girouard whose appointment only served to increase Indian concern. In concert with European settler leaders he consolidated the policy of opposition to Indian demands for equal treatment. These demands took a new form when A. M. Jeevanjee, newly returned to East Africa after a year's business trip to India, reviewed the existing position. Alarmed at what he saw, he decided, as an Indian nominated member of the Legislative Council, to go to London to voice the grievances of the Indian community. There he delivered speeches and gave interviews. He received support from the All-India Moslem League which submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Office demanding the removal of the "onerous and even insidious restrictions" so that British East Africa would become a "land flowing with milk and honey".[29]

The Colonial Office was not impressed with Jeevanjee and his complaints and the Secretary of State even refused to see him although he called several times at his office in the latter part of 1910.[30] Jeevanjee then communicated with the India Office which took up the matter with the Colonial Office.[31] An inter-departmental conference was arranged in January 1911 at which the Colonial Office explained its stand. Girouard, who was in England at the time, attended the conference with Read of the Colonial Office, and together they managed to persuade the India Office and the Council of India that there "was little to complain about". Indian criticism of the land policy was described as largely "sentimental" as the land was not suited for Indian agriculturists. As for Indians not being allowed to get land in certain parts of townships, it was felt necessary to have some restrictions "on account of the notoriously insanitary habits of lower class Indians", although much land would still be available as shown by Jeevanjee's own considerable holdings.[32]

A similar line was followed in the Colonial Office draft reply to the representations made by the All-India Moslem League and the India Office. Such were the relations between the Colonial Office and the Protectorate administration that the reply was based largely on a despatch from Jackson which set out to answer the complaints lodged by the All-India Moslem League. Jackson strongly criticised Indians. He said they cheated Africans with false weights and counterfeit coins, that they were responsible for the insanitary conditions and the disease rampant in Nairobi, that they were generally a bad influence on Africans, that if Indians were allowed grants of land in the highlands, European colonization would come to a halt, that the result would be a "pernicious effect" on the morale of the Africans, that Indians should be excluded from certain parts of townships on grounds of sanitation.

Girouard and Read argued in a similar vein. While appreciating the part played by Indians in the development of the country, they incorrectly claimed that Indian traders of the interior were "low-class coolies" dependent on European capital, that European settlement in the highlands was essential for economic development, and that segregation in towns was inevitable because of the dirty habits of Indians.[33] This was an unfair comment in many essentials. Indian traders were not "low-class coolies"; they were not dependent on European capital; European settlement was not the only requisite for the economic development of towns and the Protectorate; there were other ways than discriminatory segregation to combat insanitary conditions wherever they existed. The India Office replied that the policy of excluding Indians would not be entertained by "educated Indian opinion". If the highlands were really unsuited to Indian agriculturists, no great demand for occupation in that area would arise from Indians. All that it desired was that applications for land should receive equal consideration.[34] Read was however more concerned with protests from Europeans than with the logic behind such arguments. He said whether or not Indians occupied land in the highlands "the mere fact of their being permitted to do so would no doubt raise a storm among the white settlers"[35].

Even before the Indian contest with the Imperial Government reached its unhappy end, the European settlers sought to have discrimination written into the law. A Crown Lands Bill was rushed through the Legislative Council in March 1909 but was rejected by the Colonial Office unless all discriminatory references to "Asiatics and natives" were deleted.[36] When the Bill in its new form came up for discussion in 1913, attention was focussed primarily on ways of stopping the transfer of land to Indians. An agreement was reached whereby the Governor would have powers forthwith to enforce racial discrimination both in the highlands and in townships. All sales, transfers, mortgages and leases of land held under the new ordinance from one race to another could be vetoed by the Governor-in-Council.[37]

By 1915, custom had become enshrined in ordinance. Again, an ingenious compromise was worked out between European settler demands for the exclusion of Indians from holding land and the Colonial Office concern to prevent legislative discrimination. A policy of administrative discrimination in the allotment of land in favour of white settlers came to be adopted.

Political representation was another source of endless debate between Europeans and Indians, especially after the first Legislative Council was established in 1907. Demands for some share in the administration of the Protectorate had been made earlier but they were turned down. But in a speech delivered before his departure for England after his resignation and in a communication to the European Planters and Farmers Association, Eliot urged white settlers to make more determined efforts to obtain "some local government". Representative government could not be granted to them at this early stage, but they could have a council with nominated unofficial members.[38] For Eliot this was a new idea. When a group of Europeans and Indians suggested in 1902 that he "appoint an Advisory Council" he treated the idea coldly. The petitioners believed that non-officials on such a Council could "offer advice and suggestions as an assistance to (Eliot) in his arduous duties", but Eliot rebuffed the petition, icily remarking that his duties would not be thus "lightened".[39]

With the exception of a few members of the Indian community, Indian associations during these early years never asked for political representation. An Indian Association had been set up in Mombasa, where most of the older, established Indian merchants lived, in 1900 which probably reflected the nationalist sentiment that was being increasingly expressed in India and not for the purposes of political agitation. Six years later, the Indians of Nairobi founded an Association, this time to express Indian concern at the concessions given to Europeans. But there is no evidence to suggest that any of these associations demanded any political representation. Indian discontent before 1907 was focussed entirely on the issue of land allocation. It was the Europeans who wanted political rights, but they were initially handicapped by their inadequate numbers.

Protectorate officials were unimpressed by the European demands for non-official membership of a Legislative Council, though Lyttleton, the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, was sympathetic and believed that the proposal was "a reasonable one"[40]. He was subsequently informed that there were only 600 resident white settlers[41]. But despite their small number, European demands soon proved effective. Sadler, the new Commissioner who assumed office on Stewart's death in 1905, favoured the setting up of a Legislative Council and welcomed "the assistance which (he) would receive from a Council". As regards Indian representation, Sadler felt it was "open to question" whether "in view of the interests (of) the Indian community . it would not be advisable to appoint one of their community to the Legislative Council". Lord Elgin, Secretary of State in the new Liberal Government, agreed with the idea of a Council and outlined his views on its probable membership. One member "should represent specially the white interests round Nairobi" and another "the rest of the white inhabitants" while "a third the Indians of the Protectorate"[42].

The question of Indian representation as far as the Indians themselves were concerned arose for the first time in March 1907 when the Legislative Council was established. The Indians were incensed when they found that while the small European population was to have three members, their own much larger community, constituting the majority of the immigrants in the Protectorate, was to get no representation whatever[43]. Coming so soon after the setting up in 1906 of the Land Board, which had no Indian member, Indian dissatisfaction began to mount intensely.

Winston Churchill asked about this omission of Indians saying there could be "no reason for excluding this large and meritorious class". Elgin replied that Sadler had not been able to suggest any Indian whom he considered a "suitable candidate; he had, however, informed the Governor not to overlook the Indians[44]. But in the following year, in his covering despatch to the Colonial Office enclosing a petition from the Nairobi Indian Association, Sadler said that the Indians had "legitimate claims", that the time had "come for this request to be granted", and accordingly conceded that "one Indian gentleman be nominated......to represent the Asiatics..... for a period of two years". He did not "anticipate any difficulty in making a suitable nomination", whereupon he was asked to submit a name[45]. No nomination was, however, received by the Colonial Office until the middle of the following year when the name of A. M. Jeevanjee was suggested by Jackson, the Acting Governor, "as the best, if not the only, qualified candidate for the appointment"[46].

The arrival of Girouard as Governor, with his South African background and connections, led to the establishment of close relations with European settler leaders. A week after his arrival, Girouard cabled the Colonial Office recommending Lord Delamere's reappointment to the legislature (he had resigned a few months earlier), while at the same time requesting the postponement of Jeevanjee's appointment since it would "certainly lead to a legitimate demand on the part of the Arab and Swahili community" who outnumbered the Indians by two to one. The Colonial Office refused to budge especially as the appointment of Jeevanjee had been gazetted[47]. But Girouard was undaunted and two years later, on the expiry of Jeevanjee's term, he again pressed the Colonial Office not "to re-appoint a special representative for this section of the community" on the ground that Jeevanjee's membership had proved a "failure". Girouard's indictment may have been rather harsh, but the circumstances surrounding Jeevanjee's participation in the legislature indicate that the Governor's proposal was not merely an expression of the viewpoint of European settlers. Jeevanjee was seriously handicapped by his inadequate knowledge of English. He had in April 1910 requested to have his secretary sit beside him in the Council but this had been turned down[48]. Consequently he made very little contribution to the debates. Added to this was his probable initial reluctance to accept the post[49]. This time the Colonial Office gave way, accepted Girouard's recommendation, discarded Jeevanjee and approved of the vacancy remaining unfilled, "at any rate for the present"[50].

Meanwhile, white settlers continued to play their political game, clamouring for electoral representation. Elective representation was considered a right by the Europeans because they paid direct taxes and because the Protectorate was self-supporting. "Natives and Asiatics" however were "subject peoples" and could be "represented by the official members of the Council". The European petition of mid-1913 was sent to the Colonial Office with the approval of Sir Henry Belfield who became Governor on Girouard's resignation in 1912. The Secretary of State, however, reacted unfavourably to the idea arguing that it emanated from "one section only of the community" which was "vastly outnumbered". He wanted to know how the non-Europeans, who contributed the greater part of the revenue of the Protectorate, were going to be represented, and finally asked for further details[51]. The settlers' reply clearly reflected European hopes and fears. The whites, they explained, were "the nucleus of those upon whom the Government of the country must inevitably devolve in the future". They were thus unable "to abandon the broad principle of all British colonies which gives to western civilization the control of legislation". The Africans, "in their present state of barbarism", could not take any part in the election while Indians might "vote solid" and "control the election", a position which no European settler "would contemplate without deep apprehension". The official majority, they argued, "amply safeguards" the Indians but if the Government deemed it necessary, they would suggest the appointment of "one additional European member of the Council directly to represent Eastern interests".

Although the Indians wanted political rights and the means of expression for their own sake the Europeans hoped to give them not even a sense of participation in the running of the Protectorate's affairs. But the Indian agitation bell, as Delamere termed it, began to ring. Several Indians, seeking to thwart the dangers threatening their positions, inspired the establishment of the East African Indian National Congress (EAINC)—the organization that deserves recognition in the East African lexicon of modern protest movements. T. M. Jeevanjee, A. M. Jeevanjee's brother, was elected the first President of the Congress. He formulated the organisation's guiding principle in a major resolution which pledged "to oppose by all lawful means any attempt at encroachment upon its rights" and to strive for "complete and full equality of treatment in the eyes of the law". The Congress came out against the policy of complete residential and commercial segregation of Indians in the townships, criticised the system whereby Indian members of the subordinate staff of the civil service could not obtain promotion to the administrative grade unlike the local Europeans, and showed their resentment at the different scales of salary and other service amenities for work which they claimed was the same. What they wanted was a system of equality of opportunity through competitive examinations. The absence of Indian representation in the legislature was their main complaint. T. M. Jeevanjee described it as a "flagrant contradiction of the principle we are pledged to maintain and also of the axiom that representation is a necessary concomitant of taxation."[53] In sum, the Indians had grown weary of insults and discrimination. What they wanted was equality of rights, status, and opportunity. But these proved unwarranted assumptions. The formation of the Congress widened the gap between the Europeans and Indians.

Early Indian agitation against land restrictions was based primarily not on the land issue but on the principle of equality of rights and equality of treatment for all British subjects. The Indians regarded their exclusion from the possession of large tracts of fertile land as evidence of their inferior status and citizenship. Their claims rested on the premise that the highlands should be treated like any other private property and made available to any individual, irrespective of race, who could afford to buy it. They were prepared to accept safeguards in the Protectorate's interest, ensuring against land speculation and inefficient use of land, and were not interested at all in forestalling white settlement. But as equal citizens of the Crown, they were entitled to rights of occupation like any other citizen.

The Indians clearly failed in their early attempts to achieve equal rights in the highlands. Their protests, as well as those of the Africans, were fruitless. Compared to European pressures, the Indian agitation was pursued half-heartedly. There was, first, lack of a real need for land on the part of Indians. Although a few of them were interested and willing to go into agriculture, the majority were seeking lucrative openings in trade. Introduction of Indian peasant colonists was mooted from time to time, partly as a means of enabling Africans to learn agricultural techniques from them, but nothing came of the various projected schemes. Secondly, the Indians were handicapped by poor leadership. Jackson's "pledge", incorported in a letter to the Mombasa Indian Association in February 1902, was not recognised as a political manoeuvre. As McGregor Ross has pointed out, Indians were "lacking in political experience and acumen in not hailing this as a 'pledge' and forcing a series of reminders about it upon the British and local governments, and upon public attention on every possible occasion, including public dinners".[54] Thirdly, although conscious of discrimination, the Indians made little effort to sustain their protests. From 1902 to 1915, no Indian organisation or leader tendered evidence or submitted memoranda to any committee other than the Land Committee set up by Stewart. Even at the first session of the EAINC in 1914, when the issue was still very much alive, no resolution was passed on the highlands and only a passing reference was made in the speeches.

The Indians made few efforts to get support from the Government of India and the India Office. Only one deputation was sent overseas. Thus the India Office was often ignorant of Indian views. A. M. Jeevanjee, the only leader to present the Indian case, was handicapped by his limited knowledge of English, and only much later did he come to be regarded as a force to be reckoned with. The India Office made no comment on the numerous misrepresentations contained in the replies of Girouard and Read to the Indian complaints. It seemed that the majority of Indians were unconcerned with developments in the highlands. Their interests lay in trade where no real discrimination existed.

The various discriminatory measures, particularly the highland restrictions and the prevention of Indians from obtaining high civil service positions, had a strong impact on the economic and social development of the Protectorate. The Europeans ascended the highest rungs of the social ladder and consolidated their position as a landed aristocracy. The Indians became a commercial middle class, monopolising semiskilled trades and the lower rungs of the administration. They found themselves in an unenviable position. Despised, but still exploited by the Europeans, they stood, at the same time, in the path of African progress. European positions appeared to be nebulous, elevated and too remote for African aspirations. Indian occupations appeared to be within the African grasp. This gave rise to a competitiveness which caused much racial bitterness between Africans and Indians.

The Indians were generally on the defensive, reacting to European pressures and resisting the establishment of white supremacy. In 1914 the first Congress, held against the background of increasing white demands for elections, merely drew the attention of the Governor to "the absence of Indian representation" and appealed to him "to adequately remedy the deficiency". During the war years, there was little Indian political activity. But the Europeans made notable advances in land and electoral representation. Very little was heard of Indian claims regarding these issues which had for years been in the forefront of the early Indian protest. Perhaps the deportation and sentence to death of a number of politically active Indians under the Emergency Regulations, which were interpreted as attempts to strike terror in Indian hearts, accounts for the political lull. This may explain their complete lack of concern with the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 and the Economic Commission until the former had passed into law and the latter issued its disparaging report in 1919. The Europeans, however, remained active, consolidated their position and made substantial gains.

Yet, the formation of the Congress had created machinery by which the Indian commercial class could be transformed into active participants in the political agitation of the day. Such participation offered the only hope for their political survival and growth. Under the stimulus of a new and vigorous leadership and with the backing of the nationalists from India, the frustrated Easterners reinforced their collective strength and stepped up their agitation for the realization of their political objectives. A period of gestation was drawing to a close, giving place to post-war racial conflicts, solution of which was of the greatest importance in determining the political future of Kenya.

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14. F.O. 2/846 Watney to Hill. 21 March 1904, and minute by Hill and F.O. 2/847 Bowen to Lansdowne, 24 June 1904.
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16. Papers relating to British East Africa H.L. No. 158 (1907).
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51. *E.A.S.*, 29 November 1913.
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The Indian Parliament

MOHAMMED IMAM

IT may be trite to say with little circumspection that Parliament is the centre and focus of the Indian political system. It was constituted under Article 79 of the Constitution which says: "There shall be a Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of the People (Lok Sabha)". Its general pattern is fashioned on the lines of the British Parliament for the reason that the constitutional development in the 19th and 20th centuries was at the instance and under the direct patronage of the British Parliament, and the makers of the Constitution were nurtured on the political philosophies of Locke, Burke and Mill and held in admiration the Parliamentary democracy of England. Short of this seeming resemblance, it differs from the English Parliament inasmuch as it is a creature of the Constitution which is based on the Federal Principle and recognises the fundamental nature of the individual's rights. In other words, it has a life of its own and a distinct sea to sail upon.

1. Historical Development

The Constitution is the product of the people of India's solemn resolve to constitute India into a 'Sovereign Democratic Republic'. Democracy, Lincoln said, means 'Government of the people, by the people, for the people'. The establishment of Parliament is the realisation of the principle of 'government by the people' through their representatives elected directly for securing to themselves 'justice, liberty, equality' and promoting 'fraternity among them.' Behind this accomplishment lies the chequred history of a people's determined and consistent efforts to participate in the governance of the country. Until 1853 the governmental activities of the East India Company were confined to matters that came in conflict with its own interests. For the rest, the people were left alone, mostly to be governed by customary laws. By the Charter Act of 1853 the Executive Council, when acting in its legislative capacity, was enlarged by including six new members in it. In its functioning this Legislative Council at times became a petty or miniature Parliament. Apprehensive of the role assumed by the Council, curbs on its powers were imposed under the Act of 1861 and its strength enlarged to twelve members of which at least half were to be non-officials. The Act of 1892 further expanded the Council and introduced a limited and indirect system of electing non-official members to the Council. The official members were nominated by the Governor-General on the approval of the Secretary of State. To satisfy the increasing political consciousness the Legislative Council was enlarged in 1909 to consist of sixty members, a majority of whom were official members. The non-official members were elected by groups of local authorities like land-holders and trade associations and universities. It was empowered *inter alia* to discuss budgets, address questions to the members of the Executive Council, pass resolutions and put supplementary questions. The power of veto, however, vested in the Governor-General. As the voice of the non-official members was ineffective against the official bloc even important subjects did not evoke enthusiasm among them inside the legislature. Therefore the scheme failed to answer the political needs of the country. The urge of the time was that 'India should be governed in the interests of the Indians themselves' (Gokhale). The Act of 1919 introduced far-reaching changes, e.g., a bicameral system of legislature in which the majority comprised members elected directly. But the franchise was extended to only 1/10th of the adult male population. Qualifications were pitched high as a result of which only wealthy land owners and merchants could be returned to the legislature. Although women were not entitled to become members or vote, the provincial legislative councils were empowered to pass resolutions to remove sex disabilities. This could not arrest the emergence of political awareness and a widespread demand for self-government, enlarged legislatures and franchise with a wider basis.

The Act of 1935 conferred Dominion Status on India. It provided for the establishment of a federation and a bicameral legislature, a Council of States and a Federal Assembly. The former was to be a permanent body, one-third of its members retiring every three years, and consisted of 156 members from the provinces elected directly and 104 members from the native states nominated by the respective rulers. The latter consisted of 250 members from the provinces and 125 from the native states indirectly elected by Provincial Assembly members. The system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote and of distribution of seats on the basis of caste and community was adopted. For election to the Provincial Assemblies the franchise was extended to 30 millions, i. e., one-fourth of the adult population. There was to be a Council of Ministers appointed by the Governor-General to aid and advise him in federal matters but in matters of his special responsibility the Governor-General was required to exercise his individual judgement.

The scheme of the 1935 Act was tried in the provinces but the considerable power vested in the Governors led the popular ministries to resign in several provinces. At the Centre the Act could not be introduced because it had created a dyarchy and imposed a number of safeguards and limitations on the legislative power. Therefore, the Federal Legislature did not come to life and the scheme of 1919 continued until a Constituent Assembly was formed in 1946 on the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission which subsequently by the Act of 1947 was given the status of a provisional Parliament and vested with the power to frame a Constitution for the Dominion. The Constituent Assembly was composed of representatives elected indirectly as it was thought that direct elections would delay political change but the nature of representation on it was such that it could legitimately claim to be a body with a national character, for on it was represented every province, community and native state.

2. Sovereignty of Parliament

Parliament is a creature of and derives its powers from the Constitution. It functions within the limitations imposed on it by the Constitution. Two of them are formidable: (1) its law-making power is circumscribed by the distribution of legislative power between the Union and the States; it can exclusively make laws in respect of the subjects enumerated in List I (Union), and in respect of subjects in Lists II (State) and III (Concurrent) to a certain extent and under certain circumstances; (2) this legislative power is further required to be exercised without taking away or abridging the Fundamental Rights of the individual as laid down in Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, the vires of legislation passed by Parliament is open to challenge in the High Courts and Supreme Court and the courts finding that the law has transgressed either or both of these limitations can declare it unconstitutional and void.

Inspired to possess the sovereign character of the British Parliament which Dicey defined as 'the right to make or unmake any law whatever' and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament[1], the Indian Parliament, it is often said, is a sovereign body of a like nature. This claim, however, recognises the limitations placed on it by the Constitution but confines them to the exercise of 'ordinary legislative' powers by Parliament, yet asserting that in the ultimate analysis the will of Parliament prevails when it exercises 'constituent power' under Article 368 which, when exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein, is of an unlimited nature. Secondly, Parliament being a direct representative body of the people, its understanding of the constitutional limitations has an intrinsic higher sanctity over the understanding of the judiciary.

Until February 27, 1967, this position was conceded even by the Supreme Court[2] but, in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court, overruling earlier judgements, held that not only the 'ordinary legislative' power but also the power to 'amend the Constitution' is limited by the individual's Fundamental Rights which are transcedental and immutable, reserved by the people to themselves as a residual sovereign body under Article 13(2) and can be taken away or abridged only with their due consent in a referendum or by the specially established Constituent Assembly. However, this reading of the court is being seriously contested by Parliament. This apart, the claim of absolute sovereignty by Parliament as a true representative body of the people is not free from doubt. In a Parliamentary democracy it is the government commanding the confidence of the majority of the House which exercises Parliament's sovereignty[3]. The present Lok Sabha has the mandate of 58.04 per cent of the 250 million total electorate. Of this 58.04 per cent votes the party in majority could secure only 40.92 per cent of the votes polled.[4]

The Council of States (Rajya Sabha) as constituted today cannot be called a true representative body of the States, for after the Fourth General Election, nine states out of fifteen and one Union Territory are governed by non-Congress parties whereas their representatives in the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) were elected by the Congress-dominated State Assemblies. These factors may be adduced to disclaim Parliament's assertion that its 'will' is the 'will of the nation'. There is also the consideration that the Constitution is based on the principle of guarding itself against the dreadful tyranny of the legislature and that the Constitution is "the guarantee of the minority who, when they are threatened by the impatient vehemence of a majority, can appeal to this permanent law, finding the interpreter and enforcer thereof in a court set high above the assaults of factions".[5]

Even in respect of its exclusive field of legislation Parliament cannot claim to possess the omnipotency of the British Parliament for it is enjoined positively to exercise power in subservience and in the realisation of the Directive Principles of State Policy which are fundamental in the governance of the country. It may not be easy to ignore them, for Parliament has to face the inquest of the electorate periodically on definitely formulated principles.

3. Framework of Parliament

Parliament consists of two Houses, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and House of the People (Lok Sabha), and the President of the Republic who is also the Chief Executive of the Union and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Making the President a part of Parliament is in line with the British pattern in which the King is a part of Parliament. Not being a member of either House, the President's participation in the legislative process is ensured by providing that no Bill passed by both Houses can become law unless it is assented to by him. This is all the more necessary since the executive power of the Union is co-extensive with the legislative power of Parliament. It is obligatory for the President to summon meetings of each House at such intervals that six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date fixed for its first sitting in the next session. The President can prorogue the Houses and dissolve the Lok Sabha. He has also the right to address and send messages to the Houses, and has the duty and privilege of addressing both the Houses at the commencement of the first session after each general election to the Lok Sabha and the first session of each year[6].

Any citizen of India who is 25 years old can stand for election to the Lok Sabha and any citizen of India who is 30 years old can stand for election to the Rajya Sabha if he is an elector in any of the Parliamentary constituencies of the State from which he seeks election. However, no person can be a member of both the Houses of Parliament or a member of both Parliament and the State Legislature. Further, a person who absents himself for 60 days from meetings of the House without permission, holds an office of profit under the government, is of unsound mind, is an undischarged insolvent and is not a citizen of India or has voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship or is under an acknowledgement of allegiance to a foreign State, is disqualified from being a member of Parliament. With its power to prescribe further qualifications and disqualifications, Parliament has disqualified persons convicted for offences of corruption, bribery, etc.

Council of States (Rajya Sabha)

The adoption of the bicameral system was with a view to striking a balance between the direct representation of the people and the representation of the federal units in the Federal legislature. The primacy of this consideration outweighed the view that if the Upper House agrees with the Lower House it is superfluous and if it disagrees it is mischievous. The powers of the two Houses are similar in relation to ordinary legislation. Although money bills can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha and any changes suggested by the Rajya Sabha must be returned within fourteen days and can be rejected entirely by the Lok Sabha, and a deadlock between the two Houses in respect of ordinary legislation is resolved by a majority vote in a Joint Sitting in which Rajya Sabha members constitute less than one-third of the total strength resting the final say with the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha has a decisive role in respect of matters provided for in the Constitution for seriously impairing the balance of the Federal Principle[7]. Apart from its role as a States' representative body, its presence is felt when it demands "the too precious attention of ministers who have the right to speak in both Houses and therefore are felt to be obliged to do so. It has three outweighing merits: it supplies additional political positions for which there is demand, it provides some additional debating opportunities for which there is occasionally need and it assists in the solution of legislative time-table problems"[8].

The maximum membership of the Rajya Sabha is 250, nearly half of the Lok Sabha[9]. Except twelve members nominated by the President for possessing special knowledge, all others are elected by the State Legislative Assemblies according to the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote. The seats are apportioned amongst the States, and unlike in the U.S. Senate, no equal weightage is given to the units of the Federation. It is a permanent body not subject to dissolution as the members are elected for six years, one-third of them retiring every second year. This method may have a tendency to (1) retain a political complexion different from the newly elected Lok Sabha after every general election, and (2) cause diminution in its state representative character for it may have been elected by the legislature of a political complexion different from the one returned after a general election[10].

House of the People (Lok Sabha)

The maximum membership of the Lok Sabha is 525[11], out of which 500 are elected directly from territorial constituencies in the States on the basis of adult franchise, i.e., every man or woman who has completed the age of 21 is eligible to vote[12]. The territorial constituencies as the basis for elections are left by the Constitution to be determined

The Speaker conducts all the proceedings of the House except when a resolution for his removal is under consideration; determines the order of business and sets time-limits for speeches; maintains order and discipline in the House; prevents the use of unparliamentary language and orders suspension or removal of members flouting his rulings; suspends the business of the House when it becomes unmanageable and members unruly; declares whether a Bill is a Money Bill; counts the votes and declares the result; signs the Bill when it has been approved by both the Houses ; rules whether a resolution or question or adjournment motion is admissible or not; occupies the Chair when the House meets in a joint sitting; acts as the spokesman of the House and protects the members against infringement of their privileges; casts his vote only in the case of a tie; regulates admission to the House and gives rulings on controversial points of procedure.

Secretariat

Article 98 provides for the constitution of a separate and independent secretariat for each House of Parliament which is placed under the overall control of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, as the case may be, so that Parliament can get independent advice and its directions are executed properly without any outside interference, particularly from the executive which has to work under the control of Parliament. The entire secretariat work of the House and its Committees is organised and conducted by it. It maintains a library and reference service to keep members of Parliament well informed to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently. It prepares digests and notes of important cases and material for information of the members.

4. Functions of Parliament

The fundamental function of Parliament is to see that it does not fail as an institution created by the Constitution for the realisation of its objectives. The traditional notions of its functions would require to be redefined, elaborated and new ones added and its known trappings and procedure adapted and strengthened to enable it to deal efficiently and effectively with the challenges of the ever-growing complex situations of modern times. Without prejudice to the exhaustive categorization[13] of Parliament's functions the following are taken to analyse its working: Lagislative functions, control of the executive, ventilation of grievances, and federal and quasi-judicial functions.

Legislation

The position in law is that the essential function of Parliament is law-making within the field assigned to it by the Constitution which it has to discharge in its essential aspect by itself in strict accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Constitution and cannot be delegated to any other body.[14] This is in line with the position in the U. S. Constitution but there being a parliamentary executive in India the position in fact conforms to the trends in the U. K. rather than in the U. S. This point is elaborated a little later.

Legislative Procedure

To take, first, legislative procedure, all Bills except Money Bills can be introduced in either of the two Houses both by the government and by private members. Money Bills can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha. A Bill is introduced embodying the provisions of the proposed law, accompanied by a statement of its objects and reasons. When leave to introduce is given there is no debate but the mover may make a short statement indicating the aims and objects of the Bill. If the Bill is opposed the opposing members are allowed to give their reasons; thereafter it is put to vote. If the House favours introduction, the Bill goes to the second reading stage, also called the consideration stage. There are two stages in the second reading. At the first stage the member-in-charge may move that the Bill be taken up for consideration immediately or be referred to a Select Committee[15] of the House or a Joint Committee[16] of the two Houses (which can be done only when the other House agrees) or be circulated for the purpose of eliciting public opinion thereon. The move may be opposed by others. At the second stage when the House decides to elicit public opinion it is published in the official gazette and opinions invited. The gist of public opinion is then circulated among the members and thereafter discussion takes place as a whole. If the House refers the Bill to a Select Committee or Joint Committee it is scrutinised by the members of the Committee. The dissenting members may append notes. On receiving the report the mover moves that the Bill be considered in the light of the Committee report which is taken up for a detailed and clause-by-clause discussion. Amendments may be moved at this stage also. Then the Bill is taken up for the third reading wherein only commonplaces regarding the Bill are discussed and the Bill is finally put to vote. After the Bill is passed it is sent to the other House.

In the other House the Bill undergoes the same process. When it passes the Bill in the same form, it is sent to the President for his assent. If it refuses to pass the Bill or suggests amendments which do not find favour with the first House or does not return the Bill within six months, the President summons both the Houses to meet at a joint sitting for voting on the Bill in which case the Speaker of the Lok Sabha presides. The Bill is carried by a majority vote of the members present and voting.

The Bill then is presented to the President for his assent. He may either give his assent or veto the Bill completely. He may however send the Bill back to Parliament for reconsideration and if both the Houses pass it with or without amendments it may again be sent to the President for his assent. At this stage he shall not withhold his assent.

A Money Bill can originate only in the Lok Sabha on the recommendation of the President. After it is passed in the Lok Sabha it is sent to the Rajya Sabha for its recommendations which have to be made within 14 days. If the Lok Sabha accepts the recommendations it is deemed to have been passed by both the Houses in the recommended form and if it rejects the recommendations or the Bill is not returned by the Rajya Sabha within 14 days it is deemed to have been passed in the form in which it was sent to the Rajya Sabha. Then it is submitted to the President for his assent which cannot be withheld. A special procedure is provided for passing the annual budget, Appropriation Bill and Finance Bill. This ensures Parliament's (particularly the Lok Sabha's) complete control over finances.

Exercise of Legislative Power

The adoption of the system of a Parliamentary Executive which need command the confidence of only the Lok Sabha has brought in its trail the problem of the executive asserting the hegemony of Parliament and transforming its nature in fact, but not in law, to a supervisory body, which means in the words of Crick[17] to "influence, not direct power; advise, not command; criticism, not obstruction; scrutiny, not initiation; and publicity, not secrecy". What is said of the British Parliament's legislative power—that is, "a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of administration",[18] the House "has turned over to the Executive government the most important part of the business of legislation", [19] "discussion of a measure....for any effective or useful purpose...is rapidly becoming an impossibility in the House of Commons"[20] and that "the Cabinet legislates with the advice and consent of Parliament"[21] and that "Parliament does not initiate or create, but merely reviews, and usually accepts and registers policy ; "government by discussion" which Bagehot so fondly described has almost disappeared" – [22] is true of the Indian Parliament. The reasons for it are not far to seek. The business of legislation is a kind of intellectual work which can be done only by experienced minds. The heavy legislative business schedule[23] and other work leave members little time to attend to the details of legislation. For the consideration of very few Bills select committees or joint committees are set up.[24] Most of the time is demanded for Government-sponsored legislation[25] and only the last two and a half hours of a sitting on one day in two weeks are set apart for private members' Bills. Even though the Government, depending on its own majority, keeps its finger on the pulse of the House, sums up and formulates its wishes, the majority has to accept its conclusions. This calls for the recognition that "in legislation as well as administration, the only task for which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing the work, but of causing it to be done, of determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confined and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed."[26]

Delegated Legislation and its Control

Because of the crowded schedule of Parliamentary business and the impossibility to forsee minute details of the operational aspects of legislation in the distant future, it has become essential that Parliament should pass laws in the form of a bare outline and leave the implemental details to be filled in by its trusted executive as and when the situation calls for it. Earlier it has been said that short of its 'essential legislative function' Parliament can delegate all other aspects of legislation, like subordinate and conditional legislation, to its trusted agencies and instrumentalities. Parliament continues to exercise its control over these types of legislation by requiring the executive to lay such laws when formulated on the table of the House and by constituting a standing committee on Subordinate Legislation to review and scrutinise *inter alia* whether they have exceeded the power given by Parliament and whether they are in furtherance of and do not go against the policy underlying that particular legislation. Ordinarily the committee does not go into the question of policy behind the rules but often it becomes impossible to scrutinise the rules without touching the underlying policy. Here again the enormous growth in this type of legislation is rendering the supervisory work of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation less effective.[27] Of course, there exists in addition judicial control to see whether the delegated legislation is not *ultra vires* of the parent legislation and while dealing with quasi-judicial authorities to see whether it provides for the observance of rules of natural justice.

(b) Control of the Executive

The concomitant of Parliamentary executive responsible only to the Lok Sabha as said of legislative functions is also true of other functions. Hitherto the preponderant majority of one single party[28] had assured the executive a secured tenure. Inside the House a small opposition could not pose a formidable check and the fate of all no-confidence motions introduced was a foregone conclusion. In such a case considerations of party solidarity prevented to a great extent the parliamentary check becoming operative intrinsically. The Executive, however, cannot be said to have become uncontrolled and unresponsive as the criticism and suggestions of the party ranks and parliamentary committees prevented it from becoming so. After the Fourth General Elections this year which gave the ruling party a small majority, the efficacy of the former check is fast diminishing, and the Opposition within the House has now improved its strength considerably.[29]

Committees

Parliamentary Committees can be of two kinds: Ad-hoc and Standing. Ad-hoc committees, like select committees, are appointed on a motion whereas others can be appointed as and when the occasion arises. Standing Committees, again, can be of two kinds: Financial and others. Notable among the former kind are the Estimates Committee, Public Accounts Committee and Committee on Public Undertakings. Of the former we may mention those relevant for our present purpose: the Committee on Petitions, Committee on Privileges, Committee on Government Assurances, Committee on Subordinate Legislation.

Public Accounts Committee[30]

Parliament being too big and too inexpert a body to exert any effective financial control over government and public undertakings, this function is performed by the three financial committees. The Public Accounts Committee is modelled on the British pattern and consists of 15 members, including seven members from the Rajya Sabha elected annually. A leading member of an Opposition party has now been invited to become its chairman. Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries cannot be its members. Its work is confined to matters referred to in the Comptroller General's Audit and Appropriation Accounts Reports. The Committee is assisted by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and examines representatives of various ministries and, if necessary, calls for further information and may make on-the-spot studies of the State Undertakings involved. The report is submitted to the House. The Government takes action on the recommendations of the Committee and reports to it of the action taken. The implementation of the recommendations is watched by it.

Estimates Committee[31]

It consists of 30 members of only the Lok Sabha elected annually. No member of the Government can be its member. Its functions are to (a) report what economies, improvements in organisation, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent with the policy underlying the estimates, may be effected, (b) suggest alternative policies in order to bring about efficiency and economy in the administration, (c) examine whether the money is well laid out within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates; and (d) suggest the form in which the estimates shall be presented to Parliament. The Committee has constituted a number of study groups from among the members for on-the-spot studies, detailed studies of the estimates selected and scrutiny of action taken by the Government on the previous Committee's recommendations. The Committee calls for information from not only ministries but also leading non-official organisations.

Committee on Public Undertakings[32]

It consists of 15 members, 10 from the Lok Sabha and 5 from the Rajya Sabha elected for one year. The constitution of this Committee was necessitated by the growing socialisation activities of the Government. The functions of the Public Accounts Committee and Estimates Committee in regard to public undertakings, including government companies, are vested in the Committee. It calls for information from the ministries and undertakings concerned and takes assistance from the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Committee on Government Assurances[33]

It is wholly an Indian innovation and the result of members' anxiety to know whether there exists any machinery to check on the large number of promises Ministers are in the habit of making in reply to questions and during debates. It is presided over by a leading member of the Opposition and consists of 15 members of the Lok Sabha who are elected for one year. Its functions are to scrutinise the assurances, promises and undertakings given by Ministers on the floor of the House and to report on the extent to which such assurances have been implemented, and whether such implementation has taken place in the minimum time necessary for the purpose.

The constitution and functions of the other committees mentioned earlier have been discussed at appropriate places. Generally it may be said that the whole structure of Parliamentary Committees reflects and at the same time reinforces the mode of watchfulness over the Government. It has saved the Indian Government with its large majority from the worst temptation of autocracy.[34]

The Lok Sabha has further evolved two new procedural techniques to enable members to express their views on important matters and make the executive depose information on them. They are:

(1) Half-an-Hour and Short-duration Discussions[35]

The members had felt handicapped in raising matters of urgent public importance and discussing matters arising out of answers to questions. Therefore they made increasing use of adjournment motions. The 'half-an-hour discussion' was devised so that matters arising out of questions could be discussed and the 'short duration discussion' was devised to discuss matters of urgent public importance on all days in a week. The former are taken up at three sittings and the latter at two sittings in a week for durations not exceeding one hour each.

(2) Calling Attention to Matters of Urgent Public Importance[36]

To dissuade members from tabling motions of adjournment and to enable them to raise matters of urgent public importance and compel the Government to state its position on them, a method was devised to take up such matters after 5 p.m. on any day. When calling attention notices are referred to Ministers, the facts should be furnished by them within 24 hours. Because of its speed and the opportunities it offers to members to seek elucidation from Ministers this method has become popular and effective.

(c) Ventilation of Grievances

Although the Supreme Court is constituted as a guarantor and protector of fundamental rights and every individual has the right to go to it for their enforcement and the courts in general possess the power to review administrative action, the judicial remedy fails when it comes to the enforcement of discretionary powers of the executive to do justice in individual cases. Similarly, Parliament through its various committees was able to exercise only general supervision over the exercise of power by the executive but individual cases continued to escape its notice. With a view to avoiding injustice in individual cases a Committee on Petitions[37] of the Lok Sabha was constituted. It consists of 15 members nominated by the Speaker. Its functions are to (i) examine every petition referred to it and cause it to be circulated in extenso, (2) report to the House on complaints after taking necessary evidence and suggest concrete remedial measures or to prevent such complaints in future, (3) consider representations, letters and telegrams from various individuals, associations, etc. The report of the Committee is presented to the House.

As an evolution of this process, the Administrative Reforms Committee appointed by the government has recommended the adoption of the system of Ombudsman in the country. To suit the federal polity of the country two offices are proposed: one for the Union and the whole of India to be known as 'Lok Pal' and the other for the Union and each State Legislature to be known as 'Lok Ayukta'. The former will deal with cases against Ministers and Secretaries and the latter with cases against other officials. A decision on this type of Parliamentary Commissioner is pending and details of its functioning are yet to be worked out.

Inside the House, Question Time [38] and Adjournment Motions provide opportunities to ventilate grievances. They are frequently made use of and have proved useful, although the latter are very rarely admitted. [39] With a strong Opposition in the Houses now, they would prove more effective in ventilating grievances.

(d) Federal and Quasi-judicial Functions

The federal structure of the Constitution is allowed to be disturbed under certain circumstances at the instance of and in some cases with the due approval of Parliament. In such cases Parliament is expected to function otherwise than a Union Legislature. Parliament can arrogate to itself unilaterally the power to legislate in respect of 'State subjects' when the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by a 2/3rds majority that to do so is in national interest. Should it decide to continue to legislate in this way such a resolution need be passed every year. Whenever the proclamation of a National Emergency is made by the President, Parliament gets the power to legislate on 'State subjects', certain fundamental rights are automatically suspended and enforcement of other rights in the courts is suspended. Such a proclamation would cease to operate after two months if it is not approved by Parliament and once it is approved Parliament has no power to get it ended since this is left to the absolute discretion of the Executive. Similarly, the President, by declaring a State Emergency on grounds of failure of the constitutional machinery, takes over the State machinery, executive as well as legislative. For the continuance of an Emergency, Parliament's approval within two months has to be obtained and once approved it would be valid for six months unless revoked or approval for extension for a further like period is given by Parliament.

The two Houses of Parliament elect the Vice-President and along with the State Legislative Assemblies elect the President. The Rajya Sabha can remove the Vice-President by a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority and agreed to by the other House. They can impeach the President for violation of the Constitution after the charge is preferred by one House by a two-thirds majority and investigated by the other House by giving an opportunity to the President to represent. If the other House passes a resolution sustaining the charge preferred by a two-thirds majority of the total House, the President is deemed to have been removed. State Legislatures, though associates in the election of the President, are denied a say in the removal of the President. The judges of the Supreme Court, Comptroller and Auditor-General and

Chief Election Commissioner are removable by the President after the address of removal is passed by both the Houses of Parliament by a majority of the total membership of the House and not less than a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

5. Privileges of Parliament

The powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament are conferred by Article 105 of the Constitution. These may be considered, as is said of the British Parliament, the sum of peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively and by members of each House individually without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals but since they are conferred by the Constitution there cannot be any exemption from the law of the land, but these have to be exercised in conformity with the Constitution. The Supreme Court and High Courts can interpret the Constitution and say what those privileges are and what is their extent.[40] The Houses cannot claim the status of the Superior Court of Record in their exercise. Although there is freedom of speech in Parliament, it is subject to other provisions of the Constitution[41] and the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. There is complete immunity from liability in any proceedings in the courts for anything said or vote cast in Parliament or its Committees by the members and those who have the right to speak in or otherwise take part in the proceedings of the Houses or their Committees.[42] Similarly the publication of reports, papers, votes or proceedings by or under the authority of the Houses by any person[43] and without authority if published by the Press and broadcast by wireless telegraphy is immune from any liability in the courts.[44] The validity of any proceedings in Parliament is not open to question in the courts and the exercise of power for regulating procedure or the conduct of business or maintaining order is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. Parliament can prohibit the publication of not only expunged and inaccurate proceedings but also their true and faithful reporting notwithstanding the individual's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a).[45] For maintaining secrecy of debates strangers can be excluded from the Houses. In other respects the Houses are empowered to define their privileges by law and until such time are to enjoy those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the U. K. and of its committees and members as on 26-1-1950. No such law has been passed by Parliament so far for fear that the statute defining them would be a 'law' subject to the fundamental rights of the individual. It has been thought better to develop them by convention and tradition as codification would create more legal problems and obstacles in the free functioning of Parliament. The power to commit for breach of privilege and for contempt is inherent in Parliament but the courts under their power to enforce fundamental rights can examine the warrants of arrest and detention, both speaking and non-speaking,[46] and ascertain whether they have infringed such rights.[47]

Each House has a Committee of Privileges.[48] Questions of breach of privilege are referred to it by the House as well as the Speaker. The

Committee consists of 15 members and its Chairman is appointed by the Speaker. It is reconstituted every year. Its functions are (a) to examine every question of privilege referred to it and to determine on the facts of the case whether a breach of privilege is involved and if so, the nature of the breach, the circumstances leading to it and to make necessary recommendations; and (b) to state the procedure to be followed by the House or the Speaker in giving effect to its recommendations. The Committee determines whether there is a *prima facie* case, issues notices to the parties, gives them an opportunity to state their case and represent personally or through a lawyer, examines witnesses on oath and reports to the House or the Speaker as the case may be.

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REFERENCES

1. Law of the Constitution, 1919, p.40. In his analysis of sovereignty, Dicey makes a distinction between a 'legal sovereign' and a 'political' sovereign' whose will is 'ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the State'. "If this is so, legal sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. . .It is a legal concept. . .In speaking of the power of Parliament, we are dealing with legal principles, not with facts... Though it is true Parliament cannot in fact change the course of nature, it is equally true that it cannot in fact do all sorts of things. The supremacy of Parliament is a legal fiction, and legal fiction can assume anything", Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*, 1959, pp. 170-171. See also Wade, *Introduction to Dicey, Law of the Constitution*, 1919.

2. Shankari Prasad Deo v Union of India: AIR 1951 SC 458 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1965 SC 845.

3. For an illustration of this proposition see Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*, 1959, pp. 180-184.

4. In earlier general elections the position was.

	1952	*1957*	*1962*
Total electorate	173 million	193 million	216 million
Percentage of valid votes polled	61.16	62.23	53.23
Percentage of valid votes polled secured by the ruling Congress Party.	45.00	47.78	44.72

Source: The Fourth General Elections—A statistical analysis, June 1967 (An Indian National Congress publication).

5. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*. 1913. p. 273.

6. During 1962-67 in the Lok Sabha 2.9 per cent of the total time was devoted to the discussion on Presidential addresses.

7. Parliament can legislate in respect of State subjects only when the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting (Article 249); the approval of a National Emergency declared under Article 352 and failure of the constitutional machinery in the State under Article 356 which empower Parliament to assume absolute legislative power notwithstanding the Federal Principle and in the impeachment of the President and removal of High Court and Supreme Court judges and Vice-Presidents by the Rajya Sabha is as necessary as it is by the Lok Sabha.

8. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India*, 1964, p. 193.

9. The present strength is 236.

10. These tendencies can be counteracted and the Rajya Sabha made to reflect its true state representative character if its members are elected every time a new state Legislative Assembly is constituted after the general election or mid-term poll and old representatives cease to be members when new members assume office.

11. The present strength is 520; 495 members elected from the States and 25 from the Union territories. The President is empowered to nominate not more than two Anglo-Indian representatives when no member of the community is elected to the House.

12. The response of the people during the last four general elections was as follows :—

	1952	*1957*	*1962*	*1967*
Total electorate	173 m.	193 m.	216 m.	250 m.
Percentage of valid votes polled.	61.16	62.23	53.23	58.04

13. Laski's classification: (1) the ventilation of grievances, (2) the extracting of information, (3) debate to sustain public interest, (4) selection of the personnel of government and (5) to provide opportunities for the private member.

    Macmillan's classification made during a debate in the House of Commons on 13 November, 1951 : (1) to vote supplies, (2) to deal with legislation, mainly that put forward by the Government of the day, and (3) Grand Inquest of the Nation.

    Lord Campion in a Memorandum to the Select Committee on procedure, 1946: (1) Representation of public opinion, (2) control of finance, (3) formulation and control of policy and (4) legislation.

14. In re Delhi Laws Act : AIR 1951 SC 332, Rajnarayan Singh v.Chairman, Patna Administration : AIR 1954 SC 569 (574). What is prohibited is the delegation of 'essential legislative functions'. Delegation of subordinate and conditional legislation is, however, permissible. Essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct.

15. During 1962-67 the Lok Sabha referred 6 Bills to the Select Committees which have in all held 43 sittings and submitted 6 reports. In 1957-62 11 Bills were referred to the committee which held 73 sittings and submitted 11 reports.

16. During 1962-67 both the Houses referred 15 Bills to Joint Committees which have in all held 158 sittings and submitted 15 reports. In 1957-62 29 Bills were referred to the Committee which held 208 sittings and submitted 24 reports, and 52 Bills were referred to both committees in 1952-57.

17. *The Reform of Parliament*, 1964, p. 95.

18. J. S. Mill, *Representative Government*, 1910, p. 235.

19. Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government*, 1885, p. 236.

20. Sir Sidney Low, *The Governance of England*, 1904 p. 76.

21. Lowell, *The Government of England*, 1908. I p. 326.

22. Ogg, *English Government and Politics*, 1936, p. 452.

23. The Lok Sabha has passed 970 Bills during 1962-1967 out of which 290 Bills were passed within 869 hours. The time taken was 23.0 per cent of the total time against 28 per cent in 1957-62 for 318 Bills passed and 48.8 per cent in 1952-57 for 327 Bills passed.

24. During 1962-67 the Lok Sabha passed 290 Bills out of which only 6 were referred to Select Committees and 15 to Joint Committees, as against 11 and 29 respectively in 1957-62 and 52 combined in 1952-57.

25. During the tenure of the Third Lok Sabha (1962-67) the time taken by government Bills was 19.8 per cent and by the annual budget 25.00 per cent of the total time against 3.2 per cent taken by private members' Bills. In this period 317 Government Bills were considered out of which 273 were passed whereas out of 178 private members' Bills introduced only 83 were considered and 4 passed keeping 106 Bills pending. 23 were negatived and 43 withdrawn. In 1957–62 25.3 per cent of the time was taken by government Bills and 2.9 per cent by private members' Bills.

26. G. S. Mill, op. cit. p 237.

27. The Committee of the Lok Sabha came into existence on 1.12.1953. Originally it consisted of 10 members but at present it has 15 members. During 1962–67 it held 18 sittings and submitted six reports. 3144 statutory instruments were laid on the table of the Lok Sabha and the Committee scrutinised 4921 instruments. In 1952–57 it considered 881 statutory instruments, held 25 sittings and presented six reports. In 1957–62 it considered 4196 statutory instruments in 12 reports and held 36 sittings and presented 13 reports. There are different kinds of laying: laying without further provision for control as provided by law:

laid with immediate effect but subject to modifications or annulment; laid in draft but subject to resolution that no further proceedings be taken; laid in draft and requiring affirmative resolutions, and laid and made subject to affirmative resolution for continuance. Opportunities for discussing delegated legislation in the House are not satisfactory, During the above period only 2 per cent of the total time was spent on discussing motions for modifying statutory rules.

28. 1952: Congress 364, Opposition 125; 1957 : Congress 371, Opposition 123; 1962: Congress 362, Opposition 135.
29. 1967: Congress 284, Opposition 236.
30. During 1962–67 it held 386 sittings of 1069 hours' duration and submitted 66 reports. In 1957-62 it held 257 sittings of 608 hours' duration and submitted 39 reports.
31. During 1962-67 it held 305 sittings of 843 hours' duration and submitted 113 reports and visited 258 offices. In 1957–62 it held 246 sittings of 606 hours' duration and submitted 148 reports.
32. During 1962–67 it held 145 sittings of 332 hours, submitted 34 reports and visited 67 offices.
33. During 1962-67 it held 29 sittings and submitted 4 reports. In 1957–62 it held 23 sittings and submitted 2 reports and in 1952-57 it held 23 sittings and submitted 3 reports.
34. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India*, 1957, p. 315.
35. During 1962-67 in the Lok Sabha 3.0 per cent of the total time was devoted to this.
36. During 1962-67 in the Lok Sabha 3.0 per cent of the total time was devoted to this.
37. During 1962-67 it held 26 sittings and submitted 5 reports and in 1957-62 it held 59 sittings and submitted 14 reports. It has a historic evolution dating back to 1922 when the Government appointed the 'Committee on Public Petitions' under the chairmanship of the President of the Council of State on the model of the U. K. Parliamentary Board. Its function was to hear petitions in respect of Bills in the House but was extended to looking into grievances of individuals and other grievances susceptible of relief on the 'direction' of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in April 1956.
38. During 1957-67 in the Lok Sabha about 15.1 per cent of the total time was devoted to question hour.
39. During 1962-67 in the Lok Sabha out of 776 only 7 were admitted and discussed and in 1957-62 out of 502 only 3 were admitted.
40. Reference under Article 143 : AIR 1965 SC 745.
41. For example, Article 121 which prohibits discussion of the conduct of the Supreme Court and High Court judges in the discharge of their duties except upon a motion for presenting an address for their removal to the President.
42. For example, the Attorney General and every Minister, including non-member Minister (Article 88).
43. Article 105(2).
44. S. 3 & 4 of the Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Act. 1956.
45. M. S. M. Sharma v. S. K. Sinha : AIR 1959 SC 395.
46. Reference under Article 143 : AIR 1964 SC 745.
47. Keshav Ram Reddy v. Nafisul Hassan: AIR 1954 SC 636 and Reference case: op. cit.
48. The Committee of the Lok Sabha held 12 sittings and presented 4 reports in 1952-57, 38 sittings and presented 13 reports in 1957–61 and held 49 sittings and presented 14 reports in 1962-67.

Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

DEEP concern has been caused in New Delhi about the future of people of Indian origin in East Africa, particularly in Kenya. Questions have been asked in Parliament. Even Britain, which had seemed rather unconcerned hitherto, protested to the Kenyan authorities about the treatment meted out to these people, apparently because they had nowhere else to go except the United Kingdom.

The trouble—rather the latest wave of it – started on July 6 when the Kenyan government declared five whites and seven Indians prohibited immigrants and gave them 24 hours to leave the country. The British representative in Nairobi saw President Kenyatta immediately and, according to press reports, made "strong representations" against the summary deportation.

When they reached London these people said they were treated in this manner because of their alleged anti-African activities. Two months later, about 20 people of Indian origin, along with their families, reached London after making a distress sale of their properties in Kenya. One of them said at Heathrow airport: "The government is trying to force all Indians and Pakistanis to give up their British passports and accept Kenyan nationality. Many restrictions have been imposed to prevent us from making a living in Kenya."

About the same time, the permanent secretary of the Kenyan Commerce Ministry, Mr Kenneth Matiba, announced that his government would introduce a trade licensing bill soon because some non-Africans had failed to cooperate in its Africanisation policy. The bill, he pointed out, would speed up the Africanisation policy tremendously. The Opposition Kenya People's Union led by Mr. Oginga Odinga alleged that KANU leaders in Nyanza province were going about threatening people of Indian origin to part with their money and property on pain of being deported summarily. It sounded a bit too lofty when it said, "We would never tolerate the idea of molesting traders or anyone simply because they cannot part with their property".

In the Lok Sabha, both Congress and Opposition members were greatly agitated over reports that Indians in African countries were being treated as second class citizens and were made to live in humiliating circumstances. Members sought an assurance from the Government that the interests of Indians would be safeguarded and that those who wished to return to India would be given necessary facilities.

The External Affairs Minister, Mr Chagla, and his Deputy, Mr Surendra Pal Singh, said that according to their information there was no discrimication against Indian settlers who had taken up the citizenship of African nations. They enjoyed full rights like others.

Mr Chagla however conceded that those Indians who still held British passports or who had not accepted local citizenship might have been subjected to discrimination. When some MPs persisted that even those who had become citizens were being discriminated against, Mr Chagla promised to make further inquiries from Indian missions in the concerned African countries. Many MPs suggested that the Indian government had not so far given serious consideration to the future of Indians in Africa but this was denied by the Minister and his deputy.

The government-controlled Kenya Radio continued to voice strong sentiments against the Indian population generally and on Sept 13 it said the government had neither been instrumental in bringing Asians into the country nor was it bound to stop the exodus of the British passport holders. It said about the Indians: "They exploited their chance in Kenya to such an extent that they now control the economy of this country and monopolise the services". Any student of African affairs would have said this was wrong propaganda.

An announcement has been made that the African National Congress of South Africa will open an office in New Delhi. This will coincide with the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi on Oct. 2. Mr Alfred Nzo and Mr. I.A. Kachalia, representatives of the ANC, called on the Foreign Minister in New Delhi and explained their scheme. They also called on the Prime Minister.

Mr Nzo, who had worked in Cairo for many years, said in New Delhi that the freedom struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa and South-West Africa and elsewhere on the African continent would grow in intensity until the final victory was won.

About this time, seven young men from Angola, sponsored by the Angolan government-in-exile in the Congo, came to India for military training at the Military Academy, Dehra Dun. The leader of the team, Mr D. J. Miranda, said on arrival that the knowledge gained in India would be shared with another 50,000 Angolans getting basic military training in the Congo. The 600,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo were spearheading a military upsurge against the Portuguese authorities in Angola and the seven to be trained in India would go back to the Congo to lead the refugees. The Angolans were first given a year's training in the English language in Goa.

India signed an air services agreement with Ethiopia. Air-India inaugurated its direct flight to Mauritius on Aug. 15. With the flight went an eight-member cultural delegation under the auspices of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations. A fortnightly Boeing service now links the two countries separated by 3,000 miles.

Premier Ramgoolam told Indian journalists accompanying the delegation that Mauritius would welcome economic assistance and investment from India on an increased scale. He said India had a special responsibility towards the people of Mauritius. The people of Indian origin not only constituted the majority of the island's population but also formed the poorer sections of the community.

On Aug. 24, the island's legislative assembly decided to ask Britain to set a date for the independence of Mauritius this year. Prime Minister Ramgoolam presented a motion to the assembly to this effect. The decision was taken in the assembly after an eight-hour debate without the Opposition which walked out earlier after an attack by Local Government Minister S. Bissoondoyal.

India announced in early July that as a member of the Security Council it would support the Congolese government's call to the United Nations for a halt to the recruitment of foreign mercenaries plotting to overthrow the government of President Mobutu.

Brig. Leonard Mulamba, a former Prime Minister of the Congo, was named the Congo's first Ambassador to India. This showed the growing cordiality between the two nations. India has had diplomatic relations with the Congo ever since its independence seven years ago.

The Indian envoy in Addis Ababa, Mr. K. L. Mehta, presented 565 books to the President of Haile Selassie University. The books were on the subjects of art, culture, literature, planning, law and administration. The Ethiopian educationist thanked the Indian government and said he was pleased to note that India had not only made great progress in the modern world but also retained its ancient culture. He hoped contacts between the two nations in the field of education would be greatly strengthened.

Concern continued to be voiced in India about the fate of Indians in troubled Nigeria, Reports reaching New Delhi however said Indians in disturbed eastern and mid-western Nigeria were safe; 90 Indians were evacuated from eastern Nigeria and 27 from the mid-west.

The Fighting in Nigeria

Reports about the fighting in the country continued to be confusing. The central government in Lagos ruled out peace talks with Biafra which had seceded and formed an independent government. Gen. Gowon, head of the Nigerian military government, said he would not negotiate with Biafra until it got rid of its chief, Col. Ojukwu. Biafrans must also renounce secession and accept a Nigerian federation.

Cold war seemed to enter the Nigerian fray openly with Nigeria receiving Soviet jet planes and technicians and hinting at the possibility of hiring mercenaries in its war with Biafra. Nigeria said the US was helping Biafra which was having no difficulty in arranging dollars to buy arms. On August 20 Biafra claimed that its planes had destroyed several Soviet MIG 15 jet fighters in a bombing raid on Kano airport.

The Nigerian question figured at the UN and at the Organisation of African Unity conferences at Nairobi and Kinshasa. Secessionist Biafra appealed to these bodies to put a stop to British military assistance to the Lagos government.

OAU Conferences

African leaders meeting in the Congolese capital on Sept. 13 voted to establish a six-nation commission to visit Nigeria. They reaffirmed the OAU Charter condemning secession and supported the federal government. It was decided to send a commission of heads of state of Ethiopia, Ghana, Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia, Niger and Cameroons to visit Lagos to confer with Gen. Gowon. Earlier, heads of four East and Central African countries met in Nairobi to discuss the Nigerian problem.

At this summit Kenya and Somalia signed an agreement to respect each other's territorial integrity. Both agreed to end hostile propaganda and to ensure security on both sides of their border and accepted the offer of Zambian President Kaunda to mediate on their border dispute.

Arab-Israeli War

African leaders voted to ask the UN to demand that Israel retreat from the UAR. They resolved unanimously that Israel constituted a foreign power present on sovereign African territory and expressed sympathy for the UAR.

Leaders of Arab countries met in Khartoum in August in what was said to be the most crucial conference on Arab unity since the formation of the Arab League 22 years ago. The aim of the meeting was to coordinate political, military and economic policies to liquidate the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Tunisia and Morocco however criticised the move.

A three-day emergency meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation was also held in Cairo in July to condemn Israeli aggression against the Arabs. The Indian team was headed by Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon. Though an invitation to attend was extended to the Chinese, who quit the organisation four months ago, no Chinese representative was present. But a message was sent by the "Chinese People's Organisation for Afro-Asian Solidarity", presumed to be the parallel body Peking had been contemplating to set up.

Chinese Activities

The Chinese faced mounting rough weather all over Africa. They had the worst time in Kenya. In June Kenya expelled the Peking, envoy in Nairobi, Mr Li Chieh, and recalled its own ambassador in Peking, Mr T. Koske, following a statement issued by the Chinese mission in Nairobi attacking the Planning Minister, Mr Tom Mboya. Kenya's Vice-President, Mr Daniel Moi, accused the Chinese embassy of gross interference in Kenyan internal affairs. Mr Mboya had provoked the Chinese by asking his government during a debate on national security to keep a close watch on foreign secret agents. Mr. Mboya accused China of trying to drag Kenya into its cold war against "western" imperialism. The ruling KANU party wanted Kenya to break completely with Peking. It held a mass rally to pass a resolution asking for such a break. Mr Mboya told the rally that if the Kenyans wanted to study any thoughts they should be those of President Kenyatta and not of Mao. Mr Moi earlier accused China of distributing Mao badges in Kenya.

In Zambia police investigated the appearance of thousands of Mao badges in the country. Though some of the badges were traced to the Chinese embassy in Lusaka, the majority were reported to have been handed out by members of Pekings's mission to the Zambian trade fair at Ndola in the heart of the country's strategic copperbelt.

On his return to Zambia from China, President Kaunda said the treatment of China as an outcast could prove the single most tragic step of this century. He disclosed that China was willing to finance and build a 1,000-mile rail link between Zambia and Tanzania. Britain Russia, America and Japan had also approached him about this railway.

President Banda of Malawi went on a seven-day visit to Taipeh. His meetings with Chiang Kai-shek were described as most cordial. Before leaving, he said the Chinese ambassador in Tanzania had tried three times to bribe him to recognise the Peking regime. First, he offered £6 million and later £8 million in return for recognition, Dr Banda said. Subsequently, when he was in Dar-es-Salaam, the bribe was raised to £12 million.

Rhodesian Deadlock

Rhodesia receded into the background for the first time in several months. But there were reports that Rhodesian security forces had killed 23 nationalist infiltrators and captured 26 in the remote Matabeleland province. The statement by the Rhodesian government was the only confirmation of reports of fierce fighting between the security forces and nationalists. It was also claimed by the ZAPU, the nationalist organisation, that more than 100 Rhodesian soldiers were killed in August in clashes with nationalists. It said fierce fighting had taken place in a region near Wankie colliery and at Karoi, about 60 miles south-east of Kariba Lake. The ZAPU said white Rhodesians had used both ground troops and planes against the African freedom fighters.

Rhodesian Law Minister Lardner-Burke introduced a new law in Parliament proposing a mandatory death sentence for "terrorists" entering Rhodesia. It provided for a maximum of 30 years and a minimum of five years imprisonment for people committing acts of terrorism or sabotage.

But Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith did not altogether abandon his efforts to seek a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian independence problem. He sent messages to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London seeking an end to the constitutional crisis. Nothing was known about the nature of these peace moves. Britain plugged a gap in its economic sanctions against Rhodesia by tightening the ban on imported ferro-chromium made from Rhodesian materials. The Ghana government appealed to Britain and other nations to help thwart Rhodesian efforts to recruit white immigrants. Ghana said this attempt to boost immigration was a device to artificially increase the white population in order to undermine UN efforts to solve the problem.

Zambia handed a protest note to the British mission in Lusaka asking Britain to halt "the South African invasion" of Rhodesia and topple the Ian Smith regime there or face the responsibility of causing a "subcontinental racial conflagration". This was a renewed appeal by Zambia to Britain to take military action in Rhodesia following the recent clashes between African guerillas and Rhodesian security forces. Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe said Britain was suffering from "old age" and the Commonwealth was "already dead". He said he did not see any future for the Commonwealth which had been killed by Prime Minister Wilson. There was a report that Zambia planned to send Rhodesians living in Zambia back to Rhodesia to fight the racialist regime there. Minister for State for Western Province Andrew Mutemba said in the copperbelt town of Kitwe that there were 6,000 Rhodesian Africans in Zambia and they must realise that they could break the Ian Smith regime.

Apartheid Conference

In Kitwe, the UN-sponsored Apartheid Conference demanded in early August that the South African authorities release 37 Africans awaiting trial on charges of terrorism in Southwest Africa. As many as 16 of the conference representatives voted for the resolution. The resolution also condemned the violation by South Africa of the international status of Southwest Africa which, it claimed, had been made a direct UN responsibility.

Addressing the conference, President Kaunda said the movement for freedom for southern Africa had come to a grinding halt. The situation continued to be explosive. UN Secretary-General Thant said in a message that Africa's winds of change appeared to have run into a stony wall stretching across the continent's southern part. The winds, which brought independence to most other parts of Africa in the past decade, had produced no change beneficial to the non-whites in southern Africa.

Congo Developments

Mrs Tshombe, wife of the kidnapped Congolese leader, flew to UN to plead with U. Thant for the release of her husband. Mr. Tshombe was kidnapped in June while flying between the Spanish holiday islands of Majorca and Ibiza and taken to Algeria. This was the second time Mr Tshombe had been kidnapped in his tumultuous career in African politics. He was kidnapped for the first time by the Central Congolese authorities during a conference in Coquihatville in 1961 when he was president of the secessionist province of Katanga but was freed two months later. In March this year he was sentenced to death for high treason by a Kinshasa court which tried him in absentia. He had been living in exile in Madrid since his ouster as Prime Minister of the Congo two years ago. Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko said the amnesty for acts of rebellion in the year 1961-62 was not applicable to Tshombe. He was replying to an argument advanced by Tshombe's lawyer before the Algerian Supreme Court. On July 21 the Algerian Supreme Court ruled in favour of a Congolese government request for the extradition of Tshombe.

In the Congo, President Mobutu ordered a general mobilisation of all men and women between 18 and 25 as fierce fighting erupted at Bukavu in the east. The government said Belgian, French, and Spanish mercenaries had joined the rebellious Katangese troops in fighting government forces. Bukavu and Kisangani, formerly Stanleyville, were for a time captured by mercenaries but were later regained by the Congolese forces.

Mobutu approved a new constitution giving him more extensive powers. He devalued the Congolese franc and replaced it by the zaire, meaning river.

Malawi and South Africa

Malawi announced it would establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. President Banda said: "I am aware that it will cause a hullabaloo in certain African quarters", but added he was indifferent to such protests where the interests of his country were concerned. Malawi is the first African country to have diplomatic relations with South Africa. A Malawi representative is expected in Pretoria in December this year.

Dr Banda said there were 80,000 Malawi citizens working in South Africa and 200,000 in Rhodesia. "Would it be in the best interests of my people if Malawi practised a policy of isolation against those countries?", he asked.

A-bombs for South Africa?

South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster said his government planned closer ties with Southwest Africa. The fate of South Africa and Southwest Africa was interlocked and legislation would be prepared to enable the South African Parliament to deal with certain functions which had hitherto been handled by the Southwest African Assembly.

The Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity in East Berlin stated that West Germany was helping South Africa to get atom bombs. Many South African atomic experts have been getting training in West German atomic institutes. South Africa produces 20 per cent of the world's uranium ore. Official sources in Pretoria denied a report emanating from the US that South Africa had asked France to sell atomic bombs to it. But these sources declined to comment on a reported deal under which South Africa had agreed to sell France up to 50 per cent of its uranium output. The US report was from Negro columnist Carl Rowan, a former chief of the US Information Agency.

The whole world was shocked to learn of the death of former Chief Albert Luthuli. The Nobel Prize winner and civil rights leader died in July. He was struck down by a freight train while walking over a small bridge near his home.

The war between Portuguese soldiers and African nationalists continued in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique. The Algiers Bureau of the Angolan Revolutionary Government (GRAE) claimed that 65 Portuguese soldiers had been killed by Angolan insurgents since July 1. The Governor of Guinea, Gen. Arnaldo Shulz, said. "We have defeated the enemy wherever it is. We will keep fighting until the last terrorist is expelled or killed". In July, the Portuguese troops killed 30 nationalists and lost one man in action. About 22,000 troops are stationed in Portuguese Guinea where Portugal has been fighting an anti-guerilla war for the past five years. In Mozambique, according to Lisbon sources, 109 Africans were killed in August. But the Mozambique Liberation Front claimed that it had destroyed three Portuguese aircraft on the ground in an attack on the airfield at Mueda.

Uganda's new Constitution

In East Africa, President Obote introduced a new constitution abolishing the monarchy and making the country a unified republic. Under the new constitution, each of the four kingdoms has been turned into an administrative district. In opposition to the new measure, Planning Minister Cuthbert Obwangor resigned and joind the opposition ranks in Parliament. He described President Obote as a dictator. Observers said there was growing concern over the authoritarain nature of the new constitution, third since independence in 1962. It provides wider Presidential powers, including powers of detention without trial and postponement of elections, and ensures President Obote's automatic succession to the Presidency.

In Tanzania, former Minister Oscar Kambona left the country rather dramatically, ostensibly due to the detention of a leading TANU member and former secretary of the Youth League of the ruling party, Anangisye, for allegedly trying to incite the armed forces to rise against the government. Kambona said he was going on grounds of ill health. He got an appointment with the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

Serious tribal clashes took place in the Sudan. Army and police units were sent to the soutnwest province of Kordofan where 100 people had been killed in tribal battles over agricultural land in early July. Thirty-eight persons, including the Foreign Minister of Malagasy, Albert Sylla, were killed in July when an Air-Madagascar DC-4 crashed in a swamp just after takeoff from Tananarive airport. My Sylla had been Foreign Minister since 1960.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

Mozambique Liberation Day

The Council organised a public meeting in New Delhi on Sept. 25 on the occasion of Mozambique Liberation Day marking the third anniversary of the armed struggle launched by FRELIMO. Mr. Jagjiwan Ram, Minister for Food and Agriculture, presided over the largely attended meeting at Vithalbhai Patel House. Among the speakers were Mr. M. George Dove-Edwin, High Commissioner of Nigeria, Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouls, First-Secretary of the Algerian Embassy, Mr. Alfred Nzo, Chief Representative of the African National Congress Bureau in India, Mr. K.C. Pant, Minister of State for Finance and Vice-President of the Council, Dr. Gopal Singh, Member of Parliament and General Secretary of the Council, and Mr. H.D. Malaviya, of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference.

The Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, sent a message reaffirming India's support for the people of Mozambique and wishing success to the meeting. She said. "We have always stood four square with the people of Africa in their struggle for freedom and dignity. The continued aggrandisement of Mozambique by Portugal is an example of colonialism in its ugliest form." Dr. Gopal Singh, who read out the message, also announced the donation by Cipla, a pharmaceutical firm, of a consignment of medicines for the Mozambique freedom fighters.

Mr. Jagjiwan Ram said these were the last days of colonialism and imperialism. All those who were wise should be able to read the writing on the wall. If the Portuguese continued to oppress the people of Mozambique the same thing that happened in Goa would be repeated. Mr. Dove-Edwin said India had provided inspiring examples to many oppressive countries of Asia and Africa. When the history of the African liberation movement was written, he was sure the names of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Gandhiji would not be forgotten. Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouls said Algeria was now in the forefront of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles and had given support to as many as eight revolutionary movements. Mr Nzo said the presistent anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist policy and the consistently positive non-alignment policy of India, whose foundations were solidly laid by the late Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, had been a source of deep inspiration and strength to all fighters who were still actively engaged in rooting out the vestiges of colonial and racial oppression. The people of India had not been content with rendering assistance to the national liberation movements elsewhere, and had shown by their glorious example that this scourge of mankind must be fought and destroyed.

Mr. Pant recalled India's deep interest in anti-colonial struggles, its role at the UN where it acted in concert with other Asian and African countries, and the assistance it gave to organisations fighting for freedom. He said the silent war going on in African countries had not yet attracted sufficient notice. There was now a danger of violence breaking out. Mr. Malaviya said that though India believed in the peaceful solution of problems, it did not think non-violence was the only teachnique to achieve independence. Text of the speeches will be published in the next issue of AFRICA QUARTERLY.

Dinner for African Envoys

Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, gave a dinner in honour of African envoys in the capital. It was attended among others by the ambassadors of Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda and the acting High Commissioner of Ghana.

Seminar on Indians Abroad

Mr. Mehta had a special meeting with members of the new Executive Committee to chalk out the Council's future programme of work. It was decided to organise, among various other activities, a seminar on Indians Abroad—in Asia and Africa—next year.

Angolan Students' Visit

The Council arranged for three Angolan students, Mr. Celestino David, Mr Afonso Bengo and Mr. Thomas Dos Santos, undergoing police training at the P.T. College, Phillaur, Punjab, meetings with INTUC officials and youth leaders. The programme for another group of Angolan students receiving military training at Dehra Dun was extended to mid-July.

New Office-bearers

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Council on August 4, the following were elected office-bearers of the Council: Mr. Asoka Mehta, President; Mr. Nath Pai and Mr. K. C. Pant, Vice-Presidents; Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy and Dr. Gopal Singh, General Secretaries; Col B. H. Zaidi, Treasurer.

The following were coopted members of the Executive Committee: Mr. Nath Pai, Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy, and Mr. G. L. Bansal.

The following were admitted as members of the Council: Mrs. Annasuya Muthanna, Dr. D. L. Mazumdar, Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy, Mr. Narayan Datt Tiwari, Dr. Nirmal Singh Grewal, Mr. S. P. S. Sodhi, Mrs Shyam Kumari Khan, Dr. S. P. Varma, Mr. Madan M. Sauldie and Dr. Ram Gopal Aggrawal.

Chief Albert Luthuli

The Executive Committee of the Indian Council for Africa on August 4 passed a resolution mourning the death of Chief Albert Luthuli.

The resolution said: "The Indian Council for Africa expresses its deep sense of sorrow at the death, in tragic circumstances, of Chief Albert Luthuli, who devoted his life to the cause of peace and brotherhood of man. In his death the world has lost one of the greatest exponents of non-violence and South Africa a supreme leader who heroically fought against the racial bigotry of its rulers and the apartheid laws imposed on the vast majority of the people.

"Luthuli, like Gandhi whom he met during his visit to India and perhaps drew inspiration from him, regarded passive resistance to oppressive and ruthless state authority not only as a political weapon but also as a purifying force. The trails and tribulations he had to undergo as the leader of the African National Congress strengthened his faith in this moral weapon.

"A man of peace and a fearless fighter, he was drawn to the forefront of the grim political struggle, because as Zulu Chief he had become conscious that he was being used as an instrument of an illegitimate government. The tragic events that followed—his deposition, detention, trial and the Sharpeville massacres of 1960—did not deflect him from the path of seeking to turn enmity into amity. World recognition came in 1960 when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

"Chief Luthuli is no more. But the torch of freedom he lit cannot be extinguished and it will not be long before it dispels the darkness in South Africa".

Book Reviews

Succession to High Office

Edited by Jack Goody, Cambridge University Press, London, 1966

THE problem of succession of key personnel is one of the major problems in the proper working of any political system or organization. With the coming of political independence Africa fell a victim to one of history's cruelest tricks. Tropical Africa is in danger of 'falling apart'. Any keen observer of the African scene is stunned by the rapid fragmentation of the newly-emerging states of Africa. Among the problems facing the newly-born states, the one relating to succession to high office requires a deep and detailed analysis. The absence of an established and institutionalized system of transfer of power and authority in the African political system is an important source of instability. The system suffers from instability because the absence of a recognized and acceptable method of transfer of power introduces an element of uncertainty. The present work makes an informative and important contribution to the understanding of this problem in the continent of Africa.

Besides an interesting inroduction by Dr. Jack Goody, the book consists of four papers which deal with the succession problem as it is found in Basutoland, Buganda, Northern Unyanwezi and Gronja. They are written by Dr. G. I. Jones, Dr. Martin Southnold Dr. R. G. Abrahams and Dr. Jack Goody. In his introduction Dr. Goody has examined "some of the variable elements in systems of succession, particularly hereditary system (p 2) and has assessed successfully "the gains and costs of each of these modes of transferring scarce resources" (p 2). As different social situations require different systems, he rightly observes that each system solves certain problems and produces its own particular "dilemmas" (p 2). According to him there are four main factors in succession to high office: (1) the uniqueness of the office; (2) the time of succession; (3) the selection of the successor; and (4) the relation between successive office-holders. Besides analysing the implications of these factors, he distinguishes four types of dynastic structures: the 'stem dynasty' (p 45) with the possibility of only a limited degree of lateral succession, combined with a radical elimination that places the monarch in lone control but without support and therefore liable to fall under the sway of his troops or his officers of state (e. g. Turkey, late 19th century, Buganda); (b) the 'familial dynasty' (e. g. post-Norman England) (p 46) with dynastic shedding (royalty to nobility) with male office holders but a bilateral emphasis that opens up the possibility of female kings; (c) dynastic descent groups (e. g. Gonja, Hausa, Lozi), often non-exogenous in character; (d) royal descent groups (e. g.

Ashanti, Yoruba Southern Bantu) where dynasty is but one of a number of similar groups. It implies greater cultural homogeneity in society.

Apart from the method of hereditary succession, there are two new types of succession which are now found in all societies. They are election and appointment, for example, bureaucratic methods of succession in modern industrial enterprises. These methods have come to be adopted in response to the changing needs of the human society. In many parts of the world that have abandoned monarchical rule and set aside the transfer of power by true election, the problem of succession of key personnel is, as Dr Goody points out, "both critical and unsolved" (p 46) and "the problem of succession to high office remains just as essential, as full of conflict, and as critical for social continuity and change, as in the monarchies of earlier times" (p 46).

Dr G. I. Jones aims in his paper, "Chiefly Succession in Basutoland", to examine "the ways in which paramount chiefs and ward chiefs sought to regulate the succession to their own and to subordinate chieftancies during the period 1868-1920" (p 61). There were two principal instruments: (1) marriage and (2) the 'placing system'. The Basuto system of succession, which was founded by its first chief Moshesh, is characterized by "a systematic pattern of placing" (p 72). According to the institution of 'placing system', the chief used to settle a portion of his chiefdom upon the eldest son of his various wives while he was still alive. The son became the chief of his territory and subordinate to his father, or to his father's successor in office. Thus in the Basuto system the heir was defined early though the choice was subject to confirmation by the lineage council after his father's death. The succession was defined beyond the immediate heir, as far as his son or even his grandson. The 'placing system' was to some extent "a process of decentralization" (p 62); but it also enabled the paramount and ward chiefs "to group together scattered communities by giving them as a chief a son, a close relative or an unrelated councillor" (p 62). There were both economic and administrative advantages. On the whole the Basuto system was "remarkably efficient" (p 61). The trouble arose only when there was "either the attempt of the late chief to alter the succession in favour of a son rather than the rightful heir, or the premature death of the chief of his eldest son."

Dr. Martin Southnold has made an elaborate analysis of "the customs governing successions to the throne in Buganda" (p 89) in his paper. As the customs have changed considerably under the influence of Christianity, the author has grouped them into two categories: (1) "Pre-Christian" and (2) those relating to the "modern eras". His analysis deals with the customs of the pre-Christian era which ends with the accession of Kabaka Mwanga II in 1884. The present practice has also been described in Appendix I to the article, although it is sketchy and inadequate.

Dr. Southnold groups the rules, customs and principles governing succession into five groups: "Prescriptive (consanguineal) rules of hereditary succession" (these defined eligibility and its degrees with reference to consanguinity. For example, only a prince, that is any male descendant in the male line from any Kabaka, was eligible to succeed to the throne (p 97) or, among the princes, only 'princes of Drum' were eligible); (2) Preferential (consernguineal) rules of hereditary succession (these rules are mostly concerned with fraternal succession); (3) Personality factors, i.e, the personal characteristics of the candidates, consideration of which might lead to the preference of one candidate over another; (4) 'Political factors' which might help to weight the preference given to one candidate over another; and (5) The electoral institutions, i.e. what categories of persons expressed opinions which were taken account of in choosing a successor, etc. In practice these categories sometimes merge into one another. Greater attention should have been paid to the changes brought about by the British over-rule. The forces and realities which will "underlie" and shape the changing patterns of succession to the Buganda throne need further investigation and analysis.

Dr. R.G. Abrahams' paper deals with the problem of "succession to the chiefship in Northern Unyamwezi" which nowadays comprises the Tabora and Nzega districts and the eastern half of the Kahama districts of West-Central Tanzania. It is a "multi-chiefdom" (p 127) area which has apparently never been politically united. The whole area is divided among several distinct ruling dynasties whose number in 1959 was about 31, ranging in area from about 6o to 10,000 sq. miles. When a chief died, his successor was chosen in a divination which was conducted by the 'ritual elders' and the headmen of the chiefdom. As a system in abstract, it allows "a neat division of labour and appears to be designed to ensure the peaceful and unimpeded continuity of chiefly office". The author has tried to survey some of the "changes and continuities" in succession in the Nyamwezi Kamba chiefdoms during the last hundred years or so. Dr. Abrahams rightly points out that the alteration or maintenance of the system of succession will be intimately connected with "the form the office takes through time" (p 141).

Dr. Jack Goody has contributed an excellent paper on "Circulating Succession among the Gonja". The author has tried "to sketch the way in which succession works, to analyse the variables involved in this and other circulating systems and to spell out some of the correlates and consequences for the social system (p 142)". Dr. Goody defines "circulating succession" as "a system whereby offices pass between two or more units of organization (p 157)". It necessarily entails a "promotional system", but the reverse is not true. Among Gonjas, important offices are handed down not between close kinfolk, but between distant members of the dynasty who represent different segments of the ruling estate. Consequently the whole of the dynasty is concerned with filling the main offices of state. Thus the paramount is in principle selected in rotation from the chiefs of the constituent divisions who have themselves achieved their positions by promotions within the secondary segments. In a way "circulating systems" are essentially ways of distributing power; next-of-kin system are ways of concentrating it (p 166)." He has examined elaborately the costs and gains of the circulating system both from the point of view of the political system as well as the relationship within the dynasty. Polydynastic systems are found in Ghana (Ashanti)

Dahomey (Djougou or Zugu), Nigeria (Fulani and Habe Hausas, etc.), Mali, Eastern Sudan (Shilluk), East African coast and South-Eastern Africa (Nyakyusa). Although by the operation of the circulating system the whole of the ruling estate is directly involved in perpetuation of the state as a unit, even then, as Dr. Goody points out, it is not a "tension-free system (p 167)."

The present volume is one of the most authoritative and informative studies of the problem of succession to high office. The issues involved have been analysed and discussed in a readable manner. A selected bibliography has also been given at the end of the book. The authors have raised many important issues which need careful consideration by those interested in the study of the African political system.

D.P. SINGH

The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah—A Study of Personal Rule in Africa, Henry L. Bretton; Pall Mall Press, London, 11s. 6d, Pp. 232.

Even though Kwame Nkrumah has been eliminated from the Ghanaian scene—a development over one year old—he should not be forgotten altogether. For, he has left behind, through a decade of power, much to be discovered and explored about him. The period between his early rise and eventual ouster was a period of great significance not only in the history of Ghana but also in the history of free Africa. The whole of Africa's face underwent a change during this decade. As the leader of his country, he had his own dreams about the continent of Africa—a continent bound together by a common colonial heritage and a common upsurge for bringing unity and development among the people of free Africa. The irony, however, is that the great "Redeemer" fell from his pinnacle at a time when he had done only a little for his country and nothing for the continent as a whole. Perhaps, he was least equipped for it.

The book under review presents an exploratory assessment of how Nkrumah placed himself before his country and even his Convention People's Party, in whose name he did much for his personal aggrandisement, and how he built up a political machine which worked only to strengthen his personal rule.

The author traces the roots of Nkrumah's political machine in the US, the UK, the USSR and in the small circles of revolutionary enthusiasts in London, Paris and New York. He also discovers these roots in the writings of Jefferson, Marx, Mazzini, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois, in the experiences of the British Labour Party, the Communist International and various Fascist parties, all of which left a deep imprint on Nkrumah's mind in the days of his youth.

As his power grew, the political machine took a shape and began to be built up. He gradually projected himself as a Messiah for his people, their Osagyefo, who was the only being capable of delivering the goods. Following Mussolini's dictum that "the leader is always right" he established it by law and in effect amended the constitution to convey that "Nkrumah was always right and that any oral or written criticism of him or of any of his acts or policies or those of his government for which he was responsible in totality would be deemed *lese-majesty* and punishable as a criminal offence."

Calling himself a protagonist of "scientific socialism", the author reveals, Nkrumah had himself become a potential private capitalist. By one means or another, over the years he had extracted from a variety of sources enough private wealth "to make him a multimillionaire" with huge bank accounts, real estate holdings and commercial property worth millions of pounds. So much so that, to hide his own financial manipulations he encouraged numerous ministers and other leaders to indulge in similar practices.

He was building himself on all counts and in the process had become Secretary-General of his Convention People's Party and its Life Chairman, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Head of the State, Head of the Government, Head of the Secret Police and the Fount of Honour.

Nkrumah was always suspicious of or had aversion for more intelligent and free-ranging minds, a fact which created an insurmountable barrier between himself and the Ghanaians. In fact, he was surrounded by a cluster of flatterers and sycophants who managed to keep him completely in the dark and aloof from the realities of Ghana. He would always choose only Europeans and non-Ghanaians as his advisers, despite his weakness for the people of his own tribe, Nzima. Gradually, he lost all touch with his people.

On top of all this came his obnoxious Preventive Detention Act of 1958 which not only earned him disdain and hatred at home but also infamy abroad. This move, apparently designed to silence his opponents, boomeranged and the number of his enemies grew enormously not only among the civilians but among some ranks of the armed forces as well.

What was the impact of Nkrumah's personal rule on the functioning of the Ghana Government? The author's evaluation is that the impact was evident in four sectors: learning and correcting; regulating, ordering and stabilizing; economic development; and ideolgical, moral and aesthetic leadership. The learning capacity of Ghana, as the author puts it, was reduced to the learning capacity of Kwame Nkrumah. The stability of Ghana was the stability of the prison camp. The economy was gradually grinding to a halt. And Nkrumah had proved an utter failure in providing any moral or aesthetic leadership to his country. His unwillingness to follow his own prescriptions—one was "scientific socialism"—was his biggest failure.

The author sums up Nkrumah's regime as one "superimposed upon a politically inexperienced and in essential respects politically paralysed and disoriented people."

Knowing what Nkrumah had made of himself in the public eye, one can only agree with the author's assessment. The story of Nkrumah's rise and fall is a remarkable piece of history as related to government by personal rule in modern days. But most of the facts have already been unearthed, even more callously, by the new military regime through a series of publications. Such books as the present one would have had a greater impact had they been published during Nkrumah's days of glory. But unfortunately access to source material being a major handicap, the authors could do nothing more than waiting to probe further.

MADAN M. SAULDIE

Portugal and Africa 1815-1910

A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism by R. J. Hammond, Food Research Institute, Stanford University Press, California, 1966.

This book covers new ground not so much in its subject matter as in its approach. In the author's own words, its subject is the scramble for Africa, *viewed from a Portuguese standpoint*, its aim to evoke the political and economic atmosphere of the time and to set out the way in which a seemingly doomed dominion was enabled to survive and even to consolidate itself. Hammond says he is opposed to a didactic and moralizing approach to history and thus he does not believe in appraising the Portuguese performance in Africa by reference to what is done for the African. He equally disregards the current trend of writers on African topics to avoid "Eurocentrism." He declares: "I adopt a Portuguese standpoint so far as it is possible for one who is English by birth, citizenship and training".

Because of this approach, the author says the subject of his book "looked at from the Portuguese point of view makes sense, looked at from the British point of view makes some sense, looked at from an African point of view, sympathise however one may with the toad beneath the harrow, it would make no sense whatever". Were it really so the book would have made *no sense whatever* to the reviewer and perhaps to many others who have all sympathy for the African and all contempt for oppression of democratic aspirations.

Whatever standpoint the author takes, his researches have their value in so far as he is honest to his subject and objective in his approach. Prof. Hammond has done this in full measure. Hence this work is a valuable addition to the existing literature on the scramble for Africa—one that makes use of primary historical sources, is based on a sound historical analysis done with an open mind devoid of sentiments and emotions that very often mar the true value of historical works. Despite the Portuguese standpoint the author adopts, his book is an unbiased narrative and interpretative history of Portuguese activities in and about Africa from the early 19th century to the time of creation of the Portuguese Republic in 1910. The five tastefully selected illustrations and seven neatly drawn maps have added to the value of the book.

R. D. DIKSHIT

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Note to Contributors

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Repercussions of Nigerian Crisis in Dahomey

PHILIPPE DECRAENE

With this issue, Africa Quarterly begins a new regular feature dealing with questions relating to French-speaking Africa. The article below, the first in the series, is by the well-known French Africanist, Philippe Decraene.

A specialist on African affairs south of the Sahara on the staff of the well-known Parisian daily. 'Le Monde', and Editor-in-Chief of the "French Journal of African Political Studies", a monthly edited in Paris, Philippe Decraene is a member-correspondent of the Academy of Sciences Overseas and Research Assistant in the African Section of the Centre of Studies on Internal Relations of the National Foundation of Political Sciences, Paris. He is the author of two works, "le Panafricanisme" .(1959) and "Tableau des partis politiques africains" (1963)—Ed.

THOUGH the common frontier of Nigeria and Dahomey is interspersed with stretches of yellow sand and coconut groves where all barriers cease to exist, in reality there seems to rise a veritable wall of China between the two countries. A legacy of their colonial past—only ten years ago Dahomey was under French administration, Nigeria under British—it still takes at least four days for a telegram to reach Lagos from Cotonu, a distance of less than 250 kilometres. Postal and telegraphic communications continue to be routed via London from Lagos and via Paris from Cotonu—evidence of the "grande cesure" which exists between the former French and English-speaking territories of Africa.

Nevertheless it is clear that the small Republic of Dahomey is beginning to experience the first repercussions of the grave internal crisis which has thrown into turmoil her powerful neighbour, Nigeria. One follows in Cotonu closely, with vigilance and uneasy apprehension, the developments of the military situation in East Nigeria.

Dahomey has not adopted any special security measures on her borders, but it is true that at the moment it is in the east of Nigeria, t hat is near the frontier of Cameroon, that the struggle between the Federalists and Separatists is taking place. In the Ketou region of Dahomey, capital of one of the seven ancient Yoruba kingdoms, have been living since May 1967 some hundreds of Nigerian refugees and many more have settled in the suburbs of Porto-Novo. Then, again, on Sundays the beaches in the Cotonu region witness a flux of Nigerians or Europeans living in Lagos who go there for the week-end seeking solace from the tense atmosphere prevailing in Nigeria. Finally, the modern port of Cotonu, constructed after Dahomey's independence with French technical and financial assistance, has been, as it were, suddenly roused from its lethargy as groundnuts from oriental-Niger, formerly exported from Lagos, are now on their way to Europe through Dahomey. These are some of the noticeable features which one can relate to the aggravation of the crisis in Nigeria.

Certainly, one essential fact dominates everything else even when one communicates from one side of the frontier to the other in a common vernacular language—the Fons and Yorubas, for example. The attitude of mind, of reasoning, of general orientation, in short the very way of life in French-speaking Dahomey remains profoundly different from that in English-speaking Nigeria. They have nevertheless gods of the same pantheon whom they continue to worship here and there, the same masks, the same statues which the Fons, Nagos and Yorubas continue to carve. A vestige of the period during which the authority of the kings of Porto-Novo extended to Babagiri, now a part of Nigeria, intermarriages between Yoruba women and Fons or Nago youth occur frequently. And the receding influence of Islam in the south of Dahomey, christianised for several centuries first by the Portuguese and then by the French, explains why the Dahomiens feel a closer affinity with the Catholics of the Yoruba and Ibo regions than with the Muslims of North Nigeria. Moreover, have not the small elite of Ibos and Yorubas played for more than half a century the same dynamic role in the Nigerian Federation as that of the Dahomiens till 1958 in what then constituted the federation of AOF?

Whatever the case may be, the Dahomiens are apprehensive about the prospect of the civil war in Nigeria spreading. The Nigerian frontier is hardly a few kilometres away from the capital of Dahomey and one always fears a possible influx of refugees as happened at the time of the upheavals which coincided with the Nigerian elections to the Legislature in the winter of 1965. Such an influx would pose problems of security, certainly in maintaining law and order, and would aggravate the economic difficulties of a country where unemployment is already rampant almost in an endemic form.

The proximity, the difference in relation to numerical strength existing between Dahomey with its two million inhabitants and Nigeria with its 55 million people, enables one to understand partly the behaviour of the leaders of Dahomey. The politics of Dahomey, as is the case with the majority of African states south of the Sahara, is stamped with extreme prudence. Officially at Porto-Novo and Cotonu one disowns all contacts with the envoys of Biafra. On the other hand, close relations are maintained with the government of Major-General Gowon and notably with Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Dr. Zinsou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Dahomey, has given expression to his anxiety on several occasions to the Nigerian Charge d'Affaires at Cotonu and in May, on the eve of the hostilities between the Biafrans and the Federalists, a goodwill mission from Dahomey was sent to Lagos.

The presence of a sizable Dahomien minority in the capital of Nigeria influences to no small extent the attitude of General Christopher

Soglo. Indeed, he fears that the hundreds of thousands of Dahomien nationals who hold jobs there as boys, chauffeurs, cooks, watchmen, clerks and accountants could be submitted to pressures by the Nigerians. This threat assumes a greater reality, more so after the economic measures taken by Dahomey resulting in the closure of the only three embassies she maintained on the African continent: Accra, Kinshasa and Lagos.

On the economic level an important initiative taken by the authorities of Northern Nigeria to bring about a reconciliation between Kadauna and Porto-Novo needs to be underlined. Due to the troubled situation prevailing in Eastern Nigeria, access to Port-Harcourt, a traditional outlet for the producers of Northern Nigeria, was banned. But the congestion in the port of Lagos and the installations of Apapa have encouraged the leaders of Kadauna to envisage the construction of an exit route via the port of Cotonu, the capacity of which remains only partially utilised. Thus with the shortest route linking Sokoto to the sea passing via Cotonu, the prospects of Dahomey appear quite bright. Northern Nigeria contemplates also to participate financially in the construction of roads which will connect it to the Dahomien seaboard.

Meanwhile, there has developed simultaneously among the elites of Dahomey a trend of opinion favourable to Biafra. The young Dahomien intellectuals support more and more frequently in private the view that Major-General Gowon has displayed too much of intransigence, that Lt.-Col. Ojukwu is not as ambitious as his adversaries would like to make him out to be, that the federal system does not conform to the political realities of Nigeria, that sooner or later it must give way to a confederal system; further, one compromises at Lagos the very cause for which one claims to be struggling. In other words, one lives in Cotonu in fear of the military defeat of Biafra which one says "will solve nothing" and where one fears that at the end of this victory, the former Eastern regime will become a "colony" of the North after having been the victim of massacres similar to those which plunged into grief the federation in September 1966.

Public opinion in Dahomey considers generally that if Dahomey, with its less than 2 million inhabitants, can constitute a viable state, Biafra, which has more than 10 million people, has every right to self-determination.

—Translated by Mrs. S. Sadiq Ali.

Military Intervention and Political Change in West Africa

C. W. NEWBURY

THERE are now ten states in Africa which have seen their civilian regimes swept aside by military commanders. In most of these the change to government by army officers looks like becoming permanent. There is no reason to suppose that other states among the 39 independent countries of the African continent will not have similar revolutions.

The countries which have military governments since independence may be listed as follows: Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, Dahomey, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta. All the coups which led to the replacement of civilian control took place between June 1965 and March 1967. All the countries concerned have been independent for less than a decade. All in varying degrees share the main characteristics of tropical under-development—low capital formation, a low literary level and minimal power production, a predominantly rural population ethnically divided, a small educated elite dominating politics and the professions. To these we might add the case of Egypt where the army came to power in 1952 and remains the dominant factor behind a civilian-style presidential executive; the case of Ethiopia where the power of the Emperor is closely linked with the command of the armed forces; and, lastly, the case of East Africa where military revolts shortly after independence in Tanzania and Uganda were unsuccessful and were put down by British intervention (similar to French intervention in Gabon).

It is obvious that many of the similarities in these cases may be superficial; that local factors and personal ambitions were important in determining the exact circumstances of the overthrow of civilian rule. The differences between examples, however, are perhaps less important than the general similarities. This observation is even more convincing if the African examples are examined in the wider context of military intervention in Latin America, Southern Europe, the Middle East and Asia during the last 150 years. There have been few attempts to survey the whole range of cases of army revolts. The work of Professor S. E. Finer (*The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics*, 1962) provides the most useful synthesis; but many of the case studies have inevitably been by passed by more recent events. This is also true of a less incisive but useful book by William F. Gutteridge (*Military Institutions and Power in the New States*, 1964). Politics in new states are too fluid for definitive analysis. But Finer's study at least has the

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The most surprising feature of politics in Africa is not that there have been military revolts, but that there have not been more of them. As Finer points out, military rule has been a common factor in territories which have emerged from long periods of imperial rule. One need only cite, in general, the Latin American successor to Portugal and Spain, the Balkan successor-states to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey itself, the Arab successor-states of the Ottoman Empire, and a variety of Asian colonies—Indonesia, Burma, Laos, South Vietnam Pakistan. Countries such as India and Ceylon, the old Dominions of the British Empire, and the United States itself stand as exceptions to the general rule that the instability of the post-colonial period is a standing invitation to the generals to run the affairs of a new state.

But there are degrees of military intervention in civilian government. There have been plenty of examples of the indirect influence of the army in European politics. 'Bonapartisme' was a factor in nineteenth century French government, though it is important to remember that the significant feature of European examples is the ways in which the army has been subordinated to civilian control. This is no less true of Hitler's Third Reich than of the contemporary Soviet Union, where the ephemeral rise of Marshal Zhukov to a position in the Presidium in 1957 was exceptional. And in France, although the Fifth Republic may owe its origins to the revolt of the Four Generals on 13 May 1958, the weight of metropolitan public opinion was solidly against military control of the capital by the army in Algeria or Germany.

We are not dealing, then, with a phenomenon which has exact parallels in every state, but with a factor which is relative to the political constitution, even the political maturity, of the state. The military are not allowed, either by public consensus, by traditions of non-interference, or by the creation of rival military and security commands, to intervene in most European countries. At another level of political maturity, however, it is possible (some would say desirable) for the military not merely to exercise influence, but to displace a civilian government. From this position of temporary control the military junta may then completely supplant the civilian regime. It is with this level of complete military intervention in the affairs of a politically immature state that we are concerned in the West African examples. The discussion, therefore, requires both an analysis of the circumstances and a consideration of the weaknesses of government in the states concerned to explain the success of the military in capturing the apparatus of executive conrol.

It is also necessary to remember that in a fluid situation where personalities and factions are strong and political institutions and traditions weak, it is possible for a military regime to pass through various states in its domination of civilian government. This is best illustrated by the case of Egypt, where since 1952, the officers who began the revolution have gone through the whole gamut of arrangements with civilian participants in government. In the beginning the officers did not wish to overthrow the civilian regime at all—merely to reform it and purge it of less noble elements. A civilian, Ali Maher, was allowed to choose his own Cabinet. When he refused to pass necessary legislation, the Free Officers began to arrest the politicians; General Neguib replaced the Prime Minister in a civilian Cabinet. At the end of 1952 the politicians in the Cabinet were replaced by civil servants; the constitution was abrogated; a period of direct military rule followed which lasted till 1956. At the end of this period Neguib wished to disgengage; Nasser wished to retain command and became Prime Minister in a Cabinet where all members were military officers. There followed the banning of political parties, the crushing of the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood and other sources of political resistance. The final phase since 1956 has seen the creation of a set of fictional institutions such as the weak Assembly and the official National Union party as ancillaries of a strong executive president. Civilians were then appointed as assistants and military officers dropped from the Cabinet. The phases of military intervention, then, have been (1) reform, (2) dual civilian-military control, (3) direct military control, (4) the creation of a civilian-style government with the army in the background by the President. As will be seen, the West African states are only in the first of these stages.

Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone

The reasons for the Ghana coup of 24 February 1966 are fairly well known, though many of the details of relations between the leading officers and members of the Ghana Civil Service are far from clear. According to the testimony of the leading officers themselves, general disgust with the corruption of President Nkrumah's rule was the main motive (see Colonel A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup*, 1966). As Lieut-General Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council, has summed up the official viewpoint, one can only cite it with all the reservations that such evidence requires:

> "The Ghana armed forces, in cooperation with the Police Service, overthrew the government of President Kwame Nkrumah in order to relieve the people of Ghana from oppression and tyranny and to restore the freedom and justice to which they are entitled... No other means were available to a people subjected not only to the arbitrary use of dictatorial power but to Kwame Nkrumah's fantastic security system, as it was called, which harassed many innocent people and brought disaster to many families—all in the name of socialism."[1]

The statement is a classic pronouncement on the iniquities of the previous regime and a profession of the complete willingness of the National Liberation Council, as a military *junta*, to "return to the barracks" as soon as "a true democracy, based on the will of the people rather than that of a single man, has been established".

There is no reason to doubt the good intentions of the Council, nor the main reason given for military intervention. But it was not the only reason. The official statements of Ankrah and other members of his government are important for what they do not say. Colonel Afrifa's book, however, and the career of the leading commander in the revolt, Lieut.-General Kotoka (since killed in a petty counter-coup), make it clear that there were other important factors in deciding the army to act when it did. Among these were a general decline in officers' opinions of politicians, especially after operations by the Ghana army in the Congo; the dismissal of Generals Otu and Ankrah by Nkrumah and the fear that a 'purge' of other officers might follow; the formation of a Presidential Guard and the threat to the whole army command structure implied in the intention to train young cadets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; lastly, long-standing complaints about the rate of promotion. It is clear that the army, in the person of its senior commanders, felt its existence threatened as a corporate institution. This threat, coupled with the very close (and so far undisclosed) links with the civilian Police and Civil Service, was sufficient to precipitate the coup.

The professions of the army about 'restoring democracy' in the name of the people are classical in their simplicity. In the meantime, parties have been banned, a certain number of punishments and rewards meted out, the civil service is in the course of re-organisation (by reducing the number of ministries), and administrative districts have been enlarged. Most important, a serious effort has been made to restore the economy, build up reserves and complete the electrification begun by the Volta River scheme. The promised Constitutional Reform Commission has not yet prepared the way for the Council to resign in favour of an elected government.

The case of the Nigerian army coup of 15 January 1966 which resulted in the death of some leading politicians—notably the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa—is a complete contrast in origin and results. The basic causes lay not in army dissatisfaction with a personal system of government, but in the struggle for power in the federal system of Nigeria between the three main Regions—the Muslim North and the Yoruba and Ibo West and East. The overthrow of civilian rule by Major-General Ironsi (an Ibo) was on the whole a young officers' revolt by Ibos against the predominance of the North in Federal administration. It was assisted by the collapse of parliamentary government, the long state of emergency in the Western region where the North has retained influence by the use of the army, and by a general decline in the country as a whole of the status and capability of politicians. The details are complex and need not be recounted here. A counter-coup in the army which by mid-1966 was severely divided in its own ranks led to the deaths of many of the Ibo officer corps and brought to power Lieut,-Colonel Gowon (a Northerner) as Head of the Federal Military Government. The administration of the Regions, including the Mid-West State, fell under military governors. The massacre of thousands of Ibos in the Northern Region (partly as a reprisal against the original coup) and the subsequent secession of the East under Lieut.-Colonel Ojukwu are events that have brought the country to civil war.

Clearly the Nigerian case is not so clear-cut as that in Ghana. The central feature emphasised here, however, has been the tendency of the military executive under Gowon to abrogate more and more powers with the connivance of the Federal Civil Service which on the whole has remained compliant. Since March 1967 this accumulation of power by the Executive has been carried to the extent that the Military Council has been abolished and twelve new states decreed to replace the former four regions. It was this step with its implied dismemberment of the Eastern Region which brought Ibo secession to a head, plus the critical question of the payment of oil revenues from the wells in the East.

Finally, in Sierra Leone on 21 March 1967 the army intervened in a constitutional crisis after elections when leading officers disputed the course taken by the Governor-General in calling for the formation of a new government. What began as an attempt (a clumsy one) at arbitration in a case where the election results gave neither of the main parties a distinct control of the Assembly has been carried much farther by the formation of the National Reformation Council under Colonel Juxon-Smith. This military leader is clearly of a very different calibre from those in Ghana or Nigeria. There is something of the mystic about his profession to be both Christian and Muslim and a certain Cromwellian simplicity in his declarations that he will reform his country according to his "conversation" with God (*West Africa*, 22 April 1967). But again, as in Ghana, there are professions that once the task of clearing up financial corruption is done, a new constitution will be proclaimed and a parliamentary government elected. It would seem, however, that the debate on republican or Commonwealth (monarchical) institutions is far from over and forecasts a struggle for a strong presidential executive. The regime has been accompanied, as in Ghana and Nigeria, by a series of draconian laws banning parties, muzzling the press (one of the oldest and most independent in West Africa, and by a series of appeals for self-sacrifice and reconstruction.

Conclusion

In the West African cases the intervention of the military derives from the political structure built up since independence. In all three cases there is a gap between the institutions imported under European-style constitutions and the comprehension of the great majority of the population concerning the operation of political parties and responsible government. The centre of power has been elite-dominated; but electoral support for the political elite has been based on the rural masses where the framework of political organisation is built up on village and ethnic lines. Loyalties in government are split between the institution (Parliament, the Courts, the Civil Service) and the tribal and group sources of legitimate power—between the institutions one serves and the people one serves. In such a division of loyalties, ethnic ties, not a sense of national service nor identification with an institution, were bound to prevail.

This gulf between the sources of political power—essentially in the rural and tribal countryside—and the exercise of power in the metropolis was made more difficult in the Nigerian case by the existence of a federal constitution which enshrined ethnic divisions (not that Nigerians would have accepted anything else at the time of independence). It has proved difficult, if not impossible, in all three countries to build up the idea of responsible opposition. Instead, the predominant concern in politics has been the rule that "the winner takes all." This includes the control of state corporations, banks and international loans for regional and sectional interests. In Ghana, this was carried to the extent where all opposition was constitutionally outlawed; in Nigeria the predominance of the North in federal politics reduced the East and to some extent the West to the position of permanent losers in a state where more and more economic power accrued to the centre; in Sierra Leone where party divisions were narrow, the idea of the transfer of power to the Opposition proved unacceptable.

Consequently, there has been in the British-influenced states of West Africa a deterioration of the quality of civilian political government, though on the whole the civil service has remained remarkably stable and jealous of its inherited tradition of non-partisan service to the politicians. (The administration of the public corporations, open to political jobbery, is another story).

By contrast with the political parties, the army retains certain advantages in an African state where political instability threatens to wreck the limited economic security built up since independence and the aspirations for social reform with which the politicians came to power. In the first place it has a professional cohesion, an *esprit de corps*, which makes it unique in countries where loyalties to institutions are weak. Secondly, the younger officers may be imbued with a deep sense of social justice, a contempt for politicians, or, at the least, a rather conservative unsophisticated belief in the value of Western-type institutions. Most of the Nigerian and Ghanaian officers would fall into this category, bearing as they do the stamp of British military colleges such as Sandhurst, Latimer and Eaton Hall and a keen sense of the rites and regalia of the Officers' Mess. Thirdly, and perhaps more important, in under-developed countries, the army possesses considerable administrative skills, a logistical potential, a communications system and a well-integrated hierarchy of command which has few rivals. In addition, it may have a monopoly of arms. Lastly, the army officers, like their counterparts in Europe and Asia, perceive only too easily the distinction between the 'Government' of the day and the 'State'. Once this distinction is made, it is only too easy to claim service to the *patrie en danger*, or to the 'People', at the expense of the transient civil political machine. The next step towards proclation of the army itself as the 'legitimate' successor to civilian regimes (albeit temporarily!) is simple and logical.

At the beginning the example of Egypt was cited. It seems that both Ghana and Sierra Leone have passed through the stage of 'reform' (1) and are in stage (2), that of dual civilian-military control. Nigeria has possibly gone further after considerable cooperation between the Military Council and the Federal Civil Service and is in stage (3) of direct military control. So long as the war with the East continues this is not likely to change, and the probability of the military governors voluntarily resigning becomes remote. The danger is that in the stress of civil conflict temporary supplantment may become permanent.

The cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone are less easy to judge. They may still be regarded as dual regimes, in the way that Peron's Argentina or Franco's Spain are dual (providing we allow that the Falange and the Monarchists are civilian institutions). The great weakness of the army in West Africa, as elsewhere, is that it is weak in administrative skills and relies to a great extent on the civil service. The important development in Ghana of National Liberation Council reduction of the number of ministries suggests that already the officers have discovered a method of controlling appointments and distributing rewards. If this is so, Ghana's military men may be nearer the position of the Egyptian Cabinet under Nasser than Sierra Leone. On the other hand, one detects in Juxon-Smith the elements of the dedicated 'reformer'. It may be a short step from 'conversations' with God, to thinking of oneself as his permanent emissary. In which case an attack on the remaining strongholds of civilian authority- Civil Service, teaching professions, trading companies and local government administration—is round the corner.

One final comment seems called for. One notes a general absence of doctrines among the soldiery. These are not dedicated revolutionaries with a philosophy, but career professionals who find themselves (not unwillingly) in command. They have no blue-prints, only a certain general sense of the 'popular will'. They are not above tribal loyalties, as the Nigerian case shows. But they have power, and for the moment the populations concerned are content they should have it. It is difficult to see them "returning to the barracks" so quickly, without leaving a legacy and precedent for a long series of military regimes in this and other areas of Africa.

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The Algiers Conference

JAYASHEKAR AND M. J. SUBBAIAH

THE post-war period marked the beginning of a new era. Starting from the 1940's, a large number of countries achieved independence after years of subjugation. With this striking change in the international political scene the source of tension shifted from the political to the economic plane. Having attained political independence, the newly liberated nations turned their attention to the problem of economic development. During the political struggle for independence, the nationalist movements in these countries had roused great expectations among the people. Hopes had been kindled that with the attainment of political freedom economic prosperity would follow. The impact of international demonstration effect intensified the impatience of the peoples of these countries to attain a standard of living comparable to that of the developed world. No wonder that rapid economic development became an urgent necessity.

It is not surprising that in newly independent countries economic growth came to be identified with industrialization. Starting as they were from a stage where the economy was dominated by agriculture with low productivity and disintegrated subsistence units, rapid industrialization was not easy. As these countries wanted to pull themselves out of the morass of poverty within a short time and as their resources were inadequate, it was evident that they would need the help of the developed world. This realization came to be accepted in principle by both sides. An era of international economic aid followed and with the advent of many international financial institutions foreign aid acquired a multilateral character.

These developments raised the hopes of the developing world for a better deal from industrial countries. But disillusionment followed soon. With the emergence of the protectionist US, Europe and Japan as vital centres of world trade, the LDCs found it difficult to secure markets for their manufactured products. The trend towards multilateralism did not last long and economic aid became more an instrument of political manoeuvrability than a genuine contribution to economic development. Naturally, the LDCs were dissatisfied with the existing international economic set-up. The developing countries resorted to "inward looking industrialization" based on import substitution. Development based on import substitution becomes increasingly difficult because of limitation of the size of national markets and the growing demand for import of capital goods. Moreover, in the long run such a method of industrialization may prove inefficient. It is in this context that international economic relations assume special significance for the developing countries. In these circumstances it is no surprise that the gap between the two economic blocs of North and South has widened. The first UNCTAD conference, held in 1964, marked the beginning of a dialogue between these two groups. Attention came to be focussed on the role of international trade as an instrument of growth. Experience taught the developing countries that unless they diversified their export base and unless they found foreign markets for their manufactured goods, all their attempts at rapid industrialisation would be thwarted. This realization brought together more than 77 developing countries to put forward their demand for trade liberalisation in various forms. Since the first UNCTAD conference negotiations and deliberations have continued at various levels. The events that followed UNCTAD-I did not bear out the optimism and hopes expressed at the conference. The response of the developed countries to the outcome of UNCTAD was anything but warm. They made no far-reaching attempts to translate the UNCTAD proposals into reality. The accord on the Kennedy Round tariff reductions has opened the prospects of a better understanding between the developing and developed countries at UNCTAD-II. It is in this context that the recent Algiers conference has acquired great significance as a pointer to the stand that may be adopted by the LDCs at New Delhi.

Eighty-six developing countries from the three continents of Asia, Africa and South America met at Algiers from 10 to 26 October, 1967. Their immediate purpose was to draw up a common programme for consideration at UNCTAD-II.

There was no specific agenda for discussion at Algiers. The conference was divided into four commissions which dealt with the subjects of raw materials, manufactures, finance, and general economic problems. The subjects discussed may broadly be classified as follows:

1. Formulation of a common stand on problems confronting the developing nations.
2. Trade:
    (i) Stabilization of raw material prices.
    (ii) Access to markets of the developed countries.
    (iii) Cooperation among themselves.
    (iv) Vertical trade pattern.
3. Finance: Increased flow of economic aid on generous terms and in untied form.

The conference began on a negative note. Important delegations were asked if they believed in confrontation or retaliation. What sanctions they had behind their demand? A militant note was struck by the Algerian President in his inaugural speech. He declared that "Europe and the US have plundered the natural wealth of the third world. The advanced countries are a veritable octopus whose tantacles are drawing ever tighter on the developing world and we should consider whatever contribution the industrialized countries make as a simple restitution of a tiny part of the debt the western countries contracted by their odious exploitation". He also warned against the widening gap between the rich and poor countries. He called upon the members to stop exploitation. The leader of the Indian delegation stressed the need for reaching agreement on a common platform for negotiations. He pointed out that "the declaratory stage is now behind us" and urged the members to think of concrete steps to achieve their ends. He suggested a built-in device for UNCTAD to become an instrument of mutual consultation and concerted action. He pointed out that the debate could no longer be among the developing nations themselves; it should be with representatives of the developed countries.

Thirty-one delegates of African countries urged reorganization of the world commodity market in favour of the developing nations. They called for limiting fluctuations in primary commodity prices and suggested international agreements on them. They called upon the developed countries to avoid producing primary commodities and pleaded for channelizing aid through the African Development Bank. The Secretary-General of OAU called on the developing nations to utilize their monopoly position to achieve their ends.

The members called for the initiation of a new round of negotiations at New Delhi next year to complete the unfinished task of the Kennedy Round. It should include expansion of trade and a general scheme of preferences on a non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal basis.

The final outcome of the conference—the Charter of Algiers—embodies the agreement reached among the developing countries on various issues. It is a joint demand for better terms in world trade. The charter calls for a radical change in world trade and aid practices to close the gap between the rich and poor countries. It demands preference for exports of the developing nations in the markets of the developed countries. It urges international agreements to stabilize prices of primary commodities.

More specifically, the charter reiterates that there should be an assurance that the benefit of at least 1/3rd of the increase in the consumption of primary commodities by the developed countries should be made available to the developing countries. Technological research should be directed to the transformation of the natural products of the developing nations so that it might benefit the world. It calls upon the developed countries to realize the target relating to the flow of resources from the rich countries to the poor. The charter also makes some demands concerning shipping and the World Bank. It urges more aid to develop shipping, lower freight rates, equal access to conferences and a consultative committee on shipping.

The charter declares that the reconstruction role of the World Bank is outdated and demands that it should be made an exclusive institution for the developing nations. Its main function should be to provide loans at low rates of interest with longer periods of repayment and an interest equalization fund. It should not confine itself to providing loans for the private sector. It should cater to the public sector also.

The charter is based on three concepts:

(a) The developing countries have the primary responsibility for their own development;

(b) These countries are determined to countribute to one another's development;

(c) There should be fuller mobilization and more effective utilization of domestic resources and for this there should be concomitant and effective international action.

What the developing countries seek to emphasize through the charter is that the development of the LDCs is in the interest of the developed countries themselves and that international economic cooperation on a global scale will benefit all. The general feeling is that the chain of economic dependence hurts more than the political bondage they have shaken off. Therefore, a change is essential.

The report of the conference shows the mood of the developing nations. It is now clear that they do not propose any confrontation between the rich and poor countries. They are also tired of mere discussions and promises. They would confine themselves to demanding the creation of a new world economic order.

The developing nations have realised that what is required is hard bargaining. The outcome of the Algiers conference points to the possibility of forging a united front to bargain with the developed countries. It is interesting to note that the bargaining power of ECM countries at the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations was determined mainly by their participation as a single unit.

Beyond a certain stage, when specific issues are taken up, it may be difficult to maintain unanimity among the LDCs. The stage of economic development of a country and the resultant pattern of its trade determine the benefits that would accrue to it from a general tariff cut. Since the LDCs are at different stages of development the benefits of a general tariff reduction will not be uniform. This could be a source of disagreement. If the way out is through a preference system, then the LDCs deriving special benefits because of their association with blocs like EEC or the Commonwealth are likely to raise objections as they may have to forego these concessions. Thus the problem of achieving a united front bristles with difficulties.

Any joint programme that might be presented by the Group of 86 at UNCTAD-II would depend on two factors:

(i) The bargaining capacity of the LDCs vis-a-vis the developed countries.

(ii) The degree of unanimity that these countries can muster in presenting a united front.

On what does the bargaining capacity of the LDCs depend? Since the economic dependence of the developed countries on the developing ones is not very much, it will be difficult for the LDCs to press their case on economic grounds. There is of course no legal sanctity behind the demands of the LDCs. The whole question is a political one and the degree of unanimity that the developing nations can achieve will determine their bargaining capacity at UNCTAD-II. The significance of the Algiers conference is that it has created a measure of unanimity among the developing countries that might form the basis of their negotiations with the developed world.

Political Setting of UNCTAD-II

S. N. TAWALE

THIS article seeks to evaluate the political climate surrounding UNCTAD-II to be held at New Delhi in February-March next. It is an attempt to assess the prospective outcome of UNCTAD-II. The first part of the article gives a general background of the conference. Next are considered non-political factors and their relation to such economic negotiations as the conference. The third and fourth parts deal with the political forces governing the conference. The third is a statement of the political concepts upon which both parties to the negotiations—western industrial countries and the LDCs—rely for the final justification of their respective positions as donor and recipient groups. The idea is to see the long-term political framework within which offers of and demands for economic assistance are publicly expressed and not to assess the more immediate political compulsions behind the negotiating positions. The latter are discussed in the last part.

I

The two post-war decades have witnessed an unprecedented spurt in the field of foreign assistance—both bilateral and multilateral—to what were in the pre-war period described as "backward regions". The rechristening of these countries as "developing" or "less developed" not only reflects the change in the technological possibilities of economic development but also records the basic transformation that has come about in political thinking on the subject in recent years. The western industrialized countries have affirmed and reaffirmed their responsibility to transfer resources and skills to the LDCs, while the latter in their turn have stressed with greater force this responsibility and the need for expansion of its scope. The Soviet Union, supported by the Communist bloc, has, in addition to launching its own assistance programme, often lent political support to the LDCs' demands and at times taken initiative on their behalf while at the same time attacking the political and unfair economic character of western bilateral assistance as well as the role of foreign private capital.

The emergence of the Third World with its economic vulnerability as a constant threat to its very status in international politics, coupled with the nuclear stalemate between the super powers has, it is customarily observed, tended to shift the emphasis from the East-West to North-South confrontation. The emergent political pattern, however, is West-South rather than North-South. For, firstly, the Soviet bloc, though considered economically developed, offers a much limited possibility of assistance, particularly in the vital field of trade.[1] Secondly, Soviet political interests are the same as those of the LDCs, helping them to forge a joint front against western industrial countries.[2] It would be reasonable if we consider, for our purpose, the West and the South as two political entities of direct involvement, while taking account of the communist bloc as an indirect, though important, factor affecting the relationship between the first two. Further, in considering the position of the western industrialized group, attention is centred on the US. This is mainly for three reasons: First, the US is the largest contributor of international assistance. Second, it has assumed the leadership of the "free world" in its struggle against international communism. Third, the US offered the greatest resistance to the demands of the LDCs at UNCTAD-I[3] as it did on earlier occasions such as the bitter controversy during the fifties over the setting up of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

UNCTAD-I ended with merely a statement of issues. There was therefore little possibility of follow-up action.[4] The conference did recommend 15 General Principles and 13 Special Principles. But it was one thing to make recommendations—a foregone conclusion in view of the unanimity of the "77" and the outvoting of industrial countries—and quite another to display that political will which the latter had been exhorted to make.

Even before UNCTAD-I, the LDCs had succeeded in May 1963 in securing the endorsement of GATT (in which they now have a two-thirds majority) for an international eight-point Action Programme the essential objectives of which were elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports from the LDCs, duty free entry for tropical products, elimination of tariffs on processed and semi-processed exports of the LDCs. The Action Programme had laid down the dates by which certain measures were to be implemented. In the previous year (October 1962), a long-term cotton textile arrangement was concluded under GATT auspices among 19 countries. Its purpose was to permit greater access for the LDCs' cotton textile exports while insuring that the change took place in an orderly manner so as to avoid "market disruption".

While little has come out of the GATT Action Programme, the "market disruption" clause in the long-term cotton textile arrangement has in practice been "unilaterally interpreted"[5] by importing countries to raise highly restrictive quotas and equivalent barriers against exports. The US and some other countries have abandoned altogether the criteria of market disruption and have substituted a simple statistical standard: any increase above the base year is "disruptive" and warrants action.[6]

After UNCTAD-I the developed countries attempted to divert the attention of the LDCs to the Kennedy Round negotiations which after the preliminary work of formulation of rules got under way in early 1965. The negotiations, in which the LDCs were exempted from the application of the GATT rule of reciprocity, were concluded in May 1967. For the LDCs the outcome was disappointing. As one correspondent put it in his report on the negotiations, "The American team for the

Kennedy Round reportedly wore out two computers before the trade and tariff negotiations were over. Developing countries, however, will not need even a slide rule to calculate their gains." While precious little was gained for tropical products and agricultural products, in certain manufacture exports of interest to the LDCs the existing situation was further accentuated. The EEC tariff on cars, for instance, will come down from 22 per cent to 11 per cent but that on jute products is likely to remain about 23 per cent.[7]

The economic setbacks suffered by the LDCs during the past three to four years are numerous. The World Bank Report[8] has pointed out that there has been a continued stagnation in the overall volume of aid coupled with the tying of bilateral assistance to procurement in donor countries. The average terms of development loans have tended to harden in recent years. Because of the rising trend of amortization payments on the one hand and the constant level of capital flow on the other, the net flow at the present figure ($ 6.5 billion) cannot be maintained. The debt-servicing burden of the developing countries has reached a point where a number of countries are devoting 20 per cent of their exchange earnings from exports to the servicing of interest and amortization payments of external debts.

As a result of the ever increasing interest rates in the major financial markets, the cost of World Bank borrowings has also increased. IDA, on which the LDCs rely for more concessionary loans, was out of funds at the end of the fiscal year 1966-67.

The picture of the LDCs' trade is equally alarming. It is true that 1966 was on the whole a rather favourable year for their trade. But the export unit value of industrial countries changed from 102 in 1963 to 106 in 1966 (1963=100), while that of less developed countries changed from 102 to 104 during the same period. This means that import prices for the LDCs on an average increased by 2 per cent between 1964 and 1966. Taking this fact into consideration, there has been almost no increase in their total import purchasing power during these years.

The total effect of these factors is reflected in the stagnant or declining rates of growth of the LDCs.[10] The rates of growth during the 1960's of the two most populous Latin American States—Argentina and Brazil—were 3.4 per cent and 4.4 per cent respectively. Africa and South Asia increased their gross domestic product at the average annual rates of 3.6 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively. In per capita terms the developing countries' growth was much slower. Their rate of population growth in the sixties was 2.4 per cent. Consequently their average per capita income growth was reduced to 1.7 per cent if Southern Europe is excluded.[11]

It is with these disappointments arising out of the "negative aspects of East–West peaceful co-existence", as the Algerian President put it in his inaugural address to the Algiers meeting of the "77", that the LDCs will approach the New Delhi session of UNCTAD.

II

Non-political Factors

In determining the political context of an economic conference like UNCTAD-II, the question of the relevance of non-economic factors may be considered first. There are three factors influencing the course of negotiations: humanitarian, legal and economic. The humanitarian or moral impulse has been generally recognized as an element in relations between nations as in relations between individuals.[12] It has, however, a marginal role to play at UNCTAD-II. For, if it were not so, it would not be necessary to organize such a conference.

The question of legal obligation on the part of the developed nations to assist the LDCs has received considerable attention in recent years. Though the general premise of those who believe in the existence of such an obligation is international interdependence, especially economic interdependence, they rely mostly on Article 56 and Article 2, para 2 of the UN Charter. Essentially, the argument concerns the legal character of the recommendations of the General Assembly acting under Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter. Without going into the entire issue, since it is outside the scope of this article, it may be observed that the general legal opinion on the matter is that the retention of the two axioms—sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction—rules out any talk of UN General Assembly resolutions having a legally binding character.[13] One can however talk, as Judge Lauterpacht has observed, in terms of "legal obligation *to act in good faith* in accordance with the principles of the Charter" (italics added)[14]. The UN Charter certainly embodies a theory of economic assistance, but the theory is political rather than legal.

The general economic rationale of international economic cooperation and its effectiveness also require some clarification before we go over to our main subject—the political rationale of such cooperation. The issue with which we are basically concerned here is not whether there is an economic case for mutual cooperation on a desired level but whether the LDCs command the necessary economic strength *vis-a-vis* the advanced countries which will ensure their equal partnership in the process of world economic development. There may well be, as there is in fact, a theoretical insistence that assistance in the form of transfer of capital and technology and by way of appropriate trade policies is in the long run bound to result in an ever increasing prosperity for all countries including those expected to make sacrifices in the short run. Prof. Myrdal's statement of the problem of underdevelopment as an internal part of the larger issue of international economic integration[15] and Prof. Tinbergen's analysis of the inadequacies of the present-day nationalistic solutions for problems that are basically international in character[16] are both impressive pieces of economic logic. But how far is the choice between a long-term international view and a short-term nationalistic view essentially a matter of economic rationalization? The choice is in fact basically political.

The question arises: If the market forces, aided by the consolidation of the welfare state in the western world,[17] instead of operating towards the integration of the underdeveloped regions into the world economy operate in the opposite direction, can these regions politically exploit their economic role as suppliers of raw materials and as export markets for industrial goods?

India's Commerce Secretary, Mr K. B. Lall, speaking to newsmen at Algiers, ruled out any thought of "reprisals" at UNCTAD-II. The general strategy of the "77" also was conciliation rather than confrontation. But can they really adopt such a course of action? The issue is a most complex one and defies a quantitative judgment. It would, however, be useful to mention the study Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr. has made of US economic interests in Southern Asia.[18]

Gains from the expected increase in international trade depend on the volume of trade as well as the terms of trade for a given country. In Dr. Wolf's opinion, though on a global scale increased national income of the LDCs will lead to increased world trade, the US share will not increase as a direct result of it. In regard to the terms of trade for US exports, he points out that the terms of trade for the developed countries may well decline with accelerated industrial growth in the LDCs. There is therefore no question of a trade impetus for increased US economic assistance to the LDCs. Dr. Wolf further points out that the estimates of strategic materials requirements that are likely to be absorbed by the producing countries themselves as well as other developing countries as their development proceeds suggest that income elasticities of demand may be high relative to supply elasticities for some of the major strategic raw materials. These arguments may help us to understand to a considerable degree the small economic interest the LDCs hold for the advanced countries, particularly the US.

The present position of the LDCs in the world trade partnership is increasingly weakening. The participation of western industrial countries in over-all international trade grew from 58.7 per cent in 1963 to 65.5 per cent in 1965, that of East European countries from 10.1 per cent to 11.8 per cent, while that of the LDCs dropped from 27 per cent to 19.9 per cent during the same period.[19] This declining trend of economic dependence (which is already limited) of the industrial partners on the primary producers shows the uncertainties involved in any political approach of this kind.

Political Theories of Foreign Assistance

US Viewpoint: The Soviet enunciation of the policy of peaceful existence in the mid-fifties may be taken as the starting point of the evolution of the current US political theory of economic assistance to the developing countries. Since then the general emphasis on containing the communist power through military means has gradually given way to a more positive approach towards the problem. A typical expression of the changed framework can be found in President Kennedy's Message to Congress on 22 March 1961[20] in which he declared:

> "...the fundamental task of our foreign aid programme in the 1960s is not negatively to fight communism. Its fundamental

> task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the 20th century, as in the 19th—in the southern half of the globe as in the north—economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand."

A standard formulation of the US political rationale of foreign aid is reflected in the writings of Max Milikan and W. W. Rostow.[21] The essence of the Milikan-Rostow thesis is, firstly, that since the transitional stage of development is full of tensions, weaknesses and confusions, thus lacking political resilience, it is most vulnerable to the temptations of communist philosophy. In their own forceful words: "Indeed in the sweep of history, communism ..is likely to be viewed as a diseased form of modern state organization capable of being imposed by a determined minority on a confused, frustrated transitional society. Conversely, a society which has passed through its economic take-off...is likely to have a high immunity to the communist appeal."

Secondly, economic growth is associated with changes of a political, social and phychological character of the society in which growth takes place. The total impact of all this will be a free, democratic and peaceful disposition of those people. US vital security interests are thus served by a general climate of peace and stability in the world.

In more recent years political thinking along these lines has been supplemented by another political rationale of economic assistance in the context of South-West relations. According to this view, a direct political threat arising from underdevelopment, rather than a threat through communism, is a likely prospect. President Johnson, for instance, while addressing the Associated Press in 1964, made this alarming remark:

> "...the world must not be divided into rich nations and poor nations...In such divisions are the seeds of terrible discord and danger in decades to come."[22]

R. N. Gardner, former US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Matters, has argued[23] that in underdeveloped areas the political impulse for economic development is so powerful that the process will continue even in the absence of foreign assistance. This will however be done through ruthless suppression of consumption and forceful mobilization of capital and labour, thus giving rise to a "militant and embittered nationalism."

Less Developed Countries' Viewpoint: The LDCs, since the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, have been trying to make the problem of their underdevelopment an international concern. After partial success at that conference, they exerted great pressure at San Francisco to expand the role of the UN and increase its effectiveness in the economic and social fields. After the setting up of the UN they have constantly explained their demands in terms of the philosophy of the UN Charter in general and Articles 55 and 56 in particular. Article 55 commits the UN to the "creation of conditions of stability and well-being", "a higher standard of living, full employment" and "solution of international economic problems." The next Article pledges the members of the UN to cooperate with it in fulfilling these objectives.

There are two concepts underlying these provisions as well as the UN position in regard to the problem of underdevelopment:

(i) Economic collective security based on the presumption of community of international economic interests;

(ii) Functional approach to international peace.

The first concept took shape at the time of the Atlantic Charter which expressed the signatories' conviction that freedom of the world from want was an objective common to all nations. This was an economic variant of the doctrine of collective security enunciated earlier. And like the latter, it proved in practice to be of marginal operative value and of such general nature that the modalities of expression in the UN of both who made the demands and those to whom they were addressed became almost identical. The UN during the fifties and early sixties gave and continues to give the confusing picture of "a curious war in which everyone professes to be on the same side, marching under the same banner, towards the same goal.[24]

The concept of functionalism[25] as an interpretative device justifies the belief that the international community can be effectively built up only through "unburdening the overtaxed nation-state machinery" by transmigrating sovereignty from the state to functional groups. This theory however suffers from a weakness in that it fails to come to grips with the central problem of political theory and practice—the problem of obligation. It explains the non-political cooperation corresponding to a particular level of international political commitment, but it does not help us to understand the necessity of and demands for shifting the commitment to a higher level. In short, when obligations rather than interests determine the context of international economic cooperation, the operation of the functional experiment itself becomes subject to political calculations. The concept of functionalism therefore can hardly be expected to serve as a basis for fresh demands for closer international economic cooperation.

Gradually, the LDCs realised the weak operative strength of their conceptual framework. In 1964 the intense clamour for the creation of a new UN forum resulted in the convening of UNCTAD at Geneva. The LDCs declared to the world that the existing international division of labour was the prime cause of their underdevelopment. The central point of the political rationale behind their demands for a change in the aid and trade policies of the advanced countries is the long-term tendency of terms of trade to move against primary products—a fact established by the UN Secretariat. According to the UNCTAD Secretary-General, Dr. Prebisch (who has been the guiding force behind the group of "77"), this fact gives rise to political obligation on the part of the developed countries to transfer back resources to the LDCs. This political responsibility implies not only financing the industrialization of the LDCs but also formulation of suitable trade policies to make industrialization of the LDCs possible. The former is reflected in the objective renewed Soviet emphasis on internal economic development and prosperity.[28] Another is what Richard Lowenthal [29] has termed the Soviet policy of "patient undermining" of the western positions in various parts of the world in place of a costly overall offensive against the West.

These factors have led to a further moderation of the cold war as a political motivation for economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries. The possibility of an alternative political motivation can however be seen in the evolution of a united front of the LDCs.

Unity of the "77"

A bilateral economic relationship between an economically weak and an economically strong country is an unequal relationship. As a general rule, therefore, economic weakness makes countries adopt joint positions and multilateral approaches in economic negotiations.[30] The less developed countries of Asia and Africa since their first meeting at Bandung in 1955 have shown their eagerness for such a strategy for economic negotiations. The Bandung deliberations, however, were conducted essentially within the framework of the anti-colonial struggle. It was only in later years that the question of economic status of the underdeveloped countries assumed a central place in their international endeavours. Thus in 1961 the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries gave a prominent place to this subject on its agenda. The Belgrade conference was followed a year later by the Economic Conference of Developing Countries in Cairo.

Late in the same year the General Assembly endorsed the ECOSOC resolution to convene UNCTAD[31]. It was on the eve of this historic conference that the LDCs of the world presented a unified political front against the industrialized countries. In a joint declaration[32] prior to the conference 75 developing countries demanded a reversal, through a dynamic international trade policy, of the trends in world trade which continued to frustrate their efforts towards rapid economic growth.

The "Group of 77", as the LDCs later came to be known, maintained their unified front throughout the conference at Geneva. Their continued unity after the conference, which has come to be a new political force in world affairs, has made an initial impact on the industrialized countries though in some quarters doubts still persist as to its existence.[33] Continued unity of purpose and policies among countries which have diverse economic relationships with the advanced world and are at different stages of economic development is a very difficult task. It is only after resolving their differences that the LDCs can collectively play an effective political role at UNCTAD.

One of the two most important factors affecting the unity of 77 is what Dr. Prebisch has called the "vertical economic relationship" of the LDCs with the industrial countries. This is illustrated by Latin American countries' relationship with the US, EEC associate membership of 18 African countries, and the Commonwealth economic relationship of former British colonies with Britain. The demand for a generalized non-reciprocal preference for exports of the LDCs presupposes substantial agreement among themselves on a policy of dissolution of such exclusive economic relationships. The second important factor is the apparent clash of interests between the less developed and the least developed countries within the group of developing countries. If a demand is made for unrestricted and duty free access to the markets of the developed countries for all manufactures and semi-manufactures (including processed and semi-processed primary products) of the LDCs (with the proviso of escape clause actions), it is the more advanced LDCs which will obviously be the greatest beneficiaries. Because the least developed among the LDCs will not for a long time be able to compete with the former.

The Algiers Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 in November this year, which was a landmark in the common struggle of the LDCs, made a determined effort to reach agreement on these and other matters. The Charter of Algiers[34] – "a politically responsible and technically competent document" in the words of Mr K. B. Lall, Commerce Secretary of the Government of India—presents an impressive picture of unity of the Group. The conference succeeded in evolving a common stand on the system of preferences on a non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal basis[35] and agreement was also reached on the methods of implementing such a scheme. The 77 have demanded the "escape clause" system as against the export quota restriction scheme under which export quotas would be assigned to individual developing countries. The Charter however provides that in the interests of the least advanced among the developing countries the time-limits of such a scheme should be made flexible. Initially there should be a time-limit of 20 years. This would be subject to revision towards the end of the initial period.[36]

It would thus be seen that the LDCs are determined not to allow their differences on certain matters to undermine the political strength of their posture at UNCTAD-II. The compulsions arising from their internal economic conditions as well as their experience in international economic relations are sufficient to drive them on to the path of unity till a just and fair international economic order emerges. There is another aspect of the need for unity among them. This was pointed out by Dr. Prebisch in a recent interview with Dick Wilson.[37] Urging industrial countries to encourage unity among the developing countries, he sounded a note of warning to them: ".. lack of unity among the 77.. and resulting tensions would not smoothen relations between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries, but would only render their confrontation rougher and more turbulent."

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American Aid to Africa*

B. MAHESHWARI

THE continent of Africa has undergone a tremendous political change during the last decade. The end of colonialism in Africa since 1957 has been speedy. The emergence of several independent, sovereign states in Africa, as elsewhere in Asia, has necessitated many changes in the outlook and policies of non-African powers, particularly the United States, which have been involved in the competitive process in international relations. The independence struggle in colonial territories had held out promises of a prosperous future but the attainment of political freedom was accompanied by new strains. The new nations soon realized that a great distance had yet to be covered by them if political independence was to become a reality for the people. Two of the more important problems in these countries were national integration and economic development.[1] Both are inter-related. Having thrown alien control away, these nations realized the crucial need for foreign assistance to solve the problems facing them and to achieve the goals they had set for themselves. It was inevitable that African countries, like their counterparts in Asia, should join the ever-expanding group of foreign aid recipients.

In spite of what leaders of the aid receiving countries claim and desire, foreign aid for the donor is an important and integral instrument of foreign policy. A study of foreign aid policies and programmes, therefore, represents an attempt to assess and evaluate the foreign policy of the donor in a given region. The attempt in this paper is to describe and analyse the aid programmes of the US in Africa. The emphasis is on the nature and scope of this aid. The idea is to gain an insight into the foreign policy approaches it represents.

Limited Interest

American interest in Africa is of recent origin and of a limited extent. US policy on Africa in the past was Europe-oriented and US policy-makers were not sufficiently aware of the major forces shaping the African revolution. Thus, for a long time, the African policy of the US was dependent on the European powers. As a result, the US, despite its long tradition of anti-colonialism, found itself supporting the colonial powers against the rising tide of nationalism in Africa. In the pre-independence era in Africa—before 1957 and even to a large degree until 1960—the US tended to view Africa as the private preserve of its European friends and allies. The transformation of political relationships between the European powers and their African colonies as a result of the independence process implied the need for new policy perspectives in the US. Thus US relations with the new states of Africa tended to grow. This trend is also reflected in the evolution of US aid programmes for Africa. However, as we shall see a little later, US policy is still dominated by the idea of treating Africa as an area of imited interest.

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*One of the papers discussed at the Seminar on Recent Developments in Africa organised by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi from April 23 to 26, 1967.

The role of the US in African development has been a limited one, whether measured in absolute terms, or in relation to the vast sums it has spent in Europe and Asia. From July 1, 1945, to December 31, 1955, the US gave foreign aid grants to the tune of $45,142 million of which Africa received only $71.6 million or 0.15 per cent of the total. During the same period, the US advanced to foreign countries $16,140 million in loans of which Africa accounted for only $343 million or 2.12 per cent. It should be noted that of this latter sum, $151.7 million went to the Union of South Africa and $60.7 million to the Rhodesias, both areas of white settlement already substantially developed. US foreign assistance, both military and economic, from the fiscal year 1946 through 1960 totalled $84,091 million of which $822 million—less than one per cent—went to Africa.[2] Africa thus was at the bottom of the list of all major areas receiving US aid. In part, this was a reflection of the secondary place accorded to Africa by US strategy in world politics.

Emerging Trends

It is significant that US interest in Africa showed an increase in 1957. This was represented by an increase in the aid funds for Africa as well as by the greater attention paid to African affairs.[3] In the 1960's Africa has occupied an important place in the framework of US global policy. President Kennedy designated Africa as one of the "new frontiers"; more US aid was channelled to Africa and some of the African crises, such as the Congo, occupied a very important place in the political process of the US. There were two reasons for this development. First, European colonialism in Africa represented a serious dilemma for US policy which was torn between its pro-European orientation and sympathy for the human rights of Africans. This was largely eliminated in the 1960's. As the process of liquidation of colonialism went on US presence in Africa, through aid and diplomacy, also increased. Another factor compelling greater US involvement in Africa was the display by the communist bloc of its interest in some of the African countries. Certain selected African countries thus became the objects of competition between the Western and Communist blocs and both sides used foreign aid as a means of wooing them.

Thus, we find that US aid programmes for Africa expanded during this period. In 1960, the US was providing economic assistance of one type or another to 26 countries in Africa. The number increased to 34 in 1964. US aid programmes for Africa during the 1960's have been of the order of $250 million a year.[4] In relative terms also, the African share of the American aid-pie has become larger. Whereas in 1948-60 Africa received only about one per cent of total US aid in the fiscal year 1965, military and economic aid for Africa amounted to 5.5 per cent of the US aid budget. This represented about eight per cent of economic assistance and 2.2 per cent of military assistance. Yet the overall African share of US foreign aid has remained small. Thus in 1960-65 Africa received 28 per cent ($46 per capita) of the total financial flow (both public and private) from the Development Assistance Committee group of countries. France accounted for 40 per cent. The US share amounted to only 26 per cent, whereas in Asia, Latin America and Europe it provided the highest share of external assistance.[5]

Another important feature of US aid programmes for Africa may also be noted here. The new stress on aid policies represents some degree of US commitment to the economic development of selected African countries. This is indicated by the reduction in the size of supporting assistance[6] and an increase in the funds for development assistance. In the fiscal year 1961, development loans and grants amounted to only $74 million or 28 per cent of the total economic assistance to Africa whereas in 1967, these totalled $194 million or 88 per cent. During the same period, supporting assistance declined from $190 million to $26 million. At the same time, the US Government became a member of the World Bank-sponsored aid consortia for Tunisia and Nigeria.

These recent developments are significant but it is obvious that the US aid programme for Africa remains a limited one and plays only a supplementary role to the assistance provided by the former colonial powers of Europe. That the US is reluctant to assume a more prominent role is highlighted by the controversy raised by a Presidential Committee in 1963. The Clay Committee—the committee to strengthen the security of the free world headed by General Lucius Clay—in its report in March 1963 expressed the widely-shared view that in Africa "the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden."[7] The Committee rejected the view that the US must provide aid to developing countries lest they accept it from Communist countries "with resulting political penetration and eventual subversion." It stressed that US aid programmes for Africa should be limited. It recommended that once the existing aid commitments in some of the African countries, such as Nigeria, Tanganyika, Tunisia and Morocco, were completed "further US aid should be confined to participation in multilaterally-supported programmes." There was much sympathy in Congress for this view and some of the legislators wanted to put statutory restrictions on the proliferation of US aid in Africa.

US Administration officials insisted that there was no intention of replacing West European aid programmes by US programmes. They pointed out that "although US aid has increased in Africa, our aid amounts to less than one-third of total aid to the continent." Thus, in the fiscal year 1962, total US aid, including PL480 and the Export-Import Bank, amounted to $500 million out of the "total free-world aid" of $1,773 million. Similarly, in 1963 US aid was expected to be $510 million out of a total of $1659 million. They perceived US aid to Africa "as a supplement" to the free-world aid.[8] Administration officials also argued that the "token assistance" to Africa was designed to furnish some alternative to African countries' complete dependence on the ex-colonial powers and to facilitate their continued reliance on Western Europe for assistance. They thought that these countries' complete dependence on their former colonial masters could be exploited by the extremist elements there.[9]

While the limitation of US African programmes may be necessary to reduce the aid budget and to share the aid burden with other developed countries, diversification of aid sources is an important element of the independence process in these African countries.[10] As Mason points out, a geographical sharing of the aid burden, as suggested by the Clay Committee, "would tend to perpetuate existing spheres of influence and perhaps create others that had not existed before."[11] In view of this, it seems that US aid programmes will continue to play an important, though secondary, role in Africa as a whole. In some selected countries however, it may assume primary responsibility.

Types of Aid

US aid programmes are generally divided into two broad categories: military assistance and economic assistance. Military assistance includes military enquipment and services and is administered by the Department of Defence. Economic assistance consists of several ingredients, each with its specific goals, styles of administration and the agencies of the US Government which operate them. The following programmes can be distinctly identified as the various components of the economic aid programmes:

1. Development loans
    (a) from AID and its predecessors, and
    (b) from the Export-Import Bank;
2. Development grants and technical assistance;
3. Educational and cultural exchanges;
4. Peace Corps;
5. Food-for-Peace Programme; and
6. Supporting assistance.

Loans

As is generally known, during the Marshall Plan period, most of US economic aid was given as non-repayable grants. A very significant change has occurred since then in that the proportion of loans in the aid programme has steadly increased.[12] Besides, there has been a steady process of hardening of loan terms. Until 1961, US loans under the Development Loan Fund were repayable in the currencies of the recipients. This was changed and AID development loans were made repayable in US dollars. These loans were still for long periods and carried nominal interest rates, usually three-fourths of one per cent after the grace period. Congress took the initiative in 1963 and again in 1964 to raise the minimum interest rates to one per cent during the grace period and 2.5 per cent thereafter.

Loans have played a relatively minor role in US aid to Africa. In 1948-65, AID and its predecessor agencies[13] committed $1,683 million in economy were held by expatriates and settlers until recently. As decolonization has been very swift, settler populations have dwindled and foreign private investment declined. Africa is faced with a crisis. Independence has given an impetus to aspirations for rapid growth and increased the need for skills in the government sector.[18] It is not surprising, therefore, that out of the 82,028 technical assistance personnel supplied by the 17 OECD countries for overseas duty in 1963, as many as 66,623, or 81 per cent of the total, were stationed in Africa.[19]

It should again be noted that US aid plays a marginal role in providing technical assistance for Africa. The major share is borne by France, followed by Britain and Belgium. However, technical assistance occupies an important place in the US aid programme for Africa. Several—as many as 22 in 1964—African countries receive only technical assistance from the US. Besides, there has been a marked increase in US personnel in Africa as well as US funds for technical assistance for Africa during the 1960's. Thus, funds for technical assistance increased from $21 million in 1961 to $94 million in 1967 and the number of US technicians in Africa increased from 418 in 1959 to 1,512 in June 1966. They represented almost one-fourth of the total of US technicians overseas.

Large numbers of Americans have also gone to Africa under the Peace Corps programme since 1961. In January 1963, of a total of 4,369 members of the Peace Corps, 1,448 were serving in Africa. Seven countries had received or were soon to receive Peace Corps volunteers. There was a remarkable expansion of the programme in the subsequent years. As of June 30, 1966, almost one out of every three Peace Corps volunteers—4,949 out of a total of 15,556—was serving in Africa. Nineteen African countries were receiving Peace Corps volunteers and three more had agreed to participate in the programme in the fiscal year 1967.[20]

Another ingredient of technical assistance consists of educational and cultural exchanges which help to augment the flow of technical skills to recipient countries. In recent years, the US has been playing an increasingly important role in this process and it is likely to continue to do so. A State Department publication noted in 1965: "Within the framework of US policy and interest in Africa, the exchange programme plays and must continue to play a significant role."[21]

More African students are studying in the US today than ever before. Their number had reached 5,500 in the 1964-65 academic year. A total of 540 African students were on exchange grants under the State Department's programme. In addition, about 550 other African students received financial assistance from the Department. The US Government participates in the African Scholarships Programme for American Universities under which universities provide scholarships, the students' governments pay travel costs, and AID provides a living allowance. Besides supporting African students, the US has sponsored exchange programmes for teachers, journalists, administrators and political leaders. 334 Africans visited the US in 1964-65 under these programmes.[22]

economic aid of which loans amounted to $724 million or 43 per cent.[14] As in other regions, US aid to Africa has been conspicuous by an increasing mixture of loans in the aid programme. Thus, the proposed AID programme for Africa for the fiscal year 1967 included $100 million for loans out of a total of $220 million.

The focus of US loans to Africa has generally been on a few selected impact projects with a substantial demonstrational value. The two more conspicuous areas for which loans have been provided are development of power and trasportation. The US provided about $50 million to Ghana for the Upper Volta hydro-electric project and the Export-Import Bank has agreed to supply another $100 million in long-term loans for the nearby aluminium smelter plant. US loans were used to construct hydro-electric power stations in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Tanganyika, to build and maintain airports in Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco and other countries, and to develop highway systems in many parts of Africa. In the early 1960's the US began to provide loans for development of educational facilities. The obvious bias in US aid was thus in favour of economic and social infrastructure projects. Very little was done for industrial development. In the 1966 programme, however, AID suggested a likely shift of emphasis to loans for industrial development. It said : "While more projects of this kind[15] are desirable, directly productive capital projects must now be stressed in order to provide an earlier pay-off in economic and budgetary terms. This calls for more emphasis on industrial development, including both large industries and small ones serving local needs, and an essential economic infrastructure such as an adequate transportation net, electric power, and communications to support the development of productive industries and a market economy for agricultural crops."[16]

However, in the fiscal year 1967, AID again identified education and manpower training, agriculture and food production, health and sanitation, and transportation and communications as "the most crucial to Africa's present state of development."[17] Thus, some change in emphasis is expected but if the experience of US aid in other regions, such as Asia and Latin America, can provide any reliable guide, US aid will continue to be shy of promoting rapid industrialisation in Africa.

Technical Assistance

It is well known that developing countries are deficient in capital resources and also suffer from scarcity of technical skills required to utilize available capital funds. When indigenous skills are not available a country relies on foreign skills. Technical assistance may be used both for an immediate increase in skills by providing "experts" who will do operational jobs and for swelling the flow by adding to facilities and building institutions for education and training.

A recent study has pointed out that the need for technical assistance is much more urgent in Africa than anywhere else. An important reason for this is that the pre-independence periods in many African countries did not witness any progress towards Africanization of the administration. Almost all top posts in the administration and the

Food Aid

In recent years, the US has also exported surplus agricultural commodities to Africa under PL480 of 1954. According to AID figures Africa, excluding the UAR, received $852 million in food aid in 1946-65. The UAR alone received food worth $850 million during this period. Besides the UAR, the other major recipients of US food aid were the Congo (Leopoldville), Algeria, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, food aid was used for "Food-for-work" programmes to provide jobs for under-employed or unemployed workers on such projects as soil conservation, reforestation and irrigation, construction of roads, schools and medical facilities.

Military Assistance

If US economic aid to Africa has shown only a limited interest in that continent, the same is more true of military assistance. It can be said that until the eruption of the Congo crisis, the US had spent only a few million dollars on military and supporting assistance to Africa and even this was concentrated in a few countries such as Ethiopia, Libya and Morocco, where the US had acquired military bases, or Liberia with which it had traditional ties. According to available information the US military assistance programme in 1948-64 totalled $163.5 million, out of which Ethiopia received $81.5 million, Libya $22.5 million, Morocco $21.3 million, Tunisia $19.1 million, the Congo (Leopoldville) $8.8 million and Liberia $4.7 million. The nine other programmes were very small.[23]

It should be noted that the US military assistance programme for Africa is of recent origin although it has shown a distinct tendency to grow. Thus, in 1948-59 it amounted to only $31 million. In the fiscal year 1960, the US spent $10 million on military assistance to Africa; in 1961 the expenditure went up to $12 million; in 1962 to $18 million; in 1963 to $27 million and in 1964 to $28 million.[24]

Exasperated at this tendency of US military aid to proliferate in Africa, many powerful members of Congress argued in 1963 that African countries needed butter rather than guns, and that even if they needed guns, this should be the primary responsibility of the former colonial powers. There was a general mood of resentment against US encouragement of an arms race in Africa. These critics also asserted that such an arms race was dangerous and undesirable not only because it diverted scarce resources from developmental activities but also because it built up powerful military machines which might eventually take over these countries and run them as military dictatorships.

Administration officials defended the military assistance programme for Africa since it was meant for internal security and civic action projects which were "designed primarily to illustrate US interest in maintaining law and order."[25] They also asserted that much of this aid was for those countries where the US maintained base rights. Congress, however, added an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 which imposed two restrictions on the military assistance programme for Africa. It directed the Administration to furnish military assistance on a grant basis to any country in Africa only for "internal security requirements" or for civic action projects[26] unless the President determined otherwise and promptly reported such determination to Congress. Furthermore, the amendment restricted the value of grant programmes for defence articles for African countries to $25 million in a fiscal year.[27] Thus, US military assistance to Africa has been stabilized at this level during the last three years. For the fiscal year 1967, only $21.2 million of military assistance has been proposed by the Administration.

As stated earlier, there has been a general decline in the volume, spread and importance of supporting assistance in the US aid programme. The Congo (Leopoldville) has been the major recipient of supporting assistance since the fiscal year 1961. Morocco also received supporting assistance for base rights. It is very likely that the pressures of the Vietnam war will result in a further reduction of the military and supporting assistance programme for Africa.

Concentration in Selected Countries

One may have noticed that US aid programmes for Africa are small in size although they are spread over the entire continent. This conclusion should be qualified in the light of the fact that the programmes, in spite of their wide coverage, are concentrated in only a few selected countries and that only in a handful of African countries does US aid assume a major role.

In 1948-63, as many as 33 African countries were beneficiaries of US economic aid but only 17 of them received a total of $10 million or more during the entire period. Of these 17, nine received $50 million or more They were the Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. US aid programmes for four of these countries totalled more than $100 million each. They were the Congo, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.[28]

Similarly, in the fiscal year 1964, 34 African countries received US aid. Ten of them received less than a million dollars each, 14 between one and five million dollars, and only nine received more than $5 million each.[29]

One finds the same trend in food aid, the major recipients of which have been Algeria, the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tanzania and Tunisia. As already indicated, the military assistance programme has been restricted to a few countries.

Looking from the vantage point of the recipients, we find that aid has played a major developmental and/or security role in seven African countries: the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia.[30] The US has had old traditional ties with Liberia and Ethiopia and has maintained military bases in Libya and Morocco. The US has shown keen interest in the economic development of Nigeria and Tunisia. The US Government is a member of the World Bank-sponsored aid consortia for these two countries. The Congo is a special case and deserves a more detailed probe than can be made here.

United Arab Republic

The administrative structure of US foreign aid and foreign policy does not include the UAR in Africa and treats it as part of the Near East and South Asian region. I consider it necessary to include the UAR in this paper particularly because of an interesting legacy concerning the US aid programme for this country. As is well known, the UAR has been a major recipient of aid from both the US and the Soviet Union. Some of the actions of the Nasser Government have visibly offended the US.[31] Moreover, the UAR has often encountered very stiff opposition in the US Congress partly because of the anti-American bias in its foreign policy, but more because of its hostility towards Israel. Senators and Representatives from areas where the Jewish vote plays an important role generally swelled the ranks of anti-Administration and anti-foreign aid legislators resulting in overwhelming support for restrictive amendents concerning US aid to the UAR. The Executive branch was also disappointed with the efficacy of aid as an instrument of foreign policy in the case of the UAR and Administration officials often found it hard to deal with the Nasser Government but they were not willing to let the foreign policy initiative pass to Congress which could express itself only through legislative amendments. They also argued that irrespective of periodic irritations, the UAR was too important to be neglected or left out. It is the most influential of the Arab countries, with the largest national population, the highest percentage of educated citizens, and the broadest capabilities for industrial development. In addition, it commands a strategic position in the Near East and North Africa and in relation to Middle Eastern oil supplies. The objective of the limited US aid programme is to encourage the UAR to focus attention on its internal economic development.[32]

As was to be expected, US aid to the UAR provided an arena for the struggle between the Executive which wanted to retain the maximum degree of executive flexibility and Congress which was determined to restrict and even to eliminate such flexibility in relation to the UAR. A detailed study of this struggle shows that in 1961-65, Congress succeeded in adding restrictive provisions to the legislation concerning US aid to the UAR.[33] In 1961 and 1962, these amendments were of a general nature and left all matters about their interpretation and implementation to the Executive. In 1963, Congress adopted a mandatory restrictive provision and instructed the Executive to stop all aid to the UAR. But these attempts did not achieve their intended objective since the flow of US aid to the UAR continued. In 1964 and 1965, anti-UAR forces in Congress became more vehement and mentioned the UAR by name in the restrictive provisions. Still, the Administration succeeded in retaining flexibility by virtue of an "escape clause" which allowed the President to disregard the restriction if he determined that continuation of US aid to the UAR was in the national interest of the country. Despite opposition from Congress, the UAR has been receiving some technical assistance and substantial food aid in recent years.[34] In 1949-65 it received from the US $171 million under the economic aid programme and $850 million in food aid.

Conclusion

It is not possible to forecast the future behaviour of participants in international relations. There are some unknown variables and many intangible factors and determinants. However, on the basis of available information concerning the nature, scope and evolution of US aid to Africa, one may conclude that it is likely to continue to play a supplementary role and that there is no possibility of the US replacing West European donors. It is neither practicable nor desirable for the US to do a solo performance in Africa. Rivkin's observation is quite relevant here. The political realities of Africa with its evolving Eurafrican relations and its anti-colonial political sensitivities, and the political realities of Europe with its changing relations with Africa and its political interests make a solo effort by the US impracticable. And from the US point of view an exclusive role or even a dominant role in economic aid to Africa seems out of the question both in terms of resource availability and in terms of US relations with its European allies. The substitution of US aid for aid by the former European metropoles does not confer a substantial net benefit on the recipient states or strengthen the total free world aid posture toward the new states.[35]

Much of US aid to Africa has been on a bilateral basis, but there is a strong likelihood that it will have an increased emphasis on multilateral channels in the future. This may be brought about by two factors. First, there are some powerful members of the US Congress, such as Senator Fulbright, who have been advocating a shift in aid from bilateral to multilateral channels. Second, we find greater interest among African countries themselves for regional coöperation. The Economic Commission for Africa has been playing an important role in this respect and the establishment of the African Development Bank is likely to accelerate this process. The US Government has expressed its willingness to make available loan funds to the African Development Bank for capital projects "as an additional step toward greater regional emphasis."[36]

It appears that the volume of the US aid programme has been stabilised in recent years. The economic aid programme amounts to about $220 million a year, the military assistance programme has a statutory ceiling of $25 million, and the annual food aid to Africa is about $120 million. There is no likelihood of any significant increase in the size of aid. On the contrary, there is quite a strong possibility of reduction. The general prospects of foreign aid for underdeveloped countries are not very bright because most of the donor countries, including the US, are experiencing economic difficulties and political opposition at home. The decline of the cold war pressures has also adversely affected the flow of foreign aid because the great powers do not feel constrained to engage themselves in an aid competition in order to make friends or influence the governments of the new states. Besides, the increasing US obligations in the Vietnam war and its commitments in South Asia and Latin America are likely to eat into the African share of US aid. However, all this may change and there may be a substantial increase in US aid to Africa if an important African country becomes an African Cuba and if China or the Soviet Union resolves to penetrate the continent.

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2. Rupert Emerson, "American Interests in Africa" in Walter Goldschmidt (ed), *The United States and Africa*, New York, 1963. p. 24-25.
3. Until then Africa was part of the Bureau of the Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Department of State. Creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs under an Assistant Secretary of State in 1958 signified US recognition of Africa's importance. Separate bureaux for Africa were also set up later in other departments of the Government.
4. The size of the economic aid programme in the fiscal year 1962 was significantly substantial. Whereas the predecessors of AID had spent $356 million from 1948 through 1959, the AID programme in Africa in the fiscal year 1962 amounted to $315 million. See, *Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1966 : Summary Presentation to the Congress.* Washington, 1965, p. 224.
5. *The OECD Observer*, No. 26 February 1967, p. 27-29.
6. Supporting assistance (called Defense Support until 1961) is part of the economic assistance programme with emphasis on achieving short-term objectives. It is used to provide budgetary support to a friendly government, to induce a government not to depend on Sino-Soviet bloc aid, to provide equipment and funds to supplement the defence effort of the recipient country or to pay compensation for US military bases in that country. AID, *Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance*, Washington, 1963 p. 20.
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11. Edward Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1964, p. 55-6.
12. Thus, in 1953-55, only 6 per cent of economic aid was given as loans. This increased to 22 per cent in 1956-58 and 36 per cent in 1959-61. Since 1961, the proportionate share of loans has further increased. Thus, in the fiscal year 1965, loans accounted for 69 per cent of AID'S country and regional programmes. AID, *Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1965: Summary Presentation to the Congress.* Washington, 1964, p. 25.
13. International Cooperation Administration (ICA), Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), and Mutual Security Agency (MSA).
14. During the same period, the Export-Import Bank of the US provided $380 million in long-term loans. Its loans carry higher interest rates and should not be considered strictly as foreign aid since the main purpose of the Bank is not to assist developing countries but to promote and facilitate exports from the US.

15. Economic and social infrastructure projects such as educational facilities, transportation and power.
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23. *Proposed Mutual Defence and Development Programs, FY.* 1966, cited, p. 227.
24. *Ibid,* p. 224.
25. *The Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1963,* Washington, 1964, p. 23.
26. Civic action is the use of military forces for economic and social improvements such as construction of roads, improvement of irrigation facilities, other public works and community projects. It is a joint undertaking wherein the recipient country provides men, the military assistance programme supplies military material and equipment and AID makes available the consumables or economic aid commodities. B. Maheshwari, *Foreign Aid and the Policy Process : A Study of the Struggle over Foreign Aid in Congress, 1961-1965.* Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Microfilm, 1966, p. 28.
27. Section 512 of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,* as amended, US PL. 87-195.
28. Source : AID, *The AID Programme,* Washington, 1964, p. 40.
29. *The Foreign Assistance Program: Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1964,* Washington, 1965, p. 104.
30. The AID programme for the fiscal year 1967 indentified five countries, i. e. Congo, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia, as the major recipients. No economic aid was proposed for Libya in 1967.
31. For a typical instance of Nasser's recalcitrant attitude on US aid, see his Cairo speech of December 23, 1964, when he advised the US to "jump in lake", *The New York Times,* December 24, 1964.
32. *Proposed Economic Assistance Programs, FY 1967,* cited, p. 124.
33. See, B. Maheshwari, *Foreign Aid and the Policy Process,* cited, p. 219-25.
34. Technical assistance amounted to about $2 million a year and food aid has been about $150 million a year.
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Recent Trends in African Socialism

MADAN M. SAULDIE

AFRICA'S socialist countries have always been a minority in Africa and today, lamentably, they are a diminishing minority. Except for a few, namely Guinea, Tanzania, Senegal, Mali and Kenya,* the rest of the 29 black African countries either forthrightly reject the concept of African Socialism or pay only lip service to it. Yet, African Socialism cannot be considered a dying concept. There are certainly potential seeds of growth in it, only they need to be properly nurtured and directed along pragmatic rather than doctrinaire lines.

It is a fact that not all leaders of Africa consider themselves as "socialists". The popularity of the concept has remained confined to Sekou Toure, Leopold Senghor, Modibo Keita, Julius Nyerere, the ousted Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta. Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, Tubman of Liberia and M'ba of Gabon ignore the concept. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, though not an active socialist, represented his country at the historic Colloquium on African Socialism held at Dakar in December 1962 at the invitation of President Leopold Senghor of Senegal. The Colloquium studied closely the character and content of African Socialism as had developed by that time. This gathering made the most significant revelation that African Socialism was not a unitary doctrine but was a collection of ideas, sometimes unavoidably divergent, emanating from African leaders belonging to different situations. Yet it was not totally amorphous. It was definitely taking shape as an ideology. But the differences in approach were sometimes markedly divergent.

Thus while Julius Nyerere laid emphasis on community development as an initiative in socialism, Kwame Nkrumah** was more inclined towards building state-controlled modern institutions. Again, Liberia, which abhors socialism, has trodden a path of economic development which compares favourably with Guinea, an avowedly socialist country. But despite such variations, three basic themes appear to mark all ideas of socialism.

The first is the problem of continental unity. Subdued and divided by European colonial powers for long, African Socialism came to the leaders both as a reaction against Europe and as a unifying doctrine. They believed that the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party were projections of their ex-metropoles and could hardly inspire them. They therefore set out to evolve a new doctrine which distinguished them from their European counter-parts and was suited to the peculiar African situations.

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*This study excludes the socialist countries of Northern Africa, viz. the UAR and Algeria.

**Although Kwame Nkrumah is today out of the Ghanaian scene, his contribution to African Socialism cannot be ignored and therefore forms part of this study.

Furthermore, it was believed that since Africa had always had much indigenous socialism in the form of communal ownership of land, the egalitarian character of its society and an extensive network of social obligation in the form of cooperation, a new edifice could predictably be raised upon this infrastructure, thus maintaining the old cultures in Africa while building modern institutions. Capitalism obviously appeared unnatural to Africa and hence its rejection as a suitable economic system.

The second theme evident in all theories about African Socialism is the dilemma of economic development which arises mainly from the fact that African economies largely depend on the export of primary products. They were therefore compelled to enter into international trade and commodity agreements to obtain higher and stable prices for their products and open up new markets for them. But this conflicts with African socialists' commitment to industrialization and a reduction of this dependence. For this, again, cooperation with the ex-metropoles, though of another kind, becomes indispensable. The process thus leaves much to be desired in the pursuit of national aims against the links that the colonial past has created. This perpetually keeps Africans in a state of dilemma. That is the reason why so very little seems to have been done to lessen this dependence although a vague belief always lingers that African countries will achieve "economic independence" in the foreseeable future.

But one thing that ideas of African Socialism do inspire is the distinct identity of the African people which helps African countries to mobilize their entire populations for economic development. In this respect African Socialism certainly performs the purpose of a unifying doctrine.

The most crucial conflict between African socialists' suspicions about modern large-scale economic organisation and the exigencies of rapid economic development implying the economics of scale is a basic one. They have therefore to draw a line of compromise between their utopian aspirations and economic programmes which call for the most efficient use of all available resources.

Finally, there is the question of control and class formation. African socialists tend to believe that African society is traditionally classless and will remain so because with free enterprise lacking the necessary capital the State will eventually own the means of production and eliminate the possibility of a class war. This argument does not recognise the fact that in most socialist countries, including the USSR, certain strata within society have naturally grown and have to be reckoned with.

It appears that African Socialism has perhaps something else to achieve than the end of property, as European socialists are committed to do. Some other meaning has to be given to socialism in Africa. African socialists reject both the Western and the Eastern concepts of capitalism and socialism and are trying to build up a new edifice in an entirely new setting which is characteristic of Africa's old culture. In orthodox societies, it is stated, the difference in wealth between the richest and the poorest was very small—in fact infinitesimal as compared with the modern industrial society.

African Socialism is thus an ideology still in transition. It has yet to take a specific form. It remains as malleable today as it has been in the recent past. The Soviet Africanist, I.I. Potekhin, believes that these African countries are trying to create "socialism in Africa" and not "African Socialism". But his hypothesis may be valid in respect of countries like Guinea and Ghana rather than Senegal and Tanzania.

African Socialism suffers from certain misgivings. The conceptual misgiving reflects a certain vagueness or variability in interpreting socialism. The other misgiving arises on the practical side out of the conflict between what is deemed as expedient or growth-promoting and what might be considered as a socialistic policy. These two together help to explain why certain avowedly socialist countries sometimes adopt policies which are more expedient from the development point of view than falling in line with socialist ideals.

Moreover, the meaning of African Socialism differs from country to country. To Julius Nyerere, "socialism is an attitude of mind which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare." To Sekou Toure it appears that "to speak of socialism is to speak of a complex of structures and economic and social practices. But socialism for us is not an end in itself. We do not define ourselves in relation to it as an end but rather a beginning with the needs of specific situations." Mali leaders feel that "the political organization of the whole people can bring the country to socialism...............It is a question of the whole people organized as a political force to take its destiny into its own hands." They also believe that "socialism can be achieved without a proletriat."

Kwame Nkrumah was perhaps the only known African leader who was inclined more than anybody else towards the more conventional Marxist position on State ownership, but even he envisaged it as something only for the future. He fully recognized that in the initial stages, the private sector has to play a key role in the development of a country side by side with the public sector.

What do African socialists think about the role of nationalization, trade unions and the one-party systems in the achievement of African socialism ? So far only Guinea and Tanzania have embarked on any serious nationalization programmes. But while the real fruits of doing so remain to be examined in Tanzania—which is a late starter—disillusionment has already been marked in Guinea where most of the so-called revolutionary and nationalization policies had to be gradually reversed or moderated.

Trade unions in Africa are considered productive groups rather than consumptionist groups as in most industrialised countries of the West. Moreover, in most African economies, organized labour is the most privileged rather than the least privileged class. Furthermore, in several African countries labour movements form part of political parties thus eliminating any real conflict between the Government and the workers.

The democratic party system has been rejected in almost all African socialist countries as a legacy of the authoritarian colonial rule. The trend is towards the one-party system. But this too entails dangers such as the growth of oligarchies, political discontent and dissipation of energy. Aware of these dangers and awakened by bitter lessons provided by countries like Ghana where socialism was used as a means of building a political machine around the dictatorial personality of Kwame Nkrumah, leaders like Nyerere and Toure feel gravely concerned and are trying to avoid similar situations in their countries.

African Socialism, therefore, provides many distinctions, not necessarily improvements over the European economic systems of capitalism and communism. Whereas in Europe, socialism is an instrument for the distribution of wealth, in Africa it is a means of creating wealth. Further, while in Europe it is a struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', in Africa, where everyone is a 'have-not', it is a struggle for working cooperatively to achieve sufficiency if not abundance. Another important distinction is that while a revolution was necessary to introduce it in Europe, in Africa the idea of a revolution is hardly entertained.

After reviewing the general content and nature of African Socialism, it is necessary to examine briefly the contribution of individual countries in developing and applying the concept of African Socialism. First of all, it is necessary to recount the utter failure of the system in Ghana where along with the ouster of Kwame Nkrumah, his so-called socialist institutions also crumbled. These institutions had become the centres of corruption, inefficiency and extravagance. In the two West African states of Guinea and Senegal the leaders have tried to adapt Marxism to African conditions by blending the socialist values of the traditional pre-colonial African society with more modern Marxist ideas. In doing so, however, Sekou Toure tends to find solidarity more within the framework of the national state and the party than within traditional culture. The leaders of both countries, though repudiating unequivocally the totalitarianism and regimentation of communist countries, have been impressed more by Communist China than by the Soviet Union where the emphasis on industrialization is more pronounced than on agriculture. As the economies of most African countries are based on agriculture, their concern for the peasantry is natural. But African countries feel that a synthesis between the agricultural and industrial sectors is perhaps more suited to their situation.

As stated earlier, for the Guinean leader socialism means political economy. He argues that "political economy is not the adaptation of political action to economic action; on the contrary, it is the use of economic activities for political ends." He justifies mobilization of the masses for political ends, as a means of building socialism. For the Senegalese leader, the philosophy of humanism marks the most significant contribution of Marxism to African Socialism. They stress the aesthetic values to the neglect of entrepreneurial skills. They attach greater importance to the individual than to the masses. In essence, Toure's socialism rests on monoistic polity whereas Senghor bases his socialist ideas on pluralistic foundations.

But the experiment has been a greater success in Senegal than in Guinea. Beginning 1961, the Guinea Government had to take steps to denationalize industry and re-establish closer economic ties with France and the United States. Some of the State monopoly organizations were also wound up. Even now Guinea is in a bad state of self-imposed isolation, its leaders unwilling to make compromises which would allow it to build a more fruitful relationship with its neighbours.

In Mali, the ruling elite and the ruling party, the Union Sudanaise, are one of the most Marxist-Leninst oriented groups in West Africa. Nevertheless, Malian adherence to socialist principles is more pragmatic than doctrinaire. For, President Keita believes that socialism is a "progressive" step in the Marxist evolution of history and concurrently an economic organization compatible with traditional African social and economic patterns. But, as in Guinea, the Malian revolution is in the reverse gear now and more and more cooperation is being sought from France and other West European countries. Mali's leadership decided upon the country's eventual, though phased, return to the French-backed franc zone last February. Although the decision is currently causing considerable political difficulty within Mali, it is likely to lead to its break with the revolutionary socialist group of countries. Mali, which became independent with less resources than almost any country in West Africa, faced further difficulties with the failure of the federation of Ghana-Guinea-Mali. Furthermore, its political options to "go it alone", seeking what aid it could from the East or the West, led to the creation of the Mali franc and subsequent economic isolation from neighbouring countries, trade with whom was, essential for the well-being of many Malians. Apart from this, the move proved quite costly and the Government came to be saddled with debts it could not pay without drastic re-scheduling. The resulting rising prices, coupled with stagnant wages, caused much restlessness among the people. Hence, Mali's return to the French franc and her option for all benefits of trade and aid that go with it.

In Tanzania, at a week-long KANU Study Conference on Pan-African Socialism in April 1962, Dr. Nyerere came out with his political theory in an address entitled "Ujamaa"—meaning "familyhood". Ujamaa embodied the Tanzanian President's oft-repeated thought that "socialism is an attitude of mind" which committed men to an obligation for the welfare of their fellow countrymen. Although ridden with such contradictions as that socialism could be built on social structures already available in traditional African societies and that the dismantling of traditional institutions to give place to modern ones was inevitable, the real spirit of Ujamaa still stands out significantly and is very much in evidence. This new political doctrine, through imprecision and flexibility, provided the Tanzanian Government with an instrument which could provide justification for any of its policies, wrong or right, in regard to the development of modern institutions, a classless society, the single party-system, etc.

The Arusha Declaration of February 1967 was another step forward from the Ujamaa of 1962 on the road to socialism and economic development. Following the Arusha spirit, in a series of moves that were as swift as they were unexpected, Nyerere nationalized foreign-owned commercial banks, import-export firms and insurance companies and took a controlling interest in the larger industrial establishments and agricultural estates. He however promised "full and fair compensation to the owners". Thus, whereas socialism had been only a state of mind in April 1962 under the rhetoric of Ujamaa, the Arusha Declaration proceeded from attitudes to action. It is too early to predict whether the course taken by Nyerere and his TANU party will yield the desired results. The only thing that can be said is that there are many hazards in the path adopted by Tanzania and that it will need the courage and tact of a true socialist to translate successfully rhetoric into reality.

In Kenya, a long-awaited 56-page paper on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya in April 1965 enunciated the Government's objectives of building up the country on socialist lines. Critics had at that time said that the paper, though a sensible one, was not a "people's document". It came from above, instead of from below. It commits the Government against a revolutionary break with the past in its attempt to transform society. It aims at providing "political equality, social justice, human dignity including freedom of conscience, freedom from want, disease and exploitation, equal opportunities and high and growing per capita incomes, equitably distributed." The document is a realistic one in that it shows an awareness of the constraints within which the Government must operate in the evolution of its policies to achieve the desired goals. While advocating Africanization of the economy, the paper seeks to utilize non-African skills and capital in an attempt to minimise the conflict between Africanization and rapid economic growth. It is in general opposed to nationalization unless a special case could be made for it in particular industries.

In conclusion, it can be said that African Socialism is not yet a precise ideology or a specific guide to action. It means different things in different countries. It is a set of values and dimensions for consciously shaping a historical process in Africa and is still in a transitional stage.

Quarterly Chronicle

D. P. SINGH

INDIA AND AFRICA

THE Prime Minister of Mauritius, Dr. Sheosagar Ramgoolam, visited India from December 13 to 19. He had talks, among others, with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, and other leaders. Mauritius is an important country in more than one sense. Its population of 800,000 includes a large number of people of Indian origin—about 70 per cent. Three-fourths of the Asian people are Hindus, the rest belong to the Muslim community. There is a small Chinese community comprising about 3 per cent of the population. A remarkable experiment is being carried on in the country which can be called the "politics of plural society." Mauritius will become independent in 1968.

The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, visited Cairo on October 10 on the invitation of President Nasser. The visit, originally planned to be a private one, was treated as a state visit. The Egyptian Gazette summed up the spirit of the reception given to Mrs. Gandhi in its editorial by saying "a few others may be as welcome but none more welcome than Mrs. Indira Gandhi." The two leaders discussed the West Asian crisis, Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, the question of reopening the Suez Canal, resettlement of refugee and non-belligerency, etc. They also exchanged views on the latest diplomatic moves at the UN among the UAR, the Soviet Union and the US to solve the West Asian crisis.

Nearly 200 delegates from more than 70 countries and a dozen international organizations participated in the **international conference in support of the Arab peoples** held in New Delhi from November 11 to 14. According to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, the purpose of the conference was to "initiate actions and to add to the momentum of the forces of freedom and anti-imperialism." Israel, according to Mr. Menon, intends to pursue the path of war to destroy the sovereignty of the Arab nations with the help of Western imperialist powers" who were exploiting the natural resources of the developing countries. "The advance of empire, the threat to the freedom of the people, the disregard of the dignity and independence of nations and the threat to world peace must be sought to be arrested", he said. Among the countries represented at the conference were the US, the USSR, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Finland, Spain, and several West Asian, Latin American and African nations. Representatives from Hungary and other socialist countries also attended it. China abstained.

A major step in **Indo-Egyptian industrial collaboration** was taken when the Indian Industries Minister, Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, visited Cairo in September. He met President Nasser and others. At a press conference in Cairo, Mr Ahmed said among the concrete proposals discussed by him with UAR ministers and engineers were supply of Indian textile machinery for expansion of a textile mill near Cairo by 50,000 spindles, supply of Indian heavy machine tools from HMT, parts for production of jeeps in the UAR, and expansion of the diesel engine production programme in collaboration with an Indian firm. An Indian delegation will visit Cairo soon to finalise the details of the joint ventures.

The Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, led a five-member delegation to the **Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's conference** which opened on October 26 in Kampala, Uganda. He returned to Delhi on November 3.

A Sudanese trade delegation led by Sayed Bashir Ibrahim Ishag, Assistant Under-secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economics, visited India on Nov. 10. It had talks with an Indian delegation led by Mr. V. K. Ahuja. The delegations agreed to renew for one more year the existing trade protocol between the two countries. They shared the view that there was scope for further expansion of trade particularly in the import of non-traditional items by Sudan from India. A meeting of the joint Indo-Sudanese Committee will be held by May 1968 to explore the scope for economic cooperation on a broader basis between the two countries. An Indian trade exhibition will be organized in Khartoum by February 1968 to step up efforts to promote trade with Sudan. The Sudanese delegation visited various industrial enterprises in the Bombay-Poona region. The Union Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, told the delegation that both countries should concentrate more on promoting joint ventures in the industrial sector to ensure "an arrangement for continuing association."

An Algerian trade delegation led by Ambassador A. Chanderli, adviser on economic affairs to the Government of Algeria, visited India in October. In a joint communique issued at the end of its visit on October 7 it was stated that experts from India would visit Algeria shortly to explore the possibility of setting up joint ventures in that country for the manufacture of bicycles, motor cycles, diesel engines and tractors. It is also reported that a team of Algerian experts will visit India to prepare a comprehensive report on the prospects of importing engineering goods from India. The delegation was impressed by the quality of Indian textiles and handicrafts, telephone equipment, machine tools, tractors, etc. It has asked for the services of Indian technicians in oil, civil engineering, and civil aviation. The Indian Government has agreed to extend all possible facilities to Algeria.

Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, Charged' Affaires of the Algerian Embassy in New Delhi, gave a **talk on Algeria Today** at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, on November 16. He said his country had made significant progress in the re-organisation of state institutions, including communes. Popular assemblies had been elected and installed for the first time since 1830. A new phase would begin with the re-organisation of the administrative unit known as the "department" which is similar to the "district" in India. For the first time since independence, the national budget had been balanced. Algeria's production of petrol this year had increased by 15 per cent. Work had been started on the construction of a fourth pineline from Mesdar to Skikda. In June 1968 the pipeline from Hassi-R' Mel to Skikda would be laid. It would begin functioning by the end of 1970 with an initial capacity of six billion cubic metres, which will be raised to 12 billion in its final stages.

In the industrial field, he said, the most important project was the iron and steelworks complex at Annaba which was expected to go into production by next year, with ancillary industries following suit at the beginning of 1970. A new phase of industrialisation would begin with the creation of a large-scale engineering complex which would produce annually 5,000 tractors to modernize agriculture, 10,000 diesel engines, a large number of transport and touring vehicles and machine tools and equipment essential for industry and agriculture.

He also outlined the progress Algeria had made in the fields of agriculture and education. He said there was wide scope for trade between his country and India. An economic and trade agreement between the two was in the offing.

The Ugandan High Commissioner to India, Mr. George W. M. Kamba, addressing a meeting of students of the Punjab Agricultural University organised to celebrate **Uganda's Independence Day** at Ludhiana (Punjab) on October 15, emphasized the need to evolve a new concept of democracy to suit the realities of the African situation. He pointed out that democracies in Africa had been replaced by military regimes because of tribal feuds, economic stagnation or retrogression. International influence and pressures were increasing all over the continent. In Uganda, Mr. Kamba said, the leadership was faced with the dilemma of providing for freedom of speech, elections and institutions of representative democracy in society and, at the same time, preserving law and order. He reiterated that democracy without a nation, sovereignty, state and stability was meaningless.

The **Indian office of the South African National Congress** was opened formally in New Delhi on November 14. President Zakir Husain, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Congress President Kamaraj and others sent greetings on occasion. Union Deputy Minister Surendra Pal Singh addressed the inaugural meeting as a representative of the Union Government. Among others who spoke were Dr. Chedi Jagan, former Prime Minister of British Guiana, and representatives of a number of African liberation movements and independent African countries. All condemned South Africa's policies of apartheid and racialism. Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, a prominent leader of the South African Congress, said the "final and decisive phase" of the freedom struggle had been launched by the people of South Africa. An armed struggle against Portuguese imperialism in Angola and Mozambique had also been started. Dr. Dadoo had discussions with the Prime Minister, other Ministers and leaders of various political parties. He told newsmen the Government of India had assured "moral and material support" to the African National Congress in its fight against the South African Government.

At the UN India raised its "voice of protest and indignation" against South Africa's policy of apartheid. The Indian delegate, Mr. Sant Bux Singh, speaking in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee, said a generation had passed since the UN first took up apartheid and resolutions had been passed year after year. "Never in modern history have so few oppressed so many", he added. The only way to gain justice and freedom for the people of South Africa was through universal application of mandatory economic sanctions. South Africa's trading partners were "clearly bartering away the future of millions of human beings for their own narrow economic gains". The delegates of Tanzania, Kenya and Congo also accused the Western European nations and Japan of trading with South Africa. India denounced Portuguese colonialism in Africa and urged all countries to enforce a total trade boycott of the Lisbon Government. Mr. R. N. Mirdha, the other Indian delegate, called for prevention of the sale of military arms to Portugal. He said "India wished to do all it could to fight the "inhuman policies" of Portugal.

Mr. G. Dove-Edwin, Nigerian High Commissioner in India, gave a talk on West Africa at the International Centre, Kanpur, on Nov. 15. Referring to the present fighting in Nigeria, he said "out of the ruins of today will emerge an even stronger Nigeria, as indeed other countries have emerged stronger from wars fought to defend their integrity". He said the Ibos, under the new constitutional arrangement, had their own State, the East-Central State, where they would enjoy as much autonomy as the other 11 States of the Federation. "In like manner, we ask that they should allow the minority groups of the area, who number some 5.5 million, to enjoy the same measure of autonomy in their own two States which have been carved out of the former Eastern Nigeria in answer to demands going back at least 15 years."

THE "77" AT ALGIERS

Representatives of the developing nations from Asia, Africa and Latin America met at Algiers on October 25. The deliberations of the conference are incorporated in a document which has come to be known as the Charter of Algiers. The main aim of the conference was to secure radical reforms in the terms and conditions of economic cooperation between the developed and the developing countries. The Charter of Algiers deals with three major aspects of the problem: trade with the developed countries, economic cooperation among developing countries themselves and aid from the developed countries to the under-developed countries. The Charter called for preferences for manufactured goods of the developing countries in the markets of the industrialized world and for stabilization of world commodity prices through international agreements. It was signed by 63 countries of which 29 are African, 18 Asian and 16 Latin American.

The Preamble to the Charter declared that the lot of more than a billion people of the developing countries would deteriorate as a result of the trends in international economic relations. "The rate of economic growth of the developing world has slowed down and the disparity between it and the affluent world is widening." It recorded that the per capita income in the rich countries was increasing by 60 dollars a year, while in the poor countries the rate of growth was below even two dollars a year.

Colonel Boumedienne, inaugurating the conference which was attended by about 900 diplomats and journalists, attacked "foreign exploitation" of the third world. He said "concerted action alone will make it possible to unify our progress towards prosperity". He warned that any "accentuation of the lack of economic and social balance between the rich north and the poor south is and will remain capable of menacing the world with a calamity whose consequences are unforeseeable".

The chairman of the coordinating committee of the conference, Ambassador Azaredo Da Silveira of Brazil, formally presented a working paper which outlined a number of specific proposals. His document deplored the "protectionist and autocratic trade practices" often employed by the affluent nations.

The Indian Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, speaking at the conference, urged all the developing countries to work out a common platform for negotiations with the developed countries at the forthcoming UNCTAD conferenee in New Delhi. He said all the members should state their positions on various issues in a "realistic, brief, frank and precise" manner. He reiterated the need for building UNCTAD into a device like OECD and GATT and not to let it become merely a platform for discussion and debate. The need for inter-regional cooperation among the developing countries was repeatedly emphasized by him.

The present-day economic relations between the rich and poor nations are characterized by two disquieting features: inadequate flow of aid from the developed countries to needy nations and the growing stringency of the terms and conditions of grants and loans given by the developed nations. There is an urgent need for genuine international cooperation in the gigantic task of development for the sake of stability and peace in the world.

OAU'S QUEST FOR EMBLEM

The general secretariat of OAU has invited artists, African and non-African, to participate in a competition for the selection of a suitable emblem for OAU. Participants are required to conceive designs "which reflect accurately the African scene, African image and the aspirations of the Africans in unity". The OAU Council of Ministers will choose one design which they will recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments for approval in September 1968. An award of 1000 US dollars will be given for the winning design. The closing date for the competition is 31 August 1969. Designs should be sent to General

Secretariat, Organisation for African Unity, PO Box No. 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

THE CONGO SITUATION

The Congo continues to be the crisis-ridden country of the African continent. In recent weeks, it underwent another grave crisis caused by mercenaries and their thousand or so allies from Katanga. The mercenaries, known as Les Affreux—the Frightful Ones—were first hired by the former Congolese Premier, Mr. Moise Tshombe, to fight for secessionist Katanga soon after the Congo's independence in 1960. The mercenaries, aptly defined in the African lexicon as those who kill Africans for money, are led by Colonel Jean Schramme. The main aims of Schramme are that (1) General Mobutu should be compelled to relinquish his absolute powers and take the former Premier, Mr. Tshombe, back in his Government, and (2) the Congo should be run by Africans and Europeans working together.

Recently mercenary activities were intensified in the Kivu province. Angry Congolese reacted violently and sacked the Belgian embassy in Kinshasa to express their indignation. The President of the Kinshasa provincial branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement (MPR), President Mobutu's party, charged Belgium with "acting in agreement" with the mercenaries. Unless the mercenaries are thrown out of the country, the possibility of preserving peace and stability in the Congo is remote.

At the OAU summit conference held in Kinshasa, Congo, the 37 members who were present expressed their support for the government of General Mobutu and adopted a resolution demanding that the white mercenaries leave the country immediately. They also appointed a committee to coordinate military aid to the Congo if the mercenaries did not quit.

The International Red Cross Committee's representative said in Geneva on October 6 that the Congo's rebel white mercenaries had agreed to quit the country and that arrangements for evacuating them were being made following acceptance of the offer by Col. Jean Schramme. The offer, made by OAU, permits their evacuation under international supervision. Malta has agreed to serve as a terminal for the airlift of mercenaries. General Mobutu is reported to have promised amnesty to those rebel gendarmes who wished to return to the Congo. A Red Cross mission had been in Kinshasa for talks with President Mobutu and another in Rwanda, crossing over to Bukavu for discussions with Col. Schramme on the evacuation issue.

President Mobutu announced a major cabinet reshuffle on October 5 in which nine Congolese cabinet ministers lost their posts. The President himself retained the portfolios of defence and veterans' affairs. It is reported that the reshuffle will be followed by political changes. The structure of certain bodies in the People's Revolutionary Movement will be reconstituted. Mr. Justin Bomboko, besides being foreign minister, gets the departments of foreign trade and industry. Mr. Jean-Joseph Litho becomes minister of agriculture. The finance ministry is now headed by Mr. Paul Mushiete. Mr. Jean-Jacques Kaude is the new information minister. Mr. Alphonse Roger Kithiwa gets the portfolio of labour and social security and Mr. Bernadin M. Diakha is the new minister of education.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

The Afro-Asian bloc in UN on October 16 called on the Security Council to take effective measures to compel South Africa to hand over the territory of South-West Africa to the UN administration. The General Assembly a year ago had terminated South Africa's League of Nations mandate over the territory and placed it under the direct administration of UN.

Ambassador Joseph Ben Mwemba of Zambia demanded that the Security Council be convened to consider the matter. The South-West Africa Council, constituted by the General Assembly last May to administer the country, designated Chile, Indonesia and Zambia to refer its report to the General Assembly. The South African delegate told UN it considered the Assembly resolution on South-West Africa as "illegal and invalid".

EAST AFRICA

Six African Heads of State held an impromptu summit conference in the shadow of Mount Kilimanjaro in Arusha, Tanzania, on December 2. The African leaders confined themselves to the unresolved question of Rhodesia. Among those present were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, President Milton Obote of Uganda, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Mr. Abdilrashid Ali Shermarke of Somalia. They had gone there for the inauguration of the East African Community—a possible forerunner of an African Common Market. If this comes about, the Arusha meeting would indeed be regarded as a historic event in the movement for Pan-African unity.

KENYA

The full text of the declaration on the Kenya-Somalia border dispute, which was agreed upon at the last meeting of OAU, was released to the press. The operative part of the text is as follows:

.... "Both the governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of Paragraph 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter. The two governments have further undertaken to resolve any differences between them in the spirit of Paragraph 4 of the OAU Charter.

"The two governments have resolved to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property. Furthermore, the two governments have agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and press against each other. The two governments have accepted the kind invitation of President Kaunda to meet in

Lusaka during the latter part of October 1967, in order to improve, intensify and consolidate all forms of cooperation........"

The Somali leaders welcomed the declaration and described it as a "historic step".

UGANDA

Several delegates from the member-countries of the Commonwealth attended the Commonwealth parliamentary association conference held in Kampala, Uganda, in the last week of October. The major problem discussed related to parliamentary institutions and the erosion of Parliament's authority. There was recognition of the fact that democracy had assumed many forms in Africa. Mr. Nigel Fisher, a Conservative MP, said it was not right to condemn African states with one-party systems because they might suit them. The Guinean delegation leader, Mr. Neville James Bissember, said although democracy meant different things to different people, it was essential that legislation should always result from free discussion. Mr. Kanwar Lal Gupta of India said the greatest danger to democracy arose when a strong personality emerged as head of government. Kenya's Co-operative Minister, Mr. Ronald Ngala, stressed the need for a strong Parliament to work with a powerful executive. He thought the recent coups in Africa and elsewhere were the result of abuse of .power by leaders or ignorance of military forces. The Zambian delegate said the Westminster form of parliamentary government was the most valuable inheritance the Commonwealth had from Britain. Several delegates praised Uganda's economic and agricultural development.

TANZANIA

President Nyerere, in a major policy speech on foreign affairs at the TANU national conference in Mwanza on October 16, said Tanzania might change its attitude towards Britain with which she broke her relations two years ago, but reiterated that it would not imply any change in Tanzania's Rhodesia policy. The conference was attended by President Obote of Uganda, Kenya's Vice-President, Mr. Moi, and other leaders of Central African states who had gone there as President Nyerere's guests.

President Nyerere stressed that his country had neither the desire nor the intention to be "anti-west in its foreign policy". He condemned American involvement in Vietnam. He called for the admission of China in UN. "Total African liberation and total African unity", he said, "still remained the basic objectives of Tanzania's foreign policy".

RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENTS

The Rhodesian problem was again discussed in the UN Trusteeship Committee. The Kenyan delegate, Mr. James Nyamweya, Minister of State in the office of Kenya's President, declared that the policy of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia had failed and that a solution could be found through the use of force only. The delegates of Algeria and Sierra Leone also called for the use of force to topple the racist regime of Ian Smith and asked for international support for African nationalists. The delegates charged Britain with allowing South Africa to intervene directly in Rhodesia.

The Indian delegate, Mr. P. S. Naskar, told the Trusteeship Committee that "the only effective and speedy way to end the Rhodesian rebellion was through the use of force by Britain". He said the only reason for Britain not to use force is that the mutineers involved were white and her own kith and kin.

Earlier, the British delegate repeated that his country was still not prepared to use force against the white minority government of Rhodesia and added that it did not believe "in the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends".

The Zambian Foreign Minister urged UN to take swift measures to avoid a war in Southern Africa.

Canada's Gerard Pelletier reiterated that "it is inadmissible that a society should be organized on the system of racial discrimination under a minority of whites exercising political and economic control over the vast majority of people". He said Rhodesia must not be granted independence before majority rule was obtained. But the Canadian delegate did not support the use of force to topple the Smith regime because "of the human and material cost of such action". He advocated much more effective use of economic sanctions.

The Soviet delegate accused Britain, the US and their allies of working in collaboration with the Smith regime. He demanded unconditional implementation of the Security Council resolution on economic sanctions adopted last December.

Meanwhile the Rhodesian government was moving nearer to the Pretoria pattern of race relations in the country. A draft of the Property Owners (Residential Protection) Bill was sent to MPs in the second week of October. The draft provides for the removal of people of one race from an area predominantly occupied by another if the predominant section files a petition. Racial classes have been defined in the draft bill to cover Asians and coloureds (Africans are already excluded from white areas).

The British Secretary for Colonial Affairs visited Lusaka and Salisbury in November. He had talks with the Zambian President at which the latter demanded a tougher line on measures against Rhodesia. Mr. Thomson summed up the British attitude by saying: "No sell-out and no force".

THE WAR IN NIGERIA

The peace mission sponsored by OAU reached Nigeria after an initial delay of about three weeks in the last week of November. It was headed by General Ankrah of Ghana and consisted of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and others. The mission had discussions with Gen.

Gowan. But nothing significant came out of its efforts. The two Nigerian leaders could not be brought nearer the conference table. The usefulness of the peace mission was limited in many ways. Biafran rebel leader Col. Ojukwu knew it very well that OAU regards secession as a dangerous precedent because it may tempt other tribes as well in several African states to demand secession.

The civil war, which had remained suspended for about six weeks, broke out again in the first week of December. According to British newspaper reports, about 50,000 people have lost their lives in this senseless war.

Mozambique Liberation Day

SUPPORT for Mozambique freedom fighters was expressed by a number of speakers, Indian and African, at a public meeting held in New Delhi on September 25 under the auspices of the Indian Council for Africa to observe Mozambique Liberation Day. The following are excerpts from the speeches made at the meeting by representatives of Nigeria, Algeria and the African National Congress. The speeches of Indian leaders and the message sent to the meeting by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi were published in the previous issue of this journal.

Mr G. Dove-Edwin, Nigerian High Commissioner:

Although the cause we seek to serve is intrinsically noble, and although most of the struggle must be borne in Mozambique by the people of Mozambique themselves, it is in a sense appropriate to meet here, for is it not this sub-continent that has provided inspiring examples to so many countries in Asia and Africa who have become independent in recent times? I feel sure that when the history of Independence movements in African countries is fully written, it will show that the example of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, who spent much of his life petitioning against the unjust acts of the foreign rulers, the example of nationalists who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of freedom and, above all, the example of the great Gandhiji .... . provided inspiration to those on whose shoulders fell the task of liberating Africa from foreign domination.

Today's meeting is timely in that we are looking at a Portuguese colony, rather than a province of Portugal. Mozambique shares a common frontier with Rhodesia, a colonial problem of immense magnitude with which we have been seized for the past few years. The open connivance of Portugal with the illegal and unpopular regime of Mr. Smith, and the use of Mozambique by Portugal and Rhodesia to defeat the UN-approved economic sanctions imposed on Rhodesia make the liberation of Mozambique more urgent, for as long as the Republic of South Africa and Portugal continue to provide succour to the Rhodesian regime, for so long will it be difficult to secure those changes in Rhodesia which we all desire to see. Besides, the liberation of Mozambique necessarily means a weakening of white supremacy in Southern Africa.

While reaffirming our faith in the right of the people of Mozambique to rule themselves, we reject the implied Portuguese concept that Mozambique, and the islands of Sao Tome and Principe are geographical extensions of Portugal. I know that the Portuguese often talk of their "civilising mission" and have created the impression that in some ways their harsh rule is beneficial to its victims. But I know that slavery too was at one time justified on the ground that slaves led a better life in the Americas than where they had come from......

I will refer here only to one aspect of the "benefits" conferred on Portugal by her firm hold on Mozambique and the other territories which are willy-nilly part of the escudo monetary area. Mozambique is one of the autonomous economic units within the monetary area, with its own budget, customs tariffs, and currency, although it shares the issuing bank of Banco Nacional Ultramarino with other Portuguese-held territories excepting Angola which has the Bank of Angola. The balance on transactions between members is paid for in Portuguese escudos and when their reserves of this currency are insufficient, they must buy them from the Portuguese with their own gold or foreign exchange holdings. The nature of imports and exports is however such as to put the so-called overseas provinces perpetually in deficit in their trade with Portugal whose Treasury thus benefits from the exchange of Portuguese escudos for gold or foreign currency earned by the territories. Again, although Portugal may be in deficit on her balance of current and capital accounts with foreign countries, the escudo monetary area as a whole may be in credit because of the earnings of the colonies, to use their proper name. Thus in 1964 and 1965, a total deficit of 124 and 131 million escudos in the Portuguese balance of payments was more than offset by the "provinces" with their credits of 3,626 million and 2,454 million escudos respectively while the escudo monetary area as a whole had a positive balance of payments position with foreign countries to the tune of 3,502 million in 1964 and 2,323 million in 1965.

Yet, as the example of the Commonwealth shows, the independence of colonial territories need not lead to hostility between the former imperial power and the former colony. On the contrary, there is evidence all round to show that a healthier association and a more enduring basis of cooperation can be forged from a change in relationship. We must therefore continue to hope and apply all the pressures at our command to ensure that Portugal comes soon to see the wisdom of making the necesary concessions and adjustments before it is too late.

Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, First Secretary of the Algerian Embassy:

Not so long ago, in similar circumstances, meetings were organised throughout the world on the occasion of Algeria Liberation Day. Although the primary responsibility of recovering their freedom lay ultimately with them, the Algerian people have never forgotten the resounding echo their revolution had in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Just as the struggle of the Vietnamese people has helped and is still helping in the liberation of African, Asian and Latin American countries, so ours was appreciated as a definite contribution to the process of liberation from foreign domination. And so is now the fight for freedom of the people of Mozambique, Angola, the so-called Portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia and South Africa.

It is this deep conviction in the identity of our struggle with those of other countries under foreign rule...that is now shaping our international policy. Many are resentful that we are not "minding our own business", others would call us unrealistic, still others would label us as "adventurists". Having gained our independence the hard way, we could very well have withdrawn into ourselves as others have done and looked only to our narrow national interests. But such behaviour would have been more than a betrayal of our ideals and of the ideals of those who helped us get rid of the colonial power.

It is not by mere chance that Algeria is now in the forefront of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle. Our behaviour is an integral part of the historical dialectics which led to our independence. No pressure, blackmail, threat, military or otherwise, will make us go back on our resolute determination to extend full-scale assistance to our African brethern and pledge unstinted support to those fighting imperialism in Asia and Latin America.

Concrete examples of this assistance and support can be found in the fact that just after our independence Algiers was declared an open city for all representatives of revolutionary movements in Africa and elsewhere. Today, representatives of the FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), PAIG (Guinea-Bissao), FNL (South Vietnam), PLO (Palestine), SWAPO (South-West Africa), ANC (South Africa), ZAPU (Rhodesia) are running full-fledged missions in Algiers and benefiting from the full cooperation and understanding of the Algerian Government and people. Since 1962 Algeria has been and is still one of the countries, if not the country, which has given concrete assistance to African movements of liberation...

We should intensify our support to all those who are fighting for human dignity, equality and justice. For their fight is not only their concern. It is the concern of all conscious people round the world... Their struggle is our struggle. Their victory will be our victory. Let us all pool our forces together for a quick achievement of this end.

Mr Afred Nzo, of the African National Congress of South Africa:

The fact that our organization has for the first time been able to establish an office in Asia to mobilise support for the struggle of our oppressed people indicates the support people fighting against old and new colonialism and racial oppression and discrimination have always enjoyed from the Government and people of India.

The "civilizing mission" of Portugal in her African colonies has endowed the indigenous inhabitants of these territories with the following "benefits":

(a) Over 80 per cent of them are sentenced to a life of ignorance and grinding poverty and are forced to eke out a miserable existence through pastoral farming, made to grow certain types of crops that are appropriated by the colonial authority by paying nominal compensation.

(b) The few workers who live in the cities are ruthlessly exploited, made to live on an average earning of £6 a month...The colonial authority still imposes crippling taxes...The unemployed are rounded up on charges of vagrancy and sold to the highest bidders as slave labourers. During their term of service, usually from 6 to 12 months, they receive no cash payments until they return to their local government offices where they are paid about £5—9.

(c) In 1928, Portugal and South Africa signed an agreement under which Portugal was to export 100,000 Africans from her colonies to work on South African gold mines under primitive conditions...For each of them, Portugal gets £ 2.10s, including interest on the money these Africans are made to bank whilst working in South Africa. The money that is supposed to be paid as indemnity for those who die in mine accidents does not reach the dependents or relatives of the deceased. The agreement is renewable.

(d) About 98 per cent of the population of Mozambique is illiterate. By an agreement signed in 1940 between the Portuguese Government and the Holy Sea, African education was put wholly in the care of the Roman Catholic Church. Thus the Portuguese Government completely ignored the education of millions of the black population.

(e) In 1963, there were 613 physicians in all the Portuguese colonies in Africa and the overwhelming majority of them worked in towns and cities. There were no medical services for Africans who paid over £7,500,000 in taxes that year. Only 1 per cent of this amount was spent on the education and health of Africans.

(f) Portugal maintains its fascist grip over these colonies through a ruthless Nazi-type secret police known as PIDE. Political organisation by Africans for the redress of their grievances is illegal.

It is estimated that the imperialist stake in this area is over £ 2,000,000,000 in capital investment. The investments in South Africa alone amount to £1,500 million. Zimbabwe has a foreign capital investment of £375 million of which £200 million is British and £175 million South African. Leading West German officials continuously visit Angola and Mozambique. In 1963 a group of politicians and generals led by Dr Richard Jaegar, Vice-President of the Bundestag and Chairman of its Defence Commission, went there. Dr Jaegar was quoted as having said in Der Reinischer Merkin, Cologne, that "the Salazar Government had achieved something really great there, which does credit to Portugal". He continued: "I have the impression that Portugal has made it possible for every black man to avail himself of every form of education, but that it does not, however, assert force".

Economic cooperation between West Germany and Portugal has been growing rapidly since World War II. By 1962, the Federal Republic had become Portugal's most important trading partner, accounting for 16.3 per cent of its imports. West German companies have built the first Portuguese Iron and Steel Works near Lisbon and leading West German banks operate there. Krupp has heavy investments in Portuguese Africa. According to the Paris paper, *Combat*, of August 1964, the Krupp empire is the biggest of the foreign concerns that subsequently entered Angola, and Krupp's investment amounts to some 125 million American dollars (500 million marks). Friedrich Krupp, K. G.

Essen, heads the international syndicate, Companhia Mineira de Lobito, currently exploiting one of the richest iron ore deposits in Cassinga, in Southern Angola.

The massive assistance given to these reactionary regimes has enabled them to greatly expand their police and armed forces. Out of a white population of 3.5 million, South Africa has an army of 26,500 men equipped with modern tanks, armoured cars, aircraft, submarines and war ships provided by Britain, the US, France and other NATO powers. There are also 43,000 armed police and 55,000 reservists.

Portugal maintains an army of 100,000 troops in Africa –30,000 in Mozambique, 20,000 troops in Portuguese Guinea and 57,000 in Angola.

Encouraged by the moral, political and economic backing they have received, Vorster, Smith and Salazar have unleashed a reign of terror on the liberation movements in their domains. In South Africa there are at present between 8-10 thousand political prisoners. These include Sisulu, Mandela, Kathrada, Bram Fisher, etc. In Ian Smith's concentration camps thousands of political detainees have been languishing for long periods. They include Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU. The same situation obtains in the Portuguese colonies.

It would be a fatal mistake to think that this military build-up is directed against the liberation forces only. There is ample evidence that it is also aimed against independent African countries. The South African military base on the Caprivi strip is a threat to the newly independent peoples of our continent. Portugal has in the recent past carried its war against the people in Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea across the borders of these territories. There have been Portuguese attacks on villages in Tanzania and Zambia.

Africans in this region have, however, not been intimidated by their oppressors. Freedom fighters in Portuguese Guinea have liberated more than half of the territory. In Angola also part of the country has been liberated. During the past 3 years FRELIMO fighters have put out of action more than 5,000 Portuguese, destroyed more than 400 trucks and shot down several fighter bombers. In the political field FRELIMO has consolidated its organisation and power in the liberated and semi-liberated zones. There are vast areas, now about 1/5th of the country, in which live more than 800,000 inhabitants under the direct control of FRELIMO.

According to a joint statement issued on August 19, 1967, by the Vice-President of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Deputy President of the African National Congress of South Africa, "furious fighting has been and is taking place in various parts of Southern Rhodesia". "We wish to declare that the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie (Southern Rhodesia) area is being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country.

India's Intensive Agricultural District Programme

R. K. SHARMA

THE rapidly growing literature on economic development has recognised the dominant place of agriculture in underdeveloped countries. As a rule, agricultural progress is a pre-requisite for industrial development. Rising agricultural productivity supports and sustains not only industrial development but also economic growth in general in several important ways. First, it permits agriculture to release part of its labour force for industrial employment, at the same time meeting the increasing food needs of the non-agricultural sector. Second, it raises agricultural incomes, thereby creating the rural purchasing power needed to buy new industrial goods, and rural savings which may be mobilized, by direct or indirect means, to supply the major wage-goods (food) for industrial workers at prices advantageous to new industry.[1] Third, it helps in saving scarce foreign exchange which may otherwise be spent on importing food. Finally, if agricultural productivity becomes sufficiently high the country may enjoy a surplus in food and commercial crops of such magnitude as to permit their export.

Now that most countries in Africa are masters of their own destiny they look forward to economic development. As they were rich in certain raw materials (agricultural and/or mineral) there was in the colonial days a highly selective development of particular export industries which tended to create a few islands of highly capitalistic and efficient plantation and mining enterprises benefiting foreign investors and the metropolitan countries; the rest of the country remained a vast sea of primitive, small-scale, agriculture. This low and somewhat imbalanced pace of agriculture makes it all the more difficult the task of increasing agricultural productivity.

It has been said that in attempts to manage lateritic soils in conditions of a highly seasonal and erratic water regime, with prolific insect and plant life, great health hazards and the minimum infrastructure, it may initially be most effective to concentrate improvement efforts in an integrated manner in a few areas at a time, rather than spreading them thinly and in an uncoordinated way. Only in this way could the full impact of these separate measures on a difficult environment be realized. If this view is accepted, it will mean that it is necessary to have a heavy concentration of all related pre-requisites to assure that the whole range of seed, cropping, fertilizer, transport, marketing, credit, land tenure and water management measures are applied in the

(b) In order to achieve a rapid increase in production, improvements will have to be concentrated in areas which are most responsive and where the application of technological methods can result in the greatest benefit. This would mean concentration of efforts particularly in irrigated areas.

(c) Striking increases in food production are possible if known improvements are adopted in effective combinations. A few improved practices can be effective if adopted singly, but full benefits from most improvements can be attained only if they are adopted in combinations suitable for specific soil and climatic conditions. Sufficient quantities of fertilizers, improved seeds and pesticides and proper soil and water management—all these, while important in themselves, can be fully effective only if adopted in combination with each other.

The Programme

The recommendations of the Ford Foundation team were accepted in principle by the Government of India. It was agreed that pilot projects on the lines recommended by the team should be initiated in selected areas having favourable conditions for maximising production. Thus came into being the Intensive Agricultural District Programme, popularly known as the "Package Programme". The programme has the four-fold purpose of

(a) Determining how rapid increases in food production could be achieved so as to provide experience in other areas;

(b) Increasing the income of the cultivator and his family;

(c) Helping to improve the economic resources of the village; and

(d) Providing an adequate agricultural base for more rapid economic development and social betterment.

The programme envisaged selection of areas with maximum irrigation facilities and minimum natural hazards, providing all the essential elements needed to increase agricultural production. To start with, even in such favourable areas, essential requirements like fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, etc., were not available to cultivators in sufficient quantities and at the time required. The programme therefore aimed at an integral and intensified approach to the problem of agricultural production in areas more responsive to such production efforts. As its immediate goal, the programme sought to achieve a rapid increase in agricultural production through a concentration of financial, technical, extension and administrative resources. In the long run it aimed at a self-generating breakthrough in productivity and raising the production potential by stimulating the human and physical processes of change. The programme is also intended to demonstrate the most effective ways of increasing production, providing experience for extending it to other areas.

The essence of the programme is provision of adequate incentives and aids to cultivators for increasing production through intensive application of all resources in selected areas. It envisaged the development, with the participation of cultivators in these areas, of an improved farm plan for each holding and its implementation with all possible facilities. The essential requirements for implementation of the programme are:

(a) Adequate and timely supply of credit based on production plans and made available through strengthened cooperative societies;

(b) Adequate and timely supply of production requisites, such as fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, implements, etc., to be channelled mainly through cooperatives;

(c) Arrangements for marketing and other services through cooperatives so as to enable cultivators to get the best market price for their surplus;

(d) Adequate storage facilities for supplies and farm produce so that cultivators do not have to travel long distances to procure supplies and market their produce;

(e) Intensive educational efforts, particularly through scientific demonstrations, for dissemination of improved agricultural practices and through existing and additional trained staff who will also be entrusted with the operation and follow-up of production plans;

(f) Strengthening of transport arrangements to ensure mobility of supplies and staff;

(g) Village planning for increased production, including livestock improvement programmes and strengthening of village organizations like panchayats and cooperatives;

(h) Analysis and evaluation of the programme from its inception to its completion;

(i) Establishment of agricultural implement workshops, seed and soil testing laboratories and implementation of local works programmes having a direct bearing on production.

The programme was to be carried out for a period of five years. It was to cover all food crops as well as important cash crops in the districts, although emphasis was laid on major foodgrain crops such as paddy, wheat and millets. The programme also included development of livestock and other related activities which could be profitably taken up in the selected areas. These activities, ancillary to agricultural production, were designed to be an integral part of the overall programme.

Progress in Implementation

The programme was launched in the first three districts in 1960-61, in the next four districts in 1961-62, in the next six in 1962-63 and in the last two in 1963-64. Table I shows the total number of blocks and villages covered under the programme from 1960-61 to 1966-67.

TABLE I

Coverage of the IADP

S. No.	*Name of District*	*State where located*	*Total No. of blocks*	*Total No. of villages*
A—First Group of Districts				
1.	Thanjavur	Madras	36	2675
2.	West Godawari	Andhra Pradesh	25	911
3.	Shahabad	Bihar	20	3081
4.	Raipur	Madhya Pradesh	23	3855
5.	Aligarh	Uttar Pradesh	17	1746
6.	Ludhiana	Punjab	10	1044
7.	Pali	Rajasthan	10	866
B—Second Group of Districts				
8.	Allepey	Kerala	17	99
9.	Palghat	Kerala	16	303
10.	Mandya	Mysore	10	1329
11.	Surat	Gujarat	34	2198
12.	Sambalpur	Orissa	29	3426
13.	Burdwan	West Bengal	33	2855
14.	Bhandara	Maharashtra	13	1483
15	Cachar	Assam	15	2019
	TOTAL		308	27,850

The programme has now been in operation for over five years. It will therefore be useful to examine the progress made in the implementation of the various facets of the programme and the contribution made by it towards increased agricultural production.

Training

The IADP has played a key role in the training and education of extension officers as well as non-officials from the very beginning. A number of training programmes at the central, regional and local levels have been organized with special emphasis on job training. A significant feature of the training has been that farmers are expected to tackle on-the-spot problems associated with IADP.

Agricultural Information and Extension Education

Two types of activities are generally organized under this head: (a) dissemination of information through the use of various media of information and publicity; and (b) field demonstrations. Agricultural information units in IADP districts have now been well established, staffed and equipped. The units are supplied with information folders, pamphlets and leaflets on high-yielding varieties and the intensive cropping pattern. Composite crop demonstrations of the package of practices on cultivators' holdings constitute one of the most important means of helping cultivators to adopt improved practices. Emphasis has recently been on a small number of well-laid and efficiently-managed demonstrations. In addition, area-wise demonstrations are now organized where improved practices are demonstrated over fairly large and compact areas. The impact of such demonstrations is believed to have been very effective and impressive.

Improved Seeds

Steady progress has been made by the Improved Seeds Programme both in terms of the quantity of seed distributed and area covered in the IADP districts. This is evident from data in Table II.

TABLE II

Improved Seeds Distributed and Area Covered : IADP

Year	*Seed distributed (tonnes)*	*Area covered by improved seeds (hactares)*
1961-62	9,050	181,093
1962-63	10,898	310,441
1963-64	16,511	447,890
1964-65	24,671	682,862
1965-66	30,929	871,300
1966-67	43,777	901,307

Fertilizers

Powerful educational support to the fertilizer propagation drive has been given by the numerous demonstrations organized in the package districts. The large number of storage godowns and fertilizer sale points established in the package districts brought supplies nearer home to cultivators. Again, fertilizer loans and other forms of assistance facilitated purchase of fertilizers by farmers in required quantities. As a result of these measures, the tempo of demand for fertilizers has gone up very considerably. It should be noted however that the programme was affected by (i) non-availability of fertilizers in required quantities and (ii) adverse effects of seasonal factors, specially in 1965-66 and 1966-67. Thus, although the off-take of fertilizers has shown an upward trend throughout the five-year period, the rate of increase has been affected by these two factors. Moreover, the off-take of phosphatic fertilizers has shown a downward movement due to acute shortage of this type of fertilizer in the country as a whole. The following table provides the relevant data.

Plant Protection

Adoption of plant protection measures on a wide scale has been popularized through demonstrations and use of other extension media.

Subsidies have been given for pesticides and small types of hand-operated equipment to encourage their application at the right time. Emphasis has been placed on prophylactic measures in plant protection work in the package districts. In addition, increased quantities of seeds chemically treated against seed-borne disease have been made available. The area covered by plant protection measures increased from 11.06 lakh hactares in 1964-65 to 16.48 lakh hactares in 1965-66 but went down to about 14 lakh hactares in 1966-67. 24,704 tonnes of seed was treated against seed-borne disease in 1966-67 against 15,711 tonnes in 1964-65.

TABLE III

Off-take of Fertilizers : 1964-65 and 1966-67

(figures in lakh tonnes)

Year	*Nitrogenous fertilizers*	*Phosphatic fertilizers*
1964-65	3.04	1.57
1965-66	3.34	1.27
1966-67	3.58	1.15

Improved Agricultural Implements

Agricultural implements workshops have been established in all the package districts. These workshops undertake testing of existing implements for evolving modifications to suit local conditions and developing simple devices for easy fabrication and servicing by local hands. They also train village artisans and farmers in the repair, use and servicing of transport vehicles and tractors provided under IADP. A large number of demonstrations of the use of improved agricultural implements have been organized; in some districts farmers have started using improved implements to a large extent. Considerable progress has also been made at these workshops for the development of proto-types of implements which have been extensively tried in cultivators' fields to assess their suitability under local conditions. In addition, training courses of short duration have been organized in the working and handling of modern implements.

Agricultural Credit, Marketing and Storage

An essential aspect of the package programme is the provision for farmers of adequate and timely supplies of credit, production requisites and facilities like storage, marketing, etc. This is mainly done through cooperative societies. The state governments have drawn up phased programmes for the strengthening and development of cooperatives in the package districts. Steps have also been taken to rationalize and render more effective the working of cooperative institutions at all levels of their structure. The increased volume of production finance made available in the package districts has focussed attention on the need of linking credit with marketing so as to ensure a fair return to cultivators for their produce and to enable them to repay their loans to credit societies. Detailed surveys of the existing marketing situation have been conducted and the district agencies assisted in drawing up a phased programme for the development of cooperative marketing. Attempts have also been made to increase storage facilities for the benefit of cultivators.

Assessment and Evaluation

A built-in feature of IADP is the programme of assessment and evaluation. Here, two types of investigation are carried out: (1) a series of Bench-mark and assessment surveys conducted in each crop season in each package district based on stratified multi-range random sampling techniques; and (ii) special studies on operational and analytical problems arising during the implementation of the programme. Assessment surveys are intended to provide broad-based and reliable data on changes brought about in the yield rates of principal crops, percentages of area under different crops benefited by fertilizer application and other improved agronomic practices, average rates of essential inputs for various crops in holdings of different sizes, etc. Operational research units have undertaken a number of quick studies on problems of interest to the administrators of the programme with a view to increasing operational efficiency. In addition, anaytical studies of longer duration are being undertaken in a number of package districts by agro-economic research centres attached to some universities and agricultural colleges in the country. Details of these surveys and analytical studies have been published by the Government in their successive reports.

Limiting Factors

It would be unrealistic to expect that the objectives set forth can be fully achieved. A programme of such magnitude as IADP has its teething troubles; it has to pass through a gestation period and has to gain momentum in the field before its impact can be felt. During the implementation of the programme, there have been various difficulties, some of them organizational, others operational, and some inherent in the socio-economic conditions in the package districts. An important limiting factor initially and, to some extent, even now has been the weakness of institutions, particularly the cooperatives. It is obvious that the success of the programme and the speed with which it moves will almost be in direct proportion to the strength and competence of these institutions. Again, the technique of farm planning which was tried on such a large scale was in itself a comparatively new development in India and initially suffered from lack of adequate research data on which to base extension recommendations, lack of adequate understanding of farm planning processes by the field staff and cultivators and the limited experience of credit institutions in extending loans on the basis of production plans. No programme involving the motivation of large numbers of cultivators to the adoption of new practices and techniques can succeed unless the socio-economic system under which it functions offers them reasonable security. Finally, shortages of fertilizers, inadequacy of agricultural credit and, above all, widespread drought in many parts of the country in two successive years have been responsible for holding up the progress of the programme.

Conclusion

Given the magnitude of the task and the high objectives set out under the programme, these limiting factors were bound to crop up. What is important is that the basic concept of IADP has proved to be a sound one. As is evident from the data given in this paper, considerable progress has been made since the programme was initiated. The most important index of this progress is that the IADP approach has gained wide acceptance over the years as the right strategy for agricultural development. More programmes on identical lines, such as the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme and the High-yielding Varieties Programme, have been launched on a much wider scale. These developments represent the acceptance—indeed extension—of the "package" concept to wider areas and is in keeping with the role of IADP as a 'path finder' and 'pace setter' programme.

REFERENCES

1. cf. W. Arthur Lewis, *Theory of Economic Growth*, London (1955). p. 334.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

Visitors to the Council

A number of distinguished personalities from India and abroad visited the Council to familiarise themselves with its activities and programme of work. Among them were Mr. Daniel Mbandemezoo from Spanish Guinea, Mr. Judas Alexandre Honwana, Freelimo representative in the U.A.R., and Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, London representative of the African National Congress. All of them expressed the desire to establish closer relations with the Council.

Prof. L. Gray Cowan, Director, African Institute, Columbia University, New York, had an exchange of views with Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council. Dr. Anirudha Gupta, a member of the Council and Reader in Commonwealth Studies at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, gave a lunch in honour of Prof. Cowan.

The other visitors were Mr. George Kimka from the Uganda High Commission in India, Mr. K. M. Chakravarti from Uganda, Mr. Yoshiki Hoshino, editor of Shizuoka Daily News, Japan, Mr. Maclean Kamangara of Mozambique, who is now a student in Aligarh, and Dr. K. Mathew Kurian, Economic Adviser to to the Kerala Government.

Mr. Joseph E. Harris, a scholar from the U. S. who is doing research on African settlements in India, remained in touch with the Council which assisted him in securing contacts in Bombay and Hyderabad.

New Regional Office

A small regional office of the Council has been set up in Bangalore, Mysore State.

Banquet for Mauritius PM

The Executive Secretary represented the Council at the banquet given by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in honour of the Mauritius Prime Minister, Dr. Sheosagar Ramgoolam.

Algerian and Ethiopian Journals

The Council expresses its appreciation for the donation of publications made by the embassies of Algeria and Ethiopia. The Algerian

Embassy has agreed to supply regularly to the Council two publications in French—Revolution, a weekly, and El Moudjahid, a daily. It has also given permission to the Council to screen the film, Battle of Algiers, through its regional offices in Bombay and Bangalore.

The Ethiopian Embassy has agreed to donate two newspapers—Voice of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Herald.

West Africa

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order, The Party-States of West Africa,* Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, 1966. pp. 168.

J. H. Price, *Political Institutions of West Africa,* Hutchinson Educational, London, 1967, pp. 266.

Richard Adloff, *West Africa : The French-speaking Nations ; Yesterday and Today,* Contemporary Civilization Series, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York, 1964. pp. 361.

IT could be said that the impulse to study modern Africa coincided with the process of decolonization which began on the western coast. Before Ghana's independence in 1957, outside interest in Africa was only peripheral and, with the exception of a few anthropological tracts on African societies and customs, very little was known about the minds of modern Africans and the objectives they wished to pursue in political affairs. Apart from Lord Hailey's monumental work, *The African Survey,* the only book worth mentioning in those days was Thomas Hodgkin's *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* published in 1956.

The decolonizing process, however, opened up the closed societies of Africa under different colonial rulers. For the first time independent observers—scholars, writers and journalists—found the opportunity of meeting Africans directly and not through colonial officers who claimed to know the natives better than the natives themselves! Unfortunately this patronizing tone coloured the attitude of many early observers of the African scene. Thus, while admitting that Africans were undergoing the traumatic experience of vast social and political changes, they asked whether Africans were fit to manage their affairs according to what *they considered* modern standards. Obviously, the framing of questions in this way divided scholars into rival camps. There were those who believed, almost with the assiduity of African leaders themselves, that the newly independent states would develop into viable democracies according to their own light and custom, while there were others who could not shake off their personal skepticism.

Along with this, new questions began to agitate the minds of scholars and journalists alike. Thus, when the one-party system with its philosophy—or lack of it—became most marked in West Africa, some were at pains to point out that the system was basically democratic whatever form it might assume outwardly. Others simply condemned it as a step towards dictatorship or even "fascism". The models or typologies which different political scientists prepared only seemed to suit the situations. Unfortunately, as very often these models were built on insufficient data, they had to be abandoned or drastically amended with every new change in Africa. The essentially pragmatic character of African politics thus made all theoretization basically pragmatic!

Let us take a few illustrations. At one time when single or dominant parties became the most distinguished feature of independent states, various theories were propounded about the "mobilizing", "integrating" or "modernizing" roles of these parties. It was then generally taken for granted that political parties were the sole determinants of judging the behaviour of these states. Thus, writing in 1964, James Coleman and C. G. Rosberg Jr. could still think that political parties "illuminate most clearly the nature of African politics, but also (they) are important determinants of the unfolding African political scene." (*Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*). Another scholar went to the length of pointing out that in Africa every aspect of life was determined by politics and political processes. (Herbert H. Spiro (ed), *The Primacy of Politics*, 1966). Quite naturally these arguments gave rise to a rival group of scholars claiming that dominant parties and especially one-party systems were unhealthy trends in Africa. An able presentation of their viewpoints can be found in Arthur Lewis' *Politics in West Africa.*

The point that needs emphasis here is that potitical theorizing or arguments followed the trend of events rather than providing an analysis of those forces which determined this trend. As a result, the study of Africa has progressed piecemeal with no thread interwining the earlier theories with the new ones. Thus, again, with the failure of a number of one-party states and the rise of militarism in Africa, the focus of attention shifted from parties and politicians to the men on horses' back or the bureaucrats. For instance, Professor S. E. Finer's reconsiderations on one-party regimes in Africa are an excellent *post-mortem* study. (See *Government and Opposition*, July-October 1967. The whole issue is devoted to Africa.) Again, such questions as whether the army could play a stabilizing or "modernizing" role or whether the bureaucratic elite is the "creater of new values" do not help in furthering our understanding of Africa. These questions simply provide further opportunities for scholars to build new structures which would most assuredly collapse as soon as some unexpected change overtakes Africa.

Seen against this background, Zolberg's book certainly appears refreshing and encourages one to think of new possibilities in the field of African research. In a short space of about 150 pages the author tries to lift "the study of the politics of one-party states in Africa above the level of contemporary headlines and (he) links it to fundamental issues well within the mainstream of past and present concerns of political science." (p 6). One great merit of Zolberg's book is that Instead of confining his attention to either the French or English-speaking territories, he draws comparative generalizations from both. This at once enhances the value of his book, even though of the five states he has selected for study only one belongs to the English-speaking group.

At the outset, Zolberg lists the shortcomings of the earlier works on West Africa. These are, first, insufficiency of data which made any theorizing difficult; and, second, since these studies were made at a stage when the African parties were in their expansive phase, which he calls the bandwagon effect of nationalist politics, they had tended to exaggerate the importance of these parties. Quite obviously, Zolberg has benefited by hindsight; nevertheless his observations are penetrating.

In the first chapter, Zolberg traces the growth of dominant parties in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. One of his findings is that notwithstanding statistical evidence, most dominant parties were not even organizationally strong; on the contrary what made Ghana's CPP or Guinea's PDG assume an exaggerated importance was that there was a vacuum in the political life in these two countries. Further, it was from the practical requirements engendered by the process of decolonization that the one-party ideology stemmed. It is true that this ideology assumed different meanings in different countries; for instance, while in Ghana the one-party ideology reached its apotheosis in the slogan "CPP is Ghana and Ghana is CPP", the PDCI in the Ivory Coast seldom self-consciously discussed ideology. But at the same time it would be wrong to conclude that the Ivory Coast is therefore less "ideological" than Mali, Guinea, or Senegal, or even that it does not have an ideology (p. 54)

It is obviously this stress on ideology that demands in the end the achievement of unanimity through such means as co-option, intimidation, exile or suppression of political opponents. The methods which African regimes use may not be always dictatorial and, indeed, a government like Nkrumah's which was bitterly condemned as "totalitarian" was more democratic than many other party regimes. It is worthwhile to remember this especially at a time when, after Nkrumah's fall, he is more sinned against than sinning.

But what happens after unanimity has been achieved? It may mean, paradoxically, the end of a one-party regime. For, instead of opposition from outside, opposition becomes endemic within the party. This brings about a shift which "reveals to the leaders in the cruelest way that all of their efforts to achieve unity are ultimately a poor guide". In view of this impasse what could the future hold for Africans? Zolberg is not unduly optimistic about it as he himself reaches the painful conclusion that "we might expect a sort of institutionalized instability, just as in Latin America over many decades the coup became an institution". But this is precisely where the author abandons his role as a scholar and considers himself worthy enough to teach African leaders a few home-truths about themselves. This makes one suddenly shrink as if one has been served a rotten dessert after a rich supper.

The second book on political institutions of West Africa has been written, as the author says, for students appearing in examinations held by the West African Examinations Councils. As such, the book is very limited in scope though one does not understand why Mr. Price should exclude all the French-speaking territories when the title, at least, suggests a somewhat broader treatment. The book gives the history of five English-speaking West African countries before and after 1945 in two separate sections rendering the arrangement somewhat cumbersome. What is however more objectionable is Price's approach of treating all these territories in an identical fashion. This may perhaps suit the immediate interests of English schoolboys, but the constitutional developments in different territories in the process become so oversimplified that one cannot distinguish one from the other. Further, since Price refers to the military coups in Ghana and Nigeria, one would have expected him to give at least the obvious reasons for these political upheavals. At times one detects certain biases of the author which in a textbook is not excusable. These weaknesses apart, one will find the book useful if one can afford to buy it.

The third book on French-speaking Africa is written by a former official of the US State Department. The aim of the writer is to inform his American readers about the general social, cultural, and political life in French West Africa. Excepting a few rash remarks, such as "Islam's campaign of conversion in Negro Africa has been a centuries-long battle between Muslim modesty and pagan nudity" (?), the book may interest the beginners.

Book Reviews

Africa Since 1800

Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967, pp 304, 25s. in U.K.

THIS book gives a concise account of modern African history. It treats the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods of African history on the basis of contemporary accounts and a mass of other primary and secondary sources.

The ground for the conquest of Africa by the colonial nations of Europe was prepared between 1800 and 1875. Thereafter events moved at a lightning pace. Whereas in 1879, more than 90 per cent of the continent was ruled by Africans, by 1900 all but a tiny fraction of it was being governed by European powers. These powers "partitioned Africa with such haste, like players in a rough game, that the process has been called 'the Scramble for Africa'." The reasons governing these events were, of course, inextricably mixed up with the developments in Europe. At first the rivalry in Africa was confined to Britain and France. Subsequently, King Leopold II of Belgium appeared on the scene closely followed by Bismark's Germany. The Berlin Conference (1884-85) laid down general rules governing the colonization of Africa. Of the colonial period, which lasted about 70 years, the first 30 were devoted to establishment of the rule, the next 30 were the years of active development and the last 10 saw the retreat of European powers from Africa. The ramifications of these phases and the varied patterns of administrative and economic policies evolved by the French, British, Belgian Portuguese and other colonizers are set out in five chapters (11 to 15).

As Europe headed towards World War II the whole of Africa had come under European rule. Soldiers recruited from all over Africa fought in almost all the major theatres of war. During the war most of them learned to see their own countries in a new perspective, from the outside. Psychologically too, the war greatly transformed the mental attitudes of Africans and Europeans towards each other. It "completely shattered" the myth of the white man's superiority and invincibility. The stage was thus set for the liberation of Africa. The advance of Africa towards independence, once started, was rapid. However, while most of Africa was moving rapidly towards independence, most of southern Africa was moving still further in the opposite direction.

The concluding chapter of the book deals with the legacies of colonial rule and the African nations' attempts to deal with them. Foremost in the minds of some African leaders is the problem of "balkanization" of Africa under colonialism. There is, however, no unanimity on how to end it. While Nkrumah pleaded for a grand political union of Africa, others (Houphouet of the Ivory Coast, for example) would settle on the more modest goal of closer cooperation on a regional basis. There is also the problem of tribal loyalties which threaten to disrupt the unity of existing political units. This point is illustrated by Congo, Rwanda and Sudan. Above all, African leadership faces the challenge of popular expectations roused by independence. Tentative answers have been found in one-party rule and socialist programmes. But their effectiveness remains to be tested.

The book will be found useful by the general reader and the specialist alike. It contains excellent maps and an informative note on source material.

M. S. AGWANI

Trade Unionism in Africa

Jean Meynaud and Anisse Salah-Bey, Methuen, London, 1967, pp 242, 63s. in U.K.

This book is an English translation of the original French edition, *Le Syndicalisme Africain*, published in 1963. Trade unionism played a key role in the freedom struggle of the African continent. It continues to exercise considerable influence on political and economic developments in the continent even today. But few, if any, systematic studies of the subject have been made so far. The study under review is welcome for this and other reasons.

African trade unionism is examined in this book in its colonial, national and international contexts. In its evolution African trade unionism has been entirely different from that of Latin America and even Asia. An explanation for this lies partly in its recent origin and partly in the fact that its most important developments have coincided with the growth of nationalism. Even so, there is no uniform pattern. For instance, in areas which remained under French influence, doctrinal debates played a far more important role than elsewhere. Again, in its formative phase, African trade unionism was subjected to varying degrees of restrictions by the colonial rulers. The advent of independence changed the entire context. But the numerical and economic weakness of the majority of African trade unions circumscribes their role in national affairs. Much depends on the relationship of the trade unions with the political party in power or the government. Besides, as the authors bluntly admit, "respect for freedom of trade union action is no more than a pious hope in most African states". But whatever their avowed position in relation to political power, the trade unions cannot avoid fulfilling one of their main functions, which is to convey the discontent of the workers whom they represent. This is amply illustrated by the examples of Belgian Congo and Kenya.

The book contains a handy 'documentary appendix' comprising texts of 23 documents.

M. S. AGWANI

African Poetry (An anthology of traditional African poems).
Compiled and edited by Ulli Beier. Cambridge University Press.
Price 12s. 6d. pp. 80.

Gerald Moore and Ulli Beier in their introduction to *Modern Poetry from Africa* say: "In African poetry......the expression is always in the service of the content; it is never a question of expressing *oneself*, but of expressing *something*......Nor is the African poet ever concerned with his inner nature, with his individuality." What he is concerned with is the tradition, society, humanity and his religion. But tradition is linked with African poetry as the soul is to body. *African Poetry*, although aesthetically not of a high standard, is a good collection of religious and traditional poems. It has some really interesting verse translated from various African languages. The poems are simple in expression, direct in diction and self-contained in perfection. Each of them has something new to suggest unlike poems written in English by Africans.

The best in the collection is "Lullaby", simple and easy to understand:

Someone would like to have you for her child
But you are mine.
Someone would like to rear you on a costly mat
But you are mine.
Someone would like to place you on a camel blanket
But you are mine.
I have you to rear on a torn old mat,
Someone would like to have you as her child
But you are mine.

(Akan)

It is realistic but at the same time imaginative. For good imagery, one should turn to "The Sky" where the poet compares the night to a city, taking the stars for men and women in a city; there is an underlying moral concern with the human lot. This is revealed in the sense of contrast which the city seems to bear to the world to which the poet belongs. The sky, and the world which it symbolically evokes, is free from corruption, slavery, religion, custom, profit and loss, and 'everything knows its way.' There is no lack of sense of purpose or direction:

The sky at night is like a big city
Where beasts and men abound,
But never once has anyone
Killed a fowl or a goat,
And no bear has ever killed a prey.
There are no accidents, there are no losses.
Everything knows its way.

(Ewe)

Among the other good poems are "The Ancestors", "Song for the Sun that Disappeared behind the Rainclouds", "Death", "Prayer before the Dead Body", "The Negligent Lover", and "The Moon". The most significant are "Death", "Prayer before the Dead Body" and "The Moon". The first two have a kindred theme—death—but deal with it differently. In the first, the poet gives his last will and testament. He says that when he dies he should be buried "under the great shade trees in the market", where he could hear the beating of the drums and feel the movement of dancers' feet. What makes it mature is the irony and tone suggested in the first three lines and the last two lines which also reflect the aesthetic side of the poet's vision:

With our feet we walk the goat's earth.
With our hands we touch God's sky.
Some future day in the heat of noon,
I shall be carried shoulder high
Through the village of the dead.
When I die, don't bury me under forest trees,
I fear the dripping water.
Bury me under the great shade trees in the market,
I want to hear the drums beating
I want to feel the dancers' feet.

(Kuba)

"Prayer before the Dead Body" is a prayer which is said in Africa before the dead body just before it is buried. Lines from this rather long poem read:

Like swarms of mosquitoes dancing in the evening,
When the night has turned black, entirely black,
When the sun has sunk, has sunk below,
When the night has turned black
The mosquitoes are swarming
Like whirling leaves
Dead leaves in the wind.

Dead leaves in the wind,
They wait for him who will come
For him who will come and will say:
'Come' to the one and 'Go' to the other.
He will say 'Come' to the one and 'Go' to the other
And God will be with his children.
And God will be with his children.

(Hottentot)

The note on this poem, if one may quote from the book, is illuminating: "Such a gloomy vision of life after death is rare in Africa, where usually it is assumed that death does not create a complete and final break with the living. The poetry of pygmies and bushmen, though, often conveys a similar feeling of hopelessness."

Another poem which could be of considerable interest to readers is "The Lazy Man". It is more or less a description of the life of a lazy man. When it is morning the lazy man murmurs to himself, "So it is daylight again, is it ?" And by the time he is out of the bed "fire blazes in the blacksmith's hut." "The European" describes the personality of a Europeon:

> *In the blue palace of the deep ocean*
> *Dwells a strange being.*
> *His skin is white like salt*
> *His hair is long like plaited seaweed.*
> *His dress is made of fishes,*
> *Fishes more charming than birds.*
> *His house is built of brass rods*
> *His garden is a forest of tobacco leaves.*
> *His country is strewn with white pearls*
> *Like sand on the beach.*

(Camma)

SURESH KOHLI

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(Camma)

SURESH KOHLI

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

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Indians Abroad—in Asia and Africa: The Problem

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

(The Indian Council for Africa is organizing an all-India seminar on "Indians Abroad—in Asia and Africa". The article below attempts to set down the scope of the seminar. The Council would welcome comments and suggestions from readers and others interested in the subject of the seminar.—Editor).

WHEN we say "Indians abroad" we mean all those people of Indian origin who have gone and settled abroad as immigrant communities. This definition helps to broaden the strictly legal view that Indians are only those who have or who qualify for Indian citizenship. The concept of citizenship emerged only when India became a sovereign Republic. But, meanwhile, a further narrowing of the concept took place when, as a result of the partition, a large number of Indians overseas came to be known as "Pakistanis". This happened not because all these people opted for Pakistani citizenship but because of their particular faith and religious background. In time, the term "Pakistani" has come to be loosely applied even in respect of those Muslims who have their homes and families in India. And in East Africa particularly, it has become customary among the Hindus to refer to all Muslims as "Pakistanis". On the other hand, if the recent case in Kenya, in which the Government held that the people of Indian origin who held British passports could come to India only if they secured visas, is any indication, we can safely assume that the Government of India favours the application of a narrow and legalistic view so far as Indians overseas are concerned.

This cannot obviously be the approach of this seminar. For, apart from citizenship, what we are interested to know and study are the problems of Indians in the countries of Asia and Africa, notwithstanding what citizenship or domicile they have now adopted. This means our immediate concern is not citizenship but nationality. Fundamentally, "nationality is based on allegiance and not citizenship. Citizenship is not co-extensive with nationality. Neither permanent residence in a foreign country nor acquisition of a foreign domicile has anything to do with one's nationality" (Kondapi, 1951). From this point of view we can accord consideration to any Indian in any part of the globe, notwithstanding his present status or domicile. This view does not contradict the concept of law : for, according to well-known writers on international law, immigration involves the voluntary removal of an individual from his home state with the intention of staying abroad, but not necessarily with the intention of renouncing his nationality.

Size of the Problem

If this interpretation is accepted, then we may ask ourselves: "What is the size of the problem?" In terms of population Indians overseas do not constitute a problem. They number somewhere around five million which is less than 1 per cent of the total Indian population. At one time even this fact was enough for enthusiastic writers to point out that of every hundred Indians, one went abroad (Gangulee, 1947). But this argument has no relevance now. What is important to note is the size and composition of Indians from the viewpoint of immigrant countries themselves. This leads us to certain interesting facts. In some of the smaller territories such as Mauritius, Fiji and Guiana, Indians constitute over 50 per cent of the population. In Trinidad and Tobago they account for more than 35 per cent. Nearer home in Ceylon, Malaysia and Singapore they constitute around 10 per cent of the population, while in East Africa their number is somewhere around 2 per cent and in South Africa just over 3 per cent (see tables on following pages). What is revealing is the fact that across the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, there are Indian communities large enough to make Indian pockets in three different continents.

It is not numbers alone but the positions Indian occupy (or occupied until recently) even in countries where they are in a minority that is significant. In Burma, for instance, just before the nationalisation of land the South Indian Chettiars owned over seven hundred thousand acres of land or just over 48 per cent of the total land under cultivation. In Zanzibar, prior to the revolution of 1964, Indians accounted for 60 per cent of the island's total clove production. In East Africa, Indians numbering less than 2 per cent of the population control not only the bulk of retail trade and commerce, but provide 45 per cent of the total managerial, administrative and technical manpower of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Hunter, 1959). In South Africa, even though Indians suffer from the segregationist laws of a racist regime, their native "shrewdness and industry" have bred a fear complex in the minds of Europeans. Indeed, the very presence of Indians in South Africa poses a threat to the system of *apartheid;* for "through their diligence and efficiency Indians have often triumphed over colour hatred and envy. Their customers have included well-to-do whites purchasing in cheap markets as well as the less well-off among both whites and non-whites; but it is in the service of the poorest classes in the villages as well as in the towns that their contribution to the common welfare has been largest" (Hutt, 1965).

Thus whatever may be their size and composition, Indians have played different roles in different countries. It is the specific role of Indian communities in each country, according to their tradition, settlement and historical conditions, that must be looked into before we make any generalisations. For, even though Indian migration in the last century started mainly in the form of indentured labour, the method of recruitment and the subsequent development in the socio-economic life of Indian communities varied greatly from country to country. Even the pattern of migration followed different regional characteristics, *e. g.*, while labourers for the West Indies and Mauritius were mainly recruited from Bihar and U. P. (in some cases whole villages migrated), the flow of Indian emigrants to East Africa was restricted to certain districts of Gujarat and Kutch. The migrants to South Africa were mainly Tamil-speaking people, who also formed the bulk of Indian workers in the tea and rubber plantations of Ceylon. But it was not only as indentured labourers that Indians went abroad. In Burma a large number of Indian merchants, businessmen and cultivators had settled long before Burma was separated from the British Indian Empire. In East Africa there was a large number of Indian merchants engaged in their traditional trades before the exodus of Indian *coolies* for the construction of the Uganda railways began (Chanan Singh, 1964).

TABLE I

People of Indian Origin in Various Countries

Name of the country	*Total population*	*Asians or Indians*	*Percentage of the total*
Burma	24,229,00 (1964)	—	—
Ceylon	10,624,507 (July 1963)	1,082,000	12
Fiji	469,934 (1965)	235,338	50
Guyana	635,743 (1964)	319,000	50
Kenya	9,643,000 (1960)	188,000	1.9
Malaysia	9,070,974 (1965)	871,949	9.5
Mauritius	751,400	592,750(1)	67.2
Singapore	1,008,000 (1966)	153,700	8
Tanzania	— (1962)	92,100	—
Trinidad and Tobago	827,957 (1960)	301,946	36.5
Uganda	7,189,600 (1963)	82,100	1.1
South Africa	15,982,664 (1960)	477,125	3

(1) The figure includes both Hindus 373,150 (50.9 per cent) and Muslims 1[illegible]600 (16.3 per cent).

Need for a Comparative Study

A comparative study of all these aspects may yield important results. For instance, one may ask why it has become possible for Indians in

Ceylon and South-East Asia to maintain a close link with India while those who went to far-off lands could not maintain any such link. A simple answer could be the geographical proximity which allowed Indian migrants to Asian countries to visit their mother country occasionally. But then the well-to-do Indian families even in far-off lands have been able to keep physical links with India, though the less prosperous sections have not been able to do so. Does it mean, conversely, that the comparatively poorer Indian communities who, in course of time, lose their ties with India found it easier to integrate with the societies of tht immigrant countries? Partly this is true; for example, Indians in the West Indies, South Africa, Mauritius and Fiji—who came largely from the poorer sections—found it easier to assimilate and adopt the customs of the people among whom they came to live. But even this explanation does not seem to be universally true. Lohia points out in his book that the Indian Congress once received an urgent message from the Indian association of Trinidad asking whether Hindu marriages could be performed before dusk or after. (Lohia, 1937).

Further one should examine how the system of indentured labour disrupted the traditional family life of Indian communities abroad. Did this disruption create new problems of social adjustment or did it make it more possible for Indians to abandon their exclusive community life in foreign lands ? It seems that in British Guiana the disruption of traditional Indian life helped the process of integration. In Mauritius also this was true to a certain extent and the Indians there decided to stay back even though their period of contract was over. "Through odd jobs, market gardening, share cropping uneconomic portions of estates, dealing in livestock, hawking, usury, and the sale of rations, Indians acquired small amounts of money and began to buy land" (Benedict, 1965). This helped them to soon become the majority community in Mauritius. In Fiji, on the other hand, because of restrictions on Indian ownership of land the immigrants found it difficult to settle on a secure basis. Thus although Indians in Fiji constitute 51 per cent of the population they own only 1.7 per cent of the total land.

A third factor which is worth noting is the caste, status and social stratification of Indian communities abroad. Those Indians who went out as indentured labourers to work on the plantations of various colonies found their conditions even worse than those of the former slaves. One may suggest that this very factor should have helped their integration with the local people. This is true only to some extent.

On the other hand, the upper caste Hindus and prosperous Muslims (in East Africa in particular) felt it binding on their part to maintain close links with their relatives at home, to contract marriages according to traditional customs and employ only those people who belonged to their castes. This should indicate that the upper caste Hindus and well-to-do Muslims remained more or less completely aloof from the local communities.

In Guiana, since the lower castes constituted a majority of immigrants it was possible for them to intermix with the indigenous population on a basis of equality. It does not seem, however, that the racial barrier between Indians and Negroes was mitigated even though their economic standards were very similar. "Indian labour was imported in West Indies after the emancipation of Negroes. The fact that they were prepared to work on the sugar plantation in conditions little removed from slavery has earned for them the contempt of the Negroes. This feeling still exists today". (Adinarayan, 1960). The problem of integration, therefore, is not as simple as one would like to believe.

The pattern of Indian settlement constitutes yet another problem. In East Africa Indians remain mostly concentrated in the cities. According to a 1957 report 75 per cent of the Asian population in Tanganyika lived in 14 townships and 60 per cent in the 5 largest towns. Similarly 75 per cent of Asians in Uganda were living in the urban areas. In South Africa the flow of Indians from the rural to urban areas was artificially checked by the Group Areas Act and, contrary to popular belief, the living conditions of Indians in the towns are extremely backward (Hutt). In Ceylon, Fiji, Mauritius and West Indies the Indian population has spread over the plantation areas which may explain why they remain less urbanised as a community. From a sociological viewpoint we should try to find out the implications of these facts. Is it necessary that Indians with a rural bias should be more willing to get assimilated with the local population? On the other hand, the concentration of Indians in the urban areas of East Africa may possibly act as a check against the flow of African population from the village to the town in recent times. This may account for the growing resentment of Africans against Indian settlers. Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam and Kampala are almost wholly owned by Indian landowners and businessmen and this fact may alone exacerbate the racial feeling of Africans. These are some problems which need serious consideration.

However, it is incumbent on our part to examine the erroneous belief that Indian immigrants live a better life than the indigenous population. It is true that in East Africa the standard of living of Indians is comparatively far better than that of the average African (Davidson, 1960). But it would not be correct to jump to the conclusion that all Indians enjoy this high standard; in fact, over 11 per cent of the working Asian population in East Africa earn less than £120 per annum which is just the subsistence standard for any African (see Table 2). Further, a large number of Indians in Kenya live in slum areas right in the heart of cities like Nairobi and Mombasa. At another end, the conditions of Indian labourers in tea gardens and rubber plantations in Ceylon or Malaysia are worse than those of the poor sections of Ceylonese or Malaysians. Anti-Indian legislation has in addition cut Indian wages and thereby made their life harder.

Policy of British India Government

It is only when we analyse these variations from the point of view of class, status, occupation, area of settlement, and the living standard of Indians that we can make a few generalities. It is true that the problem of Indians overseas is mainly the legacy of the British colonial empire and *as such it should now be treated as a problem of the Common-*

population on a basis of equality. It does not seem, however, that the racial barrier between Indians and Negroes was mitigated even though their economic standards were very similar. "Indian labour was imported in West Indies after the emancipation of Negroes. The fact that they were prepared to work on the sugar plantation in conditions little removed from slavery has earned for them the contempt of the Negroes. This feeling still exists today". (Adinarayan, 1960). The problem of integration, therefore, is not as simple as one would like to believe.

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wealth. The fact that Indians are treated as separate communities in various ex-colonies even after generations of settlement is not perhaps so much due to the tenacity of Indian culture as due to the artificial compartmentalisation of societies in colonial times. Thus, in all ex-British colonies the whites were given a privileged position while the non-Europeans were treated as second class citizens. In particular, it had been the policy of British rulers to differentiate Indian immigrants from the local population from the very beginning. Thus, in the '30s, the Zanzibar Government tried to break the domination of Indians over clove production; in Tanganyika Indian vehicles were not allowed to ply in the southern regions, while in Kenya no Indian was employed in the Defence Force. The policy of discrimination was obviously pursued with a view to create a hiatus between Indians and the local population. In Mauritius, Fiji and Guiana laws were enacted to prevent Indian participation in the political life of these territories. Thus in 1950 only 3.2 per cent of Indians had the right to vote in Mauritius and this is still the case in Fiji.

TABLE II

Percentage of Taxpayers in Each Income Group in Kenya (By Race)

Income Group	*Africans*	*Arabs & Somalis*	*Asians*	*Europeans*
Under £ 120	91.4	86.0	11.0	1.5
£ 120-159	4.7	7.2	4.3	3 2
£ 160-199	·1.7	1.9	3.3	0.6
£ 200-399	1.7	2.0	13.0	2.5
£ 400 and over	0.5	2.9	68.4	92.2
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source : Development Plan of Kenya, 1962-70, Kenya, P.34.

If the problem represents a historical legacy it should be approached in a historical perspective. The two questions which need further probing are : (1) How far the then British India Government tried to secure and protect the interests of Indians overseas? and (2) What was the attitude of the Indian nationalists toward their brethern abroad? It is true that the British Government did not care much about the life of Indians either at home or abroad, but it nevertheless took a series of measures from time to time to safeguard Indian interests. Thus, it protested against the passing of the Land Restriction Act 1943 which affected the Indian population in Natal ; it vigorously advocated the Indian demand for land in East Africa, and passed the Indian Immigration Act 1922 "to secure and ensure proper treatment of Indians abroad". These are some instances which should show that the attitude of the British India Government was not exactly apathetic to the question of Indian settlements abroad. We should like to know through what channels it worked to ensure protection of the Indian communities and whether these channels cannot still be utilised. This is not an idle question; for there are many critics today who suggest that compared to India's present posture the former British Government took a more positive stand on the question of Indians at least in East Africa (Tandon, 1964). They point out: "Generally the Indian Government, and the Indian people, in their attitude towards their brothers in East Africa showed a complete lack of patience which they often expressed by chiding them, as parents would to their naughty children, to behave decently in a foreign land" (ibid). The Government's stand on the Kenyan Indians after the passing of the British Immigration Act (February 1968) seems only to confirm this pessimistic view.

The Nationalist Attitude

The attitude of the Indian nationalists, on the other hand, had been one of great sympathy for Indian overseas. The Indian National Congress (INC) passed year after year various resolutions demanding that the Government of India should protect Indians abroad and that the latter in turn should indentify themselves with the cause of India's freedom. In the '30s, Nehru expressed this in the following words : "Wherever in this wide world there goes an Indian, there also goes a bit of India with him". Lohia in a more specific way pointed out : "Overseas Indians .....can act as the unofficial embassies of the Indian National Congress".

At the same time the nationalists tried to indentify themselves with the cause of Indians abroad. Indian leaders were sent to study the conditions of Indian immigrants in Fiji, Mauritius, Kenya and so on. In a specific resolution on Kenyan Indians, the Congress condemned the Government of India's attitude of acting "as a mere advocate instead of a contracting party to protect the interests of Indian nationals abroad" (Rajkumar, 1951). In 1937, the Congress showed its bond of solidarity when it organised a boycott of cloves to protest against the measures of the Zanzibar Government against the Indian producers. Even as late as 1946, when Indians organised a *satyagraha* in Durban, the Congress passed a resolution describing that the *satyagraha* was waged "not only for their self-respect but for the honour of India".

The point to be investigated is what impact this policy had on the minds of Indians overseas. *Did this policy of identification prevent the Indians abroad from identifying themselves with the local population ?* In this connection, one may ask what was the legacy of Gandhi's *satyagraha* movement in South Africa ? While providing Indians in South Africa with a weapon to fight the racialist laws did it not also help accentuate their exclusiveness ? Gandhi himself did not think even as late as 1939 that Indians should form a common front with Africans. In an interview with a South African leader, he said : "A non-white united front will be a mistake...The Indians are a microscopic minority... they can never be a 'menace' to the white population. You, on the other hand, are the sons of the soil who are being robbed of by the Europeans. You are bound to resist that. Yours is a far bigger issue" (*Harijan*, 18 February, 1939).

The *question that necessarily arises is whether this attitude did not make Indians look up to their mother country for guidance in all public affairs? And, secondly, whether it did not make them expect too many* *things from India once the latter became independent.* There is substance in this kind of speculation. Much of the psychological disillusionment one finds today among the Indians abroad has arisen from this feeling of broken hopes. It is very necessary to explore this aspect.

Nehru's Policy

By the '40s, when Nehru became the sole exponent of India's future foreign policy, one finds a change in the attitude of the nationalists. Nehru cherised the vision of a great upsurge of Asian nationalism. As such he treated the question of Indians abroad not separately but as an integral part of colonial liberation. It was he who asked Indians to identify themselves with the immigrant countries and advised them to work with the local people for the common goal of independence. This is clear from Nehru's 1939 Report on Indians in Ceylon as a result of which the INC asked Indian leaders in Ceylon to call off their strike. Thus, very interestingly, Nehru asked Indians to forget their separate identities which the earlier generation of nationalists had emphasised. Accordingly, the Indian communities on his advice came out in a large way to contribute to the nationalist movements of different countries. Thus, Indians organised the trade union movement in Burma (Mahajani, 1960) ; they contributed to the development of a modern economy in Kenya (Royal Commission, 1955) ; and identified themselves with the nationalist TANU party in Tanganyika. But one may ask whether these acts helped them any better after these countries became independent.

The Nehru policy was based on the unrealistic hope that within the broad pattern of African and Asian nationalism the separate identity of Indian immigrants would be forgotten. This did not happen. Instead of pan-Afro-Asianism, several nationalisms emerged. Thus, the cry of "Burma for Burmese", "Ceylon for Ceylonese" was followed in the '60s by the cry of "Kenya for Kenyans" and "Zanzibar for Zanzibaris", and so on The problem of Indian communities was more accentuated when a series of discriminatory measures were taken against them by the independent governments of Asia and Africa. The only logical end to this development would be the expulsion of Indians from the countries of their settlement.

It was perhaps unfortunate that Nehru did not take a lesson from Asian developments and apply them to Africa. As a result, he treated the question of African freedom in the abstract. He himself was not clear about the magnitude or the specific nature of the problem of Indian settlement in Africa. At one end he asked them not to expect anything from India, at another he described them as "guests of the Africans". This ambivalence in his attitude is pin-pointed by one critic. "The Indians in Africa are either Indians on a temporary sojourn abroad or for all intents and purposes they are Africans—which is what the phrase 'complete identification with the Africans' should mean" (*Seminar*, June 1960). It is not sure how far this ambivalence affected the position of Indians in Africa. It is quite possible that it gave encouragement to Europeans to exploit the situation by pointing out to Africans *things from India once the latter became independent.* There is substance in this kind of speculation. Much of the psychological disillusionment one finds today among the Indians abroad has arisen from this feeling of broken hopes. It is very necessary to explore this aspect.

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Indians in East Africa

It is now time to ask what lessons India could have learnt from the Asian developments? Some suggest that the Government should have entered bilateral treaties with the newly independent states of East Africa with a view to secure the traditional rights of Indian settlers (*Seminar*). This argument is based on the ground that there was enough goodwill for India at that time to secure such guarantees from the African governments (Grewal, 1967). To counter this argument others say that such behaviour would have easily laid India open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of African states. Further, it would have been reminiscent of British policy in regard to protecting their nationals abroad (Davidson). Perhaps these are valid objections but one does not understand the strange immobility of the Indian Government in the face of such pressing circumstances. The mere sermonising in which it indulged adversely affected the position of Indians in Africa. Indeed it seems that even as late as 1960-61 we did not acquire any clear understanding of Africa and the problem of African independence. What would happen when Africa emerged not as a single entity but as several independent states, with the same bandwagon rush for nationalism, i.e. "Kenya for Kenyans", "Somalia for Somalis" etc. —on these questions we remained blissfully silent. Still now it does not appear that the Government has fully grasped the problem of African development of which the Indian question forms an integral part. So long as Indians are with Africans and face the oppressive racialist policies of South African or Rhodesian regimes, it is easy for the Government to uphold their cause within the broad framework of its anti-racial and anti-colonial stance. But what happens when an African regime enacts racial laws against the minorities, including Indians? This is a hypothetical question but the day may not be far when India will be called upon to tackle such a problem without notice!

It is this total lack of understanding of the African situation that makes the Government extremely prone to giving "advice" to Indians in Africa. It is an ideal thing that Indians should integrate themselves with the emerging African societies. But, before we say so, would it not be more in order to identify the hurdles that lie in the way of integration? As a migrant community, Indians face today innumerable difficulties. The policy of Africanisation has badly hit Asian employment in East and Central Africa. As such a certain amount of insecurity is bound to arise among them. Again, when they are exhorted to contribute their utmost to the economic development of these countries, we should find out the size of the capital Indians have for investment. With the exception of a few rich families, Indians are mostly middle-class tradesmen, or *Dukawals* which is not enough to make them economically very enterprising. True, they are more prosperous in a comparatively poor society, but if this alone is an argument against them then it should be directed first of all against the business community at home. Experience shows that, despite all efforts to encourage them, private entrepreneurs in India have remained more or less apathetic to investing in any venture that involves a certain amount of risk (see *Economic & Political Weekly*, October 1967). Besides, the business community in any part of the world wants to be assured that its interests would not be jeopardised by political uncertainty or acts of vendetta by any government. If this is a valid defence, it is irrational to think that Asian businessmen in Africa *should behave* differently.

It is in this connection that the specific question of *citizenship* arises. Indians have been generally accused of not accepting citizenship of the countries where they have settled. But before we arrive at any conclusion, we must examine carefully all the rules and regulations which govern the conditions of citizenship in the African countries. It has been opined that the rules for Tanganyika citizenship were framed in such a way as to bar a large number of Indians from qualifying for it at the first instance (Grewal). Further even when they qualify, what is the guarantee that Indians will enjoy the rights of citizenship? Would they not be discriminated against in matters of employment, education, trade licences etc? In this connection it is worthwhile to note that a large number of Indians who fled Zanzibar in the wake of the revolution still remain stateless even though they applied for citizenship of the various East African countries. One would like the seminar to devote special attention to the problem of these people. Further, what will happen if, as a result of the expulsion of some Kenyan Indians, an exodus begins of Indians of all sections in Kenya? It is technically very correct for the Government of India to say that since these Indians hold British passports, it is none of its concern to know what happens to them. But is this attitude realistic? If the recent Immigration Act is any pointer, the British Government would make all these people of Indian origin in Africa a stateless, homeless community.

The problem of citizenship, therefore, cannot be studied in isolation from the historical and socio-economic conditions of Indian minorities in Africa. As minorities it is not unnatural for Indians to exhibit their "clannishness" or to remain somewhat aloof from the main stream of current African life (Ghai, 1964). On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the Indian problem is not a racial one but one of class adjustment in emergent nations where the bulk of population remains extremely poor (Davidson). In that case the issue is not racial but one of reconstruction of societies as, indeed, it is the case so far as developments in Tanzania after the Urusha declaration show. But if this is a correct diagnosis why is it that the comparatively poor Indians, say in Ceylon or Singapore, still do not find a place for themselves among the local people?

Again, historically, one should examine the different means through which the ex-colonies became independent. Did the various constitutional frameworks which Britain had left behind help in the integration of settler communities with indigenous populations? From our point of view the developments in Fiji and Mauritius have a timely importance. In Fiji where Indians are in a majority the constitution is framed in such a way as to give them only 12 out of 36 elected seats. Moreover undue importance is given to the local chiefs which underlines British anxiety to earn the goodwill of a particular group in Fiji. Further, as a result of communal representation, the Indian leader, A. D. Patel of the Federation Party, finds himself in the Opposition. It is very likely that Indians in Fiji would soon demand abolition of communal representation and its replacement by the system of "one man one vote" (*Review of International Affairs*, No. 399, 1966). In such a situation we should like to know what attitude the Government of India should adopt.

In Mauritius, on the other hand, the Indian-dominated Labour Party of S. Ramgoolam has formed the Government with 19 of the 40 elected seats in the Assembly. The Labour Party was in fact in power when Mauritius achieved independence. But there are signs of political complications arising from the demand of the Creoles for closer association with Britain (the recent riot is an example). Under such circumstances would it be desirable for India to enter into bilateral treaties with Mauritius, thereby making amends for lost opportunities in Asia and Africa? An immediate problem the Mauritians face is that of population explosion ; unless further pressure on land can be avoided by immigration or birth control measures, that land would soon be plunged into sorrow (Benedict). We have to formulate certain steps to help mitigate this problem.

A Perspective : India's Possible Role

We must now consider the question of Indians overseas in the broader perspective of India's overall national interests. As we stated right in the beginning, cannot the existence of sizeable Indian communities in the three different continents be interpreted as a source of advantage for India? During the early fifties and sixties India was indeed expected to play a more positive role in view of the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia and Africa. Under the woolly vision of pan-Afro-Asianism, we missed the opportunity of giving substance to this expectation. Instead, we took it for granted that Ceylon, Burma and Nepal etc., would continue to stay within our sphere of influence until this day-dreaming was shattered by other developments. In East Africa, the British were indeed apprehensive that India would enter in a big way once they withdrew from the eastern coast (McKay, 1958). If, in response, India too had anticipated this role, perhaps its influence in Africa could have been far more stable than what it is today. It is a wild guess—but one wonders if India had anticipated its role—whether the African leaders would not have turned to her for assistance to suppress the mutiny of 1964. Instead, they turned to Britain even at the cost of extreme personal embarrassment (Nyerere, 1964).

It is rather paradoxical but true that while India drew a large canvas of pan-Afro-Asianism, its attitude to the new nations betrayed the psychology of a small power. Instead of playing a role in consonance with its size and population, it went out all the way to satisfy the whims of the emergent nations. The problem of Indians overseas which we could have tackled at one time with ease was left outside the periphery of our foreign policy goals. We did not think that Indians abroad could be an asset and not a liability. And we made that assessment in order (1) to bolster our national image and (2) to guarantee peaceful integration of Indian communities without interference on our part. Now at the end of two decades of this policy, we may like to know whether we are any nearer to these goals. Have we earned the goodwill of Asian and African nations? (as the *Statesman* said "not even 67 paisa worth"). On the other hand, have the interests of Indians been protected, leave aside their playing any constructive role in other countries?

In terms of future goals can we conduct the affairs of Indian settlers in such a way that they complement rather than embarrass our foreign policy? In other words we may re-state the problem in the following manner—"realising that Indians in both Asia and Africa will be treated as immigrant communities by the Governments of these countries, can we regulate our policies so as to help promote our interests as well as protect our *nationals* abroad?

This would involve reshaping a number of concepts regarding Indians, but the excercise may prove useful. Let us consider for a moment the immediate items in our foreign policy. First and foremost we want to boost our export trade, especially in Asia and Africa. Now, whom can we consider our most likely customers in these markets? Experience shows that the Indian businessman can act as our middleman, not because he is patriotic or principled in his dealings (who is?) but because of his ties, involvement and stakes in the country of origin. If therefore we give them some concessions and privileges by way of inducement it is possible that, instead of losing, we may extend our foreign markets. Perhaps a study on some such lines would help us to work out a foreign trade strategy.

Again there are a number of influential Indians in East Africa (as MPs, administrators and experts) whose sentimental attachment to India cannot be doubted. It should be our policy to devise means to come into closer contact with them. (In this connection, I remember what a Kenyan Minister told me: "Your High Commission," he said, "makes it a point to draw a line of distinction between Indian Indians and those who have settled here. It does not matter what distinction you make, for us all of you are the same.")

At the risk of repetition let us say that the question of Indians overseas should be considered within the broad framework of our future role in the Indian Ocean. The large number of Indians in Mauritius and Fiji at the two extreme ends of the ocean should make us more confident about those possibilities.

Summary

Thus, to summarise the above views, the problem of Indians overseas is a legacy of British colonial rule. But it does not mean that we should study the problem in terms of broad generalisations; on the contrary, our effort should be to study and compare the specific problems of Indians in different countries from a historico-sociological angle. Once, during the period of our struggle for independence, we had expressed our solidarity with our countrymen abroad and had asked them, in turn, to help us in our struggle. After independence, the approach was turned upside down; instead of helping them, we asked Indians overseas to integrate themselves with the societies in which they lived. Nehru felt that this approach would promote goodwill for India and boost the image of Afro-Asian solidarity. Instead, multi-nationalisms appeared and Indian settlers found themselves in a hopelessly difficult position. The problem has become more complicated now but, perhaps, there is still time to consider the Indian question as an integral part of our foreign policy. This may help in converting what we considered a liability into an asset.

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Seminar on Indians Abroad—in Asia and Africa

(a) The Seminar will aim at—

- (1) A detailed study of the problems of Indians abroad in different countries with case studies;
- (2) Discussion of the problem within the general framework of India's foreign policy goals and objectives.

(b) A comparative study of the policies of China and Pakistan in regard to their own nationals abroad.

(c) The following case studies are likely to be taken up :
Indians in

- (1) East Africa;
- (2) Mauritiuis;
- (3) Fiji ;
- (4) Ceylon (with special reference to the Indo-Ceylonese Treaty of 1964) ; and
- (5) Singapore and Malaysia.

(d) One full session for

- (1) Studying the problems of Indians abroad from the historical perspective—the origins of Indian migration and the policies adopted by the British Colonial Government in India and by the Governments of the immigrant countries; and
- (2) Studying the problem from the point of view of the goals and policies of the Government of India after independence.

(e) Another session to discuss the policies pursued by Pakistan and China towards their own nationals.

(f) A general discussion to help formulate concrete policies in regard to Indians overseas. The idea is to invite Government officials also and discuss with them the position of Indians abroad.

Africa at the United Nations

R. S. RANA

THE United Nations during the past 22 years has survived many a crisis. Some of them, such as those precipitated by the cold war, were of an external nature; others, like the composition of its main organs, were internal affairs. While muddling through the years of crisis the UN underwent fundamental changes. The first and foremost change that has occurred in the character of the organization is its proximity to universality. In 1945 the organisation was predominantly an European affair—Asia and Africa were represented by only eleven states[1] (South Africa is not included for obvious reasons). It is not difficult to prove that the UN was not intended to be universal. Mr. Oliver Stanley, then British Colonial Secretary, while opposing the 'splinterization' of the British Empire expressed great concern about the effective functioning of the UN in the future. He stated :

> I do not believe that any splinterization of the British Colonial Empire would be in the interest of the world......Would the new machinery for world security, which is to be devised at San Francisco next month, be made any stronger by the substitution of these 40 (new) states for a cohesive Empire able to act as a strategic whole?[2]

With the passage of time however it became clear that the danger to the UN came not from the 'splinterization' of the British Colonial Empire or the colonial empires of other imperial powers, but from non-splinterization of the colonial empires like that of Portugal. The lack of perspective on the part of the framers of the UN Charter, especially representatives of the Great Powers, was shown by the fact that by 1967 the UN had become uinversal in composition, most of its new members coming from the continents of Africa and Asia as a result of decolonization. In this process of decolonization, which appeared like "the scramble for Africa in the reverse", the role of the UN was by no means insignificant. By holding discussions in the General Assembly, instituting inquiries in the Trusteeship Council and appointing and sending commissions to non-self-governing territories, the UN accelerated the process. The new States of Africa acknowledge the work done for them by the UN because most of them consider the world body as their foster mother.

Another equally fundamental change was that the membership of African and Asian states resulted in shifting the focus of attention of the UN from "maintenance of international peace and security" to social welfare programmes, economic development, human rights, education, etc.

At the time of framing the Charter, Africa was represented in the UN by only three States—Egypt (now UAR), Ethiopia and Liberia. After ten years another African state (Libya) joined this small group. After 1956, however, African states began knocking at the door of the UN for membership. Between 1956 and 1964 their number rose from eight to 35 and by 1967 it stood at 39. The table below gives the yearly increase in African membership.

TABLE I

Yearly increase in the number of African states in the United Nations

Year	No. of African states	Total membership of the organization
1946	3	51
1947	3	55
1954	3	60
1955	5	76
1956	9	81
1958	10	83
1960	26	100
1961	29	104
1962	33	110
1963	33	113
1964	35	115
1965	36	117
1966	39	122

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1962-66; United Nations Year Books.

The 'wind of change' that was blowing over Africa stormed the UN and the period 1955-1965 was aptly described as the 'Africa Decade'. This article seeks to show to what extent UN attitudes were influenced by this new development and how far it affected the attitudes of African members themselves.

Membership of the United Nations

"Sovereign statehood" in the African context, according to Prof. A. A. Mazrui, is not "when they (African states) assumed control of their domestic affairs..... and ceased to be colonies. As a matter of experience many of them found that the ultimate expression of sovereignty was not direct rule internally but direct diplomatic relations with other countries abroad."[3] UN membership more than fulfils this purpose. It is a visible manifestation of their independence. Economically impoverished and militarily weak, their desire for identity is greater and UN membership, by according them a status of equality, meets this requirement. The principle of 'one state, one vote' as embodied in the Charter is of great value, politically and psychologically, for African states which hold it, in the words of John Karefa-Smart, in great esteem and see in its provisions the expression of their hopes and aspirations "for a world in which all nations, large and small, rich and poor, powerful and weak, will work together in peace and security and contribute each according to its means, to the development of the whole world's resources and to the economic, social and cultural betterment of all people and the preservation of freedom and human dignity."[4] The UN gives them opportunities to enter the diplomatic circle of the older states and because of its control over a wide range of communication media offers facilities to leaders of these countries to address a larger audience, to express their opinions on important world issues, to influence the decisions of the Great Powers and to seek support from the world on problems of special interest to Africa.

The UN provides a venue where delegations from African states come in contact with delegations from other African countries and from all over the world. They play the dual role of representing their countries at the UN and establishing contacts with countries with which they have no diplomatic relations because of lack of funds. It would be financially suicidal for African countries to maintain diplomatic relations with all other countries or even with all the countries of Africa. Only Ghana tried to establish diplomatic relations with every country in Africa and this has been described by a member of the Ghana mission to the UN as a "policy of financial silliness."[5] It has embassies in 48 countries of the world. The utility of the UN as the centre of diplomatic activities is shown by the fact that the Addis Ababa Unity Conference of May 1963 was the direct result of informal discussions among African representatives at the UN.

African states on entering the UN found it far from "united". The cold war between the Soviet Union and the US had penetrated every organ of the world body. They soon became aware of their importance to the parties involved in the cold war. They found that the Latin American group of countries by playing a mediatory role between the Big Two could exercise more influence than was warranted by its economic and political strength, and that because of its numerical strength[7] it could get its members elected to the various bodies of the UN.

This gave rise to a tendency among most African states to follow a policy of non-alignment. They had also before them the example of India. But non-alignment, as African states understood it, did not mean neutrality. After listening to the points of view of both sides to a dispute they would support one of them. Another reason for following this policy of non-alignment was that they were concerned more with economic development and social welfare than with ideological considerations. Commitment to one ideology would have restricted their freedom to receive urgently needed assistance from wherever it could be had. They also developed a tendency to form groups to promote greater cooperation among themselves and to strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis the Great Powers as also other groups.

The first in a series of inter-African conferences to formulate general policy at home and abroad and chalk out agreed plans of action was held at Accra in April 1958. It was attended by all independent African states.[8] After exchanging pleasantries and affirming their faith in the need for greater cooperation among African states in the educational, economic and cultural fields, the assembled leaders expressed regret at the division of the world into two blocs, condemned racialism in all forms, demanded freedom for Algeria and other dependent territories of Africa and decided to constitute an informal permanent machinery comprising their permanent representatives at the UN for co-ordinating their activities on subjects of common interest.

The Accra conference for the first time elevated the concept of African Personality to the international plane and marked the emergence of an African voice at the UN. Later conferences, even though marred by differences among African states, did not alter the general principles laid down at the Accra conference. The concept of African Personality and the role of Africa at the UN envisaged by the participants in the Accra conference found adherents among the new states of Africa. An informal permanent machinery for consultation and cooperation was organised in May 1958. But the number of African states in the UN was so small that they preferred to work with Asian states which held similar views on world problems, including economic development, human rights, and the struggle against colonialism.

Many events took place between the Accra conference and the second conference of independent states of Africa held at Addis Ababa in 1960 complicating Africa's international relations. African states had joined the UN in strength. France had changed its colonial policy and many more African states were expected to become free in September 1960. The increase in the number of independent states gave rise to factions. Some African states joined the Brazzaville group formed on an *ad hoc* basis in October 1960 and formalized into a regular caucussing group in December 1960[9] and others the Casablanca group[10] formed as a result of meetings held at Monrovia in 1961 and Lagos in 1962. Differences between the two groups were mainly on the questions of the Congo and Algeria. While the Brazzaville group expressed satisfaction at the negotiations going on at Evian between the delegates of FLN and the French Government and voiced its concern over the UN in the Congo helping the cause of the Lumumbist faction too much, the Casablanca group condemned the French Government and extended its full support to FLN in its struggle against France and on the Congo reaffirmed its recognition of "the Government of the Republic of Congo, which came into being on 30 June 1960" (the government headed by Prime Minister Lumumba).

The growing dissensions among the African states were viewed with grave concern by many African statesmen and efforts were made both at the UN and in Africa to restore unity. A Unity Conference was held in May 1963 at Addis Ababa. The resolutions adopted at the conference covered many subjects, including decolonization, apartheid, economic development, disarmament, social welfare, education and culture, health, sanitation and Africa and the UN It reaffirmed the faith of African states in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Brazzaville and Casablanca groups were formally dissolved in the summer of 1968. After the Addis Ababa conference there has been only one caucussing group of African states in the UN

To supplement their general policy of non-alignment and organisation, African states adopted various tactics to deal with issues coming before the General Assembly. They sought to present issues like the apartheid policy of South Africa, decolonization and disarmament as moral questions involving principles of human dignity, rights, freedom, economic development rather than as "threats to international peace and security". The US and the UK found themselves supporting the stand of African states during debates and then searching frantically for technicalities not to vote with them. These African tactics were so successful that the US and the UK were obliged to support a resolution in the Security Council condemning South Africa and asking all governments to end the sale and shipment to that country of equipment and materials that it could use for making arms and ammunition[11].

Again, instead of taking a position of 'no return', specially on matters concerning Africa, they have followed a policy of flexibility. They appear to possess a well conceived list of priorities and are willing to strike compromises. For instance, they attack all colonial powers equally strongly but the question of South-West Africa appears to be at the top of their priority list. They have lost no opportunity to condemn both South Africa and Portugal for their policies, but the latter has been given ample opportunities to gradually modify its colonial policy. While demanding extreme measures of sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, they have not asked for their expulsion from the U N. South Africa and Portugal have been ousted from bodies like the ILO, the UN Conference on Map Problems in Africa, the UNESCO-sponsored 26th International Conference on Education, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the UN Conference on Tourism, and the International Union for Conservation of Natural and General Resources, but not from the UN The policy of African states on this question has been explained thus:

> Their expulsion would serve no useful purpose at all. It would be sheer waste of time. It is better to bring them here and keep on whipping them until they have learned their lesson. To throw them outside and leave them in the cold would just relieve them of this real burden. If members of an organization do not want to observe the rules of the organization, the only way you can teach them a lesson is to bring them up every time and expose them to a certain amount of humiliation and indignity, and one day they will learn sense.[12]

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Another tactical move made by African states is to show greater and the UAR on the Middle East seat in 1946, 1949 and 1961. Even though the provisions of the Charter provided for the possibility of amending it ten years after 1955, and proposals were sponsored to this effect, it was not till 1965 that one was actually carried out. Despite the fact that all the permanent members were convinced about the just demand of African states for adequate representation in the Security Council and the ECOSOC, a resolution incorporating the desired change in the strength of the two bodies was passed only on 17 December 1963 and became operative on 31 August 1965[15] when the US deposited the instrument of ratification.

The performance of the UN in the field of economic development in Africa, however, has been very substantial and significant. As African states were late in coming on the UN scene, aid to Africa was delayed. This was primarily due to the fact that the administering authorities were hesitant to ask for economic aid from other sources. Independence changed this attitude quickly. Assistance from former metropolitan powers was still accepted but the new and more dynamic attitude of the independent administrations toward economic development led to introduction of programmes of technical assistance from many sources. Among them was a UN programme. Once introduced, its progress was fast and wide-ranging.

In monetary terms the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) in Africa grew from an initial $500,000 in 1950-51 to about $17.5 million in 1965; the African share of the global technical assistance expenditures of the UN rose in this period to 35 per cent. In 1955 expert-advisers serving in Africa were fewer than 300 and most of them were concentrated in four countries—Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya and the UAR. By 1965, there were more than 1,000 experts and 40 African countries and territories had UN programmes of technical assistance in which all its specialised agencies participated.

Even though UN aid does not form a very big percentage of the total aid received by the countries of Africa from various other sources—through bilateral agreements with the US and the Soviet Union, etc.—it has proved very useful. It has the advantage of not having any political implications and is offered without any profit motive. African leaders are aware of the significant role played by UN aid in the economic development of their countries. This is evident from the number of African countries—about 40 countries and territories—receiving economic aid through the UN.

The entry of African states into the UN has been viewed with great interest as well as anxiety and various allegations have been made about their behaviour in the world organization. They have been accused of being indifferent towards matters other than those concerning Africa, of not carrying out their responsibilities and of exercising more influence than warranted by their strength—military or economic.

It might be true that before 1960, African states, whose strength in the UN was very small and who were obsessed with their insignificance, were indifferent to issues other than those concerning Africa. But after 1960, when their number increased considerably, they have shown keen interest in and great understanding of almost all important issues. Disarmament may be taken as an example to illustrate the point. The interest of African states in disarmament was aroused for the first time in 1959 with the decision of France to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara. Since then African states have carried on an active campaign for disarmament. Ethiopia, Nigeria and the UAR are taking active interest in the discussions of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Mention is always made of world issues like disarmament at almost all inter-African conferences.[16] African states have shown the same kind of concern over almost every world issue affecting international peace and security or human rights.

There may be differences as to what constitutes responsible behaviour. But in the context of the UN responsible behaviour is understood as behaviour showing an awareness of political realities. The question assumes greater importance in the General Assembly where each state, irrespective of its strength, enjoys one vote. It is quite easy to conceive a situation where the 40 and odd African member states may use their majority in recommending resolutions which do not win the support of the major powers which shall be required to implement them. The Security Council is free from this difficulty because it can take no decision without the concurrence of it's five permanent members.

However, it is encouraging that so far African members have tended to behave in a very responsible manner. For instance, in the "Committee of 24" the African and Asian states have a clear majority of 16. Invariably the African members have introduced proposals for the elimination of colonialism. Even though it is easy for them to get a proposal adopted they have always accepted reasonable modifications with a view to achieving unanimity.

Although aware of their extremely weak position in the Security Council, they have not written it off. Knowing that only the Security Council can take measures which could be effectively enforced, they try, as far as possible, to raise their problems before it. Resort to the General Assembly is had only when they find the Security Council deadlocked by differences among the Big Powers. Again, when the former Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, was under fire from the Soviet Union, the African members came to his defence in spite of their differences with him over the Congo question. Further, despite their disapproval of UN operations in the Congo, the African members have paid their subscriptions regularly. In sum, African states, in spite of their dissatisfaction with the performance of the UN in the last 20 years, regard it as the best machinery under the circumstances for the solution of world problems. Their faith in the principles of the Charter remains unshaken.

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8. The states represented at this conference were Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR.

9. The Brazzaville states were Cameroun, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Central African Republic and Senegal.

10. The Casablanca powers were Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Morocco, the UAR and Ghana.

11. Resolution (S/5471), as proposed by Norway, S/5469, meeting 1078, *Year Book of United Nations,* 1963, p. 22.

12. From the statement of Mr. Wachuku of Nigeria in the UN, UN Doc/A/PV. 1221, 30 September 1963.

13. *Divided:* Some members vote "yes, others "no", and some others abstain. It is immaterial whether the number of members voting "no" is small or big.

    Identical: All members vote the same ; none abstains unless all abstain.

14. *Solidarity:* Some members abstain, while others all vote identically.

    For greater details, see *Africa in the United Nations* by Thomas Hovet Jr, London, 1963, pp. 108-9.

15. *Keesings Contemporary Archives,* 6-13 November 1965, p. 21057.

16. See the resolutions of the Addis Ababa Conference of May 1963. Even a cursory perusal of the proceedings of the Security Council and the General Assembly will show African states' interest in world problems.

Education in Black Africa
(An historical account)

ROBERT CORNEVIN

ON March 7 last, the Republic of Senegal celebrated (through its press and radio) the 105th anniversary of the foundation of its first school which was opened at Saint Louis du Senegal by the teacher Jean Dard.

On March 7, 1817, Jean Dard had seven pupils, whereas now in Senegal 240,000 children are enrolled in the First Degree and more than 3,300,000 in the 15 republics of the former French Tropical Africa (Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal, Tchad, Togo).

We shall try to outline the history of that education.

I. The Era of Experiments

1. *Jean Dard and mutual education at Saint Louis of Senegal:*

Jean Dard endeavoured to put into practice mutual education (Bell's and Lancaster's method, introduced in France by Father Gaultier). After four years of experimentation, he established a spelling system in Ouolof. When he left (by the end of 1820) his successors, Dominique Daspres (1822-1827) Epinat and Ballin, continued this task with difficulty.

Jean Dard (who came back to St. Louis in 1833 and died there after a few months' stay) has written a French-Wolof and Wolof-French dictionary as well as a *memorandum on the role of education in the civilizing task of France.*

2. *Mother Javouhey: girls' education and studies in France:*

Mother Javouhey, founder of the congregation of the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny and the Sister of Claudine Javouhey, who founded the Pondicherry hospital in 1826 from the Bourbon island, stayed for two years in Senegal (1822-1824). She opened classes for the *signares*[1] and also had the idea of educating Africans in France. Between 1825 and 1827, 19 black or half-bred children undertook this journey and were educated at Bailleur sur Therain (Oise), near Paris, then at Limoux (Aude) in the southwest of France. Deaths forced her to give up this project and the survivors were sent back home except for three, Arsene Fridoil, David Boilat and Pierre Mouss, who were admitted in 1838 in the St. Esprit seminary and ordained as priests in 1840.

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[1] Signare is derived from the old Portuguese senhora (lady). This word was then applied to mulottos married to Europeans in the country's tradition.

3. *The "quarrel between the ancients and the moderns"*

In 1841, the Ploermel brothers took charge of education in the schools of St Louis and Goree. They imparted mainly professional training (agricultural and handicrafts).

In 1844, the three Senegalese priests, under the direction of the most brilliant amongst them, David Boilat, *first African Director of Education in Senegal*, opened a secondary school. The struggle between the "classical" and the "technical" continued for five years (1844-1849) and ended with the victory of the Ploermel brothers who in 1848 opened a forge and woodwork workshop at St. Louis[2].

On the other hand, the sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny oriented their teaching for young girls towards home science.

4. Rev. Father Bessieux settled in Libreville in Gabon and opened the first school there on January 1, 1845.

II. Faidherbe's Policy

Having had experience in a Muslim country, Algeria, where he had fought a few years earlier, Faidherbe was disturbed to see that education was monopolised by Christian priests in a Muslim country. He opened an evening school for students from Coranic classes. The French-Muslim school (founded by a decree of March 31, 1857) was officially opened by Faidherbe on the following April 7.

In 1855, Faidherbe received the sons of former enemies in a school which became (decree of March 5, 1861) the *school of hostages* under the control of the Director for Local Affairs. Closed down in 1872, it re-opened in 1893 under the name of *The Chiefs' Sons School.*

In 1860 there were in Senegal 860 students out of which 200 were girls and schools were opened at Podor and Dagana.

III. Education from Faidherbe until 1903

After Faidherbe's departure, education declined and in spite of the opening in St. Louis of a secondary "college" run by the Ploermel brothers in 1884, there were only nine primary schools in 1898, of which only one was directed by the laity.

In the new territories annexed by France, schools opened in step with the military progress; in *Soudan* there were 800 students by the end of the century, in *Guinea* the first school opened in Boffa in 1878, a school for girls opened in Conakry in 1893 while there were 400 students in 1900 in the Ivory Coast.

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[2] Georges Hardy, Report on Overseas Education, International Colonial Institute, Brussels, 1931, p265.

In Dahomey, where, until 1890, the schools of the English methodist mission were teaching in Porto Novo, Goun and English, while the French Catholic fathers of the African missions of Lyon were teaching *Congbe* and Portuguese, the Governor, Victor Ballot, was pushing the teaching of French. Schools were then soon opened in Porto Novo, Cotonou, Ouidah, Grand Topo, Agoue, Abomey Calavi, Ketou, Abomey, Zagnanado, Parakou and Perere-Nikki.

IV. The First Charter of Education in Western French Africa : the decree General Governor Roume of 1903

The decree of November 24, 1903, provided for primary education, village schools, regional schools, urban schools, upper primary schools, upper professional schools and, finally, teachers' training colleges.

This decree, which secularized primary education, was not applied in many places where the necessary taking-over from missionaries was not possible.

A Teachers' Training College opened in St Louis in 1903.

1. *Importance of the year 1913:*

After the failure of recruitment by selection of inspectors (forseen under the general decree of June 6, 1908) the recruitment of inspectors was made by a competitive examination (decree of March 31, 1913).

The Bulletin of Education in Western French Africa, which for 50 years served as a forum for African teachers, was published for the first time in 1913 and in the same year was published the first history book adapted for Africa, Andre Leguillette's *History of Western French Africa.*

In 1913 (speech of the General Governor, William Merlaud Ponty) 60 new teachers (of which 38 were from the metropolis) were employed.

In 1913, the Teachers' Training College was transferred to Goree.

2. *First World War and its consequences:*

In spite of the departure of many teachers, programmes were implemented in 1916 and education reorganised with primary and upper primary education being followed by superior technical education including the William Ponty Teachers' Training College, the Pinet Laprade Upper Primary School, the Faidherbe School of Administration, the Printing School, the School of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine and the Medical School (Dr. Ary le Dantec attached to the native hospital of Dakar).

The *lycee Faidherbe* was opened in Saint Louis du Senegal by the decree of June 20, 1919.

3. *The reform of May 1, 1924, reduces the role of the General Governor under cover of decentralisation:*

The ordinance of February 18, 1927, prescribed the application of the metropolitan curriculum to urban schools in Senegal. An impetus was given to education. Two other teachers' training colleges were opened in Soudan, in 1934 the Frederic Assoption School in Katigougou, in 1938 that of Dabou (Ivory Coast). In 1939 the Women's Teachers Training College.

A general ordinance of January 30, created *a scientific and documentary award* to encourage local research. In 1936 mutual schools were organised.

V. Evolution of Education in French Equatorial Africa until the Second World War

In Gabon, after R. P. Bessieux (1845), the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny opened the first institution in 1863. An ordinance of April 9, 1883, regulated the organisation of primary schools and their commencement was made under the local ordinance of May 28, 1883. However, education did not make any headway except for the opening of a Protestant school on the Ogoue.

From 1901 onwards the emphasis was on agricultural and technical education. The professional school of Libreville was opened on December 26, 1901, agricultural apprentice schools were opened in the experimental garden of Libreville (August 15, 1902) and Brazzaville (November 5, 1902). A professional school was opened in Brazzaville in 1905 while lectures for adults were started in Brazzaville in 1904 and in Bangui in 1907.

On March 6, 1907, the Teachers' Training College of Brazzaville was opened and the ordinance of September 7, 1907, provided for the opening of primary schools, teachers' training colleges, and a council for improvement of schools. A circular of September 15 completed this ordinance and laid emphasis on the training of local teachers attendance in schools.

But it was the ordinance of April 4, 1911, completed by the instructions of November 15 which organised the educational system in French Equatorial Africa into elementary primary schools, superior primary schools and professional schools.

The implementation of these measures was somewhat disturbed during the war, but a circular from the General Governor dated May 8, 1925, reorganised the educational system in French Equatorial Africa.

The principles were :

(1) To impart a knowledge of spoken French, the essential medium of our civilisation, to the greatest possible number of

natives in the shortest possible time, and then to send them back to their environments before they forgot their manual and agricultural occupations.

(2) To educate more completely only the gifted and chosen pupils so that they will be capable of earning their living as they leave school, in administration, commerce or industry.

This new organisation implied the opening of village schools, city and regional schools in important centres and an advanced primary school in Brazzaville and, after that, in each district town of the colony.

Besides, in February 1935 a *Staff School* was opened. This school was meant to train the native civil servants and it was also giving some instruction to those students who wanted to continue their studies beyond the elementary primary level. At the same time, *the Edouard Renard School was opened.* It was an advanced school in the area, preparing students who were already CEPE (i.e. who had finished their elementary primary school) until the level of the 4th form of the secondary school. A decree dated February 20, 1946, changed the Edouard Renard school into a federal school.

VI. Education in Cameroun and Togo between the Two Wars.

In parts of these territories conquered by the allied forces and placed under French mandate, the administration had inherited a well organised system of teaching essentially in the hands of Christian missions and teaching specially in the coastal .areas, economically developed sectors and an important part of the population.

In *Cameroun* in 1913, the four Christian missions were teaching 41,500 pupils distributed into 225 schools. There was one teachers training college, three advanced primary schools, one professional school (these figures include the whole of German Cameroun as well as the very rich British Cameroun).

The educational system was organised in Cameroun by the ordinance of July 25, 1921, which was more or less the same as the Roume ordinance of 1903.

In 1922, there were 35 official schools (58 forms) and 22 private schools (Christian) having respectively 3140 and 4047 students.

In 1945 there were 130 official schools (246 forms) and 1037 missionary schools having respectively 16,741 and 93,000 students.

In *Togo* education was actively promoted during German rule and in 1913 the Schutzgebiet Togo had 347 schools and 13,750 students. Teaching in German was only in 179 out of the 347 schools (three official schools, 106 Catholic schools, 65 students of the Breme Mission and five schools of the Methodist Mission).

After a period of reorganisation necessitated by the switch-over from German to French of the Togolese teaching staff, the organisation and then development of education were pursued according to French students. An ordinance of September 4, 1922, organised public education and set the following curriculum: spoken French, reading, writing, hygiene——

Private education was regulated by the ordinance of September 27, 1922, which subjected the opening of private schools to an authorisation of the Commissaire of the Republic, which was granted after a recommendation from the head of the circonscription. The sebventions granted to missionary schools are at first proportional to the results obtained for the school leaving certificate. Later on, by the ordinances of May 18 and June 17, 1929 (Evangelic and Catholic missions) and of January 14, 1930 (Methodist missions) the Government paid 2/3rds of the teachers' salaries.

The ordinance of October 27, 1933, codified in a single text he arrangements formerly made and the rectification of December 14, 1937, extended the control of the head of education to the catechumenate within the time-limit necessary to teach French.

The ordinance of June 28, 1928, strengthened the organisation of education, whereas the ordinance of January 18 established the overall system of people's rural education for the purpose of spreading French among the masses and helping pupils to become good workers in their own environment.

Between the two World Wars, Togo and Cameroun had caught up with their better endowed neighbours of French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa.

VII. Education during the Post-war Period (1945—1960)

After 1945 a real revolution took place in the field of education. Although the number of African students in France up to that period had risen to some tens (among whom we find Leopold SENGHOR, Dr. ADJAVON, ex-President of the Togo Parliament ; Alioune Diop, the founder and active member of "Presence Africaine", Mr. SANTOS, lawyer at Lome ; Dr. AKAKPO, the Ambassador of Togo to the United States), a large-scale inflow of students into France occurred after the war prompted by the desire of African statesmen to promote a policy of accelerated education.

Teachers' Training Colleges were built in all the territories followed shortly by lycees and secondary schools.

This policy was followed by all, the more so since education was governed by the Territorial Assemblies. Within a period of 15 years a sharp increase was registered in school attendance both at primary and secondary levels, the Dakar University was founded (1850) as well as the Centre for Higher Studies in Abidjan (1958) and the Institute for Higher Studies at Brazzaville.

This policy, assisted financially by FIDERS (the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) by way of school buildings, achieved remarkable results as may be seen from the figures for 1966 which also reflect the concern of African Governments to pursue this endeavour (see Table I.)

A number of comments could be given in connection with the data provided in the table. We have not included any percentage of female school attendance, for example. It should also be pointed out that school attendance varied greatly within a given State according to the geographical situation—the coastal area or the back country. Moreover the school age population was calculated on the basis of 15 per cent of the total population. These assessed figures may, therefore, lead to the conclusion that in spite of an increased number of schools some areas registered a decrease in school attendance.

VIII. Independence, Cooperation and the Problems Encountered

The accession to Independence of former French Africa has revealed the importance of the problems to be solved. 1. *Educational Problems: School curricula* which have to be adapted to African conditions are the concern of the National Commissions for Reform. *Short-term Education* which would cover a greater number of pupils without uprooting them. *Adult Education:* Application of new educational methods. 2. *Staff Shortage* is the more acute since the best of African teachers took up ministerial and diplomatic jobs precisely at the time when the population burst in France, starting in 1946, placed the French educational staff in a crisis. (This crisis has eased since 1966).

Notwithstanding its own difficulties, France was able to cope with the situation as may be seen from the figures pertaining to the assistance provided to Africa in this field[3].

It is, however, obvious that the solution to the problem must be sought in international cooperation, including simultaneously Belgians, Canadians, French-speaking Swiss, Vietnamese and Africans from all countries.

The ease and rapidity of modern transport should ensure a greater exchange of teachers and research workers at all levels within the French-speaking world. At the same time, African Governments are concerned with the preparation of new curricula, better adapted to African needs and with new approaches to education which would provide the youth with jobs well within the framework of development of their country.

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[3] Progress Report (1964-1966), The Board of Cultural and Technical Cooperation, Foreign Affairs Secretariat in charge of Cooperation, January 1967.

TABLE I

Actual School Attendance in Africa and Madagascar

	Primary (thousands)			Secondary			Technical			Rate of school attendance			
										A	B		
	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total	Total	Public	Private	Total
Cameroun	275,7	333,8	609,5	7965	18222	26187	3631	5310	8941	64%	23,8%	36,3%	60,1%
R.C.A	126,7	—	126,7	4005	943	4948	650	169	819	42%	46,5%	—	46,5%
Congo-Brazza	171,6	20,7	192,3	9000	1973	10973	1721	—	1721	85%	45,9%	57,4%	103,3%
Ivory Coast	260,5	99,5	360,0	22730	5436	28166	2400	—	2400	40%	31,6%	12,0%	43,6%
Dahomey	77,8	52,9	130,8	5121	6085	11206	254	200	454	24%	15,3%	11,1%	26,4%
Gabon	37.4	41,7	79,1	2687	2098	4785	1150	350	1500	85%	44,2%	50,7%	94,9%
Upper Volta	77,1	31,7	108.8	4177	2455	6632	402	608	1010	10%	5,6%	3,1%	8,7%
Madagascar	450,0	204,0	654,0	19000	33110	52110	3960	2500	6460	50%	34,6%	15,7%	50,3%
Mali	120,6	10,4	130,9	19241	2033	21274	1419	180	1599	15%	11,2%	1,1%	12,3%
Mauritania	20,0	—	20,0	2000	78	2078	41	—	41	10%	10,4%	—	10,4%
Niger	58,2	3,7	61,9	2955	117	3072	139	—	139	8%	8,0%	0,6%	8,6%
Senegal	190,1	28,7	218,8	20830	4511	25341	3222	1224	4446	30%	27,8%	4,3%	32,1%
Tchad	138,0	21,5	159,5	6300	500	6800	682	—	682	23%	18,3%	2,7%	21,0%
Togo	93,9	64,8	158,7	5200	6170	11370	690	550	1240	40%	22,8%	17,6%	40,4%
Total	2097,7	983,4	3011,0	131211	83631	214942	19561	11891	31452	34%			

Staff under Plan of Cooperation : October 15, 1966.

State	Staff under the Plan of Cooperation	Education
Senegal	1473	1025
Mali	393	288
Mauritania	266	107
Ivory Coast	1715	1160
Upper Volta	484	274
Niger	497	232
Dahomey	249	154
Gabon	497	233
Congo	520	330
R.C.A.	595	277
Tchad	650	293
Madagascar	1172	1125
Togo	141	86
Cameroun	864	491
Organismes Communs	90	
Congo Kinshasa. Ruanda Burundi	61	
Total	10267	6075

Political Role of Islam in West Africa

A. R. I. DOI

ISLAMIC history shows ample evidence of the persistent role of religion in political struggles against the rulers. Some of these struggles, though political in nature, gave rise to various 'revivist' movements. The revivists or the Mujaddidun as they are called in Arabic proved by their multifarious activities that they were really playing 'a revolutionary role of religion which could uphold as well as tear down a political and social structure'[1] of any given society to build an ideal 'Umma' (nation).

The purpose of the present study is to consider the role of religion in political insurgences and some of the ways by which religion contributed to the development of various reformist movements in Islam in West Africa. It has generally been suggested that concern about the political decline of Islam in the Near East following the Russian attacks on the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century motivated some of the attempts at reform and proselytising in various parts of the Islamic world, including Nigeria. The example frequently given in the West African scene is that of Usman Dan Fodio or Uthman bin Fudi (Fudayl) who began his reformist activities in the year 1775 AD[2].

When we cast a glance at the Islamic world of that time, it becomes quite evident that the ancient glory of the Islamic Kingdom, even the Ottoman Empire itself, was diminishing a great deal, and by 1774 AD, the Turks were defeated finally by the Russians. Egypt, the centre of Islamic learning then, was invaded by Napoleon Bona Parte in 1798-9 AD. These events had caused great anxiety among Muslim intellectuals everywhere in the world. The Muslim Moghul Empire of India after ruling that sub-continent for centuries had become a scene of petty rivalries of the native princes and was about to pass in the hands of the British. These major events, all dealing heavy blows to Islamic political strength, made many Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders conscious of the fact that it was their duty to defend the cause of Islam through their voluminous writings and reformist movements.

Whatever the basic cause of the political rebellions like Jihad, the important fact remains that Shehu Uthman had some precedents also in Africa where leading political opposition movements were linked with religious societies. Almost 300 years before the Shehu's Jihad, an Amir of Harar sparked off one of the most decisive military campaigns in North-East African history—the 16th century Jihad in Ethiopia—which was responsible for the greatest cultural transformation in the history of that land.[3] As a result of this Jihad, Imam Ahmad bin Ibrahim al-Ghazi invaded Ethiopia between 1526 and 1543 and was called 'The Conqueror' by the Muslims and 'Gran' by the Europeans and the migratory movements of the Somali tribes which formed the core of his armies and was followed by the Gallas[4] during the last year of the reign of Lobna Dongel. The Portuguese, who were Roman Catholics, allied with the Christian Ethiopians and defeated the Imam Gran and triggered off an Ethiopian nationalist reaction which made them almost anti-Muslim in character.

There were also precedents in West Africa where reformist Jihads were declared in the Gambia-Senegal valley in Futa Jallon in 1725 by Alfa Ba against the heathen practices of Mandingo. Although Alfa Ba made the plans for Jihad, he could not live to see the fighting started. Therefore, his son, Karamoko Ibrahim Alfa, took the field and conquered Mandingo and established the Imamate (kingdom) of Futa Jallon with its capital at Timbo.

Within a few years of this rising, that is in 1775, another Jihad was proclaimed in Futa Toro between the Senegal and Ferlo rivers where the Torobbe Muslim Fulanis rose against the pagan Dayankobe Fulanis. The Torobbe conquered them and established an Islamic state under the leadership of Shaykh Suleman Bal and a line of Torodo Imams followed after the first Imam, Abd al-Qadir bi Hammadi.[5] Although these two earlier Jihads of Alfa Ba and Shaykh Suleman Bal were good precedents for the Mujahids like Shehu Usman Dan Fodio (d. 1817) in the Hausa land and that of Seku (Shaikh) Ahmadu (d. 1843) in Macina and Al-Hajj 'Umar Tell (d. 1864) in Bambara, 'neither of them ever achieved great political power, and their history was one of continual instability until they were finally destroyed by the French at the end of the century.[6] It is difficult to say whether Shehu Uthman, Seku Ahmad and Al-Hajj Umar were influenced by these earlier Jihads or not, but the fact remains that at least the Jihad of Futa Toro was known to leaders of Sokoto.[7]

The political nature of these religious reformist movements, large or small, can hardly be denied. Most religious reformist movements during the period of Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad were more modest in their attempts, but were none the less involved in unmistakable political actions, directly or indirectly. We have an example from the Indian sub-continent. The message of Shah Wali Allah, mainly to do away with very many innovations in the belief and practice of the Muslims, did not give rise to any armed action. But, later on, Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi, popularly known as Sayyid Ahmed Shahid, gave his life in one of the armed conflicts, indicating the persistent association of religious movements with political revolts.

Under the traditional authoritarian control, heterodox religious movements which did not win a legally recognised position were forced to seek cover, and frequently were ready to offer armed resistance to the ever-present threat of suppression in order to develop their own forms of religious life. During the days of Shehu Uthman, Islam in Nigeria had become almost Nigerian Islam with all its local influences of the traditional African belief, what Dan Fodio considered as dangerous and devilic innovations. The opposition between institutional religion and the *locally* practised syncretic rituals gave rise to the inherent conflict between the two forces (parties). The ruling kings or chiefs thought that the established social and political order was threatened by such reformist movements with dissenting social and political orientations. Therefore, those who were potential trouble-makers were asked to quit their lands.[8] In some cases, a public crisis which the ruler had failed to cope with would provide a politically dormant religious organisation with the opportune moment to develop its political ambitions through open rebellion under the leadership of a religious or spiritual leader.

Shehu Usman or Shaikh Uthman (d. 1817) exercised considerable influence as a teacher of royal children appointed by King Nafata of Gobir as a Muslim preacher and spiritual leader. King Nafata held the Shehu in great esteem and showed reverence to him as a man of learning. But, as time went on, the King realized that the Shehu's activities and his popularity among the people of Gobir constituted a threat to his authority. He therefore put some restrictions, to begin with, on some of the Shehu's followers who engaged in preaching Islam. The King decreed that except the Shehu none should be allowed to preach in public. Secondly, the organisation of Shehu's followers, called the Jamaah (literally meaning *a group*), should not be allowed to put on the turban (for men) and veil (for women). Thirdly, only those Muslims who were Muslims by descent should be recognised as members of the Jamaah, and the new members of the faith were asked to revert to their pagan faith.[9]

This account is given by Muhammad Bello and puts forward the Shehu's case. There is a great deal of literary material available on the Shehu's Jihad proclaimed against Nafata's son Yunfa around 1804 AD. I need not go into details about the Jihad itself as we all know that enough has been written on this most popular West African topic in recent times. The great literary output of the period of Jihad primarily concerns itself with justifying the Jihad. But there is the other side of the picture painted by one who opposed the Shehu's Jihad and the very principles guiding it. Shaikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi saw in the Jihad an urge to satisfy one's political ambitions. Shaykh al-Kanemi's letters have been produced in Sultan Muhammad Bello's illustrious work, *Infaq*.[10] Al-Kanemi says:

> "Tell us, therefore, why you are fighting us and enslaving our free men? If you say: We have done that to you because of your heathenism, then I say: We are innocent of heathenism and it is far from our courtier. If the performance of prayer, the giving of alms, knowledge of the unity of God, fasting in the month of Ramadan and the building of mosques is heathenism, what is Islam then? These buildings in which you have said Friday prayers are they churches, or synagogues or fine temples? If they were not for Muslim rites, then why did you perform prayer in them when you conquered the capital? This is nothing but sheer contradiction."

Much has been said by modern writers about the politically ambitious character of the Shehu's Jihad. But the Shehu gave an explanation on the authority of an eminent Muslim scholar-jurist of Timbuctoo, Abu'l Abbas Ahmad Baba bin Ahmad bin Ahmad bin Umar bin Muhammad Aqit, popularly known as Ahmad Baba of Timbuctoo[11].

> "Ahmad Baba bin Ahmad bin Al-Hajj has ruled in his book, *al-Kashf wa Bayan li-Asnaf Majlub al-Sudan*,[12] that the lands of Bornu, Kano, Katsina, Songhai, Mali and parts of Zakzak are Bilad al-Islam (Islamic countries) ; but that near each one of these are situated the territories containing '*infidelity*'.

Ahmad Baba replied when he was asked about the legal decision concerning the inhabitants of these above mentioned lands:

> "Know, may God grant us born success, that the inhabitants of these lands are Muslims except for Afnu which I do not know where it is nor have I heard of it. Near each however is a land in which dwell the infidels."

Shehu Uthman has vividly described the people, "a section of whom have never smelt the scent of Islam and who make no pretence of it. These are undoubtedly 'infidels' and the judgement concerning them cannot, again, be ambiguous for any one. A section of them are syncretic people who perform the obligations of Islam while displaying at the same time the practices of infidelity and uttering words that contradict Islam. These are undoubtedly 'infidels', apostates to whom the rules of Islam are not applicable."[13]

In such a society as mentioned by the Shehu, the essential function of religion was to provide a collective symbol that would transcend the divergence of social background so as to make it possible to coalesce a large multitude into a community. People from all walks of life thus could tread the common ground of a popularly accepted religion. Whatever the occasion of the public religious observance, whether it was the 'Id festival, Friday prayers or the month of fasting (Ramadan), religion came to serve as a symbol of common devotion in bringing people out of their divergent routines and orienting them toward community activities. But, the Habe kings of Hausaland against whom the Fulani leaders revolted had mixed up Islam with paganism. Even al-Kanemi, who was opposed to the Shehu's Jihad, agreed that the ruling princes were involved in irreligious practices. In his letter to the Fulani Ulema and their chiefs, al-Kanemi says:

> "Among your greatest arguments for associating believers in general with heathenism is the practice of the Emirs of riding to some places for the purpose of offering sacrifices . etc. As for this practice of the Emirs, it is certainly a disgraceful and blameworthy innovation which should be forbidden and its doer chided."[14]

Shaikh Uthman has emphasised the pagan practices of the kings in his *Tanbih al-Ikhwan* or *the Warning to The Brethren*:

> "As for the kings, they are no doubt heathen, though they

> profess the religion of Islam, since they practise polytheism."[15]

The Shehu's Hijra or Migration as a factor in the rise of the Jihad was enhanced by the request of the Yunfa, the king of Gobir, to the Shehu asking him to take his family and leave Degel as he wanted to send troops against its rebellious inhabitants. The Shehu flatly refused to leave alone and asked his followers to leave with him, if they could, and they all left Degel for Gudu on the frontier of Zamfara in February 1804.

The Shehu has discussed further the theological issue concerning 'the land of the Believers' and 'the land of the infidels' to justify his migration and finally the Jihad. He says in his *Tanbih :*

> "The case of any territory is judged according to the state of its king : if he is Muslim, the land is 'the land of believers (Bitad al-Islam)' ; if he is heathen, the land is 'the land of the infidels' and migration from it to another country is obligatory... The kings of these places (i.e. Bornu, Kano, Katsina, Songhai, Mali and parts of Lakzak) show reverence for certain places, trees and stones, by offering sacrifices and alms, and this is no doubt heathenism, by the consensus of opinion of the Ulema (lit. Ijma')".[16]

The basic notion of Jihad as a divine commission from God and similar pronouncements by the Shehu, his brother Abdullah and his son Sultan Muhammad Bello abounded in various literary works defending the Shehu's actions in regard to both the migration from Degel to Gudu and the proclamation for Jihad. The search for identity of the Shehu's action led them to the example of the Hijra of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina after being persecuted at the hands of the Quraish. Prophet Muhammad also shattered the authoritativeness of the Bedonin outlook by rejecting it as pagan—which meant that it was hostile to the law of the one and only God and antiquated by the coming of Islam. The reality of the religious relationship became the basis of the new community whose members were kin by faith rather then by blood as was also the case with the members of the *Jama'a* of the Shehu. The fragmentation of the past was to be overcome by integration with the Prophet as the visible centre of a social grouping. This was done in the case of the Jama'a, by the Shehu as a centre of the Islamic community made up of his followers that was soon to constitute itself as a body politic with strength to compete with and in a sense absorb the tribal units from which it recruited its members. The Shehu was later designated as Amir al-Muminin or the leader of the faithful to command the forces of the Jihad.[17]

Now let us see the Jihad of Dan-Fodio in the light of the established principles of Islam.

Examining the religious characteristics of the traditional Islamic society and the essential structure of Muslim government, we shall see that diffused religion was a pervasive factor in all major aspects of social life, contributing to the stability of social institutions. If one studies the classical period of Islamic political science from al-Mawardi (d. 1058) to the time of that acute Ibu Taimiyya (d. 1328), one comes across the following established principles.

The purpose of man is the service of God (Ibada) and complete Ibada requires the existence of an organised community of believers which requires government. The primary purpose of government is the rendering possible of 'Ibada'[18]. The moral purpose of the state becomes manifest in the obligation to command the good and prohibit the bad[19] as the foremost civic religious duty. Al-Ghazali (d.1111) calls this duty as 'the greatest pole in religion (al-Qutb al a'zam fil Din)"[20], and al-Mawardi considers it as a 'specific duty (Fard 'Ain)[21]. The purpose of Muslim government is derived from the above political theory and, according to Al-Ashari (d. 935), its execution may be done by tongue, hand or sword—whichever way one is able.[22] It is the duty of the government to guarantee 'Ibada' by safeguarding the Muslim community vis-a-vis the non-Muslim world. The Muslim community is to be safeguarded against schism and heresy. In case of any breach, Jihad is to be proclaimed since such country will be deemed as the Dar-al-Kufr, the place of infidelity, rather than the Dar al-Islam, the country of Islam.

From this point of view, if the conditions prevailing in the Hausaland were as they are described by a Fulani writer, Dan Fodio's Jihad was to safeguard his followers from heresy and schism. Jihad in these circumstances becomes a citizen's obligation to render military service in special circumstances.

One factor we should not ignore in such circumstances. It was a psychological weapon to stimulate hope at a time when old ways no longer worked. This becomes clear when we discuss the mission of Shehu Uthman. He was a man with a strong inner conviction that he had been instructed 'from above in his mystic vision to unsheath the sword of Truth and reform Islam in Hausaland'. He was considered a *revivist* (Mujaddid) by his followers on the basis of the Prophetic Tradition that there will appear a Majaddid at the turn of every century, and he belonged to the 13th century of Islam. In fact, he has alluded to the fact that he was a reformer of the 13th century in his *Wird.*[22]

In short, the Jihad of Shehu was another way in which religion contributed strength to popular movements engaged in political struggle against the ruling power. It did so by creating faith, confidence, and cohesion for the movement. It was simply a political struggle in the name of God.

To launch a struggle against an established authoritarian government was a risky and extremely difficult undertaking, The traditional monarchical Hausa Kingdom of Hebe had absolute power that tolerated no opposition and the ruler governed not merely by his absolute power to condemn or kill but also by the people's traditional submission to authority. This is the reason why he could ask people who were not Muslims by descent to revert back to paganism. Under the threat of torture or death, conditioned by traditional values and awed by supernatural forces, the common people would not lightly take the road of rebellion to redress injustice and seek relief from suffering.

It was here that religion performed a critical function, for it gave the cause of political opposition the sanction and encouragement of the Sharia and the pleasure of God. It was in the name of God that a struggle was launched against a ruling power which by abusing its office and neglecting the principle of 'commanding the good and prohibiting the bad'[23] had forfeited its divine commission and the people were free to disobey such rulers as the place was no longer 'Dar al-Islam' (the abode of Islam).

The political role of Islam in West Africa shows the nature and growth of a politico-cultural tradition of Islam and explains the cultural consciousness of the early Muslims from a narrowly defined kin, racial, and territorial basis to a universal religious and cultural basis and this kind of growth can be best understood as a response to the 'formative problems' the early Muslims in West Africa encountered in building a politico-religious empire. The need to stamp out dissent and schism—what the Shehu Uthman repeatedly termed as removal of the Bidat or innovations in the belief and practice of Muslims in the Hausaland—contributed to the building up of a sense of belonging to a religious community and its culture, and to the elimination of all but religious criteria for membership at least during the 19th century. The Jihads or the reformist movements, whatever course they took, resulted in the formation of Islamic states, the emergence of a new West African Muslim aristocracy, and widespread conversion to Islam.[24]

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Breath of Change in Spanish Africa

RANDALL BAKER*

NOW that Africa is past the greatest period of decolonization, the attention of the anti-colonial movements is narrowed to the few territories remaining under alien domination both on the continent of Africa and in the seas around it. It seems that only by a process of elimination is publicity ever likely to focus on the most anomalous areas—those under the Spanish aegis.

A well-established enigma surrounds these scattered and often desolate areas and where information is available other than in scant statistical form, it appears often dated and contradictory. This is unfortunate for these Lilliputian lands are remarkable and atypical in so many ways from the more normal colonial situation. They are lands where fascism has been reconciled with native advancement in the 1960's, where, in some instances, the colonialists outnumber the *indigenas*, where independence was politely refused because "we are not ready" and where *noblesse oblige* has been propounded as a political credo by an African nationalist leader.

Nevertheless, behind the mystique of diplomacy, all these territories have received at least a breath of the "wind of change"—and in most it has found manifestations in a series of administrative and constitutional changes. These have been unprecedented and are of considerable interest not only to the local populace, but also to the leaders of neighbouring African states. It is hoped to develop in this paper a threefold approach to these changes:

> to examine the meaning of these changes in reality and in theory to all factions;
>
> to examine the origins of these rapid changes after a long period of constitutional dormancy; and
>
> to examine how far these moves have been, or can be, steps towards full self-determination.
>
> prospects the future holds for these fragmented remnants in Africa's already balkanised political landscape.

For the purpose of convenience the territories will be examined in terms of the threefold physical, political and economic division into which they naturally fall.

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A. The Moroccan Presidios

The Spanish Moroccan *presidios* or *plazas* are in reality nothing more than towns which remain completely Spanish in political, cultural and ethnic structure, intruded into the Moroccan coast of the Mediterranean. They represent all that remains of the former *Marruecos : Protectorado Espanol* which, with French Morocco, became the Kingdom of Morocco in 1956. Only Ceuta (73,000) and Melilla (79,000) actually intrude into the Moroccan boundary being urban enclaves—though to these are usually added the offshore territories of Chafarinas and Penon de Alhucemas numbering their population in hundreds. All these fragments are integral parts of either Malaga or Cadiz provinces in Metropolitan Spain. There is no differentiation in the Spanish mind between the Metropolitan motherland and these isolated areas on or near Africa's shore, and Spain's claim to these areas is old and sentimental, dating back to the acquisition of Ceuta from Portugal in 1580.

For reasons of political strategy and nationalist sentiment, these few square miles are a potential cause of friction between Spain and Morocco—though it is indisputable that in cultural outlook the presidios are orientated more towards Europe than the Maghreb. The population composition does little to suggest that they lie in Africa as Melilla demonstrates:

	Total Population	*Spaniards*	*Africans*	*Jews*
Melilla	79,000	70,000	7,000	2,000

Source : Europa Year Book

Representation is afforded by the seating of the mayor of each town in the *Cortes* in Madrid as part of the provincial representation, whilst a constant link with the homeland is provided by regular cheap transportation between Ceuta and Algeciras by "*Trans-Mediterranea*" sealines.

Morocco's understandable resentment is further heightened by the heavily fortified nature of Ceuta which houses a unit of the Spanish Army on its rocky area. So far, surprisingly little has been stated by Morocco with regard to the *presidios* when compared to the conflict arising out of Spanish West Africa.

In terms of economic reality the *presidios* mean little to Spain though Melilla port benefits by dues on the export of ore from Kelata, Morocco, which totalled 1,000,000 tons in 1963. Ceuta is developing a fishing industry which returned 36.8 million pesetas* in 1962[1]. Despite the minor economic value which these territories represent the sentimental attachment heavily outweighs this, though the report[2] in Khartoum in 1962 that Spain intended to establish a North African state with its capital at Ceuta was dismissed by the Spanish authorities as grotesque. The report must be considered unlikely since Spain relinquished its hold over Morocco fairly readily in 1956, but the sentimental attachment to the area is undoubtedly heightened by the close personal contact General Franco had with this northern part of Morocco both during the Abd el-Krim campaign and the early years of the Civil War. For these reasons the smallest part of Spain's domain in Africa is likely to present the most difficulty in finding an acceptable solution for both Spain and Morocco—both of whom consider these urban areas integral parts of the respective "motherlands". Only the basis of the feeling varies: in the former it arises from 400 years of unbroken contact, and in the latter from the harsh realities of 20th century political geography. An ironical parallel may emerge to the Gibraltar situation a few miles across the straits where a similarly alienated population exists in a precarious position. However, the present situation seems to be its own *raison d'etre* and there are none of the complex frontier formalities which peculiarise Gibraltar and Spain. It seems difficult for either Moroccans or Spaniards to envisage the situation in any other but its present form.

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*167 Spanish pesetas = £1 sterling.

The Provincias

Two political developments emerge as significant in Spanish West Africa (Ifni and Sahara) and are chronologically:

(a) the rapid establishment of Prinvincial status in 1959 ; and

(b) the Draft Resolution of the United Nations Decolonisation Committee[3] in December 1965 which "......urgently requests the Government of Spain, as the administering power, to take immediately all necessary steps for the liberation of the territories of Spanish Sahara and Ifni from colonial domination .."

The former piece of legislation works towards binding the two Atlantic areas of the Sahara closer towards metropolitan Spain, whilst the latter is designed to relieve Spain of its dominant executive role over the areas and their populations. Both, their propagators claim, are designed to "advance the native"[4] to his desired goal politically, socially and culturally. Both developments need to be viewed in the circumstances peculiar to these two "Provincias", before any generalisation is propounded regarding what is "wanted or needed".

Ifni Province

Since 1959 the arid enclave of Ifni has been juridically considered an integral part of the motherland by the hurried superimposition of Provincial status. Before examining the motives for this, something of the nature of this status needs explanation and this will apply in the structural framework to the Sahara also which received similar treatment at the same time. As an adopted member of the Spanish homeland unit, Ifni citizens are citizens of the state of Spain with rights to elect representatives to the *Cortes* in Madrid[5], though in fact since 1959 elections have not been held. The provincialisation removed the system whereby those citizens who qualified "culturally and educationally" before a board were made *emancipados* subject to Spanish law, though not necessarily having the right to vote. Now all citizens are nominal subjects of Spain but differentiation still exists in law between native and European courts. Underneath the all-embracing act of provincialisation there are several factors which serve to divide these African provinces from those in peninsular Spain. These have been described as:

> "Legislative Recognition of Local Custom and the Peculiarities of the Indigenous People."

The civil and military governors in each of the homeland provinces of Spain are combined in the appointed office of the Governor-General at Ifni (and also in Sahara Province). The office of Governor-General —who is invariably drawn from the military—must be viewed in the light of peculiarities existing in metropolitan politics where related posts exist at the provincial level under the present government system. Nevertheless, the African provinces are further differentiated by the fact that the Governor-General is responsible to the *Direction Generale de Provincias y Plazas Africananas*,[6] in Madrid which deals with the African territories separately from domestic provincial affairs. As a "part of Spain", the population must "accept the responsibilities and duties of Spanish citizens" which would involve acceptance of the stringent labour ordinances forbidding unions (though this is of little practical consequence in Spanish West Africa where there is no indigenous proletariat), the ban on political parties outside the *Falange* and the strict censorship laws pertaining to public mass media.

The reasons behind the sudden provincialisation in 1959 after 106 years of colonial quietude[7] are bound up with Hispano-Moroccan relations. During the first flush of independence after 1956 Moroccan claims to the Sahara territory were voiced particularly outside the government and these nationalist aspirations culminated in the attack of several bands of Moroccan irregulars against Ifni in 1158. Spanish retaliation was swift and the garrisons at Ifni and the Sahara were raised to 12,000 men[8]. By binding the territory closer (Ifni), Spain hoped to counter Moroccan claims.

Though there is no definite precedent for Morocco's political claim the composition of the population of Ifni is overwhelmingly related to that of Morocco:

Total population : 52,995
Europeans : 8,500
(from African Affairs Handbook quoting Spanish census)

Nearly all the Europeans are connected with the administration and military. Spanish troops in Ifni now number 700[9] and require many services which the other Europeans help provide. However, outside Sidi Ifni where over 80 per cent of the Europeans reside there has been little advancement of Hispanisation and the Nomadic Berbers retain their traditional way of life and Moslem religion, and would find more affinity with Morocco than Spain—though politics play little to no part in the lives of these wandering people who recognise no frontiers.

Morocco's claim must be viewed as a political gesture when placed against the reality of Ifni, for the area has nothing to offer independent Morocco beyond the satisfaction of removing the renowned Spanish Legion and gaining a paper victory. In economic terms the considerable heat and severe aridity will support but a few wandering pastoralists—whilst mineral and other wealth is completely absent. Against the claims of Morocco some assessment has to be made why Spain is prepared to retain this enclave wilderness at the expense of a large military occupation and with swift retaliation in the face of a threat of arms.

To the Spanish economy Ifni will never be other than a burden, for in 1962 the total domestic revenue of Ifni was 11,000,000 p. or 66,700£ sterling, which Spain had to subsidise to the extent of 37,000,000 peseta[10] and whilst importing a small quantity of goods from Spain Ifni contributes nothing. Economic colonial exploitation is completely out of the question. But, to an authoritarian Government such as that of Spain there are obvious attractions in retaining a closed and isolated place in which select military units may be trained and political undesirables lodged. This latter case was particularly true after the Civil War though how true this is today is purely speculative. Attempts have been made by Spain to help reduce the costs of maintaining the 75 square kilometers varying from the creation of a free port at Sidi Ifni, and financial encouragement to the 500 craft fishing fleet which netted some £30,000 in 1962[11] to the proliferation of postage stamps designated *IFNI* for world consumption.

Surrounding the UN special committee resolution requesting self-determination for Ifni, the facts are such that annexation by Morocco is the only alternative to occupation by Spain. At present Ifni is its own *raison d' etre*, though any state acquiring the territory would have to reconcile the ephemeral benefits of prestige with the realities of economics. However, if Morocco were to succeed to Ifni, the burden would be light because the military would have withdrawn along with their service staff and the reason for expenditure would be removed. Sidi Ifni's population would decrease in European content to about 15 per cent of its present total, and Morocco would have gained just 75 square kilometers of arid ground and some 45,000 Berber nomads. Sidi Ifni's trade would decline to almost nothing since the main recipients of the imports would have gone, and of exports there are none. Perhaps in view of this, since 1963, the political climate has improved and after an erroneous report in the *Maghreb Arab Press*[12] that Ifni had fallen to Morocco General Franco and King Hassan IV met at Baranas (Spain) and stated publically that the Ifni-Morocoo dispute would be "settled peacefully". To date nothing more has emerged regarding the enclave's future. Self-determination may be safely ruled out as having any connection with indepenence in this completely inviable unit.

Sahara Province

Following provincialisation simultaneous with that in Ifni, the Act of April 21, 1961, "laid the basis of the legal system in the Sahara Province"[13] again allowing for special local circumstances. As Table 2 indicates there is a strong predominance of persons of non-European origin, most of whom profess the Moslem religion; Spanish Catholic proselytising not having proceeded far beyond the two towns of El Aiun and Villa Cisneros. Rocognition of these often nomadic people was embodied in the statement presented to the United Nations enquiry on Non-Self-Governing Territories[14] in 1963 :

> "The system of public and private law is to be based (in Sahara) on the fundamental laws of the Spanish nation, due regard being paid to the peculiarities and special features of the region".

TABLE II

Province	31,746
Europeans	7,953[16]
"Others"	24,306
Alien nomads (seasonal)	50,000 (circa)

This has found its manifestation in the acceptance of Islamic Law: "Organisation and ownership of property take into account the traditional communal land rights of the Moslem inhabitants"[15]. Unlike Ifni, in the Sahara elections have been held to choose members for the Cortes (1963) and also for the municipal and provincial councils. In drawing up the administrative system and the electoral roll prior to these first provincial elections in Africa the difficulties of administering a nomadic people were recognised and manifested in the creation of *Yemaas* or nomadic councils which would prevail outside the domain of the provincial and municipal control. The authority of the Yemaa is recognised by the Spaniards in all local matters, though it must be remembered that the nomads themselves have little to no direct interest in the central administration at El Aiun, and may not remain in Spanish territory throughout the year being at the mercy of the rare and ephemeral pastureland upon which their animals depend for survival.

For the more settled people of the Province, the electoral roll is composed of the *vecinos*[17] ; the heads of families or households depending on the circumstances. This allocates one vote to each family or household. Those entitled to vote do so for both municipal and provincial councils, and later for members in the *Cortes.* The representation therefore is of those Provincial citizens who are resident throughout—not for the nomads who at any one time might form the majority of the population but interest themselves little in administration above the family or group level. Qualifications or eligibility to either Municipal or Provincial councils is again based on the vecinos system, though anyone over 23 with business or commercial interests locally may also stand. Elected representatives at all three levels had been voted into office by 1964.

When reporting on administrative changes at the U. N. regarding the Spanish Sahara, Snr. de Lequeria, Spain's permanent representative stated[18]:

> "From the economic point of view Spain has no interest in these territories...But there is something stronger than material interests: conscientiousness in the fulfilment of a duty."

It is certainly true that Spain's economic interests in terms of trading activity are very small and it gains little to nothing in goods to repay the large subsidy which is required every year. The action of Spain in binding 119,000 square miles of desert closer to the peninsula homeland needs to be viewed, apart from the "conscientiousness in the fulfilment of a duty", in the light of political expediency, economic speculation, threats from Morocco and, perhaps, the dim shadow of a former imperial brilliance.

As in Ifni, the Spanish authorities in the Sahara responded rapidly to an armed attack from Moroccan irregulars in 1958 by increasing the local force to 10,000 troops of whom 6,000 remain today.[19] Within one year the colonial status of 74 years was rapidly removed and matters became "internal problems" of Spain. Despite the attack, perhaps because it was by an irregular force, Spain was willing in 1958 to make concessions and a strip of territory between 27°40 N. and Wad Dra was conceded to Morocco.

After a period of relative political quietude in Hispano-Morcocan relations hostility arose once more, related to one of the periods of "wild economic speculation" which has characterised Sahara Province in the 1960's. When the Algerian oil discovery in the first years of this decade offered prospects of wealth and progress to that state, Spain followed suit by inviting seventeen oil companies to drill in the sands of the Sahara and overall some 200,000,000 U. S. dollars were fruitlessly expended on exploratory work.[20]

During the course of drilling, the engineers were kidnapped[21] and driven off to Morocco. This drew a sharp exchange of notes and in one King Hassan IV stated:

> "I am desolated by the incident", but added, "the whole affair should be viewed in the light of the legitimate impatience of those of our loyal subjects who are still under foreign domination."

Spain hurriedly replied with a note to the Moroccan Foreign Office which asserted: "Spain's rights to Rio de Oro[22] were recognised by Morocco in the Declaration of Independence (April 1956). And, moreover, Morocco has never exercised any sovereignty over these areas—not even in Tarfaya"[23] The question of the integrity of the Moroccan state arose again as it has done with different degrees of militancy over the other enclaves. However, at the same Baranas meeting where Ifni was discussed, an agreement was verbally stated that all future action regarding Morocco and Spanish Africa should be peaceful. The situation has since been complicated by Mauritania's rival claim.

The claim of Mauritania again related to Spanish hopes of exploiting developments elsewhere—this time the rich deposits of iron at Fort Gouraud in Mauritania. The natural outlet for this ore would be by rail to the port at Villa Cisneros because the Sahara Province runs several hundred miles between Mauritania and the sea. Spain's hopes of raising revenue by charging heavy freight rates were dashed by the announcement that Mauritania would build an alternative line around the Sahara Province boundary: a task involving very heavy capital expenditure especially the excavation of a tunnel at Choun. Mauritania, since its independence, has pressed several claims to the Sahara Province.[24]

Despite the talk of self-determination at the UN[25] and the words of Snr. Lequeria replying at the UN[26] when he said:..."If because of the remoteness of the area in which the inhabitants live, they might one day wish to change their status—and the majority decided in favour of such a course—Spain would place no obstacle in the way ...", there are but two courses open to Sahara Province in any future political change: annexation by Morocco or Mauritania. Such is the poverty of this region economically that any thought of self-government in terms of independence is impossible. There is no national loyalty to this area on the part of the majority and the division of the country into arid granite plateau, sandy coastal desert and the northern stone plain (*Hammada*) militate against any indigenous form of agricultural development. Despite the Report in the Madrid newspaper "Ya" of one billion tons of phosphate south of El Aiun—the low quality and severe inaccessibility militated against its exploitation. The area forms an inviable independent unit similar to Ifni—a whim of politics. Should a referendum be held, the natural response of accession to Morocco might be nullified hy the fact that the nomads are not politically articulate, and the *vecinos* of the municipalities would in all probability swing the vote in favour of retention by Spain[27]. Some effect has been made by Spain to bring the nomads closer to the political life of the settled community by two "sedentarization" programmes centred around well construction in the north, but the numbers involved are comparatively small. The gulf between the Europeans and the local people does not narrow since the absence of secondary schools in the area does not allow one of the few opportunities for cultural exchanges. Europeans depend heavily on the Canary Islands for their cultural activities and regular flights connect Villa Cisneros and El Aiun with Teneriffe. The prospect of a nascent nationalism among the 23,000 *indigenas* is very slight as those in towns depend on Spain's presence for trade and the future of the Province will most certainly be settled from without—not within.

Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea[28] forms Spain's solitary foothold in "Black Africa", and falls into two main regions: the insular and the continental. Comprising the former are the islands of Fernando Poo (776 sq. mls.), Corisco (6 sq. mls.) Elobey Grande (1.5 sq. mls.) and Elobey Chico (0.5 sq. mls.) and some 300 miles distant from Fernando Poo, the island of Annobon (6.56. sq. mls.). On the mainland of Africa between the Republic of the Cameroons and the Republic of Gabon lies Rio

Muni (10,040 sq. mls.). These component parts of the Spanish Equatorial Territories lie some 2,500 miles directly from peninsular Spain and 3,750 miles by sea.

Constitutional Background to Autonomy

Spain regained its tenure, dating back to the Treaties of San Idelfonso (1777) after a brief British occupation dating from 1827 to 1844, but considered the territory unworthy of any form of organised government until 1858, when the presence of the Jesuit missions necessitated the appointment of a Governor-General. For 101 years following this appointment the territory saw no change in the undisputed colonial status in which Spain held it as "an appanage". During this time the torporial atmosphere was only rarely broken by accusations of organised slavery such as that during the 1930 period which implicated the Government of Liberia and involved Britain through its concern over the traffic in Kroo Africans into the island for work on the European plantations. Further conflict during the civil war when Fernando Poo and Rio Muni divided between the Franco and Republic governments respectively brought forth no change in the administrative structure.

TABLE 3
Population Structure[29]

Equatorial Guinea	:	245,898
Fernando Poo	:	62,612
(White population)	:	8,602(3.5%)
Nigerians (alien migrant labour)	:	22,500 app.
Rio Muni	:	183,377
White population	:	2,700 app. (1.5%)
Nigerian migrants	:	6,800

Since 1959, however, the area has undergone a series of rapid and fundamental changes which have transformed the African from a person without any civic rights to a position of equality with citizens in metropolitan Spain. Previously the African could only hope to better himself by becoming an *emancipado* or assimilated citizen, for which status he had to present himself before a board of 12 nominated by the Governor-General. The *emancipado*, however, of whom there were an estimated 15,000 out of a total population of 195,000 (1950)[30] had no rights of suffrage. The division was principally a legal issue, for the *emancipado* was subject to the Spanish Court of Law and was not tried under Native Law in a Native Court. The great majority of the Africans domiciled in Equatorial Guinea came under the aegis of the Office of the "Indigenas".

On 30 July 1959, the Law of Organisation and Juridical Structure was promulgated and by this reform, the *provincias* of Fernando Poo and Rio Muni were created on an equal footing with their counterparts on the Peninsula. Under this Act, the provinces were represented in the Madrid *Cortes*, whilst the local administration was overhauled to resemble that in Spain, Nevertheless, the Act in Article 2—detailing the legislation applicable—"gave explicit recognition to prevailing customs and habits"[31]. At the head of the provincial structure was the Governor-General—again following the Spanish pattern—who was inevitably a retired member of the Spanish military hierarchy.

In August 1963, at a cabinet meeting in San Sebastian, it was decided, after deliberations with some of the nationalist representatives of the more conservative movements, to offer autonomy to the two provinces. During the discussions two important issues were debated and it was concluded that

> ".. we felt it necessary and advisable for our people to pass through a period of preparation prior to absolute independence"
>
> and...
>
> "on this solemn occasion emphasis was placed ... on the fact that the island and continental territories ... could have joint or separate self-government ...... We unanimously opted for a united Equatorial Guinea."[32]

Thus in December 1963, the provinces were put to the vote at a referendum conducted, in a most atypical Spanish manner, on the basis of universal suffrage. Most of the European population boycotted the poll and the result was an expected overwhelming "si". Nevertheless, a surprising number (1/3) registered a negative vote in view of the abstention of so many Europeans. This could be construed as a reflection of the thorough process of Hispanization which has been conducted in the schools and in public information media over the years—preaching a sense of deep-rooted loyalty to the motherland. There followed rapidly on the heels of these results, the polls to elect the system of administration for the local level, the General Assembly and the Governing Council.

TABLE 4

December Referendum Returns

Total = 94,655
percentage of total = 74.66%
For = 62,603
Against = 29,986
Blank = 1,167
Void = 899

Autonomy in Practice

The regime which commenced on 1 January 1964 has the following structure. At the local level the two provinces of the autonomous area are divided into Provincial Councils (2), Municipal Councils or *Ayuntamiento* and, Village Councils (sometimes called Committees of Neighbours) or *Juntas Vecinales*. The members of the three bodies are voted into office by the customary Spanish system of Heads-of-Families or bachelors over twenty-one. The candidates for office must similarly comply with these requirements. The *Ayuntamiento* is interested in matters relating to street lighting, traffic control, road repairs etc., whilst the Provincial Council is concerned with broader issues such as farm cooperatives, communications, etc. The mayors of the *Ayuntamientos* and the chairmen of the *Juntas Vecinales* are chosen from three candidates put forward by the Civil Governor. The latter post is appointed by the Governing Council—the highest collegiate body, and is given only to native born citizens. Both these posts are occupied by Africans at the moment. Each *Ayuntamiento* mayor automatically becomes a member of the Spanish *Cortes* (*diputado*). The chairmen of the Provincial Councils (Diputaciones) are elected by a 2/3rds majority by members of the Council. The mayors of the two provincial capitals, Santa Isabel and Bata, are appointed by the Presidency upon the proposal of three candidates—and these two posts carry *diputado status* (i.e. a seat in the Cortes).

The two Provincial Councils form the General Assembly from which a Governing Council of eight is chosen by the members. From this Governing Council a President is chosen... subject to the approval of the Spanish Commissioner-General, the successor to the former Governor General. The present President of the Governing Council is a right-wing Rio Muni African, Dr. Bonifacio Ondo Edu, who polled 4,280 votes out of a possible 4,397 in the January primaries in Evinayong, Rio Muni.

Citizens of Equatorial Guinea have now been placed on an "equal footing" with citizens of Spain, though, as under Provincial legislation, recognition is made of local peculiarities:

> "Primer. El servicio militar seguira, como hasta ahora, siendo para ellos de caracter voluntario". (Exemption from compulsory military service on the Spanish pattern).
>
> "Segunda. Las practicas consuetudinarias relacionadas con el estado civil de las personas seran respetadas a todod los efectos mientras que la natural evolucion de las citidas practices no aconseje otra cosa."[33] (Recognition of peculiarities pertaining to the indigenous way of life.)

Atop this complex pyramid of administration, predominantly of an uncompromisingly imported nature, stands the supreme authority of the Commissioner-General representing the *Caudillo*. This undisputed supremacy, however shadowed, is the main source of political contention in the autonomous territory, and for this reason it is necessary to examine briefly the powers of the Commissioner-General.

Over and above the Governing Council, the Commissioner-General has the power of dismissing that body through a recommendation to the National Government in Madrid : "Suremocion sera acordada por el Gobierno de la Nacion a propuesta del Comisario-general."[34] In his hands lies the control over foreign relations, immigration, the police and civil guards, measures passed by the Autonomous Governing Council, information media of all sorts and anything which might be loosely construed as concerning the *seguridad y orden publico.*[35] Authority may rest with the Governing-Council, but power quite definitely remains vested in the representative of the Spanish metropolitan Government. Finances are subject to scrutiny in Madrid and any juridical dispositions drawn up by the General Assembly are subject to the scrutiny of the Commissioner-General. From the evidence bearing on the continuing supremacy of metropolitan Spain, it is necessary to examine the political circumstances surrounding the Acts of Autonomy, and determine why full independence was "refused".

Political Climate Surrounding Autonomy

When the question of administrative change was considered again by the Spanish government after the provincialisation of 1959 a remarkable gesture for Spain was made by the authorities in Guinea when they invited all political parties in voluntary or involuntary exile to return for discussions on the nature of the new administration. At that time (1963) there were three principal shades of opinion represented by parties—all of whom held the others in considerable loathing. At the far left was, and is, the I.P.G.E. or *Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial*, under Jesus Mbo Ovono, which was the only articulate body—largely through the support it received from the Nkrumah government in Accra. The I.P.G.E. was centered at the Ministry of African Affairs in Accra and was distinguished principally by its apparent approval for a union with the Republique des Camerouns in which country it claimed "there are 3,000 refugees (sic) over the border."[36]

The I.P.G.E. favours more militant action than is advocated by the M.N.L.G.E. (*Movimento Nacional de Liberacion de la Guinea Ecuatorial*), and has declared both it and its "war front", the F. R. E. N. A. P. O.:

> "un element, tres, tres dangereua et anti-africain collaborateur desiimperiaoistes"[37] (Published in French by the Ministry of African Affairs, Accra).

This division which continues smouldering to the present day is at the root of many of the problems which these parties raise regarding "our sacred rights—the right to be independent and free."[38] The more militant wings refused to cooperate with the Spanish authorities and it fell to the third element, the right-wing Dr. Bonifacio Ondo Edu, to lead the discussions. The remarkable difference in political opinion between Dr. Ondo Edu and Mba Ovono is illustrated by the following two statements:

> "One of the things to which I aspire in life...is clarity ; and among the things I have been able to learn from those who educated us......there is a simple motto : *noblesse oblige*"[39]

and Mba Ovono's

> "The I. P. G. E. also accuses the M. N. L. G. E. of having betrayed the people of Equatorial Guinea for their (sic) total independence, by linking themselves to Imperialism and the Spanish Colonialists."[40]

With the absence of the more radical elements from the San Sebastian talks it fell to the thoroughly Hispanised Dr. Ondo Edu to make the guidelines for Guinea's future. When the structure of autonomy was announced, the I. P. G. E. was vehement in its denunciation.:

> "... le gouvernement de cette autonomie fantoche est preside par les memes gens teleguides qui feurent invites a Madrid en septembre 1963 par le Gen. Franco et accepterent de vendre la Guinea Equatoriale aux mains des imperialists espagnols pour 30 millions de 'pesetas' "[41]

In reality, all parties were invited to return, though the I. P. G. E. after the strength of its polemics since 1947, probably feared a political manoeuvre after the fashion of China's "100 flowers" and took no part.

The referendum of 15 December, and the primary elections which followed have been heavily criticised both by M. N. L. G. E. and I. P. G. E. whilst Rene Pelissier, author of several works for the Instituto de Estudios Africanos in Madrid, has remarked on their scrupulous honesty. On the referendum to decide for or against the Ondo Edu variety of autonomy Luis Majo, a member of the present Governing Council, had the following comment:

> "The voting had not been free, and the Spanish authorities had fired on the people who, in view of the irregularities in the voting procedure, had refused to vote."[42]

The primary elections were similarly regarded by Atanasio N'dong Nyione of M. N. L. G. E. as of little value when he stated:

> "We offer ...... some paragraphs of a report from Guinea. By forming a movement called M. U. N. G. E., which is protected by the big business houses of the land...the Spaniards...used every form of coercion to see that those elements made a good showing. and they succeeded in part since five are now on the Governing Council ... You should know that they even used the military aircraft ... many people who refused to vote as the Government wished died by the guns of the Constabulary."[43]

All the parties seem united against the present regime on one major issue: the powers of the Commissioner-General. In his statement before the U.N. Committee on de-colonization, Snr. N'dong Nyione quoted the many powers retained by the Commissioner-General, whilst I. P. G. E. has many times spoken of the Governing Council as puppets of the Commissioner. Both parties speak of "chaos and disorder" since autonomy and I. P. G. E. press releases from Accra (prior to the removal of Nkrumah and the I. P. G. E's cover, the Ministry of African Affairs Office) have mentioned "thousands protesting in front of Government House (Santa Isabel); thirty students from Guinea expelled from the Virgen de Africa hall of residence at Madrid University after petitioning the *Caudillo*; over one thousand political detainees in each Guinea jail and the tiny island of Annobon being turned into a "concentration camp". It states also that over 12,000 soldiers are stationed in four military bases in Guinea. Nevertheless, it remains true that the daily scene in Santa Isabel or Bata has changed little since January 1, 1964.

Political and Economic Viability of an Independent Guinea

Both militant parties have included an O. A. U.-sponsored referendum for independence in their manifestos but neither has included any argument of how realistic this is under the prevailing economic and political conditions.

The economy of Guinea is largely artificial, though thriving, and shows that the typically colonial export structure—primary products—directed almost entirely towards Spain (over 90 per cent). Furthermore, the two main products, coffee and cocoa, are heavily subsidised: coffee 61p. per kilogramme subsidy (31p above world parity) and cocoa 10p. per kilogramme subsidy.

This gives Guinea a favourable balance of trade – some 823,000,000p. (13,716,000 U. S. dollars). Though the subsidies, which had reached 460 million pesetas (7.6 million U. S. dollars) by 1964, give Equatorial Guinea a trade intensity index above 29 other African states and a per capita income as follows : Fernando Poo 246 U. S. dollars and Rio Muni 91 U. S. dollars.

This is higher than most African states and 19 provinces of Spain. It needs to be recalled that coffee and cocoa are European plantation crops and so most of the subsidy is directed at European Spaniards. Spain is fully aware of the economic dependence of Equatorial Guinea on the Peninsula and the Minister of Information put it in the following terms:

> " ... the foreign trade of Fernando Poo and Rio Muni depends to a great extent on the rest of Spain, and any drastic change in the present system of exchange would have serious consequences for both territories."[44]

These subsidies serve to create a link between Spain and Guinea which could be used to exert considerable pressure if the need arose. In the agricultural sector (there really is not any other in the Guinean economy), most of the agriculturally productive land is in the hands of the White settlers who divide 81,292 acres among 583 Europeans, whilst the Africans divide some 37,000 acres among 3,000. Nevertheless, the Spanish authorities claim they are trying to foster a "middle class in its mission to the natives on a par with other Spaniards."[45]

Apart from the above economic difficulties facing an independent Guinea, there is also the problem of the large Nigerian alien labour community which forms as much as half the population of Fernando Poo at times. Spain has taken great care to ensure that all this labour is contracted and returns at the termination of its contractual obligations. The alternative is to become a domiciled resident with full rights. It seems that Spain is noting the words of Jose Condero Torres speaking about the alien community when he said :

> "... this nationalism, stimulated, propagated and perfected will become inclined towards an anschluss between Guinea and a neighbouring territory of greater size."[46]

Spain is working hard to keep discontent to a minimum through a process of heavy capital expenditure, an ambitious development plan which is "essentially social in its outlook", careful attention to the comforts of immigrant labour and housing developments. It is hoped that the 2,579,000,000 pesetas being spent on the Development Plan on housing, an international airport, health and education will be a solid foundation upon which Dr. Ondo Edu's regime can be founded. The great mystique surrounding Spanish diplomacy would not be anxious to see the Guinea regime collapse into chaos after two hundred years of a "divine civilising mission."

In conclusion, by far the greatest problem facing any government of a fully independent Guinea is unity. The territory is nothing more than a "united dichotomy", where the planter dominated Fernando Poo received the lion's share of development, whilst Rio Muni remained a tract of little touched rain forest. Recently this gap has been keenly felt since Rio Muni has been harbouring some of the militants and a crash programme has pushed 750,000,000 pesetas into forestry which shows signs of becoming the territory's biggest industry, especially in face of the declining coffee and cocoa prices.

Several claims have been made on Guinea or its component parts. The Camerouns harbours annexation ambitions over Fernando Poo which lies only a few miles from Douala, the Camerounian capital. Nigeria would not be content to stand by in the face of Camerounian moves since 30—40,000 Nigerians may be resident at any one time and Nigeria has already once lost territory to the Federal Republic of the Camerouns in recent times. The Fang tribe of the Gabon is divided by the boundary of the continental province of Guinea and that territory is known to favour liberation movements. The M. N. L. G. E. was born in the Gabon and even Dr. Ondo Edu was in voluntary exile there at one time.

Thus Guinea emerges as a state in isolation—its economy tied almost hopelessly, it would seem, to Spanish subsidies and its independence, should it come, threatened by rival claims to its small area. The autonomous area will find it difficult to play its part in African politics since it is completely isolated—in its language unique south of the

Sahara, in its mediaeval outlook of *noblesse oblige* in the present radical phase of African politics and by its internal pressures for civil disorder by rival party jealousies. The considerable shortage of secondary education establishments as well as the very restricted scope for higher education (of necessity in Spain or a Spanish-speaking territory) will encourge Spain to retain its super-patronising attitude if that country is anxious to prevent the complete collapse of a rapidly evolved system of "democratic and just government" after so many years of "blissful slumber in the Gulf of Guinea."

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22. Rio de Oro was the name loosely applied to the old colony, but now Rio de Oro forms one half of the new Province along with Sequia el Hamra.
23. Tarfaya is a district of Morocco north of Sequia el Hamra.
24. Morocco also claims large areas of Mauritania.
25. UN A/6160 of 13 December 1965.
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Mozambique: Resistance and Reconstruction

JORGE REBELO

MOZAMBIQUE lies in the southern part of the east coast of Africa, bordered in the north by Tanzania, in the south by South Africa and in the west by Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. For many centuries before any Europeans reached the area, Mozambique played an important part in the trade of the Indian Ocean and when, at the end of the 15th century, the Portuguese started to compete in this trade, they set up bases on the coast of Mozambique to serve the main route to India. At this time, however, they probably had considerably less influence on the life of the country than the Arab traders through whom Islam and the use of Arabic spread along all the trade routes. The Portuguese established a few small trading stations and missions and alienated some land even the Zambezi but there was no effective occupation of the interior, or Even much of the coast line until the last decade of the 19th century. on then it was not achieved easily. There had been a long history of resistance to Portuguese occupation and it was only by exploiting rivalries among the tribes and kingdoms of the area that the Portuguese were eventually able to dominate them.

From this time on—the end of the 19th century—Mozambique has been a colony of Portugal although in Portuguese terminology it is called an "Overseas Province". The theory behind this name is that the colonies are integral parts of Portugal and that the people of Portugal and of the colonies form one nation. Connected with this idea is the famous system of "assimilation" whereby the inhabitants of Portuguese colonies supposedly have the opportunity of becoming full citizens of Portugal irrespective of race or origin. However, from the beginning Portuguese colonial policy was full of contradictions, for, side by side with this "Greater Nation" theory was the assumption of the natural inferiority of the "native" and linked with this the principle of forced labour: in the 1890's Antonio Enes, Governor of Mozambique and influential colonial theorist, could write quite openly of the "indigenous" African: "I do not consider him something to be exterminated because of the necessity for the expansion of the white race although I may believe in natural inferiority", while in 1943 Vieira Machado, member of the Salazar government, wrote : "It is necessary to inspire in the black the idea of work, and of abandoning his laziness and his depravity, if we want to exercise a colonizing action to protect him."

It was these attitudes which dictated colonial practice, rather than the dream of the great multi-racial Portuguese community ; forced labour was legal practice in Mozambique up to 1959 and it continues still under other names ; wage rates are regulated on a racial basis with whites favoured against mulattoes and mulattoes against black Africans ; educational opportunity is so heavily biased in favour of whites that in 1961 when the legal basis for the status of *assimilado* was abolished, only 4,353 (1950 census figures) Africans out of an estimated population of 7 million had been able to obtain the basic qualifications, literacy, proficiency in Portuguese and sufficient means to live to some extent in a European style for being accepted as assimilated. Even those who were assimilated could not enjoy their theoretical rights as Portuguese citizens : a Catholic priest, Father Guenjere, recently stated at the UN that in 1965 he saw a black African assimilated school teacher beaten for using a European toilette on a station. The station master justified the beating thus : "I told them to beat him because a black must not be allowed to mix with white people ; these latrines are for whites only". Any assimilated Mozambican can quote many similar cases of open discrimination. Even so, to have reached the position of *assimilado* an African must have been much more fortunate than most of his fellowmen who with no education and no citizenship are exposed to even greater repression and exploitation.

Given this situation, it is not surprising that resistance to Portuguese rule continued after effective occupation had been established. In the early 20th century there were a number of tribal revolts which the Portuguese put down with considerable brutality. In the 1940 's Africans began to form political associations—Associao Africana, Centro Associativo dos negros de Mozambique, Associao dos naturais de Mozambique—to press for reforms. The Portuguese government however exercised strict supervision over these, purged them of genuine nationalists and either banned their activities or took them over and controlled them in the interests of the government. As a result, determined nationalist groups were forced to work underground.

The late 1950's saw the emergence of a number of separate political organisations which had as their goal not simply reform but full independence of Mozambique from Portugal. These organisations were developed chiefly by Mozambicans working temporarily in neighbouring African countries where they were out of the immediate reach of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police. The most important were UDENAMO (Uniao Nacional Democratica de Mozambique) formed by Mozambicans working in Rhodesia, MANU (Mozambican African National Union) formed by Mozambicans in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, and UNAMI (Uniao Nacional Africano de Mozambique Independente). In June 1962 a meeting of these groups was held at which they decided to unite into one body, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique, FRELIMO). In September the 1st congress was held at which the aims of the movement were defined, a programme of action drawn up and a Central committee elected which included members from all the major provinces of Mozambique and belonging to all the parties which had combined to form FRELIMO.

In view of the intransigent attitude of the Portuguese, FRELIMO's programme included from the beginning preparation for armed action. However efforts were made to open negotiations with the Portuguese. These were met by a negative response, Portugal refusing even to accept the principle of eventual independence in the distant future. Thus on 25 September 1964 FRELIMO proclaimed the beginning of an armed struggle for liberation and that day the first combat took place. In the three years of war which have passed since then FRELIMO has succeeded in driving the Portuguese out of the two northern provinces, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, except for a few garrisoned towns and military posts which are now so isolated that they have to be supplied by air. This means that now a fifth of the territory of Mozambique has been liberated and about one-seventh of the population. The Portuguese army has suffered heavy casualties : about 6000 Portuguese soldiers killed or completely put out of action, nearly 400 military vehicles and trains destroyed and 23 planes shot down.

Military activity is only part of FRELIMO's work, however, for as soon as an area is liberated the responsibility for administration and social services falls on FRELIMO. The work of reconstruction which has been going on in these liberated and semi-liberated regions had to begin very much from scratch. Even before armed action began under the Portuguese there were very few services for the African population. Medical and educational services scarcely existed outside the towns where the white population lived, while agriculture and commerce were organised for the benefit of the Portuguese government and the Portuguese estate owners; Africans either had to work on plantations under a system of de facto forced labour or else were forced to grow cash crops such as cotton and rice and to sell them at extremely low prices to a number of large companies. They were not allowed to use their land for growing subsistence crops and as the prices paid for cash crops were very low little food could be bought with the proceeds and famine was endemic.

Now the people are able to grow the crops which are of the utmost use to them; they have been encouraged to clear more ground and despite the war more land is under cultivation than during the years under Portuguese domination. FRELIMO has had to provide the people with the means of cultivation which meant, during 1966 alone, importing over 9,000 each of hoes, hatchets and pangas into the two northern provinces. FRELIMO also organises the export of surplus foodstuff and any cash crops still produced so that the producer benefits from his work. In 1966, 500 tons of cashew nuts was exported, 100 tons each of sesame seed and groundnuts and 10 tons of casot oil seed. Cottage industry has also been encouraged and some hundreds of wood carvings have already been exported. A training progamme was carried out to enable the people to make their own agricultural tools using metal from Portuguese lorries destroyed in the fighting. Local production of soap and salt began during the last year and there are plans to expand small-scale industry of this kind to provide as many of the people's needs as possible. Those commodities which cannot be produced locally, such as cloth, are imported through FRELIMO and distributed to the various districts.

In these northern regions liberation has also provided the opportunity of some education for thousands of Mozambican children who, under the Portuguese, would have grown up unable to read and write. In 1966 FRELIMO was able to provide primary schools for 10,000 children in Cabo Delgado and recently 2,000 more children have started school in Niassa Province. A health service has also been started which operates clinics of various types in the northern provinces. The region is organised into medical districts with links between the different health centres so that cases can be transferred, for instance, from a small first aid post to a clinic with better facilities. A very important part of the health service is that concerning preventive medicine. There are two aspects of it : vaccination campaigns and programmes of public health education. Already in the last two years 100,000 people have been vaccinated against smallpox and there have been local campaigns against typhoid, tetanus and tuberculosis.

Despite these encouraging figures, the progress of both education and health services can be considered satisfactory only in the light of the legacy of Portuguese misrule in the past and the war conditions of the present. Both programmes fall very far short of the needs of the area and also of FRELIMO's aims. Lack of supplies and lack of trained personnel are the chief obstacles to extending and improving these services. Constant efforts are made to combat both problems. To tackle the personnel problem, a secondary school, the Mozambique Institute, is run in Dar-es-Salaam to provide further education to some of the children finishing primary school in Mozambique, and scholarships are arranged at foreign universities for those who show special aptitude during their secondary course. FRELIMO representatives are constantly outlining their needs to friendly organisations to try to ensure the arrival of some of the most urgently needed supplies. For, although self-reliance is at the root of FRELIMO policy, it is inevitable that while the war lasts and the Portuguese continue to occupy the main centres of industry and commerce, these new social services will depend heavily on such outside aid.

As long as the Portuguese refuse to recognise the Mozambicans' right to independence the military battle will go on and the work of reconstruction will follow in the wake of new FRELIMO gains. The civil struggle for a better life for the people and the military battle are inseparable, for the aim of FRELIMO is to create for all inhabitants of Mozambique a prosperous and healthy society. But experience has shown that this can only be done by a truly national and popular government committed to social justice and national development for the benefit of all. As the Portuguese are opposed to every aspect of such a government the first step towards the new Mozambique must be to drive out the Portuguese army and rid the country of Portuguese administration.

Ibo Literature : The Novel as Allegory

O. R. DATHORNE*

BISHOP Crowther wrote in his journal that by 1865 many Ibo school children could read portions of the New Testament but there was no complete translation of the Bible until the 20th century. The late start in the writing of Ibo vernacular literature is due to this, and to the fact that after an orthography had been devised in 1929 by a committee from the School of Oriental and African Studies, the protestants refused to adopt it. What has been published is therefore sparse and spasmodic, in the main confined to school readers, books of religious instruction and the writing down of tales.

The first important writer to emerge was Peter Nwana whose short novelette *Omenuko* won the first prize in a competition organised by the International Institute of African Languages and Culture in 1933 and was first published two years later. It relates the story of how Omenuko, a trader, on his way to the market loses all his possessions when a bridge collapses. He is in the company of carriers, apprentices and a close relative and on reaching his destination he sells them all into slavery. When he arrives back home he realises that his crime is too great to be suppressed and he decides to kill the elders of the town as well as the parents of the children he had sold. But members of his family advise him to run away and he, his three wives, his mother, brothers and their families go to live in another town. There the Chief treats him well, and in spite of the fact that the Chief had a son, Omenuko is groomed to succeed. When the son grows up a tense situation is created for by then Omenuko is himself Chief; plans are made to oust him but he returns to his own town. With the money he has made he is able to repurchase the slaves and after many sacrifices he finally manages to expiate his guilt.

Nwana's short novel is more than a hero-quest story; it is an examination of conflicting loyalties and the psychology of crime and retribution. The writer does not disguise his didactic intention and throughout the novel he claims to be telling a true story:

> I have set on record some of the events and incidents in the life of Mazi Omenuko so that readers may learn something from such a life ... From his childhood Omenuko was blessed

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*I speak no Ibo myself and am grateful for the help of several people who were kind enough to translate these novels for me.

> with riches; but when he came to manhood all his money vanished, anguish and disillusionment drove him to contemplate death as the only restful end, while peace and fraternal love counselled him not to hasten what was to come at its chosen time.

The melancholy which entered Africa with the coming of Christianity is uppermost in this book. Throughout the novel Omenuko is dogged by a continuous trail of misfortunes and at one stage he prays to the gods to help him out of the state of living death in which he has found himself. The author is not in sympathy with his hero's beliefs and when Omenuko had offered a sacrifice and looked upon the coming of the vultures as a favourable sign that it was acceptable to the gods, Nwana comments:

> It is true that he rang the bell and the vultures came, but you should know that even the most stupid of domestic animals soon begin to answer to the name you apply to it very often. The vultures had learnt that whenever he rang the bell he was calling them together.

The author is obviously impatient with the society he describes. But the novel nevertheless attempts to canvass something of historical proportions—in Nwana's words "what happened in our town in ancient times". It is set in the first few years of the century and Nwana tells us that the year is 1918 when Omenuko returns to his home. It is not unlikely that this was one of the models that Chinua Achebe was later to employ when he attempted the historical novel of Ibo life in English.

If there are signs that Nwana's novel bears resemblances to *Pilgrim's Progress*, another novel in Ibo, L. B. Gam's *Ijɛ Odumodu Jɛrɛ* (Odamodu's Travels), has much in common with *Robinson Crusoe* and *Gulliver's Travels*. Odumodu was the son of a poor man whose parents could not afford to send him to school. He went to Lagos as a carpenter's apprentice and decided to go to sea as a ship's cook. He was shipwrecked and.marooned on a desert island in the kingdom of Finda. There he encountered a race of small white men to whom he brought civilisation and learning. He opened up a large farm and in a school, which he also founded, he taught the local people agricultural techniques, carpentry and boat-building. Later after winning the king's daughter, he returns home a rich man. The year is 1886.

The story has obvious allegorical implications. Odumodu enlists on a vessel called "The World" and is setting out on an archetypal adventure to reform both himself and the earth. His early life had prepared him for his later role—he learnt farming and cattle-rearing on his father's farm and carpentry in Lagos. It is particularly interesting that the writer was obviously making the point that the black man had certain attributes to give to the white man, since the reader learns that on the island "the ruler was astounded to see a man of my size and above all to see that I had a black skin." Moreover, the novel celebrates the church and the farm; Odumodu feels at one stage that "we must give thanks to those who spread the word all over the world", and earlier he argues that "farming is the chief of all occupations". Of his two sons one becomes a priest and the other a farmer.

There are some resemblances here with Nwana's novel; both heroes are involved in a controversy regarding the succession—Odumodu has to be smuggled out of Findaland. Both novels describe a departure and a return, both have an historical setting. Perhaps all this shows that both writers were consciously or unconsciously using the form of the tale and adding Christian didactism to it as well as attempting to create character.

A more obvious parable is D. N. Achara's *Ala Bingo* (The Land of Bingo) which is even closer to the tale. It is about a king who journeys to the sky for six months and spends six months on the earth. His movements result in the seasons: when he goes to the sky it rains and when he comes to earth the dry season begins. But in many ways it is more than just an allegory; the king is given warm human attributes. In the sky one day he sees a human footprint near the river where he bathed; through this he meets a beautiful princess and marries her. He has two sons who are both prodigies and in order to decide who should succeed him he sets them the task of answering riddles. Ogu, the elder, finds the correct solution and this is why, Achara adds in a most unsatisfactory ending, the eldest always succeeds.

In a way the novel has to do with human pride and the search for humility. From the opening of the book the reader is told that the king was so important that there was "only one man [the king himself] and his slaves in a whole town." Finally the moral point is made when the king is forced to accept the advice of his slaves and to return to earth—in the words of the proverb that is used, "hunger makes one accept what he refused before." He undergoes all types of humiliation including having to visit a sick servant in "the house of sickness" and also a leper. He waits several days before the Chief of the East would give him an audience.

The "love" interest which will be noticed time and again in vernacular literature is very much present here. It has little to do with the oral tradition, and this description, for instance, of the king's feelings after his first encounter with the princess, has no parallel in oral literature:

> One day the king met her suddenly while she was eating what was being laid out for her. On earth she is unrivalled in beauty. Her face is like the moon. Her hair is like English wool. Her skin is as smooth as a well smoothened piece of wood. Her teeth were glistening like saliva. Her smile looks like the early morning sun in the dry season. She is a perfect piece of creation. Her beauty upset the mind of the king. Every word that comes from him is about the princess. All his dreams are centred in her. He no longer feels hungry. The satisfaction that he gets from seeing her is as good as food.

In the context the comparisons are far-fetched and absurd; they contrast strangely with the king who later on gave up the insubstantiality of sky for the security of the earth.

More recently official attempts have been made to encourage Ibo literature. In 1960 the African Literature Bureau in Eastern Nigeria awarded prizes for three winning short stories, and more recently the "Society for Promoting Igbo Language and Culture" has published prize-winning short stories. One can only hope now that the difficulties of orthography have been overcome, writers will begin to experiment with verse.

Quarterly Chronicle

D. P. SINGH

India and Africa

THE *Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir Seeowsagar Ramgoolam,* came to India on 13 December 1967. He stayed for a week. He had talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The two leaders made a general review of the international situation. At a banquet given by Mrs. Gandhi the Mauritian leader said : "We have come to learn a great deal about the lessons and example set to the world by India". He said his country was trying its best to "find its own destiny" with the cooperation of India and other friendly countries. He extended an invitation to Mrs. Gandhi to visit Mauritius. The two leaders had talks on developing Indo-Mauritian cooperation in economic and other fields.

Speaking at a luncheon reception at the Press Club of India, Sir Seeowsagar said that at his meetings with the Indian leaders he had discussed the question of enlarging economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. He also invited Indian industrialists to invest in Mauritius. He said he did not like the war in Vietnam. He disapproved the attitude of the British government towards the white minority government of Mr. Ian Smith in Rhodesia.

Mr. B. R. Bhagat, Minister for State for External Affairs, led an Indian delegation to Mauritius which participated in the independence celebrations in that country on 12 March. The Mauritian government had also invited some prominent non-official Indians. Among them were Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon and the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University. The non-official delegation went separately.

The ninth session of the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee was inaugurated by the Indian Prime Minister on 18 December 1967 in New Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi stressed the need for unity among Asian and African countries which would benefit the whole world. She said: "There can be no civilised society without the rule of law. And it is essential where there are people of different viewpoints, different interests, that there should be some way for them to settle their disputes without breaking heads or taking the law in their own hands". The Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee is an inter-governmental body of jurists which discusses legal issues of contemporary interest in the field of international law. It was set up at the initiative of Mr. Nehru in 1956. Its first session was held in New Delhi in April 1957.

At its 9th session the Committee took up issues like codification of the law of treaties and the question of South-West Africa. Several delegates from Afro-Asian countries attended the session.

On 4 January, *the Ninth Commonwealth Forestry Conference* was inaugurated in New Delhi by the Vice-President, Mr. V. V. Giri. The Inspector-General of Forests of India, Mr. Hari Singh, was elected Chairman of the conference. About 75 delegates from 16 Commonwealth countries took part in the conference. The meeting lasted till 25 January. Delegates came from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and New Zealand and various other countries. Mr. Giri appealed for international cooperation for the "practical application" of forest technology on an industrial scale in developing countries. He stressed the need for well-planned, integrated and wood-based industries and for developing social consciousness among the masses to preserve forests. The conference discussed several important matters about afforestation, preservation of forests and forest technology.

Mr. Surendra Pal Singh, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, paid a goodwill visit to Ghana from 28 to 31 December. He met Lt.-General J. A. Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, Inspector-General of Police and Vice-chairman of the NLC, and Brig. A. A. Afrifa, the NLC member for Trade and Finance. He exchanged views with them on matters of mutual interest to Ghana and India. He also visited Monrovia and Liberia where he represented India at the ceremonies held for Mr. William V. S. Tubman and Mr. William R. Tolbert who reassumed the presidency and vice-presidency of Liberia respectively.

The *Kenya government approved on 17 January the "feasibility studies" submitted by Birla Brothers* for setting up a Rs. 20 crore paper mill there. This is going to be one of the biggest single industrial projects in Kenya. The mill is likely to go into production by 1970-71 and will produce 45,000 tons of paper every year. Final negotiations will be held soon. It will mark a major breakthrough in India's efforts at economic collaboration with African countries through joint ventures.

A *non-official goodwill delegation of members of Parliament* led by Mr. Nagendra Singh Mahida, Chairman of the National Shipping Board, left for Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. There were four members in the delegation including Sardar Santokh Singh. The tour lasted five weeks. The delegation had trade talks with the governments and industrialists of these countries.

The Mayor of Mombasa, Alderman John Joseph Mambo, visited India at the invitation of the Government of India under the cultural activities programme in January. He stayed in the Capital for one week and visited Ahmedabad, Agra, Chandigarh and Nangal. In Delhi he called on the Vice-President, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Mayor of Delhi. Mr Mambo is also organizing secretary of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union.

Mr. Prem Kripal, Secretary to the Union Education Ministry, led the Indian delegation to the Commonwealth Conference on Education held in Lagos, Nigeria, in the last week of February. The conference discussed the problems of educational development in the member-countries and will review the progress of the various plans started since 1957.

On 22 *February in New Delhi an Indo-Cameroun trade pact was signed.* This is the first trade agreement India has signed with a West African country. It is hoped that many more pacts will follow soon. The ground is being prepared for such agreements with Ghana and Nigeria. The terms of the agreement provide for extension of the most-favoured-nation treatment on all trade and tariff matters except regional cooperative arrangements like the tripartite preferences agreement among India, Yugoslavia and the UAR. It also provides for Indo-Cameroun trade meetings once a year. At present the volume of trade between India and Cameroun is only about Rs. 20 lakhs. It is hoped that the agreement will pave the way for expansion of trade between the two countries. Mr. Dinesh Singh, Union Minister of Commerce, and Mr. Vincent Efon, Cameroun Minister of Commerce, signed the agreement on behalf of their countries.

The *Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Dr. Okoi Arikpo,* who is at present on a visit to Commonwealth countries to apprise them of the latest situation in Nigeria, visited India on 28 February. Addressing a press conference in New Delhi Dr. Arikpo said that the Federal government had given an undertaking to restore the damaged economy of the country, to resettle people rendered homeless, and to carry on the task of national reconstruction and general reconciliation of all communities in the country. He assured that the Federal government would not take punitive action against, or demand reparations from, the rebels in any part of the eastern sector of Nigeria once they laid down their arms. He indicated that some western countries had lent their support to the rebels and had signed contracts with them for the supply of oil. Dr. Arikpo said the Federal government had not received any military assistance from the Soviet Union. The ultimate solution to the Nigerian problem would have to be a political one.

Speaking on Indo-Nigerian cooperation, the Nigerian Foreign Minister said: "We in Nigeria feel a special sense of attachment to the Government and people of India because over the years we have received considerable support in the form of teachnical assistance from this country. In our civil aviation organization, our railways, our hospitals, schools and colleges, we have an appreciable number of Indians whose services have been made available to us through the kindness of the Government of India. These men have been good ambassadors of their country and they are contributing immensely to the development of Nigeria".

Commodore Alexander Desta, Chief of the Imperial Ethiopian Navy, arrived in New Delhi on 4 March as a guest of the Indian Navy. During his 17-day stay in the country, he will visit the Defence Staff College, Wellington, the National Defence Academy, Kharakvasala, and naval establishments in Bombay, Cochin, Jamnagar and Lonavla.

The Minister of Economic Affairs and Works and Supplies of the Government of Malawi, who led the delegation of his country to UNCTAD II, has requested the Indian Ministry of Housing and Works for assistance to build the new capital of the Malawi Republic. The National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC), the biggest and only public sector concern engaged in construction work, is likely to take up the assignment. A formal agreement is expected to be reached between the two governments after an exchange of visits by officials of the two countries.

Asians and Kenya, Britain and India

A large number of Asians are leaving Kenya for various reasons which are essentially psychological —fear and persecution. There are about 185,000 Asians in Kenya of which about 60,000 are already citizens of Kenya. Indian passports are held by only 4,000 people. The remaining 1,00,000 hold British passports which entitle them to free entry into the UK. They are therefore primarily Britain's responsibility.

The exodus of Asians started after the Kenyan Parliament passed the Immigration and Trade Licensing Act providing that every non-citizen should apply for a work permit with a fee of 500 shillings. Further, every employer must be prepared to furnish a bond of up to £500 for each non-citizen. If a work permit is granted it may be for a period of three to six months. The Kenyan government's position is that the passing of this law has nothing to do with the Asian exodus. But the number of Asians leaving Kenya kept on swelling steadily. About 700 to 1,000 Asians began to leave Kenya for London every day.

The British government has passed an Act to curb immigrants' entry into the country. This has angered sensible people in India and Britain. It is for the first time in the history of Britain that non-Britons holding British passports have been prevented from entering Britain. The Act is directed only against non-whites. The main instrument of control will be employment vouchers issued to persons with specific jobs or those with professional qualifications to come to Britain. There will be a quota of about 1,500 vouchers a year for those who have hitherto been exempt from such immigration control. Thus entry without such vouchers has been made illegal and punishable under the law.

Indian public opinion and the Government have been extremely agitated over this display of blatant racialism by the British government. In an editorial, the *Times of India* expressed the view of the majority of Indians when it said: "In rushing through the measure to keep the non-white British citizens out of the country Mr. Wilson has flouted the past commitments of his own party, the many assurances that his predecessors in office gave to British citizens of Asian origin in East Africa and the internationally accepted principles of human rights". The current influx is not so large as to justify "so blatantly unjust a piece of legislation". In fact, the British government has yielded to pressures of insufferable racists like Mr Enoch Powell and Mr Duncan Sandys. Mr. Wilson probably thought that by enacting such legislation the party might improve its prospects in the next general elections.

The Indian government has conveyed its displeasure to the British government in no uncertain terms. In response to a calling attention motion in Parliament Mr. B. R. Bhagat, Minister of State for External Affairs, said: "It is regrettable that the UK which had this tradition till a few years ago has found it necessary to restrict this practice. The Government of India reserves the right to revise the present regulations on the basis of reciprocity with other Commonwealth countries." He declared: "While the Government of India has allowed free entry to people of Indian origin and indeed to others on compassionate and humanitarian grounds, the Government of India is not willing to accept British passport holders, whether of Indian origin or not, who are denied their fundamental rights by the British government". Denying an allegation made by the Opposition that by demanding an increase in the emigrants' quota to 15,000 a year from the present 1,500 the Government of India wanted to bargain and compromise. Mr. Bhagat said: "There is no spirit of bargaining, there is no compromise on principles". He added: "India might feel compelled to revise its present regulations in order to restrict the right of entry of British passport holders into this country". He conveyed to the British High Commissioner in India, Mr. John Freeman, that there would be serious repercussions on the friendly Indo-British relations and on the very concept of the Commonwealth.

In Kampala, Uganda President Milton Obote charged Britain with trying to turn Uganda into a refugee camp for British citizens who could not enter their own country. "It appears that the British government considers it is not in a position to receive the tens of thousands of its nationals in Uganda, and that Uganda should keep them until Britain is ready", Mr. Obote told a news conference. British citizens remained in our country "at our pleasure", he said. "It it becomes necessary to send 2,000 such persons back to their own country as a matter of national interest, then they will be sent to Britain irrespective of what went on in the British Parliament".

UNCTAD—II

The search for new programmes of international economic cooperation in trade and aid which could help reduce the trade gap of developing countries had led to the creation of UNCTAD. The less developed countries' disenchantment with the working of GATT, which was formed in 1948 to study and solve the problems of international trade and development, contributed to the search for new institutional arrangements. The first UNCTAD met in March 1964 in Geneva. According to the recommendations of the conference, UNCTAD became a permanent member of the UN family of international bodies. All UN members are members of this new organization. The permanent organ of the organisation is the Trade and Development Board which meets twice annually and has 55 members who are elected by the conference from among its members.

The second session of UNCTAD lacks an ideal setting. At its 16th session the UN General Assembly had adopted a resolution which designated the 1960s as the 'development decade' with the target of a minimum annual rate of growth of 5 per cent in the income of developing countries, But the development decade has been a period of sheer disillusionment. Moreover, there has been no decisive action on some of the major recommendations of the first UNCTAD. There has been little progress in liberalization of trade policies in favour of the LDCs and a stiffening of attitude in regard to aid. According to a report of the UNCTAD Secretariat the total net outflow of aid from the developed countries declined from 0.87 per cent in 1961 to 0.63 per cent in 1966. The terms of credit, the report says, have also become stringent and the 'overall situation has deteriorated'. Moreover, the share of the LDCs in the world trade dropped from 27 per cent in 1953 to 19 per cent by 1966. However the situation is not hopeless. There is far greater agreement today than there was four years ago. The second session has before it important proposals.

The second session has an ambitious agenda. The major questions of interest to the LDCs are about (i) the terms and conditions of foreign aid; (ii) preferential entry into the markets of the developed nations for the goods and products of the LDCs; (iii) measures to counter the causes or effects of instability in the export earnings of the LDCs like inter-agreements on commodity prices and supplementary financing etc.; and (iv) action to bring about beneficial trade among the LDCs and the developed countries in face of the protectionist policies of the latter.

The conference was inaugurated on 31 January by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. It will last eight weeks. Mrs. Gandhi expressed the aspirations of the poor nations and called on all the delegates to 'evolve a global strategy' of international economic development. "What we need," she said, "is an integrated programme of international cooperation, which outlines convergent measures to be undertaken by every member of the 132-nation conference." The question before the advanced nations, therefore, was not whether they could afford to help the developing nations but whether they could afford not to do so. She warned the conference that if it failed in its task the consequences would be "too terrible to contemplate".

Mr. Dinesh Singh, Indian Minister of Commerce, was elected President of UNCTAD. Mr Raul Prebisch, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, while presenting a 'preview of the problems' before the plenary session, called for a 'massive mobilization' of international resources to help the poor nations to raise their rate of growth of economic development. He warned the developed nations against further postponement of evolving a global strategy of development. "The key elements in a global strategy of development are trade policy, international financial cooperation and domestic development policy".

A dramatic walk-out by 1,000 delegates was staged on 2 February in protest against South African participation in UNCTAD. After the completion of certain procedural formalities the plenary session began with policy statements by the member countries. The work of the conference has been divided among five committees—Committee on Commodity Problems and Policies (Chairman Dr. George of Senegal);

Committee on Diversification and Expansion of Exports and Manufactures and Semi-manufactures of Developing Countries (Chairman Mr. K. W. Ryan of Australia); Committee on Problems of Developing Countries in regard to invisibles including shipping (Mr. Luis Paulo Linderberg Sette of Brazil); Committee on Trends in World Trade and Development (Chairman Mr. Janos Nyerges of Hungary) and Committee on Development Finance and Aid (Chairman Mr. Jacob Everts of the Netherlands).

Addressing UNCTAD, U Thant, UN Secretary-General, on 9 February appealed to developed countries to create conditions conducive to the growth and development of the LDCs. He said the real question was not 'whether development will occur, but how it will occur and within what international framework'. He called for rationalization of international trade as it would benefit both the rich and poor countries. Referring to the problem of tariffs he said 'a gradual aproach to the problem would surely be acceptable to all so long as we are moving in the right direction'. He appealed to the delegates that "if there are difficulties and dangers ahead let them be brought forward and frankly discussed at this conference."

A detailed report on the plenary session and discussions in the various committees will be published in the the next issue of the journal.

Summit Meeting at Kampala

The Heads of State of 12 East and Central African countries met in Kampala, Uganda, in December last year. It was attended by the three members of the East African Community (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda), Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia, the two Congos, Burundi, Ruanda, the Central African Republic and Sudan. A formal secretariat or headquarters for this 'group' has yet to come up. Special meetings of the East African Community Authority were convened during the summit conference itself to consider the applications of Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia and Burundi for their admission to the Community. Formal negotiations regarding membership are still going on.

The primary task before the summit conference was to consider a report of the foreign ministers of East and Central Africa who had met earlier in Lusaka to prepare it. Although the full contents of the report are not yet known, it is believed that it primarily concerns import-export trade within the region, exchange of economic data and co-operation in such matters as transport, civil aviation and telecommunications.

Several significant decisions were taken at the summit conference to solve the pressing problems of telecommunications and civil aviation. It is hoped that positive steps will be taken to implement the decisions. The spirit of "good neighbourliness" generated by the conference should be utilized to secure speedy solutions of the problems facing these countries.

Central African Union

General Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, has announced the formation of a United States of Central Africa. The members of the new union are Congo (Kinshasa), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The protocol was signed at Bangui, capital of the CAR.

The agreement provides that the leaders of the three states will meet frequently to evolve a common policy in the fields of economy, commerce, transport, telecommunications, security and cultural affairs. Commissions will be set up to coordinate work in these fields. Membership of the union is open to all sovereign independent states of Central Africa. The treaty does not envisage any political union. But if the experiment in the fields of economy, commerce and cultural co-operation succeeds, it may provide the impetus for co-operation in the political sphere also. Similarly, the union is yet to produce definite projects for safeguarding security. It is hoped that Rwanda Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville) will join the union shortly. As regards the membership of Gabon and Camerouns the position is yet to crystallize.

West African Economic Community

An important step towards economic cooperation in West Africa was taken at a meeting of 12 states held at Accra recently under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The countries represented were Nigeria, Ghana, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Mauritania and observers of UN bodies and the OAU.

Lt. General J. A. Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council of Ghana, inaugurating the conference, said the issue before the delegates was whether they could muster the courage for cooperation in the field of economic development, whether they could fashion workable institutions for this purpose and embark on concrete steps in the harmonisation of their national efforts in economic development. Speaking about Ghana's position, he said : "Since the coming into power of the National Liberation Council, we have sought to promote the objective of African unity in the economic and political spheres by fostering closer links with our neighbours. It is our conviction that African unity can be built upon the solid foundation of practical and realistic cooperation at the regional level. This presupposes that each country will develop and consolidate its economic resources in an atmosphere of political stability to ensure maximum contribution to the common cause. Our collective weight must be placed behind the need of each one of us."

For seven days the delegates discussed problems of cooperation in building up road networks, air transport, telecommunications, trade and commerce. At the end of the conference the delegates signed the Articles of Association—a temporary arrangement to govern the means of cooperation among the member states before the establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa. A treaty is being negotiated to bring the Community into existence. In the meantime an Interim Council of Ministers with powers to establish a Secretariat and an interim Economic Committee has been constituted.

Mr. Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the ECA, said the Community would be a body with its own characteristics. "We are not copying from anybody." He went on to say that "this action should not arouse fears anywhere, for we are protecting our interests in order to develop and to harmonize them with those of other continents".

Afro-Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM)

The Ministerial Council of the OCAM ended its six-day session on 20 January in Niamey, capital of Niger. It prepared the agenda for a summit conference to be held later. About 30 resolutions were adopted by the Council for the four-day summit. The Council did not accept the proposal put forward by Cameroons for creating an OCAM news agency. But in the end a committee was set up to scrutinize the idea in detail. The Political Committee of the OCAM, which consists of the foreign ministers, decided to recommend a programme to the Heads of State aiming at the promotion of "a true policy of concerted cooperation" within the organisation.

OAU : New Liberation Programme

The annual African Foreign Ministers' conference, which lasted five days, ended on 26 February in Addis Ababa. The session has been described by the delegates and observers as remarkable and fruitful. About ten resolutions and recommendations were adopted at the conference. Most of the decisions were unanimous or by acclamation.

For the first time a regular budget was adopted for the organization. The conference called upon all OAU members to boycott the summer Olympics at Mexico if South Africa was allowed to participate in it. It demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories in West Asia. Another important resolution was about a new programme for the African liberation movements. The chairman of the conference, the Foreign Minister of Mali, Mr. Osman Ba, said the effectiveness of the new programme will be felt before September when the Council of Ministers (Foreign Ministers) met again at Algiers. He disclosed that the conference had approved an adequate budget for the liberation committee to enable it to implement the new programme successfully.

Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, Mr Katema Yifru, said the decisions taken at the conference were a milestone in the four-year-old history of the OAU. Mr. Abdul Aziz Bouteflika, Foreign Minister of Algeria, observed that the conference had achieved a new success.

Algeria : An Abortive Coup

On 4 December, Algiers was rocked by an abortive coup led by the former Chief of Staff, Col. Tahar Zabiri. In a radio broadcast, Col. Boumedienne charged that a group of men were "thirsting for blood and adventure". But, the President continued, the people "had mastered the dissidents and broken the trouble-makers". Col. Boumedienne himself assumed direct command of the armed forces. By 16 December four of Algeria's five military regions had publicly pledged their support to the President. On 29 December at Algiers the commanders of the Algerian army pledged their unflinching loyalty to the Government of Col. Boumedienne. In a resolution the army officers pledged to maintain the unity of the army and demanded "an exemplary punishment to the guilty ones".

Cameroun: Assembly Elections

On 31 December elections were held in Cameroun for the West Cameroun National Assembly. The polling was reported to be brisk and heavy. This was the first election to be held after the introduction of the single-party Carmeroun National Union in 1966. Thirty-seven candidates are reported to have been returned unopposed.

Following the elections a new Prime Minister of West Cameroun has been nominated by the Cameroun President, Mr. Ahmadon Ahijdo. Under the federal constitution the President has the power to appoint the Prime Minister of East and West Cameroun. Mr. Soloman Tandeng Muna, former Minister of Transport in the federal government in Yaounde, is the new Prime Minister of West Cameroun. A reshuffle in the federal government has been announced.

Congo (Brazzaville): PM Dismissed

On 12 January President Massemba-Debat abolished the post of Prime Minister and dismissed Mr. Ambroise Nouamzaly, who had been Prime Minister since May 1966. The President himself has assumed all the functions af the PM. A dramatic government reshuffle has also taken place. Mr. Simon Gokwa was replaced as Minister of Health by Dr. Jacques Mvoutis. Mr. Andre Hombessa was demoted from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Information. Mr. Michael Bindi is the new Minister of the Interior. Mr. Claude da Costais was replaced as Minister of Works by Mr. Pierre Mouama, former Minister of Information. Lt. Poignet is Secretary of State for National Defence. Mr. Nicholas Mondjo, who was until now Ambassador to France, has replaced Mr David-Charles Ganao as the new Foreign Minister.

Several important points have been noted by observers in these drastic changes. The disappearance of the pro-Chinese Noumazaly and the demotion of Hombessa and at the same time promotion of the pro-French Mondjo and Mr. Bongo-Nourra is significant. The inclusion of an army officer in the cabinet has been observed with interest. The proposition that the bicephalous system of President and Prime Minister ruling jointly in a country in Africa is not possible seems to have been affirmed again.

Dahomey : New Coup

President Soglo was overthrown on the night of 16 December by a group of young army officers. In the seven years since independence

Dahomey has had to go through five coups. The present coup was a climax to the tensions which were mounting in the country as a result of several strikes. Although some observers attribute the coup to tribal differences among the army officers, the major factor in the crisis appears to be the mounting economic and financial stagnation in the country.

The coup was led by Major Kouandete and Capt. Kreekon, both belonging to the northern part of the country. The young officers who seized power declared in a broadcast: "We young officers of the army—conscious that the whole army's responsibility is involved, knowing that our chiefs have deceived the people and the National Army, conscious that it is our duty to re-establish normal conditions, the authority and the dignity of the nation—decide in the best interests of the nation (i) that Gen. Soglo's government is dissolved, (ii) that the Military Vigilance Committee is dissolved. We decide, therefore, to create a Military Revolutionary Committee". They accused the Soglo government of 'shirking its responsibilities.' A provisional government has been set up. Col. Alphonse Alley, Chief of Staff of the army, is reported to have joined the new regime as Head of State. A Constitution Committee will soon prepare a new constitution which will be put to a referendum for approval of the people. Gen. Soglo is now in Paris.

Guinea: Toure Re-elected

President Sekou Toure was re-elected unopposed for another term of seven years. He polled about 99.7 per cent of votes in the elections, according to Conakry Radio. He has been Guinea's President since independence in 1958. A new parliament consisting of 75 members of Mr. Toure's Democratic Party was also elected. The Democratic Party is the only political organization in the country.

Recently in an interview broadcast by Radio Luxemburg, Mr. Toure reaffirmed his desire to re-establish diplomatic relations with France and Britain. In November 1965 Guinea broke diplomatic relations with France over an alleged French plot to overthrow the Guinea President. In the same year relations with Britain were also severed over the Rhodesian issue. The President said he would follow a policy of cooperation with all states on the basis of respect for Guinean sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs. "We consider this still valid as much for France and for Britain as for all other countries in the world", he added.

Kenya : Cabinet Reshuffle

On 4 January, President Kenyatta announced a 'limited' reshuffle of the cabinet. Although the composition of the government remains unchanged the portfolios of five ministers have been changed and a new minister added to the cabinet. Dr. J. G. Kiano now holds the portfolio of education. Mr. E. N. Mwendwa is the new Minister of Labour. Mr. C. M. G. Argwings-Kodhek, who was earlier Minister for Natural Resources, becomes Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the President's Office. Mr. J. J. Nyagah, formerly Minister for Education, becomes

Minister for Natural Resources. Mr. J. Nyamweya, who was earlier Minister of State in the President's Office, becomes Minister for Power and Communication.

Mr. Odero-Jowi, formerly Assistant Minister for Finance, has been appointed Minister for East African Affairs and Mr. John K. Cheruiyot Deputy Minister for East African Affairs.

Mali: Rule by Decree

On 16 January the National Assembly approved a dramatic measure under which all members of the National Assembly resigned and handed over power to President Modeibo Keita to enable him to rule by decree. The reason given for this step by the Assembly was that since July 1967, a 'revolutionary situation exists in the country. The deputies are reported to have said that they have decided to return to the masses. It will be recalled that the country has been experiencing an 'internal revolution' since 18 July 1967 when a new economic policy was launched by the government. Later on the President suspended the activities of the ruling party.

Mauritius: Birth of a New Nation

Mauritius became independent on 12 March. But the achievement of independence has different meanings for the various communities living there. All the groups except Hindus think that freedom might mean substitution of British domination by permanent Hindu domination. It is essential that proper safeguards should be evolved through constitutional measures to assure the minorities of their rights and interests.

It goes to the credit of the Prime Minister, Sir Seeowsagar Ramgoolam, and his Labour Party that genuine efforts are being made to break down community barriers. He is working sincerely for some sort of 'pan-Mauritian movement' to enable the people to widen the horizons of their loyalty. The opposition party, Parti Mauricien Social Democrate, is led by a 33-year-old barrister, Mr. Gaetan Duval. It is supported by the whites and the Creoles. It is in general agreement with the ruling party's domestic policy except in regard to housing and employment.

The country faces urgent problems like unemployment, a soaring population growth (3 per cent a year) and diversification of the economy. At present sugar and its by-products form about 99 per cent of the exports of the country. Plans for developing the tea, tobacco and fishing industries have to be carried out systematically. Much will depend on the spirit of cooperation among the various communities and on the ability of the leaders of the country.

Mauritius will be the 27th member of the Commonwealth.

Nigeria: New Initiative

Nigeria's nine-month-old civil war is entering its most crucial period . Although the Federal camp has the upper hand; it cannot have a quick and decisive victory over the breakaway Biafrans. The latter now depend on the Portuguese, the French and a group of mercenaries for their immediate survival. The Federal camp is characterized by deep differences of opinion. The 'Hawks' in Lagos still maintain the posture of teaching a lesson to the Ibos. They argue that the military pressure on Biafrans should not be eased at this juncture. The Ibos fear that a ceasefire would be followed by another series of massacres.

Both sides have toughened their attitudes after the visit of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Arnold Smith, to Lagos. Lagos has rejected his proposal for stationing a Commonwealth police unit to effect a ceasefire. However, a programme of gradual disengagement should be formulated. It is reported that Canada might contribute to the peace-keeping mission if it succeeds. After the failure of its November mission there does not seem to be any sign of the OAU taking any new step. The UN also cannot intervene in this essentially domestic affair of Nigeria.

South Africa: Recent Developments

The recent cabinet reshuffle by the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has been interpreted by observers as a warning to the "Vikrampte" section of the Afrikaner ruling Nationalist Party which stands for intensification of apartheid and isolation of South Africa. The Right-wing leader, Dr. Albert Hertzog, now retains the Ministry of Health only. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, which was also held by him, has been given to Mr. M.C. Van Rensberg.

Mr. Jacobs Johannes Fouche was elected on 19 February as the new President of South Africa. Earlier, he was Minister of Agricultural Technical Services. He was the only candidate nominated for the election. He is the second President of the Republic.

Recently there was a move in South Africa to make Parliament a body consisting only of whites' representatives. A government-appointed commission in its report recommended that in the State Parliament the coloured mixed race population should not have any representation at all. It has urged abolition of the system under which the coloured in the Cape province—where the largest number of South Africa's 1,600,000 coloureds live—are represented by whites on the Provincial Council. It also proposed legislation to prohibit multi-racial membership of political parties. This measure would be a blow to the small liberal and progressive parties which have some non-white members. Another recommendation relates to the powers and scope of the existing Coloured Peoples Representative Council. It calls for the enlargement of the powers of this body so as to convert it into a largely elected "coloured Parliament". The report is virtually certain to become law.

The South African Government took new steps to close a loophole in its law against racially mixed marriages. A bill was introduced in Parliament which stipulates that racially mixed marriages entered into outside South Africa by men who are either South African citizens or domiciled in South Africa will be considered void inside the country. Thus the Mixed Marriages Act which prohibits marriages between whites and non-whites inside South Africa has been extended in its scope as it will also invalidate mixed marriages contracted abroad.

UN and South Africa

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has again called on the member nations to sever diplomatic, commercial, military and other relations with South Africa to force the latter to abandon its policy of apartheid. The 32-member commission declared that apartheid is "a crime against humanity". Mr. Manouchehr Ganji of Iran, who prepared a report on conditions in South Africa, South-West Africa and Rhodesia, said the non-white people lived in these areas "in a condition of slavery". His report shows that "most African families live on an income much less than that required for mere subsistence while their European counterparts earn salaries high enough to lead a very comfortable life". He asserted that the Southern African situation was "rapidly deteriorating—literally from day to day". It will lead to greater violence in this part of the continent. Mr. Ganji said international action must be stepped up to prevent the explosive conditions from worsening. Although action by the Security Council was crucial it was not all. Several other measures should be adopted to assist and strengthen political movements in these countries. He also recommended the creation "of a grand jury of legal experts for the protection of the life, personal safety and rights of the inhabitants of South-West Africa". Mr. Ganji has been asked by the commission to continue his survey of "policies and practices of racial discrimination" in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique.

Speaking on 20 February before the Security Council, which was considering the South-West Africa question, India's Permanent Representative, Mr. G. Parthasarthi, urged it to impose economic sanctions against South Africa as the only way to compel it to release 33 South-West Africans who had been sentenced to severe terms of imprisonment on charges of terrorism. Mr Parthasarthi said diplomatic methods would not succeed in bringing the South African Government to "come to its senses". He said "the so-called trial was a sheer political vendetta against the heroic South-West Africans whose only so-called crime was to challenge the illegal occupation of their land by the racist regime of Pretoria". The Indian delegate said South Africa could persist in its blatant defiance of the UN only because it was assured that some of its friends and allies would not agree to any coercive action. He declared : "My delegation is, therefore, prepared to throw its full weight behind any resolution which calls for sanctions against South Africa".

On 26 February the African Supreme Sports Council representing 32 African countries approved unanimously a boycott of the 1968 Mexico City Olympics because a racially mixed team had been allowed to participate in it by the International Olympic Committee. The Council's communique said it "today unanimously decided on the withdrawal of all the African countries from the Olympic Games to be held in Mexico

City". The Council's Executive Bureau pointed out that the decision was in protest against South Africa's present policy of racial discrimination in sports which is a violation of the fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter.

Arms for South Africa

The question whether Britain should sell arms to South Africa came up again in recent months. The British cabinet was severely divided over the issue. The Security Council had passed resolutions in 1963 and 1964 insisting on imposing an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. The Conservative Government at that time interpreted the UN resolutions to mean that Britain should not sell those weapons which might be used for suppressing the liberation movements in the territories which had yet to become independent. Prime Minister Wilson is reported to be in favour of continuing the embargo. His colleagues, especially Mr. George Brown, felt that if France had no qualms about selling arms to Johannesberg Britain should not have any. A sum of about £40 million is involved in the decision—no small sum for the present government at a time when its imports are rising and exports falling.

Despite the government's post-1964 ban, arms continued to flow into South Africa with the obvious connivance of the government. The excuse given was that the pre-1964 contracts were still being implemented. By the end of last year the South African government had asked for renewal of the contracts which were expiring. Johannesberg set a deadline by saying that "if we do not get a firm answer by this date (31 December 1967) we shall take our business elsewhere".

Mr. Wilson said in the Commons on 18 December: "The government have completed their examination of the supply of defence equipment to South Africa and have decided that their policy on this matter, namely to conform to the Security Council resolution of 18 June 1964, remains unchanged". In Washington, the State Department spokesman said on 19 December that the US would maintain the present embargo on shipment of arms to South Africa.

According to reports appearing in the *Observer* (London) Zambia's President, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, has asked President de Gaulle to explain France's policy of selling arms to South Africa. No reply has yet been given to the Zambian President. This is the first challenge from an African Head of State to France for its continued violation of the UN arms ban. It is reported that France has agreed to supply the Portuguese with naval vessels and South Africa with submarines, aircraft and other types of weapons.

China in Africa

China's influence in Africa declined further in 1967. Partly because of its pre-occupation with its so-called cultural revolution it could do little to arrest this process. At the United Nations General Assembly on 28 November, 19 African countries voted against China's admission whereas two years earlier only nine African members had cast a negative vote.

China's stock was already low in 1966 after a wave of anti-Peking feeling which led to the expulsion of the Chinese from Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Ghana. Last year African antipathy grew because of the excesses of the cultural revolution and China's disregard of accepted rules of diplomatic conduct, especially in the treatment meted out to foreign diplomats in Peking. There was also resentment against Chinese double-dealing over the trade sanctions applied by African countries against South Africa. These were being circumvented by Peking despite its propaganda support for the campaign.

China's only outstanding political and propaganda success in Africa during 1967 was the signing of an agreement on 5 September with the Tanzanian and Zambian governments to build the Tanzanian-Zambian railway. Groups of Chinese engineers arrived in Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka at the end of December to start surveys for the 1,000-mile line, which will cost an estimated £100 million.

China has felt itself free to support rebel or subversive movements, some of which are committed to the overthrow of established African governments. For example, a group of rebels which entered Malawi in October, led by a former Minister, Yatuta Chisiza, were found to be carrying Chinese weapons. The Chinese have also intervened in the Rhodesian problem by supporting one of the rival nationalist groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The other party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, enjoys Soviet support

During 1967 the Chinese were mainly concerned with the completion of existing aid agreements rather than undertaking new commitments. The main exceptions to this rule were the economic and technical co-operation agreement signed with Mauritania in February and the trade agreement with Zambia in April. Zambia was also granted a £6,000,000 interest-free loan in June.

The Language Issue in India

SADIQ ALI

PERHAPS there is no country in the world where the language issue is as difficult and complicated as it is in India. To understand it let us first grasp the basic facts.

India's struggle for political freedom produced awakening in many spheres of national life. A struggle for freedom rouses a nation to its profound depths. It does not leave untouched a single important aspect of national life. It is an aggressive, defiant self-expression not only in the political field but also in social and cultural life. In the later stages of India's struggle for freedom the English language, which was the medium of instruction at all levels of the educational system and also the language of administration, began to appear as the symbol of slavery. It is true that it opened the door for knowledge of various kinds but it helped the alien ruling power to instil in the Indian people a sense of cultural inferiority. It also created a class of educated men who, with certain exceptions, formed a privileged class cut off from the mass of Indian humanity sunk in poverty and ignorance. It was natural, therefore, that when the masses went into action in the fight for freedom the language they spoke at home and in intercourse with their fellow men in the daily business of living should acquire prominence. A fighter for freedom could not address them in a language they did not understand. The languages of the people, therefore, acquired a new importance.

According to the census of India, 1961, there are 1,652 languages and dialects in India. But the number of developed languages with a high literary tradition is 14 as is mentioned in the Constitution of India. Most of these languages are spoken by many millions of people, in some cases running into 70 or 80 million, even more, but these are all regional languages. If these regional languages replaced English, India from the language standpoint would be split into many parts, each incomprehensible to the other in the absence of any uniting link. In the preindependence period English was the uniting link. If this link is snapped in free India it is of crucial importance that we find a substitute link.

It is this which is the essence of the language problem in India today. Mahatma Gandhi, the supreme leader of the freedom movement in its later stage, was fully conscious of this difficulty. He found that one of the important languages in India, that is Hindi, was spoken by the largest group of people in the country. It is spoken in all its varieties by some 40 per cent of the population of India. The Hindi spoken by all these millions is not a standardised language but the basic structure and the grammar is the same. Gandhiji sought to popularise Hindi as the national language of India. He called it Hindustani to distinguish it from two particular forms of it which depended mainly on Sanskrit or Persian for their growing vocabulary. He created institutions for spreading the language of Hindi or Hindustani in areas where it was not the language of the people. The idea of Hindi as the national language of India became a part of India's struggle for freedom. The content of freedom was widening so that it meant not just political emancipation but also cultural and economic freedom. This had powerful support from many quarters.

When India became free the question of India's national language came up for serious consideration. The Constituent Assembly, formed as a consequence of British withdrawal from India, was engaged in hammering out a Constitution for India based on democratic principles. Among the issues before it was the question of India's national language. English was the official language during British rule. It was spoken or understood by some two per cent of the Indian population. It is true this two per cent population formed the intelligentsia of the country. The ruling class, the entire bureaucracy which carried on the administration of the country, came from it. So also lawyers, doctors, engineers and most of the teachers. English was also the language of commerce and industry as also of the judiciary. The democratic aspirations of the vast bulk of the Indian people were, however, in conflict with this privileged position of the English knowing small minority. It was necessary for their fulfilment that the languages of India acquired their rightful place in the new democratic scheme of things. But it all came up against one serious difficulty. If English was removed at one stroke what would take its place? Hindi was spoken, it is true, by some 40 per cent of India's population but the remaining 60 per cent had yet to learn it. Ordinary people might learn it in an elementary way but those who have important work to do in administrative or in other fields should acquire some mastery of the language.

This position did not exist at the time India became free. Some time must, therefore, elapse before Hindi became an effective medium of expression in non-Hindi areas. There was, however, another and a potentially more powerful source of doubt and hesitation in giving Hindi the status of India's national language in place of English. The world today is dominated by science and all its discoveries. The intricate texture of modern life is not expressed, it was argued, in Hindi or for that matter in any Indian language. Would not the country, it was asked, sacrifice economic growth and scientific advance on the alter of a 'nationalist' idol? After all this argument and counter-argument a unanimous decision was arrived at by the Constituent Assembly which was embodied in the Constitution of India. While it proclaimed that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi it laid down that for a period of 15 years from the commencement of the Constitution the English language shall continue to be used for all official purposes of the Union. It had also provided for the appointment of a commission from time to time in order to ascertain the progress made in the use of the Hindi language for the official purposes of the Central Government.

The commission would also go into other questions particularly the language of communication between the Union and the States or between one State and another. The commission in making the recommendations would, it was also laid down, pay special regard to "the industrial, cultural and scientific advancement of India and the just claims and the interests of persons belonging to non-Hindi-speaking areas in regard to public services". It was also provided that the work of the "Supreme Court and the High Court would be carried on in the English language until Parliament by law otherwise provided". The Constitution also provided that it was open to the State legislatures to use regional or State languages for official purposes of the States to the extent they desired from time to time. There was also the problem of the linguistic minorities. While each State had a language of its own, there was also almost in every State a proportion of the population which did not speak that language. Safeguards were provided for these linguistic minorities.

From this brief summary of the provisions in the Constitution it is evident how complex the language issue was. The question had to be considered principally from two points of view, viz. educational and administrative. The basic policy of the country has been that Hindi should be encouraged as also the other 14 important State languages. These 14 languages should be the medium of work in the 17 States of India and some Union territories. In regard to education it was clear from the beginning that the medium in primary schools should be the mother tongue of the student.

The language commission reiterated the need to implement the language provisions of the Constitution at the all-India level. Any adjustments necessary for meeting any practical difficulties could in its opinion be made without amending the constitutional framework. It dealt with a whole variety of matters connected with the language problem in the country. There were two members of the commission who on the basic issue of the official language at the Union level expressed the view that English should continue to be the official language and also the medium of instruction at the university level far beyond the target date of 1965, both on account of the practical difficulties involved for non-Hindi speaking people and the inherent richness and value of the English language which has become a world language. The report restarted the controversy which appeared to have been settled when the framers of the Constitution after lengthy discussions had arrived at the unanimous decision which was embodied in the Constitution. Voices were raised, especially in the non-Hindi areas, against Hindi being made the official language of the Union. That, it was argued, involved discrimination and put a heavy burden on States whose regional language was not Hindi. They also desired that the all-India services should be recruited on the basis of the official language of the Union continuing to be English and that any other course would give rise to acute discontent among those adversely affected by it.

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution a committee of Parliament on official language was constituted in 1957. Its report was submitted in April 1959. The report suggested that after 1965 when Hindi became the principal official language English should be used as a subsidiary language for the purposes to be specified by Parliament and for as long as necessary. In the opinion of the committee a democratic government cannot continue to function indefinitely in a language which is understood by only a fraction of the population. Official work should, therefore, be transacted in the linguistic media most widely understood by the people. The committee accepted the importance of English. Its gradual replacement in official work by Hindi and the regional languages did not mean severance of their ties with English. It must continue to have a special place in the intellectual and scientific fields and as a means of international contacts. Advanced students of science and technology should be familiar with one or two foreign languages. English had not only a rich literature which is intimately connected with the whole body of Western thought and culture but is at present the most important vehicle of scientific and technical information. It was also the most widespread language in the world today. The committee wanted the switch-over to Hindi to be regulated so that it caused the least inconvenience to non-Hindi areas in the country.

There was a great debate in Parliament on the language question. It was in this debate that Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru made two memorable speeches in which in order to allay the apprehensions of the non-Hindi-speaking areas he gave an assurance that Hindi would not be imposed on any part of the country and that English would be an associate additional language for as long as the non-Hindi speaking areas wanted it. He, however, stressed the fact that once the regional languages became the media of instruction there would be a tremendous change in the linguistic scene. Educational and other work would then be progressively carried on in State languages. That would bring the people into greater emotional contact with what government did. With the clarifications and assurances offered by Mr. Nehru the Language Bill was passed. The Official Languages Act prescribes that "notwithstanding the expiration of the period of fifteen years from the commencement of the Constitution, the English language may, as from the appointed day, continue to be used, in addition to Hindi—(a) for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before that day; and (b) for the transaction of business in Parliament."

This did not end the controversy. There was a demand that the Nehru assurances should be embodied in an Act of Parliament.

The language question was also considered at various other levels. The educational authorities gave serious thought to it. There were conferences of Vice-Chancellors, of State Education Ministers and the like. The question was also considered in the National Integration Council. The language issue, it was increasingly felt, if not solved properly and effectively, would be a source of national weakness endangering the very unity of the country. As a result of these various consultations it was generally agreed that the three-language formula was the right remedy for many language difficulties. This formula if properly implemented would strengthen national unity. It would equalise the burden between the

Hindi and non-Hindi-speaking arers. The three-language formula means that in the Hindi-speaking areas, students would learn not only Hindi but also English and one other language especially belonging to non-Hindi areas. The non-Hindi speaking areas would learn their own regional languages plus English and Hindi. The regional languages progressively would become the media of instruction at the college and university levels.

The Union Government, in response to the demand for embodying Nehru's assurances on the language issue in an Act of Parliament, decided to introduce a bill for the purpose. This bill after a great deal of discussion became an Act of Parliament towards the end of 1967. There was, however, a great deal of controversy about a certain resolution which accompanied the bill. The resolution provided that after recruitment a working knowledge of Hindi will be required for an English-knowing person ; similarly, a working knowledge of English will be necessary for a Hindi-knowing person. The new controversy in the country centres round this point in the resolution, i.e. compulsory knowledge of either Hindi or English for entrance into the central services. It did not contemplate compulsory knowledge of both languages before recruitment. There is a section of opinion which has pointed out that compulsory knowledge of either English or Hindi opens out the possibility of widening the gulf between Hindi-speaking and non-Hindi-speaking areas. It imposes an unequal burden on non-Hindi areas inasmuch as they will have to learn both Hindi and English which are new languages to them. It also maintains that as the resolution is worded the administration will have two kinds of people—those who either know English well or Hindi well. That would not, according to them, contribute to unity in administration. They want steps to be taken which will equalise this burden and ensure equality of opportunity in the administration and other fields.

Effective implementation of the three-language formula throughout the country has been suggested as one major step for equalising the burden on Hindi and non-Hindi-speaking areas. The acceptance of all Indian languages as the medium for U. P. S. C. examinations is another major step to reduce inequality. But all this has not closed the controversy. Doubt has been expressed in some quarters about the need for the three-language formula or the possibility of its effective implementation. The leadership of the country is engaged today in dispelling what fears still exist on the language question.

What has been said here is a cool objective statement of the language controversy in India. Those who are directly affected by one or other aspect of the language controversy feel passionately about it. Passionate feeling in different regions creates an atmosphere of tension in the country. This tension at times takes ugly forms. Democracy provides a way of solving problems and controversies through free and peaceful discussion. However, when a problem rouses contradictory passions, special restraint is necessary for finding the right solution.

The question of language is very much connected with the unity of India. It has in it the potentiality of both dividing the country and uniting it. The whole effort is to see that it is solved in a manner which will foster the unity and integrity of India. The question of language has also many economic and cultural implications especially for vast numbers of the newly educated young men and women of India. It is natural for millions of young boys and girls who are receiving education to look for conditions which will ensure them a rightful place in the political, economic and cultural life of the country.

INDIA

Total population : 439,072,582 (according to 1961 census)

Number of persons speaking languages specified in Schedule VIII of the Constitution.

Language	*Persons speaking it*
1. Assamese	68,03,465
2. Bengali	3,38,88,939
3. Gujarati	2,03,04,464
4. Hindi	13,34,35,360
5. Kannada	1,74,25,827
6. Kashmiri	19,56,115
7. Malayalam	1,70,15,782
8. Marathi	3,32,86,771
9. Oriya	1,57,19,398
10. Punjabi	1,09,50,826
11. Sanskrit	2,544
12. Tamil	3,05,62,706
13. Telugu	3,76,68,132
14. Urdu	2,33,23,518

Percentage of Hindi-speaking persons	30.40%
Percentage of Urdu-speaking persons	5.31%

African Delegates to UNCTAD-II

The following delegates from Africa participated in UNCTAD-II in New Delhi:

ALGERIA:

H.E. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Head of the Delegation); H.E. Belaid Abdeslam, Minister of Industry & Energy, (Deputy Head of the Delegation); Alternate Representatives: Mr. Layachi Yaker, Director of Economic, Cultural & Social Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Raouf Boudjakdji, Head of International Organisations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Idriss Djazairi, Head of Economics & Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Mohammed Aberkane, Deputy Director of Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Houcine Djoudi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations at New York; Mr. Arslan Benkritly, Charge de Mission in the Algerian Office of Agriculture & Commerce; Mr. Mohammed Larbi, Counsellor in the Ministry of Industry & Energy; Mr. Mahfoud Zerouta, Secretary General of the Algerian Development Agency; Mr. Ghazi Hidouci,Charge de Mission in the Bureau of Planning and Economic Research; Mr. Mohammed Lamine Alouane, Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva; Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, Secretary, Embassy, New Delhi; Mr. Abderrammane Remili, Charge de Mission at the Bureau of Planning & Economic Research; Mr. Ahmed Kerras, Director of Research in the Central Bank of Algeria; Mr. Nourredine Bakalem, Charge de Mission in the National Bureau of Customs; Mr. Nourreddine Moussaoui, Secretary in the Economic & Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Moustapha Kettab, Secretary in the Division of International Organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BURUNDI:

H.E. Mr. Barnace Kanyaruguru, Minister of Plan; Mr. Aloys Ntamgara, Director, International Trade & Industries, Ministry of Economy; Mr. Simeon Sibomana, Director, Treaties & Cooperation Ministry.

CAMEROON:

M. Vincent Efon, Ministre du Commerce et de l 'Industrie (Chef de la delegation); M. Timothee Mpanjo, Secretaire General, Ministere du Commerce et de l' Industrie (Adjoint an Chef de la delegation); M. Quam Dikoko, Counseller of Ambassade, Charge des questions economiques, Repeam Onu; M. Jean-Baptiste Beleoken, Directeur des

Produits de Base, Ministere du Commerce et de i' Industrie; M. Paul Mbock, Directeur des Relations Economiques, Exterieur au Ministere du Commerce et de l' Industrie; M. Njountche, Directeur Adjoint du Commerce Exterieur, Ministere du Commerce et de 1 'Industrie; M. Mgbwa, Directeur Adjoint du Controle, Ministere des Finances; M. Albert Ndoung, Sous-Directeur du Plan, Ministere du Plan et du Development; M. Alexis Boum, Chief de Service des Relations Economiques Internationales, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres; M. Mikwa Mbette, Service des Prix; M. Ngassa, Administrateur Civil en service au Cameroun Occidental.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:

S.E.M. Alexandre Banza, Ministre 'Etat' Charge des Finances et de 1 'Economie Nationale (Chef de la delegation); M. Louis Alazoula, Secretaire d'etat au Development (Chief adjoint de la delegation); S.E.M. Roger Guerillot, Ambassadeur, Representant Permanent a la Communaute Economique Europeenne; M. Bernard-Christian Ayandho, Haut-Commissaire au Plan at a 1 'Assistance Technique; M. Francois Pehoua, Directeur des Contributions Directes et des Assurances; M. Casimir Abemango, Chef du Service du Commerce Exterieur.

CHAD:

S.E.M. Abdoulaye Lamana, Ministre de 1 'Economie et des Transports (Chef de la delegation); S.E.M. Adoum Aganaye, Ambassador, Bruxelles; M. Mahamat Gabdou, Directeur du Commerce et de 1 'Industrie; M. Ahmed Mahamat Dadji, Charge des Affaires Economiques au Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres.

CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF):

S.E.M. Jean di Lutete Umba, Vice-Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur (Chef de la delegation pendant son Sejour a N. Delhi); Mr. Andre Kazadi, Secretaire General au Commerce Exterieur (Chef adjoint de la Delegation); S.E.M. Leonard Mulamba, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiare a New Delhi; Mr. Zephirin Konde, Conseiller au Cabinet du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur; Mr. Gustave Mulenda, Premier Secretaire d 'Ambassade a Berne; Mr. Alidor Musangu, Directeur au Ministere de l' Agriculture; Mr. Baruti, Technician a la Banque Nationale du Congo; Mr. Leon Musafiri, Directeur au Commerce Exterieur; Mr. Jules Sambwa, Conseiller a la Presidence de la Republique; Mr. Timothee Mbela, Sous-Directeur au Ministere des Transports et Communications; Mr. Mpembele, Sous-Directeur au Ministere de 1 'Economie Nationale et de 1 'Industrie; Mr. Augustin Lekonga, Premier Secretaire d 'Ambassade a New York; Mr. Ildephonse Musampa, Chef de Bureau au Commerce Exterieur; Mr. Alphonse Kumbu, Chef de Bureau aux Affaires Etrangeres; Mr. Bile, Inpsecteur des Finances; Mr. Ferdinand Boundji, Attache de Cabinet au Ministere des Terres, Mines et Energie; Mr. Jacques Daniel Bongoma, Conseiller au Cabinet du President de la Republique 92.10 fevrier; Mr. Francois Matonda Sakala, Chef de Cabinet Adjoint au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur (2-10 fevrier).

ETHIOPIA:

H.E. Mr. Abebe Reta, Minister of Commerce & Industry (Head of the Delegation); Mr. Assefa Gabre Mariam, Ambassador of Ethiopia in India (Deputy Head of the Delegation); Mr. Tekle Haimanot Gabre Mariam, Assistant Minister of Commerce; Mr. Bekele Endeshaw, Assistant Minister of Commerce; Mr. Yohannes Habtu, Assistant Minister of Commerce; Mr. Birhanu Wakoya, Director General of Commerce; Mr. Wolde Mariam Girma, Director General of Commerce; Mr. Kifle Belai, Counsellor, Imperial Embassy, New Delhi.

GABON:

M. Kassa Mapsi, Ministre Economie Nationale; M. Georges Koudou, Directeur des Affaires Economiques; M. Simon Peter, Premier Conseiller; M. Pierre Leroux, Directeur des Douanes; M. Julienne, Conseiller; M. Pierre Fanguinoveny.

GAMBIA:

Hon. Sherrif M. Dibba, Minister of Finance; Mr. Horace Reginald Monday, Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Finance; Mr. Muhamad Musa Jallow, Chairman, Gambia Oilseeds Marketing Board.

GHANA:

Mr. F. Ribeiro-Ayeh, Commissioner, Ministry of Trade; H. E. Major-General S.J. Otu, High Commissioner to India; H. E. Mr. K.B. Asante, Ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Organisation in Geneva; Mr. F.W. Beecham, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Trade; Mr. K.N. Arkaah, Director of Economic Relations Division, Ministry of External Affairs; Mr. Y.K. Quartey, Commissioner for Shipping, Ministry of Communications; Mr. A.E.K. Ofori-Atta, Counsellor, High Commission, India; Mr. J.P.B. Baffoe, Senior Commercial Officer, Ministry of Trade; Mr. G. K. Hagan, Economics Officer, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Mr. M.Y. Asomaning, Commercial Attache, Permanent Mission. Geneva; Mr. J.E.B. Haizel, Commercial Officer, Ministry of Trade; Mr. Mohamed Alhassan, Representative of Cocoa Board; Mr. P.K. Agboh, Economic Officer, Ministry of Finance.

GUINEA:

M. Ousmane Baldet, Secretaire d' Etat au Ministere d'Etat, Charge du controle financier; M. Berete Framoi, Secretaire general de la Commission des licences; M. Boubacar Diabate, Premier Secretaire, Ambassade de Guinee au Caire; M. Sekou Top, Attache Commercial, Ambassade de Guinee a Bonn.

IVORY COAST:

S.E.M. Bedie Konan, Ministre des Affaires Economiques et Financieres (Chief de Delegation); S.E.M. Mohamed Diawara, Minister du Plan, (Chef Adjoint de Delegation); S.E.M. Koffi Aoussou, Ambassadeur de Cote d' Ivoire en Belgique (Chef Adjoint de Delegation); M. Clement Anet Bile, Viee-President de l' Assemblee National; M. Siaka Coulibably, Directeur du Commerce Exterieur; M. Doumbia Abou, Directeur des Assurances; M. Amethier Jean-Baptiste, Directeur des Finances Exterieures; M. Amadou Traore, Conseiller de l'Ambassade de Cote d 'Ivoire a New York; M. Jean Mande, Directeur des Dauanes; M. Mamadou Toure, Counseiller Technique au Ministere de l' Agriculture; M. Gahoussou Ouattara, Charge des Relations Exterieurs a la Caisse de Stabilisation des Productions Agricoles; M. Abouanou Kouame, Attache de l'Ambassade de Cote d' Ivoire en Belgique; M. Sibi Gbehou, Ministere du Plan; M. Daubrey Auguste, Ministere du Plan.

KENYA:

The Honourable Mwai Kibaki, Minister for Commerce & Industry (Head of the delegation); Mr. Leonard Matthew Kabetu, Director of Trade and Supplies, Ministry of Commerce & Industry; Mr. Arvind Govind Barve, Assistant Director of Trade & Supplies, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Mr. James Ombere Ockotch, Commercial Attache, Kenya Embassy in Cairo; Mr. Raphael Charles Makokha, Commercial Attache, Ministry of Commerce & Industry; Mr. Peter Ndungu, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Laxman Valji Bhanderi, Marketing Research Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

LIBERIA:

M.D. Franklin Neal (Head of the delegation); M. Lami Kawah; M. Nathaniel E. Marsh; M. Joseph Mensah.

LIBYA:

Mr. Ibrahim El-Bakbak, Under Secretary, Ministry of Economy & Trade (Head of the delegation); Mr. Issa El-Kablawi, Director of Economical Department, Ministry of Planning & Development; Mr. Shukri Ghanim, Deputy Director of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economy & Trade; Mr. Mohamed Elbahi, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Mohamed Banon, Chief of Section, Ministry of Industry; Mr. Mazin Addhm, Official, Research Department, Bank of Libya.

MADAGASCAR:

S.E.M. J. Rabemananjara, Ministre d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres (Chef de delegation); S.E.M.V. Miadana, Ministre des Finances et du Commerce; M.J. Razafimbahiny, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres der Affaires Africaines et des Affaires, Economiques Exterieures; Son Excellence M.A. Razafindrabe, Ambassadeur Representant Permanent de Madagascar aupres de la C.E.E. a Bruxelles; M.R. Rajohnson, Secretaire General du Comite Interministerial de Coordination des Relations Internationales; M. J. J. Maurice, Chef de Service a la Direction des Affaires, Economiques du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres;

M.D. Robson, Directeur de l'Industrie au Ministere de l'Industrie et des Mines; M. Ratsifaritana, Chef de Service des Echanges Exterieurs au Ministere des Finances et au Commerce; M.F. Rasamoely, Directeur du Tresor; M.I. Janvier, Administrateur-Civil au Ministere des Finances et du Commerce; M.M. Ranaivo, Directeur du Bureau de la Commercialisation et la Stabilisation des Prix du Riz au Ministere de l' Agriculture de l' Expansion Rurale et du Revitaillement; M. L. Rasolomanana, Administrateur Civil au Commissariat General au Plan.

MALAWI:

H. E. Mr. A. K. Banda, Minister for Economic Affairs; Mr. A. J. P. Monk, Under Secretary, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Mr. A. W. Lovatt, Senior Economist, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Mr. W. C. Salima, Trade Officer, Ministry of Economic Affairs.

MALI :

S. E. M. Louis Negre, Ministre des Finances, (Chef de la delegation) ; M. Oumar Coulibaly, Directeur de Cadinet du Ministere dn Commerce ; M. Seydou Traore, Conseller Technique a la Presidence ; M. Sekou Sangare, Conseiller technique a la Presidence ; M. H. Bazzin, Conseiller Technique au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres.

MAURITANIA :

S. E. M. Mohamed Salem Ould, M'Khaitirat, Ministre des Finances et du Commerce (Chef de la Delegation) ; S. E. M. Racine Toure, Ambassadeur pres de la Republique Federale d'Allemagne et de la Cee ; M. Cheibani Ould Heiba, Conseiller Economique et Financier de la Republique ; M. Abdoul Karim Kane, Directeur du Commerce.

MOROCCO :

H. E. Moulay Ahmed Alaoui, Minister of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Artisans ; H. E. Mr. Abdelwahab Laraki, Secretary of State to the Prime Minister; H. E. Mr. Abdellah Lamrani, Ambassador of Morocco in India ; H. E. Mr. Abderrahmane Filali, Secretary General of Commerce.

NIGERIA :

H. E. Alhaji Shetima Ali Monguno, Nigeria's Commissioner for Trade (Head of the delegation) ; H. E. Alhaji Sule Kolo, Ambassador, Permanent Representative, Geneva (Deputy Head of the delegation) ; Mallam I. M. Damcida, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Trade, Lagos; Mr. J. P. O. Adeoye, Head of Economic Division, Federal Ministry of Trade, Lagos ; Mr. M. T. Adebanjo, First Secretary, Permanent Mission, Geneva ; Mr. A. O. Olumide, Assistant Secretary, Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos ; Mr. E. C. Jubuike, Assistant Secretary, Federal Ministry of Industries, Lagos ; Mr. M. T. Gbashah, Second Secretary, High Commissioner's Office, New Delhi ; Mr. O. B. Assien, Assistant Secretary. Federal Ministry of Finance, Lagos ; Mr. T. B. Oluyide, Head of the Sales Division. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd., Lagos ; Dr. M. H. A. Onitiri, Director, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan University.

RWANDA:

S. E. M. Celestin Kabanda, Ambassadeur a Washington (Chef de la delegation) ; M. Deogratias Gashonga, Directeur general a la Presidence ; M. Thaddee Ntakaburimvano, Directeur general du Plan ; M. Chrysostome Nduhungirehe, Directeur general du Commerce Exterieur ; M. Claver Ryabonyende, Charge des Affaires Economiques et Commerciales, Minister de la Cooperation Internationale et du Plan ; M. Leonidas Munyanshongore, Premier Secretaire d'Ambassade Mission Permanente, New York.

SENEGAL:

S. E. M. Doudou Thiam, Ministre d'Etat Charge des Affaires Etrageres (Chef de la Delegation) ; S. E. M. Habib Thiam, Ministre du Plan et du Development ; S. E. M. Daniel Cabou, Ministre du Commerce, du l' Industrie et de Partisanat ; S. E. M. Ousmane Soce Diop, Ambassadeur du Senegal pres les Nations Unies ; S. E. M. Djim Momar Gueye, Ambassadeur du Senegal en Allemagne Federale; S.E.M. Medoune Fall, Ambassadeur du Senegal en Belgique et pres le Marche commun; S.E.M. Comun Michel Dembele, Directeur de cabinet du Ministre du commerce; M.N. Diawar Sow, Adjoint au Directeur du commerce; M. Saip Sy, Adjoint au Directeur des transports; M. Adama Diallo, Directeur du Mouvement general des fonds; M. Bocar Ly, Conseiller technique au Ministere de 1 'Economie rurale; M. Diodje Faye, Chief Division de la Cooperation technique internationale au Ministere des affaires etrangeres; M. Charles Delgado, Premier secre taire a la Mission permanente du Senegal aupres des Nations Unies;- M. Cheikh Sarr, Directeur des Affaires economiques.

SIERRA LEONE:

H.E. Mr. Joseph A. Wilson, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (Head of the delegation); Mr. Victor D. George, Secretary, Department of Trade, Industry and Agriculture; Mr. Charles Browne-Mark, Deputy Secretary, Economic Planning Division of the National Reformation Council, Secretairat; Mr. Eya E. Mbayo, Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

SOMALIA:

H.E. Honourable Mohamed Ali Daar, Minister of Industry & Commerce (Head of the delegation); H.E. Hon. Abdi Nur Mohamed, Ministry of Finance; Mr. Mohamed Haji Hassan, Ministry of Industry & Commerce; Mr. Mohamed Jama Bodeh, Somaltax, Mogadiscio; Mr. Ali Haji Hashi, Ence, Mogadiscio; Mr. Shakib Scek Mohamoud, Ministry of Industry & Commerce; Mr. Ahmed Haji Hassan, Ministry of Agriculture.

SUDAN:

H. E. Dr. Ahmed El Sayed Hamad, Ministry of Commerce and Supply (Head of the delegation) ; Managing Director, Neilain Bank (Deputy Head of the delegation) ; Sayed Ahmed Salah Bukhari, Ambassador of Sudan; Sayed Mohd El Mamoun, Assistant P. U., Ministry of Commerce ; Sayed El Baghir Yousif, Assistant General Manager, Bank of Sudan ; Sayed Abdel Wahab Tamim, Sudan Consul General, Bombay ; Sayed El Amin Abdel Latif, First Secretary, Sudan Embassy ; Sayed Osman Mustafa, Senior Inspector, Ministry of Finance ; Sayed Abbas Attia, Inspector, Ministry of Industry.

TOGO:

M. Prosper Plackton, Administrateur civil (Chef de la delegation) ; M. Ferdinand Djomeda, Directeur de l' Industrie, Ministere du Commerce, de l' Industrie du Tourisme et du Plan.

TUNISIA :

M. Mansour Moalla, Sous-Secretaire d' Etat au Commerce et l' Industrie (Chef de la delegation) ; M. Chedli Thani, Directeur au Secretariat d'Etat au plan et a l'economie nationale ; M. Slim Benghazi, Ambassador de Tunisie aupres des Nations Unies a Geneve ; M. Ahmed Chtourou, Ministre plenipotentiare aupres des Nations Unies ; M. Chadly Ayari, Doyen de la Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Universite de Tunis ; M. Rachad Ben Ydder, Directeur de la Societe nationale d'investissement ; M. Habib Ben Abdesslem, Administrateur-conseiller au secretariat d'Etat au plan et a l' economie nationale ; M. Toufik Largui, Secretarie d'ambassade ; M. Abdelmagid Dimassi, Chef de service a la Banque centrale de Tunisie ; M. Moheb-Eddine Hamza, Chef de Service, Secretariat d'Etat au Plan et a l' economie nationale ; M. Mohamed Baccar, Charge de mission ; M. Ali Djerad, Secretaire d'ambassade.

UGANDA:

Mr. William Wilberforce Kalema, Minister of Commerce and Industry (Head of the delegation) ; H. E. Mr. George W. M. Kamba, High Commissioner to India (Deputy Head of the delegation) ; Mr. Samuel Byoga Rutega, Under Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry ; Mr. Christopher Musoke, Under Secretary, Ministry of Finance ; Mr. Eriphaz Amujal Odeke, Assistant Commissioner for Agriculture ; Mr. George Wycliffe Boazi Gowa, Principal Economist ; Mr. Norman Shalita, Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Works, Communications and Housing ; Mr. Ahmed-Bidandi Katumba, Senior Economist ; Mr. Bogere Kivumbi Ssembatya, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry ; Mr. Stanley Lutabale Takirambudde, Senior Marketing Officer, Ministry of Agriculture ; Mr. James Kohaza, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Finance ; Mr. Henry Josia Balamaze Lwanga, Deputy Chairman, Coffee Marketing Board ; Mr. Paul Marcus Jayarajan, Assistant Governor, Bank of Uganda ; Mr. Charles Opira-Angoma, Executive Officer, Uganda Development Corporation ; Mr. Charles Ndawula, Marketing Officer, Lint Marketing Board ; Mr. George W. Kinuka, Second Secretary, New Delhi ; Miss K. Mulji, Secretary to the Delegation.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC :

H. E. Mr. Hassan Abbas Zaki, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade (Head of the delegation) ; H. E. Mr. Abdel Moneim El Kassouni, Minister of Planning (Head of the Delegation) ; Mr. Hamed El Sayeh, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade (Deputy head of delegation) ; Mr. Mohamed Zaki Shafei, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences ; Mr. Ahmed Said Dewidar, Director General of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade ; Mr. Sherif Lotfi, Member of the Board of Directors, National Bank of Egypt ; Mr. Ahmed Kandeel, Director General of Economy, Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade ; Mr. M. A. Hamdi, Commercial Counsellor, UAR Embassy, New Delhi ; Mr. Ahmed Shoukry El Nahal, Director, Office of Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade ; Mr. Saad Khalil, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Trade ; Mr. Said Talaat Harb, Counsellor, Permanent Mission, Geneva ; Mr. Ahmed Kishti, Secretary to H. E. the Minister of Planning.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA :

Hon. A. M. Maalim, Minister for Commerce and Industries (Head of the delegation) ; H. E. Mr. S. A. Salim, High Commissioner, New Delhi (Deputy Head of the delegation) : H. E. Mr. E. P. Mwaluko, Ambassador, Peking ; Mr. M. G. Abdullah, Commissioner for Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry ; Mr. W. E. Waldron-Ramsey, Counsellor, Tanzania Permanent Mission to the United Nations ; Dr. J. R. Modi, Senior Economist, Treasury ; Mr. S. K. G. Visram, Senior Industrial Officer, Ministry of Commerce and Industry ; Mr. C. D. Mbapila, First Secretary, Tanzania High Commission, New Delhi; Mr. G. A. Cheyo, Assistant Commercial Officer, Ministry of Commerce and Industries ; Mr. A. A. Abbass, Third Secretary, Tanzania Embassy, Paris ; Mr. T. M. Chacha, Assistant Marketing Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives ; Mr. C. M. Nyirabu, Economist, Ministry of Economic Development and Planning ; Mr. S. T. Maliti, State Attorney, Attorney General's Chambers ; Mr. D. T. S. Ballali, Economist, Bank of Tanzania ; Mr. J. F. Rweyemamu, Special Lecturer, University College, Dar-es-Salaam.

UPPER VOLTA :

S. E. M. Tiemoko Marc Garango, Ministre des Finances et du Commerce (Chef de la delegation) ; M. K. Lazare Sore, Directeur du Commerce (Chef adjoint de la delegation) ; M. Pierre Tahita, Directeur du Plan ; M. Emmanuel Zongo, Conseiller Commercial ; M. Jean-Pierre Tapsoba, Inspecteur des Douanes ; M. Marcel Ouedraogo, Secretaire des Affaires Etrangeres.

ZAMBIA :

H. E. Mr. M. J. Chimba, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Foreign Trade (Head of delegation) ; Mr. J. Chisata, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Foreign Trade (Deputy Head of the delegation) ; Mr. J, H. Chileshe, Senior Principal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Foreign Trade ; Mr. K. Chongo, Economist, Ministry of Finance ; Mr. E. S. Kapotwe, Trade Commissioner Designate, London ; Mr. C. C. Chipampata, Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; Mr. P. Kirthisingha, Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

Meeting to Mourn Africans' Death

The Council organised a public meeting at Vithalbhai Patel House on March 9 to mourn the death of three African patriots—Victor Siferani Malambo, James David Dhlamini and Duly Shadreck—executed by the illegal Rhodesian regime. About 200 representatives of voluntary organisations and several African diplomats and nationals attended the meeting which was presided over by Mr. R.K. Khadilkar, Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha. A minute's silence was observed in memory of the martyrs.

In a message to the meeting, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said : "The racist regime of Southern Rhodesia has murdered three African patriots. This foul deed has caused a wave of indignation throughout our country and throughout the world. In Africa's long history of suffering, few events have been marked by such brazen disregard of all canons of civilisation. We hear that, not content with perpetrating this monstrous act, the ruling clique in Southern Rhodesia is proceeding with the execution of other African freedom fighters. I have no doubt that this madness presages the doom of that regime and of all racist doctrines.

"While regretting my inability to take part in the all-party meeting at Vithalbhai Patel House on Saturday evening, I join you in paying tribute to the African martyrs. They have not died in vain, for their cause will triumph".

The Vice-President of India, Mr. V. V. Giri, in a message said : "Little wonder, millions of hearts, in India and elsewhere, have been bleeding on learning about the martyrdom of three gallant African soldiers of freedom who laid their youthful lives at the altar of racial equality, human dignity and emancipation from all abnoxious features which tyrannical 'apartheid' connotes. This cold-blooded murder of freedom fighters is evidence of the height of repression and scant respect for the rule of law and the outright denunciation by the present regime in South Rhodesia. The public meeting convened by the Indian Council for Africa for this purpose is, indeed, a singularly appropriate vehicle for voicing the profound grief of the freedom-loving peoples of the world".

Mr. Khadilkar said the Smith regime had posed a threat to the whole freedom-loving community of the world. The monstrous crime committed by it was not unexpected. The lukewarm policy adopted by the British Government, whose sovereignty it had refused to accept, and the clandestine backing by other imperialist powers had helped its survival. They still maintained trade and other relations with the apartheid regime. He said a popular movement should be built up in and outside Africa to pull down the Smith regime.

Mr. J. B. Kripalani, MP, said that his long experience of public life had taught that to be weak was the biggest crime, whether it be an individual or a nation. He asked what the coloured people had done for their own people. It was left to China to mobilize against racialism and it was natural for China which had suffered for so long under white domination. Mr. Kripalani did not want the people to believe that Britain would do anything against the Smith regime. Not even the UN could do anything about it since it was influenced by the big Powers.

The Minister of State for Communications and Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. I.K. Gujral, said the frontiers of freedom were not limited by geographical boundaries. Indian hearts went out to their brethern suffering in Africa. The British Government should try to undo this crime against humanity. The deep indignation of Afro-Asian nations should be so voiced as to isolate those responsible for lynching freedom.

Mr. Hiren Mukerjee, Communist MP, said as long as freedom was in jeopardy, peace would never be complete. He said the whites had always oppressed the coloured people. Racialism was fighting its last-ditch battle and it was for forces of progress to ensure their own victory.

Mr. Hem Barua, MP, said the executions had once again exposed the weakness of the British administration. Mr. Harold Wilson had given mute support to Mr. Ian Smith and the century had been sullied by this act of racial prejudice. The UN was "an important weapon of human justice".

Mr. Alfred Nzo, chief representative of the Asian mission of the African National Congress, said in hanging the patriots the rulers of Rhodesia had committed aggression not only against Zimbabwe but also against the entire African continent. "We accept the challenge and pledge that those responsible will not escape due punishment". He said the British Government by trickery and duplicity had perpetrated the illegal regime in Rhodesia and it must share the blame for the outrageous action.

The meeting, in a resolution moved by Dr. Gopal Singh, MP, General Secretary of the Council, condemned the hangings and said the attitude of the British Government was distressing. Britain was still legally responsible for the administration of Southern Rhodesia but had failed to intervene in time and prevent the executions. The resolution (full text published elsewhere) was signed by all those present at the meeting and will be sent to the UN.

Lunch for UNCTAD Delegates

The President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, gave a lunch in honour of heads of African delegations to UNCTAD-II at Parliament House on March 22.

Twenty-three African countries were represented at the lunch. They were: Sudan, Mr. Mohamed Kailani, Deputy Under-Secretary, Commerce Ministry; Congo, Mr. Charles Maurice Siannard; Ethiopia,Mr. Kifle Belai, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Ethiopia; Nigeria, Mr. Monguno, Minister of Commerce; Mali, M. Seydu Traore, Ambassador; Ghana, Maj-Gen S.J.A. Otu; UAR, Mr. Issa Abdel Latif Sarag Eldin, High Commissioner to India; Tunisia, Mr. Chotorou, Ambassador to the UN; Cameroon, Mr. Ndjountehe, Director, Foreign Trade; Kenya, Mr. K.S.N. Matiba, Permanent Secretary; Guinea, Mr. Berete Pragmoi, Ambassador; Malawi, Mr. G.N. Khofi, Assistant Minister; Libya, Mr. Elkeblawi, Secretary-General, Foreign Trade; Rwanda, Mr. D. Gashonga, Director-General, President's Secretariat; Chad, Mr. Adoum Aganaye, Ambassador to Brussels; Gabon, Mr. Simon Peter, delegate; Senegal, Mr. Diawarson, delegate; Mauritania, Mr. Racine Toure, Ambassador to Germany; Tanzania, Mr. A.A. Maalin, Minister of Commerce; Niger, Fro Mayaki, delegate; Central African Republic, Mr. Gasimir Abemango; Sierra Leone, Mr. J. A. Wilson, High Commissioner to the UN; and Congo (K), M. Kazadi Anbre.

Among the distinguished Indian guests were the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, the Deputy Speaker, Mr. R. K. Khadilkar, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, Mrs. Violet Alva, the Chairman of the Administrative Reforms Commission, Mr. Hanumanthiah, Mr. I.K. Gujral, Minister of State for Communications and Parliamentary Affairs and a member of the Executive Committee of the Council.

The Council was represented by its President, Mr. Asoka Mehta, the Vice-Presidents, Mr. Nath Pai, MP (PSP) and Mr. K. C. Pant, Minister of State for Finance, the General Secretaries, Mr. Gurupadswamy, Minister of State for Food and Agriculture, and Dr. Gopal Singh, MP, and Col. B. H. Zaidi, MP.

Among the Opposition Members of Parliament present were Mr. Hiren Mukerjee (CPI, Lok Sabha), Mr. Bhupesh Gupta (CPI, Rajya Sabha), Mr. Madhu Limaye (SSP), Acharya Kripalani, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, former Chief Minister of U.P., and the Maharani of Patiala.

The lunch was also attended by Mr. S. L. Poplai, Secretary-General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, Dr. J. N. Khosla of the Indian Institute of Public Administration and Mr. G. L. Bansal of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, all of them members of the Council.

Addressing the luncheon meeting, Mr. Desai said the developing countries must largely depend on themselves though they might receive aid to accelerate their progress. They should meet often to discuss their problems and profit by each other's experience. They must also strive to achieve a status of equality with other nations. He expressed the hope that the few African countries which were still not free would soon achieve their independence and they would all work together in freedom. Talking about India's problems, he said the country hoped to achieve food self-sufficiency in three to four years. It must improve its agriculture but could not afford to neglect industrial development.

Replying, the Nigerian Commerce Minister, Mr. A. S. Monguno, highlighted the common problems and aspirations of the developing countries and supported Mr. Desai's suggestion for meeting frequently to find solutions to their problems. The more advanced countries had to make some sacrifice to help the less advanced countries. In this task India could play a vital role. He thanked the Indian Government for the hospitality it had shown to UNCTAD delegates.

Discussion on Indians in East Africa

Dr. Gopal Singh, MP, General Secretary of the Indian Council for Africa, presided over a panel discussion on "Indians in Africa" at India International Centre on March 16. The speakers were Dr. B. N. Antani, MP (Swatantra Party), Dr. Anirudha Gupta, Reader in Commonwealth Studies at the Indian School of International Studies, Mr. Ajit Gopal, a former Hindustan Times correspondent in East Africa, and Mr. H. S. Chhabra, Editor of *Africa Diary.*

Both the panel and the audience were sharply divided on the attitude India should adopt on the problem of Indians in Africa. In his observations, Dr. Gopal Singh called for a balanced view of the problem unswayed by sentiments. He described Dr. Antani's remarks as lop-sided. The trouble was that we had always adopted an attitude of self-righteousness, an attitude of superiority that we were out to civilize the world, etc. and this was now recoiling on us. He deplored the attitude adopted by Indians in East Africa who did not take up Kenya citizenship. Now when they were in the soup they sought our sympathy. He suggested that the Indians in distress should be allowed to settle down in India for some time till they could sort out their problems.

Dr. Anirudha Gupta said there was some ambiguity in our stand, that on the one hand we did not accept the people of Indian origin in Africa as Indians and, on the other, we pleaded on their behalf. Within East Africa itself, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda might be forced to follow Kenya. Dr. Gupta said as a legacy of British colonial policy, the position was that the "Indians need not and did not join the Africans and could not join the Europeans".

Dr. Antani denied as false the charge against Indians in Africa that they were exploiters of Africans. Indians had gone to East Africa with their capital; they were responsible for building up commerce, industry and trade in most African countries; they had 'pioneered' the political and nationalist movement in Africa. Instead of taking up their cause, he regretted that the Government of India and Indian leaders since independence chose to sermonize to them to integrate themselves with Africans.

Mr. Ajit Gopal said Indians themselves were to blame for their present troubles. He accused the Government of living in an unrealistic world, in the dream world of Afro-Asian solidarity. Our leaders did not take a balanced view of developments in African countries. Mr. Chhabra reminded the audience that Asians with British passports had not been asked by the Kenya Government to leave the country, but were going on their own to beat the recent British Immigration Act. By rejecting Kenya citizenship Indians had shown lack of confidence in the Kenya Government and did not therefore deserve our sympathy. He condemned the British attempts to curb the entry of people with British passports. The British Act was a most unprincipled piece of legislation and in complete violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Reception for African Missions

The General Secretary of the Council, Mr. M. S. Gurupadswamy, gave a reception at his house to meet representatives of African missions in Delhi. Among those who attended the reception were Mr. S. A. Salim, High Commissioner of Tanzania, Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, First Secretary of the Algerian Embassy, General Leonard Mulamba, Ambassador of the Congo, and Mr. S. A. S. Bukhari, Ambassador of Sudan.

Mr. Santokh Singh's Visit to Africa

Mr. Santokh Singh, MP, a member of the Council, visited East Africa in January.

Greetings to Mauritius

On the occasion of Mauritian independence, Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, sent a message of greetings to the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Dr. S. Ramgoolam, and a set of books on Gandhi on behalf of the Council.

Angolan Nurse-trainees

Three Angolan women students receiving training in nursing in Goa—B. L. Narciso, D. M. Almeida and G. V. Theresea—visited Delhi and were entertained by the Council.

Bombay Regional Office

Mr. Christopher Musoke, of the Uganda Ministry of Finance and a delegate to UNCTAD, was a guest of the Bombay Regional Office of the Council during his stay in Bombay on his way back to his country.

Executive Secretary's Tour

The Executive Secretary accompanied the Tanzanian delegation to UNCTAD-II on a study tour of Bangalore and Bombay. The group comprised Mr. A. M. Maalim, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, High Commissioner in India, and Mr. S. K. G. Visram, an official of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

They visited the Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd., the Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. and the Indian Telephone Industries. They met the Chief Minister of Mysore, Mr. Nijalingappa. A lunch was given in their honour by the Bangalore branch of the Indian Council for Africa and its President Mr. Virendra Patil, Minister for Public Works.

In Bombay the delegates visited the Bombay Dyeing Ltd. and the jeep factory of Mahindra and Mahindra. Mr. Harish Mahindra, President of the Bombay branch of the Indian Council for Africa, gave a lunch in their honour at the factory. Members of the Export Promotion Council were hosts to the delegates at a dinner.

Visitors

Among the distinguished visitors to the Council and its library were Mr. N. K. Bose, Commissioner for Tribes and Scheduled Castes, Mr. S.K. Dey from the Gandhi Memorial Committee, Mr. Mohammed Kailani from the Sudan Ministry of Commerce and Industry and a delegate to UNCTAD-II. and Abdullah Sidahmed from the Sudan Embassy.

Resolution on Rhodesian Executions

The following is the text of a resolution passed at a meeting organised by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi on March 9 to mourn the death of the three African nationals executed by the illegal Rhodesian regime.

This meeting of representatives of different political parties, trade unions, youth and student organisations, women's associations and social welfare agencies has learnt with shock and dismay the news of the calculated and cold-blooded murder of the three African nationals—Victor Siferani Malambo, James David Dhlamini and Duly Shadreck—in Salisbury by the illegal and racist regime of Ian Smith despite the protests and warnings of men and women of goodwill and civilized governments all over the world.

This meeting is specially distressed to note the failure of the British Government, which is still legally responsible for the administration of Southern Rhodesia, to intervene in time and effectively prevent the executions from taking place.

The meeting condemns the action of the judges of the Rhodesian High Court for pronouncing a judgement in flagrant violation of all norms of law and jurisprudence and contrary to the principles of natural justice.

The meeting appeals to the United Nations and to all its member countries not to countenance complacently the continued existence of the illegal Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia but to take immediate steps involving, if necessary, the use of force to dislodge the usurpers and establish a free and democratic government based on the principle of "one man, one vote."

Book Reviews

A History of Postwar Africa, John Hatch, Methuen, London, 1967.

JOHN Hatch, a well-known writer on African affairs, knows it is foolish to predict the future of Africa. One reason is that events have taken place too fast for the layman anywhere to catch up with them. For instance, within a few years, more than 35 new nations were born. The result is we remain very much in the era of contemporary history trying to fathom the significance of what has just happened.

The writer has therefore made no attempt to predict, though here the danger is that the reader looks back on events with greater knowledge of their consequences. Mr. Hatch has produced a factual story with journalistic ease. Most of the important events he has personally observed.

One interesting feature of the book is the bluntness with which he sizes up people, situations and popular reactions. Thus of the European community of Nairobi he says it was afflicted with "snobbery, false gentility and moral deterioration attendant on that function".

He believes that the fewer the Europeans living in a territory, the less racial tension is there. Race relations were most embittered where large white communities had settled.

He has tried to blow the myth spread by the whites that African society before the coming of Europeans was brutal and chaotic. He says most of it was no doubt primitive but it was highly organised. "...There were many inter-tribal wars, but the deaths involved never remotely reached the slaughter caused by European wars".

Mr. Hatch suggests an apt definition of "racial parity" in East African territories during British rule. In Kenya it meant equality between Europeans and non-Europeans; in Tanganyika it was interpreted as equal numbers from all the races; in Uganda, equal numbers between Africans and non-Africans!

Most subjects, including Kenya, are covered comprehensively so that it is possible to understand what is happening there now and why. He has done well to recognise the part played by Asians in the development of East African countries—in social welfare, educational advance and the fight for political emancipation.

There is a lesson for Kenya in what he says about the exodus of

Europeans from Algeria in the early sixties. "Algeria was l peasant society without upper or middle classes..."

Some assumptions made by the writer are open to ques Southern Rhodesia would have progressed faster and got gr cooperation in that direction if the African nationalist parties The Nationalists were *not* united in Kenya or Zambia — th Rhodesia—and yet they got ahead fast on the road to freedo the "southward tide of African nationalism", but this tide s been controlled at the Zambezi. Again, he is not quite co assumes that Mauritius is getting closer to continental Afric

His assumption that the leadership of Africa passed i of Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda in the eastern part nent after Kwame Nkrumah's overthrow is an oversimplific pan-African trends in leadership.

One would wish Mr Hatch had written something a influence in Africa which at one time was considerable. about Indian influence either, particularly about the In movement and the personality of Jawaharlal Nehru. There useful discussion of African foreign policy, of non-alignmen ideals which led to the formation of the Organisation for Af

The book contains a wealth of information in its 400 mation hard to come by in a single volume. One of its exce is a comprehensive bibliography of recent literature on Afric

The Political Organisation of Unyamwezi, R. G. Abraham University Press, 1967.

The aim of this study is to contribute to the grow knowledge on the nature and modes of working of indigen institutions that have evolved in the pre-industrial and pre- societies of the world. Africa provides an extraordina material for this kind of undertaking.

This study covers political organisation in Unyamwezi before independence in 1961. Unyamwezi covers 35,00 and has a population of 4 lakhs. The author outlines economic framework and examines the origins of the mo system. He then discusses the internal organisation o chiefdoms and villages and the emergence of national politi

What is of special interest is the evidence of the progre sation of the chiefly office which, at one time, had a significance.

The non-time sacred chief is now an executive and a agent of the Central Government. What is now of imp ability to govern, rather than his surviving ritual functio to Dr. Abrahams.

But he has special responsibilities to his people as their chief which may sometimes appear contradictory to his obligations to the Central Government. This study brings out the strains in these and other relationships.

The author argues that the chiefdom system in this part of Tanzania inhabited by the second largest ethnic group in the country has not created powerful constitutional restraints upon its rulers. One important reason is that the system has had so often itself to adapt to new external and internal pressures.

Thus the opening of the country by the Arabs, the growing strength of the greater headmen, the coming of the Germans, the first World War, the establishment of British rule and, latterly, the development of national politics have each in turn exerted a strong influence upon the system.

AJIT GOPAL

Apartheid : Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture, and Information. UNESCO. 1967.

Apartheid is no new subject. It came before the public as early as 1946 when India complained to the UN General Assembly about the discriminatory policies pursued by the South African government. India's complaint was, however, confined to the treatment meted out to the people of Indian origin in South Africa. Since then South Africa's policies of discrimination, commonly known as *apartheid*, have grown in both dimension and intensity.

With the change of government in South Africa in 1948 and coming into power of the National Party, the racial policy took a more serious turn in the sense that it became the declared official policy of the government and a very scientific approach was adopted to the whole issue.

By a series of legislative enactments, viz., the Population Registration Act of 1950, Pass Laws, the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952, the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 and its amendments of 1952,1956, 1957, the Group Areas Act and so on, the government headed by the National Party created a political order which needed for its success reforms of a fundamental nature in the social and educational spheres, education being the *sine qua non* of this policy.

Not unaware of the very significant role played by education in the development and formation of the human personality the white leaders of South Africa had before them the good work done by the dictators of the present century who proved beyond doubt that by pursuing a particular educational policy a desired quality of citizens could be produced.

The book under review contains the conclusions of a study conducted by a committee of experts under the auspices of UNESCO in response to a General Assembly resolution asking UNESCO to examine the effects of the policy of segregation pursued by the government of South Africa in the variouss pheres of human activity. The book is divided into four sections. Each part is devoted to studying the effects of apartheid on education, science, culture and information. Even though the scope of the study is restricted to a mere inquiry into the effects and not to suggest measures to mitigate the harm done by the irrational policy of the country in question, the book is a valuable source of information for those interested in knowing what is going on in South Africa under the guise of "separate development of all races". The book brings to the fore clearly the insincerity and duplicity of the leaders of the National Party in the application of their declared objectives of separate development of all the constituent races of South Africa.

Apartheid, according to the 1947 Election Manifesto of the National Party, "envisages segregating the most important ethnic groups and subgroups in their own areas where every group will be enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit. We endorse the general principle of territorial segregation of the Bantu and the Whites ...... the Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the Whites. The process of detribalization should be arrested ...." And the Population Registration Act of 1950 with its later amendments has classified the South African population into three ethnic groups: White, Coloured and African, the Asians constituting a sub-group in the coloured group.

In order to give the appearance of legitimacy and naturalness to the artificial compartmentalization of society into these divisions the leaders of the National Party sought the aid of education. Their attitude towards the significance of education in the cultivation of an attitude of mind which would accept the new social order which they are trying to create is illustrated by the statements made by two prominent members of the National Party about three years before it came into power.

> As has been correctly stated here, education is the key to the creation of the proper relationship between European and non-European in South Africa ...... *Put native education on a sound basis* and half the racial question is solved...... I say that there should be reform of the whole education system and it must be based on the culture and background and the whole life of the native himself in his tribe... This whole (present) policy is also a danger for our own Western civilization. (p. 27)
>
> We should not give the natives an academic education as some people are too prone to do. If we do this we shall later be burdened with a number of academically trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and *who is going to do the manual labour* in the country? ... I am in thorough agreement with the view that we should so conduct our schools that the *native* who attends those schools *will know that to a* great extent *he*

> *must be the labourer in the country* (p. 27).

What a sad commentary on the real motives of the leaders of the National Party? After these unequivocal statements only the Verwoerds and Vosters could have the audacity of speaking of the "separate and equal development of all the races of South Africa."

What role the state, in other words the government, should play was stated by Mr. W. A. Maree, the Minister of Bantu Education: "Where one has to deal with under-developed peoples, where the state has planned a process of development for those people, and where a university can play a decisive role in the process and direction of that development, it must surely be clear to everyone that the state alone is competent to exercise the powers of guardianship in this field ...... (p. 94)

Once the decision on the type of education to be provided was arrived at steps were taken for its implementation. Except the education of the whites who attend mainly (92 per cent) state schools (p. 33), the education of the other two ethnic groups till now looked after by the local authorities was in 1953 centralized under the Minister of Bantu Affairs, Departments of Coloured and Indian Affairs.

The process of 'development' in the field of education resulted in a gradual increase in the burden of education on the Africans. Whereas the education of whites – compulsory for all in the age-group 4–17 —is financed partly by provincial taxation and partly by central subsidy which is up to 50 per cent (p. 39), the financing of education of African pupils is borne mainly by the Africans themselves, subsidy from the general fund having been fixed at R. 13 million since 1955-56.

As far as the number of Africans receiving education, even though enrolment at the primary level has arisen from 970,239 in 1955 to 1,628,267 in 1962 only a minority go up to higher primary. In fact the percentage of those who reach the higher secondary level in proportion to those enrolled at the primary level has actually fallen (3.47 per cent in 1953 to 3.02 per cent in 1963) (p. 53).

During the past five years—1960-65—only three non-whites were able to graduate in engineering from South African universities: A coloured electrical engineer (1964,) an Indian radio engineer (1965), and an African civil engineer (1962). And even the one African engineering graduate could not get a job within the country. He is serving in Swaziland. This is due to the pattern of employment which is as follows: The menial unskilled jobs are occupied by Africans, the highly skilled jobs, professional, technical and administrative as well as most of the white-collar jobs by whites.

The contents of books in schools and colleges are strictly dictated by the requirements of the proposed social order. They completely ignore the past history of the African people, speak of the superiority of whites over the coloured and so on. A fear complex is deliberately generated in the African mind. And because of the policy of segregation investigation in social fields takes the form of research only on non-controversial subjects like ethnological studies of 'tribal' systems, etc. Subjects like the impact of urbanization and industrialization on the social and economic structure of society are taboo.

Not only are the areas of advanced research strictly limited but the restrictions imposed and the nefarious policy of apartheid in educational institutions results in many eminent professors, who do not support the official line, leaving the country impoverishing institutes of higher learning.

Similarly in the cultural and information spheres the restrictions imposed have arrested progress. Contacts with the outside world are discouraged; cultural stagnation is the consequence.

Although people all over the world have recognized the dangers of apartheid and have taken measures to put pressure on the South African government, it appears the steps taken so far are not adequate. Even though South Africa has been expelled from a number of international bodies, diplomatically isolated from most capitals of the world and debarred from trading with most countries, internal developments in South Africa have not been affected.

The book stresses the need for more effective and serious efforts to deal with the situation created in South Africa. A very important contribution indeed.

R. S. RANA

(i) **Handbook of American Resources For African Studies.** Peter Duignan, Stanford University, 1967. P. 218. Price n.m.

(ii) **Portuguese Africa : A Guide to Official Publications.** Compiled by M.J. Gibson, Library of Congress, Washington, 1967, P. 217, Price n.m.

(iii) **French-speaking West Africa : A Guide To Official Publications,** Compiled by J. W. Withall, Library of Congress, Washington, 1967. Price n.m., P.201.

The ever-widening and deepening world interest in the "dark continent", especially since the 1950s, has resulted in a rapid increase in the volume and range of writings on African affairs. The dark continent has been brought into light suddenly. To facilitate and coordinate research-work it is essential that systematic surveys of materials should be made available to scholars and students. The publication of the volumes under review is a welcome step in that direction. As the volumes deal only with American resources for African studies, it is hoped that scholars in other countries will also be encouraged to make similar efforts facilitating research on African affairs.

In his book, Peter Duignan has made an admirable attempt to survey all the relevent materials available in America. He has described the contents of 95 library and manuscript collections, 108 church and missionary libraries and archives, 95 art and ethnographic collections, and four business archives. As Mr. Duignan himself says, this work is "only a start".

The second guide covers comprehensively the documents of Portugese Africa from 1850 to 1950. It is arranged in six parts, each consisting of publications of the governments of Angola, the Cape Verde Islands, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Sao Thome'e Principe, and the "metropole" of Portugal. Besides the official publications of each country, there are catalogues of books written by individuals and published by government agencies or government-affiliated organizations. The books, documents and publications listed in the volume are about politics, history, economy and social conditions in these countries from the earliest times to the present day. The last section which lists the publications issued by the Portuguese government is comprehensive. The handbook has been arranged systematically and scientifically.

The last book under review, as is obvious from its title, records comprehensively "the published government records from mid-nineteenth century to the present date". The publications of the federation of the French West Africa (1895-1959) are included in the first part of the book. The second includes, in addition to the documents of the French administration in these territories, materials issued later by the national governments in Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali Federation (1959-60), Mali Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. In the section on Togo, documents published by the League of Nations and the United Nations are also listed. The third section consists of documents issued by the metropolitan government in Paris. In the last section materials published by the French Union, the French Community and the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) have been selectively included. In fact, this is the most comprehensive guide to resources about French-speaking Africa.

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

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AFRICA AND INDIA
COMPARISON OF SIZE



SINUSOIDAL EQUAL-AREA PROJECTION

Problems of Communications in Africa

S. AWAD

THE problems of transport and communications in Africa are basically similar to those facing many, or most, developing regions today. There are inadequacies and shortages of infrastructural facilities on the one hand and lack of finance for the rapid development of the infrastructure on the other. But, in Africa, all is magnified by the huge size of the continent which, as can be seen from the map appended, has a land mass some 10 times the size of India. Moreover, against the 16 States of which India is composed, linked together by a strong Central Government exercising India-wide responsibility for communications, railways and national roads, Africa is composed of over 40 countries all but a very few of which are sovereign independent States. Each is solely responsible for its own communications and transport and it might, therefore, be said that, in Africa, India's transport and communications problems are multiplied 40 times. Where India has a centrally financed and supervised national railway system and a network of centrally financed and maintained national highways traversing the length and breadth of the land, Africa has 28 railway systems, only a very few of which are integrated with their neighbours, and a conglomeration of some 40 odd national road systems, many of which are not connected to those of their neighbours. In the field of tele-communications, there are a number of local networks but the major international links tend to be to the European centres of commerce and lateral links are largely underdeveloped.

The pattern of transport and communication in Africa reflects the slow progress that has been made in the past with African industrialization, particularly with the creation of heavy industries. It is also closely bound up with the pattern of Africa's colonial period and, particularly, with the penetration of interior areas by the colonial powers that took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This penetration, which occurred partly for administrative reasons and partly for the purpose of developing trade, took place originally along the great rivers, particularly the Niger and the Congo and, in the greater part of the continent, where navigable rivers did not exist, along tracks cleared through the bush linking the coast port settlements with interior regions. Along these vertical routes such export goods as, originally, ivory and rare metals were transported. Later, transport of the primary agricultural export commodities, such as groundnuts, sugar, cocoa beans, coffee, cotton and palm products, which are still the staples to Africa's foreign trade, developed along these routes. Later still, the discovery and exploitation of mineral deposits such as phosphates, iron ore, manganese and copper, together with the development of railways, intensified transport along the penetration routes.

Geopolitically Africa has for long been compartmented into many, often small, countries most of which have been economically dependent upon the export of a limited number of agricultural commodities, or minerals, and mostly possessing very underdeveloped national economies. There has been little development of inter-African-country international trade. In keeping with this state of affairs, Africa does not have a recognizable continuous system of either railways or roads, but rather a jigsaw puzzle of local, often rudimentary, railway and highway networks. Additionally, the great Saharan desert forms a barrier between the extreme North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the case of the railway networks, the absence of links between different systems is accentuated by the fact that adjacent systems are not infrequently of different track gauges, reflecting their different colonial origins, which makes interconnection more difficult and more costly. Such differences are less important in the case of the missing links in the road transport systems, nevertheless, at present 17 African countries drive on the left-hand side of the road and some 26 on the right. Except at the northern edge of the continent where the Maghreb countries, with their considerable European orientation, have developed good through networks of both railways and roads and, in South Africa, where both road and rail transport is highly developed, the mass of the continent is served by fragmented, local and usually inadequate systems, whether road or rail.

Some Comparisons with India

The effects of this lack of political and administrative coherence can be seen from the rather limited data available for railway and road transport. It is not intended in these notes to overstress comparisons between transport as at present developed in Africa and India, but it may make the African picture clearer to Indian readers if attention is drawn to a few salient points.

Railways

Despite the fact that Africa is some ten times larger than India, the route mileage of the 28 African railway systems as shown in Jane's World Railways, 1965/66, at approximately 73,000 kilometers, is little more than one-third longer than the route mileage of the Indian National Railways. If the comparatively dense rail network of the Republic of South Africa is excluded from the African figure then the route mileage of the remaining 27 rail systems, at some 51,250 kms, is shorter than the Indian system of 56,500 kms. As regards passenger transport, it is only to be expected that, in the much more densely populated India, the use of railways for passenger traffic would greatly exceed passenger rail traffic in Africa. Such data as are available indicate that, in 1963/64, it was, in fact, some nine times greater. Data available for freight movement for the same period show that the 27 rail systems in Africa north of the Republic of South Africa hauled approximately 29,000 million ton/kms of freight in 1963/64 as compared with 88,500 million ton/kms in India. These figures reflect, of course, both the greater degree of industrialization that there is in India today and the heavy Indian east-west transport of energy in the form of coal.

Roads

Data for road transport are more scanty, but figures published by the International Road Federation for 1963 show that the lengths of the paved roads, and total road systems in India and in Africa were as follows:

	Type of Road	*Total length*
India	Paved Roads	103,069 kms.
	Total Roads including earth roads	705,002 ,,
Africa	Paved Roads	106,238 ,,
	Total Roads including earth roads	1,270,423 ,,

The United Nations Statistical Yearbook for 1965 gives the relative vehicle parks, in 1964, as:

	Type of Vehicle	*Total Number*
India	Passenger cars	384,000
	Trucks	342,000
Africa	Passenger Cars	2,250,003*
	Trucks	880,000+

*Of which 1,015,000 were in the Republic of South Africa.

+Of which 261,000 were in the Republic of South Africa.

Future Development

If this is the present, it is the future with which we are concerned now. Here it is not sufficient to say that more railways, more roads and more telecommunication systems must be built, or that existing fragmentary systems must be linked and developed into an African whole. It is necessary that the purpose of such development should be clear and meaningful and that the large sums of money that will be required for such works should be invested only in economically fully justifiable projects. This involves clear thinking, careful planning and thorough investigation of individual projects.

Transport is part of the economic and social infrastructure and is a service rather than an end to itself. We need therefore to be clear what sort of service is to be provided and also for what purpose. The social benefits of improved transport, such as the improvement of administration, of health services and of access to educational facilities, and the breaking of the mobility barrier that has kept people in the rural areas isolated from the outside world, are too well-known to need elaboration. But more roads and more railways cannot be built without investment and investment in the transport infrastructure has to be allocated, from very scarce capital resources, against many competing demands.

At this stage in the development of most African countries, then, transport development has to be linked to general economic development and planned in such a way that it will service and accelerate it. Economic development itself has a number of forms and takes place at various levels. But in a continent where perhaps 80 per cent of the total population is rural, and where it has been reliably estimated that subsistence agriculture accounts for over 50 per cent of the value of all agricultural production over the continent as a whole, and for as much as 80 per cent in some countries, agriculture and the transformation of agriculture from a subsistence to a market agriculture is of immense importance. To aid this, the development of transport to facilitate the supply to the farmer of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs at lowest cost, and the low cost transport of products from farms to markets, is of the greatest importance. The construction, therefore, of access and feeder roads and farm to market roads is a primary necessity in many African countries.

The second great need in Africa is industrialization. At present African industry and trade is largely rooted in the export-import lines of the past and apart from a small amount of import substitution industry, mainly of no more than local importance, there has been outside the Republic of South Africa at any rate, little industrial development of international importance. If Africa is to play a part in the world of the 20th century, this situation must be changed. Africa is a highly endowed continent with great resources of good agricultural land, of potential power, of minerals such as coal and iron, and manganese ores and copper. There are also large resources of petroleum and petroleum gas. The sinews are, therefore, not lacking but a major obstacle to the development of basic and ancillary industries, and of intra-African-country international trade, is the small size of many of the national markets which are too small in terms of population and purchasing power to provide the markets necessary if the new industries are to have the essential benefits of the economies of scale. In the case of many potential industries and, indeed, of industrial development in general, it is, therefore, vital that multi-national markets are formed and this can only come about with the assistance of greatly improved transport networks linking adjacent countries and groups of countries together. In the case of the heavier industries, this will necessitate the construction and linking together, and standardization, of railway systems on a very appreciable scale. Additionally, greatly developed road transport networks will be required to carry the trade that will flow to consumers from increased African industrial production.

These are the basic facts that must influence transport development in general, and the expansion of the railway network in particular, in Africa in the years ahead. But there are many other sectors of the economy which also require development and which will compete with transport for available finances; so every major transport development scheme will require to be viewed in the context of the wider development aims and policies and, if they fit in with these, they will require to be scrutinised carefully for economic feasibility.

To conclude, a word about coordination. The term is of importance in its application to future transport development in Africa in two senses. Firstly, international coordination. We have seen that if industrialization is to make progress in Africa there must be transport systems serving markets covering two, or three, or more, individual countries. The required transport networks, therefore, will have to be conceived on a larger than purely national scale very often and will require for their planning and operation close coordination and harmonization of plans and policies between countries in a group. Such coordination is being sought in Africa through the formation of Permanent Transport Committees on a Sub-Regional basis. One such Permanent Transport Committee already exists covering the four Maghreb countries in the North and another covering 12 of the 14 countries that form West Africa is in the process of formation.

The other sense in which coordination is important in Africa is in respect of the different modes of surface transport, road, rail, and inland waterway. The place of inland water transport, normally in Africa the lowest cost form of transport, is generally uncomplicated since it is limited to the comparatively few areas which are, in fact, serviceable by existing navigable waterways and it is mainly feeder and connecting services that have to be developed in connection with inland water transport. The situation regarding road and rail transport however is more difficult. On the one hand we do not want, in Africa, to be investing in road networks that will primarily have the effect of straining the economic viability of adjacent railway networks. On the other hand we want to be sure that rail systems are not extended when existing road networks can carry the foreseen traffic load economically. These are problems that will have to be faced by African transport planners and if they can be clearly anticipated and firmly handled, perhaps Africa will escape some of the economic troubles that beset the transport systems of many developed regions today.

SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA ON AFRICAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS

(Source: Jane's World Railways)

Railways in Central Africa : Route kilometers

Gauge (meters)	*1.435*	*1.067*	*1.00*	*0.615*	*0.600*	*Total*
I **Existing lines:**						
—*Cameroon*						
Cameroon Railways	...	...	517	...	...	517
Victoria Railway	...	...	...	...	48	48
—*Congo (Brazzaville)*						
CFCO	...	515	...	...	...	515
Comilog branch line	...	285	...	...	...	285
—*Congo (Kinshasa)*						
BCK	...	2,556	...	...	...	2,556
CFL	...	959	125	...	...	1,084
Vicicongo	...	...	...	...	839	839
OTRACO	...	366	...	136	...	502
Total I	—	4,681	642	136	887	6,346
Percentage	0	73.8	10.1	2.1	14.0	100.0
II. **Planned extensions**						
—*Nigeria—Cameroon—Chad*						
Extension Maiduguri-Fort-Lamy	...	250	...	...	...	250
—*Cameroon—Chad*						
Extension Yaounde - Fort–Archambault	...	...	1,300	...	...	1,300
—*Cameroon—Central African Republic*						
Extension M'Balmayo-Bangui	...	...	900	...	...	900
—*Gabon*						
Owendo–Belinga line	561	...	...	...	...	561
—*Congo Brazza and Kinshasa*						
Congo bridge	...	30	...	...	...	30
—*Congo Kinshasa*						
Interconnection Kinshasa-Port-Francqui	...	857	...	...	...	857
Total II	561	1,137	2,200	...	...	3,898
Total I+II	561	5,818	2,842	136	887	10,244

Railways north of the Sahara

I. Route Kilometers

Gauge (meters)	*1.435*	*1.055*	*1.00*	*Total*
Algeria	2,704	1,095	240	4,039
Morocco	1,618	...	...	1,618
Tunisia	483	...	1,512	1,995
Mauritania	650	...	...	650
U.A.R.	4,434	...	253	4,687
Total	9,889	1,095	2,005	12,989
Percentage	76.13	8.43	15.44	100.00

II. Track Kilometers

Gauge (meters)	*1.435*	*1.055*	*1.00*	*Total*
Algeria	3,209	1,095	240	4,544
Morocco	1,773	...	...	1,773
Tunisia	483	...	1,512	1,995
Mauritania	650	...	...	650
U.A.R.	7,118	...	253	7,371
Total	13,233	1,095	2,005	16,333
Percentage	81.20	6.70	12.28	100.00

Railways south of the Sahara: Route Kilometers

Gauge	*1.435*	*1.067*	*1.00*	*0.950*	*0.762*	*0.615*	*0.600*	*Total*
Senegal	...	...	1,032	...	...	...	...	1,032
Mali	...	...	640	...	...	...	...	640
Guinea	14	...	805	...	...	...	...	819
Sierra Leone	...	94	...	...	500	...	...	594
Liberia	353	148	...	...	...	...	...	501
Ivory Coast-Upper Volta	...	...	1,173	...	...	...	...	1,173
Ghana	...	948	...	...	...	...	...	948
Togo	...	...	462	...	...	...	...	462
Dahomey	...	...	579	...	...	...	...	579
Nigeria	...	3,036	...	...	...	...	...	3,036
Cameroon	...	...	517	...	...	...	48	565
Congo (Brazzaville)	...	800	...	...	...	...	...	800
Congo (Kinshasa)	...	3,881	125	...	...	136	839	4,981
Angola	...	2,776	...	...	...	...	18	2,794
Zambia	...	1,390	...	...	...	...	...	1,390
Rhodesia	...	2,480	...	...	...	...	...	2,480
Botswana	...	640	...	...	...	...	...	640
Swaziland	...	228	...	...	...	...	...	228
Rep. of South Africa	...	18,900	...	...	...	...	...	18,900
South West Africa	...	2,340	...	...	...	...	...	2,340
Mozambique	...	2,221	...	...	...	...	...	2,221
Malawi	...	508	...	...	...	...	...	508
Kenya	...	...	2,030	...	...	...	...	2,030
Uganda	...	...	1,220	...	...	...	...	1,220
Ethiopia	...	...	781	306	...	...	...	1,087
Sudan	...	4,727	...	...	...	...	...	4,727
Total	367	45,117	12,009	306	500	136	905	59,340
Percentage	0.62	76.03	20.24	0.51	0.84	0.23	1.53	100.00

Railways south of the Sahara: Track Kilometers

Gauge	*1.435*	*1.067*	*1.00*	*0.950*	*0.762*	*0.615*	*0.600*	*Total*
Senegal	...	...	1,178	...	...	...	...	1,178
Mali	...	...	640	...	...	...	...	640
Guinea	14	...	844	...	...	...	...	858
Sierra Leone	...	94	...	...	558	...	...	652
Liberia	353	160	...	...	...	...	...	513
Ivory Coast-Upper Volta	...	...	1,318	...	...	...	...	1,318
Ghana	...	1,270	...	...	...	...	...	1,270
Togo	...	...	512	...	...	...	...	512
Dahomey	...	...	635	...	...	...	...	635
Nigeria	...	3,791	...	...	...	...	...	3,791
Cameroun	...	...	612	...	...	...	147	759
Congo (Brazza.)	...	944	...	...	...	...	...	944
Congo (Kinshasa)	...	4,801	140	...	...	150	871	5,962
Angola	...	3,359	...	...	...	...	18	3,377
Rhodesia-Zambia-Botswana	...	5,839	...	...	...	...	...	5,839
Swaziland	...	228	...	...	...	...	...	228
South Africa including South West Africa	...	30,000	...	...	...	...	...	30,000
Mozambique	...	3,039	...	...	...	...	...	3,039
Malawi	...	555	...	...	...	...	...	555
Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania	...	...	6,995	...	...	...	...	6,995
Ethiopia	...	...	845	355	...	...	...	1,200
Sudan	...	5,343	...	...	...	...	...	5,343
Total	367	59,423	13,719	355	558	150	1,036	75,608

Number of Locomotives

Gauge	*1 435*	*1.067*	*1.055*	*1.00*	*0.950*	*0.762*	*0.615*	*0.600*	*Total*
I. North of Sahara									
Algeria	235	...	?	100	...	...	...	...	335
Morocco	142	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	142
Tunisia	45	...	...	142	...	...	...	...	187
Mauritania	21	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	21
U. A. R.	1,124	...	...	43	...	...	...	...	1,167
Total	1,567	...	...	285	...	...	...	...	1,852
II. South of Sahara									
Senegal	...	...	...	109	...	...	...	...	109
Mali	...	...	...	32	...	...	...	...	32
Guinea	2	...	...	38	...	...	...	...	40
Sierra Leone	...	?	...	...	67	...	...	...	67
Liberia	6	10	...	...	...	...	...	...	16
Ivory Coast-Upper Volta	...	...	...	65	...	...	...	...	65
Ghana	...	157	...	...	...	...	...	...	157
Togo	...	...	...	22	...	...	...	...	22
Dahomey	...	...	...	43	...	...	...	...	43
Nigeria	...	332	...	...	...	...	...	...	332
Cameroon	...	...	...	59	...	...	...	60	119
Congo (Brazza)	...	106	...	...	...	...	...	...	106
Congo (Kinshasa)	...	103	...	29	...	...	14	44	190
Angola	...	226	...	...	...	...	...	...	226
Rhodesia-Zambia	...	438	...	...	...	...	...	...	438
Swaziland	...	?	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Rep. of South Africa incl. S. W. Africa	...	3,353	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,353
Mozambique	...	249	...	...	...	...	...	...	249
Malawi	...	36	...	...	...	...	...	...	36
Kenya-Uganda Tanzania	...	...	...	466	...	...	...	...	446
Ethiopia	...	...	...	35	34	...	...	...	69
Sudan	...	250	...	...	...	...	...	...	250
Total	8	5,260	...	898	34	67	14	104	6,385

Number of Carriages and Wagons

Gauge	*1.435*	*1.067*	*1.055*	*1.00*	*0.950*	*0.762*	*0.615*	*0.600*	*Total*
North of Sahara									
Algeria	8,184	...	?	2,273	...	...	...	...	10,457
Morocco	6,665	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,665
Tunisia	1,042	...	...	4,426	...	...	...	...	5,468
Mauritania	590	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	590
U. A. R.	19,512	...	...	424	...	...	...	...	19,936
Total	35,993	...	...	7,123	...	...	...	...	43,116
South of Sahara									
Senegal	...	...	...	838	...	...	...	...	838
Mali	...	...	...	470	...	...	...	...	470
Guinea	14	...	...	329	...	...	...	...	343
Sierra Leone	...	?	...	...	...	936	...	...	936
Liberia	92	160	...	...	...	...	...	...	252
Ivory Coast-Upper Volta	...	...	...	1,072	...	...	...	...	1,072
Ghana	...	3,072	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,072
Togo	...	...	...	594	...	...	...	...	594
Dahomey	...	...	...	668	...	...	...	...	668
Nigeria	...	6,170	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,170
Cameroon	...	...	...	853	...	...	...	512	1,365
Congo (Brazza)	...	1,263	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,263
Congo (Kinshasa)	...	7,696	...	121	...	...	370	369	8,556
Angola	...	2,905	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,905
Rhodesia-Zambia	...	13,334	...	...	...	...	...	...	13,334
Swaziland	...	?	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Rep. of South Africa incl. S. W. Africa	...	124,033	...	...	...	...	...	...	124,033
Mozambique	...	2,106	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,106
Malawi	...	423	...	...	...	...	...	...	423
Kenya-Uganda Tanzania	...	...	...	10,754	...	...	...	...	10,754
Ethiopia	...	...	...	671	582	...	...	...	1,253
Sudan	...	5,989	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,989
Total	106	167,151	...	16,370	582	936	370	881	186,396

Road Transport in Africa

AN ECA NOTE

ROADS are of special significance in Africa because of the fragmentary character of the African railways systems and the limited scope for water transport. They are also important as feeders to other transport routes by land, water or air. Finally, since the road network consisting of national highways, secondary roads and even hammoek paths can cover an area more fully than other forms of transport, they exert a special influence on its development.

Road statistics in Africa are, however, meagre and unreliable. There is little information on passenger kilometrage and ton-kilometrage and one is obliged to fall back on indirect or secondary statistics e. g., the number of vehicles in circulation. Between 1960 and 1964, the total number of such vehicles on the continent (excluding SA) rose from 1,488 thousands to 1,854 thousands or by about 25 per cent. These numbers were very much below those obtaining in developed countries. In fact, South Africa had about as many vehicles as the remaining African countries taken together. But the number of vehicles in the latter is growing, in some cases, quite fast.

In 1963, the latest year for which data are available, the total length of roads in Africa (excluding South Africa, Angola and Mozambique) totalled 946,291 kilometres. The density of the network was 3.7 kms. per 100 sq. kms. This is a low figure but large parts of Africa are as yet uninhabited or thinly peopled.

Generally speaking, the national road systems are not interconnected and taken together do not constitute networks for sub-regions. There are, of course, exceptions in all sub-regions, but these are often *ad hoc* connexions rather than links in a planned system. Besides, the quality of roads varies greatly from country to country and within each country. In most countries even the main trunk roads are liable to periodic interruptions from floods or slips.

Road transport is conducted by enterprises of different sizes and status—ranging from "many wagons" in West Africa to large transport organizations operating in Congo (Kinshasa) and Eastern and Western sub-regions. In some instances, the undertakings are owned, partially or wholly, by the government; in others, government-owned railways run them. In all instances, they are controlled by the government.

Generally speaking, road transport predominates in short-haul and most medium-haul operations. The rates charged vary from country to country—normally between 12 and 4 cents per ton. But in some instances, e. g., on the Addis Ababa-Assab route, it is as low as 2 cents per ton.

The road transport system in Africa is barely keeping pace with the growth of demand for its services. The standards of many roads are low, and road networks, especially international links, require extension and strengthening. Quite a number of African countries are devoting more than 20 per cent of their total investment on development of transport. The share of road transport in the total, however, varies considerably. It is pretty low in Sudan, but quite high in Ethiopia. In some countries rural road networks are receiving prior attention.

It seems that African countries will be passing through a period of intense road development in the near future. In order to avoid wasteful use of limited resources, neighbouring countries should harmonize their road development plans, co-ordinate these with those of other modes of transport and with industrial and agricultural plans, pay special attention to the development of rural road and improved facilities for training and research.

Road and Motor Vehicle Statistics for African Countries

Country	*Road Kilometrage (1963)* *('000)*					*Motor Vehicles (1964)*				
	Total	Perma- nent	Improved	Unim- proved	Road Km per Km2	Total '000	Private cars '000	Commer- cial vehicles '000	Persons per Motor Vehicle	Motor Vehicles per road Km.
Algeria	41.3	—	—	—	0.02	299.5	207.0	92.5	35.7	7.25
Basutoland	1.7	—	0.8	0.9	0.06	1.6*	1.2	0.4*	457.5	0.94
Bechuanaland	7.8	—	1.5	6.3	0.01	2.0*	—	—	271.5	0.25
Burundi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cameroon	13.7	0.6	13.1	—	0.03	32.6	12.5	20.1	156.6	2.38
Central African Rep.	18.2	0.1	2.4	15.7	0.03	6.0*	1.8*	4.2*	220.0	0.33
Chad	30.8	—	5.5	25.3	0.02	6.2	2.3	3.9	532.0	0.20
Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	145.4	1.4	144.0	—	0.06	53.0*	29.0*	24.0*	289.0	0.36
Congo (Rep. of)	11.3	0.2	0.2	10.9	0.03	12.0*	7.5*	4.5*	68.8	1.06
Dahomey	6.1	0.6	2.3	3.2	0.05	10.0	5.9	4.1	230.0	1.64
Ethiopia	22.6	1.3	4.2	17.1	0.02	20.6	14.0	6.6	1078.0	0.91
Gabon	5.6	—	4.4	1.2	0.02	9.0	3.2	5.8	51.0	1.60
Gambia	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.11	1.7	1.0	0.7	190.5	1.42
Ghana	28.6	3.5	5.8	19.3	0.12	44.4	27.4	17.0	169.5	1.55
Guinea	7.6	—	5.0	2.6	0.03	20.7	8.1	12.6	165.0	2.72
Ivory Coast	32.1	0.9	5.3	25.9	0.10	49.2	28.1	21.1	76.2	1.53
Kenya	41.8	1.8	3.5	36.5	0.07	70.7	61.6	9.1	129.0	1.69
Liberia	1.9	0.1	1.1	0.7	0.02	9.0*	5.2*	3.8*	115.8	4.74
Libya	18.6	11.0	—	7.6	0.01	53.1	35.0	18.1	29.4	2.86
Madagascar	29.6	1.4	25.0	3.2	0.05	55.3	29.5	25.8	111.6	1.87

*Data for 1963

Road and Motor Vehicle Statistics for African Countries

Country	*Road Kilometrage (1963) ('000)*					*Motor Vehicles (1964)*				
	Total	Perma-nent	Improved	Unim-proved	Road Km per Km2	Total '000	Private cars '000	Commer-cial vehicles '000	Persons per Motor Vehicle	Motor Vehicles per road Km.
Malawi	9.8	0.4	0.6	8.8	0.08	15.6	8.0	7.6	250.0	1.59
Mali	11.9	0.7	3.8	7.4	0.01	7.3	2.9	4.4	614.0	0.61
Mauritania	5.6	—	2.9	2.7	0.01	0.5	0.2	0.3	1800.0	0.09
Morocco	50.0	16.0	—	34.0	0.11	219.1	157.9	61.2	59.2	4.38
Niger	7.2	0.1	2.6	4.5	0.01	6.1	2.2	3.9	542.0	0.85
Nigeria	73.1	—	12.4	60.7	0.08	70.0	46.0	24.0	805.0	0.96
Rhodesia	75.5	5.3	30.2	40.0	0.19	118.0	94.7	23.3	35.1	1.56
Rwanda										
Senegal	13.0	1.2	1.4	10.4	0.07	45.8	27.1	18.7	74.2	3.52
Sierra Leone	6.4	0.4	2.8	3.2	0.09	13.1	8.8	4.3	168.0	2.04
Somalia	12.9	0.6	2.2	10.1	0.02	10.5	4.2	6.3	223.5	0.81
Sudan	8.1	0.2	2.3	5.6	0.01	40.2	20.5	19.7	328.0	4.96
Swaziland	2.2	0.1	1.0	1.1	0.13	5.1	3.1	2.0	56.5	
Tanzania	33.0	0.9	3.9	28.2	0.03	40.5	31.3	9.2	249.0	1.23
Togo	2.8	0.2	—	2.6	0.05	0.8	0.5	0.3	2000.0	0.29
Tunisia	8.8	6.7	1.1	1.0	0.05	86.4	51.1	35.3	52.9	9.82
Uganda	47.0	1.2	—	45.8	0.20	34.1	28.5	5.6	216.0	0.72
United Arab Republic	54.8	8.8	—	46.0	0.05	110.6	84.5	26.1	261.5	2.02
Upper Volta	16.7	0.1	6.0	10.6	0.06	6.6	3.4	3.2	720.0	0.40
Zambia	33.9	1.3	4.3	28.3	0.04	47.5	37.5	10.0	75.8	1.40

Sources:
1. UN Statistical Year Book 1965.
2. International Road Federation Statistics.

Railways in African Economic Development

HARJINDER SINGH

THE continent of Africa, second in size only to Asia, covers nearly one-fourth of the land surface of the world. Its 311 million people constitute about 8 per cent of the world population. Compared with industrial countries in Europe, the area of land under cultivation per head of the entire African population is three times.[1] It is richly endowed with "agriculture and labour in agriculture" resources. Recent surveys of its other resources clearly suggest a vast potential. It already produces nearly one-seventh of the world's mineral output.

But in common with other undeveloped countries of the world, Africa has low per capita levels of production and consumption[2]. As the great majority of the people of Africa are dependent on land for their living, their main economic activity consists of subsistence agriculture, much of which is based on shifting cultivation. This traditional system of cultivation is "characterized by low production per man and low productivity per acre"[3]. Consequently, except for a small number of African agricultural products, its contribution to world production and trade is relatively small. Although it is difficult to estimate accurately the quantum of agricultural production because a large proportion of it is from the subsistence sector, there can be hardly any doubt that compared with similar crop areas elsewhere it is low.

For agricultural output to rise above the subsistence level, it is necessary for the inhabitants to be able to produce a surplus of commodities which can be sold abroad[4]. This depends upon modern techniques of production, improved seeds, fertilizers, etc. on the one hand and markets for the disposal of surplus products on the other. Transport fulfils its true function when it benefits producers by transporting surplus products to different markets[5]. It encourages farmers to enlarge their surpluses and come out of the subsistence sector. This changes their mode of living and stimulates the desire for goods produced by manufacturing industries. Thus transport creates demand for primary products and stimulates consumption of manufactured goods. In this way it has an accelerating effect on the growth of the economy.

Further, it removes the mobility barrier among the people in the rural sector, improves market intelligence and discourages market imperfection. Workers from the rural sector can go to centres where they are needed at reasonable wages and manufacturers can find the right type of workers. An efficient combination of the various factors of production reduces costs and makes goods cheaper. It also encourrages price equalisation between different regions of the country. It is in fact the absence of transport facilities which accounts for the markedly varying prices at different centres.

Even in the 18th century it was recognised that economic development depended upon the expansion of transport. Adam Smith's theory of division of labour mainly rests on an expansion of markets made possible by an expansion of transport facilities. Availability of such facilities helps access to world markets which "has been perhaps the most powerful engine of economic development for formerly backward countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada; and it continues to fufill this role for the countries of Africa today"[6].

Until recently the main impediment to economic development in Africa had been lack of modern transport facilities which meant high transport costs. Human porterage remained an important form of carriage of goods by land. This slowed the wheels of commerce; the time cost in travelling between producing and initial marketing centres represented an important loss of productivity[7].

This method was also more expensive in money terms. For example, in 1957 cocoa was carried in head-loads of 50 kg. at a time in Togo at a cost that was about 20 times the road transport charges for a similar distance. This "held up not only the economic development of Africa, but her development in most lines of human interest."[8]

The modern forms of transport—railways, ocean shipping, air transport, etc.—by reducing the time required to cover long distances have made an important contribution to the economic development of Africa. They have made it possible to transport large quantities of bulky commodities over great distances in any season of the year—an important factor for cash crops and mineral products. In view of the low purchasing power of the African population, the export of surplus crops was an economic necessity, so that the first demand for rail transport was created by export trade.[9] A few examples will show the great power of improved transport to quicken the economic pulse of regions in Africa[10].

"Before the construction of the Dahomey rail line, carriage of goods from Cotonou to Niamey required 70 days by human poterage. When the line reached Parakou in 1934, the time was reduced to three days.........Before the rail line was built in Northern Nigeria, two or four-wheeled carts were used between Zungeru and Kano, requiring 25 days to cover 250 miles at a cost of £42 per ton, and even this service was confined to the dry season. After the line was completed, the 25 days were reduced to less than that number of hours. The most spectacular result of this line was a quite unexpected and rapid increase in the exports of groundnuts, now one of the leading exports of the country." The following example is from Kenya. "Before a new road was completed in the coastal belt of northern Kenya in 1953, it cost £ 1.00-1.75 per ton-mile to bring market crop by porter or by donkey to coastal villages. Trucks now handle this produce at a charge of 50 to 75 cents per ton-mile."

It is difficult to estimate the relative share of transport in gross domestic product as transport in most countries can hardly be separated from other forms of economic activity. For example, in some cases internal trade and transportation are generally carried out by the same people. Export and import companies control a significant part of ocean shipping and also carry out several road transport activities. But estimates available for West Africa clearly show that the transport sector accounts for a substantial part of the gross domestic product. In Nigeria, Dahomey and Mali its contribution to the gross domestic product is about 8 per cent (each) at factor cost.[11]

TABLE I

Relative Share of Transport in Gross Domestic Product of Selected Countries of West Africa

Country	*Year*	*Percentage of GDP at Factor Cost*
Senegal	1959	5
Ivory Coast	1960	4
Gabon	1960	5
Mali	1959	7
Cameroon	1959	3
Togo	1959	2
Niger	1961	2
Dahomey	1959	8
Nigeria	1957	8.5

Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Africa, Vol. I, Western Sub-region and Republic of South Africa, 1966, p. 57.

In order to analyse the present system of transport and its contribution to economic development in African countries separately, our study will primarily be concerned with rail transport. But some attention will also be paid to road transport in view of the close relationship which exists between them.

II

The railways have played an important role in Africa. In many parts of Africa construction of roads was not at first accepted as an urgent need. The Congo accorded priority to the development of waterways. But in other parts of Africa "it was not until the railway programme was well advanced that there arose a demand for the wide expansion of the road system as a feeder to the railways".[12] For example, in former French West Africa "the construction of railways actually preceded the systematic extension of the road system........It needed, at a later date, the great increase in the use of motors for the transport of passengers and goods to create the imperative demand which exists today for the improvement of the standard of road surfacing".[13]

It is claimed that Africa was brought directly within the "orbit of European civilisation" due to its minerals and precious stones which stimulated railway construction. This may be true in the case of the Republic of South Africa and the Katanga area of the Congo. But in fact there were several factors which stimulated construction of railways in Africa. Broadly, they can be grouped under two headings: non-economic factors, i. e. political, military and administrative; and economic factors or evacuation of exports.

If we peep into past history, we shall find that the real stimulus to railway construction was given by the "Berlin Conference of 1884-5 when it was held that a title to territory could be sustained only by effective occupancy. The construction of a railway was calculated to furnish one of the most obvious proofs of occupancy, and it is noticeable that a number of railways in Central and part of West Africa were projected in 1885 "[14]. The railways in former French West Africa were designed for strategic purposes. "The Central line in Tanganyika was primarily built for strategic reasons and the Uganda Railway on philanthropic and political grounds in which the desire to suppress the slave trade played a very important part."[15] Construction of railways in some other parts of Africa was undertaken to find transport for minerals. For example, in the Republic of South Africa "the first stimulus to the construction of rail-roads was given by the requirements of the diamond and gold industries".[16] The subsequent construction of railways was due to the expansion of agricultural crops. In Nigeria and some other parts of West Africa railways were built for the transport of cocoa, groundnuts and other agricultural products.

The largest expansion of railways occurred between 1900 and 1932 mainly for non-economic reasons. In 1800 there were in operation a little less than 1,000 kilometres of railway lines. The figure rose to 8,600 kilometres in 1900 and about 30,900 kilometres by 1910. Later, economic considerations for the construction of railways became more important. The economic depression of the 1930s checked further construction of railways in Africa and the total length of railways is reported to have decreased somewhat during World War II. But after the end of the war railway construction was undertaken "as a direct response to the heightened level of economic activity in many parts of Africa"[17]. Africa has now about 73,000 kilometres of main and branch lines as against 46,780 kilometres in 1958. Rail freight traffic increased considerably during this period as shown in Table III.

Railways in South Africa

Railway lines are heavily concentrated in the areas covered by South Africa as seen in Table II. This part of Africa leads all other countries not only in the length of railway lines but also in the freight carried. The history of the development of railways shows that the construction of trunk railways in South Africa "was occasioned very largely by the major mineral discoveries while the routes followed were determined by the physical features of the country traversed.........Since 1910 the elaboration of the network has gone hand in hand with the general economic development of the country "[18]. For example, the first railway line operated in this area was a small one in the neighbourhood of Durban. It was completed in 1860. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley completely changed the picture. It gave rise to an urgent demand for a railway for transportation of diamonds. "Ox-wagons took a month or two months to transport goods from Port Elizabeth or Cape Town or Kimberley, at £15 to £30 a ton. Coaches or mule carts took seven to nine days for the journey "[19]. So the Cape Government undertook construction of a standard gauge railway from Cape to Kimberley in 1873. Later, the Natal Government began to construct railways to serve its sugar estates.

TABLE II

Railways in Africa

	Name of country	*Route kilometres in 1965-66*
	North Africa	
1.	Algeria	4,039
2.	Morocco	1,618
3.	Tunisia	1,995
4.	Mauritania	650
5.	U.A.R.	4,687
	West Africa	
1.	Senegal	1,032
2.	Mali	640
3.	Guinea	819
4.	Sierra Leone	594
5.	Liberia	501
6.	Ivory Coast-Upper Volta	1,173
7.	Ghana	948
8.	Togo	462
9.	Dahomey	579
10.	Nigeria	3,036
11.	Cameroon	565
	Central Africa	
1.	Congo (Brazzaville)	800
2.	Congo (Kinshasa)	4,981
3.	Angola	2,794
4.	Mozambique	2,221
5.	Zambia	1,390
6.	Rhodesia	2,480
7.	Malawi	508
8.	Botswana	640
9.	Swaziland	228
	South Africa	
1.	Republic of South Africa	18,900
2.	South West Africa	2,340
	East Africa	
1.	Kenya	2,030
2.	Uganda	1,220
3.	Ethiopia	1,087
4.	Sudan	4,727

TABLE III

Railway Traffic

A. Passenger (*in millions*) *B. Net ton-kilometres*

Country	*Traffic*	*1948*	*1957*	*1965*
Algeria	A	878	650	636
	B	1132	1366	1050
Angola	A	78	104	—
	B	479	1243	—
Cameroon	A	69	87	107
	B	54	109	175
Congo (Brazzaville)	A	26	51	109
	B	73	145	301
Congo (Republic)	A	143	353	578
	B	1994	2532	1668
Dahomey	A	35	49	78
	B	14	38	44
East Africa (including Kenya Uganda & former Tanganyika)	B	1257	2378	3382
Ethiopia	A	72	57	—
	B	133	155	—
Ghana	A	269	247	498
	B	207	300	353
Guinea	A	28	38	—
	B	38	37	—
Ivory Coast	A	89	99	507
	B	71	137	325
Madagascar	A	82	153	148
	B	82	131	168
Malawi	A	—	—	—
	B	—	105	90
Morocco	A	720	665	470
	B	1080	1533	2032
Mozambique	A	—	182	—
	B	—	2008	—
Nigeria	A	525	738	859
	B	1076	2015	1987
Rhodesia & Zambia	B	—	6253	7834
Senegal	A	167	266	291
	B	198	385	302
Sierra Leone	A	—	70	—
	B	—	30	—
South Africa (including South West Africa)	B	16582	26559	42733
Sudan	B	607	1514	2139
Togo	A	51	70	73
	B	11	8	7
Tunisia	A	303	292	479
	B	869	896	1237
U. A. R.	A	1425	4165	5788
	B	1145	1658	3314

United Nations Statistical Year Book, 1966, Publishing Service, United Nations, New York, 1967, p. 416-417

The discovery of gold mines in Witwatersrand and proclamation of the area as public gold diggings in 1886 gave further impetus to the expansion of railways in South Africa. Witwatersrand was connected with the Cape ports and with Durban and Delagoa Bay by lines which connected the Transvaal borders. The real stimulus for the building of railways in Transvaal was given by the Government after signing "a protocol with Portugal providing for cooperation between the two states in the building of a railway to the 'centres of trade'."[20] By 1910, three separate railway systems were operating in this area. These were merged when the four provinces—the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State—joined together to form the Union of South Africa. The total capital of the new organisation on 30 May 1910 was £87,263,366.

Following the formation of the Union greater attention was paid o the construction of agricultural branch lines. The outbreak of war in 1914 brought this policy to a halt. At once minerals and labour became scarce and all available resources had to be employed for building lines to facilitate military operations. But after World War I expansion of the railway network took the form of agricultural branch lines.[21] Secondly, the railway lines of South West Africa were incorporated in the Union. Little of the area is covered by railways. There are however lines inland from Walvis Bay and Luderitz and a central line connecting these with Windhoek. Thirdly, to improve the transport facilities narrow gauge lines are undergoing conversion into broad gauge lines. Programmes for electrification of some of the main lines have also been undertaken. While steam traction is still extensively used, electrification work is in progress on more routes in accordance with Government policy[22].

Today the railway system in the region is by far the most important sector of the economy. The capital account stood at £743,932,500 at the end of March 1964. The railways are operating a route of 21,240 kilometres (including 2,340 route kilometres in South-West Africa). In the year ending 1965/66 the railway lines carried 42,733 mn. ton-km.

Railways in West Africa

The railways were the first modern mode of transport introduced into West Africa. But it is important to remember that the first railways in most of the regions were built for "political purposes, rather than as the result of precise economic considerations"[23] in the context of the "scramble for Africa", rules for which were laid down in the Berlin Treaty of 1885.[24] Later, economic reasons (although there were other reasons too) influenced the expansion of railways. These included promotion of export of surplus crops which was an economic necessity at that time. But after the war railway development in the region was entirely for export purposes.

In Nigeria the first line from Lagos to Ibadan was constructed between 1896 and 1906 with the guiding principle of export of crops[25]. The present railway network has been in existence since 1930 and was designed to channel produce from the main growing areas to the two major ports, i.e. Harcourt and Lagos. The western line runs from Lagos through the centre of cocoa growing areas, across the Niger at Jebba, to Kaduna, the northern capital, and on through Zaria to Kanu. A branch line from Zaria to Kaura is used to ship out cotton and groundnuts, and an extension via Kano to Nguru serves the same purpose for groundnuts and various other products[26]. The eastern line starts from Port Harcourt. It was built mainly to facilitate exploitation of tin deposits in the north and coal in the east.[27]

Recently the railways, following the war-time and post-war shortage of equipment combined with increased exports and imports, have been able to handle the groundnut crop within the year of its production which is a great achievement. The Bornu Extension, which was under construction for some 50 years, is also an important development in the post-war period. The real work on the project was started only in 1958 after an International Bank mission had stimulated interest in it.[28] The Bank granted a loan of $10 million to cover half of the total cost of the project. "It is estimated that as a result of this extension, freight on groundnuts, a key export commodity in the Northern Region of Nigeria, will be halved. What is more, the notorious bottlenecks in the evacuation of the crop will be cleared up."[29]

In Ghana, the difficulties of the mining industry at Tarkwa during the last quarter of the 19th century show to what extent poor transport facilities held up economic development.[30] Construction work on a railway began in 1898 at Sekondi to serve the gold mining areas at Tarkwa. This was an event of great historical importance[31]. The line from Sekondi to Kumasi was completed in 1902 but it took another 20 years to complete the Accra-Kumasi line. The line starting from Accra was designed to carry cocoa. A branch line from Dunkwa to Awaso was completed in 1942-43 to facilitate export of bauxite. The Achiasi-Kotoku extension carried out in 1953-54 made it possible for the Central Provinces to be linked with the Accra-Kumasi line, and for rail journeys between Accra and Takoradi to be shortened. Accra was also linked with Tema, the new industrial centre and a modern harbour, by a new line.[32]

Railways in former French West Africa were built not for economic reasons but for "military, political and administrative purposes"[33] to transport troops from one place to another. But when the railways were built, the latent opportunities for opening up the country economically were also realised.[34] But they occupied only a small place in planning because it was not considered possible to create a remunerative traffic. So, at that time "what was required was light track railways following routes selected for the politico-geographical, rather than topographical or economical reasons."[35] It was only in the last quarter of the 19th century that the growing demand for vegetable oil and minerals gave a new fillip to the trade between West Africa and Europe. Thus signs of a general economic integration began to appear in former French West Africa.[36] Railways were required to link the navigable stretches of the Senegal and Niger rivers for communication purposes.

The total length of railway lines in the whole of West Africa is about 13,000 kilometres.[37] But the most striking feature of the rail transport system is that it has tremendous variations in railroad lengths from country to country ranging from no line in Niger to nearly 3,040 kms.

in Nigeria. Further, the variations in the "capacity and performance" are much wider than indicated by the variation in the lengths of the railroads. The Nigerian railways alone provide more Tkm for goods traffic than all the other railway systems in the sub-region.[38] But traffic has increased significantly in most of the countries. Passenger traffic figures for 1965 were everywhere higher than those for 1948, though the rate of growth varied considerably from one country to another. Freight traffic expanded most in Ivory Coast and Dahomey followed by Nigeria and Ghana.

Railways in East Africa

Railway construction in Uganda and Kenya was not undertaken for commercial reasons.[39] The British East Africa Company wanted to construct railways in the interior parts of the territory. But in 1891 the British Government decided that "so far as its own sphere in Africa was concerned, the most effective means of implementing the resolutions of the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 regarding the suppression of slave trade would be to construct a railway from Mombassa to Lake Victoria."[40] It is sometimes claimed that the motive for constructing such a railway was that it would "provide the best means of blocking the further encroachment of Germany in East Africa."[41] Whatever the reason, it was taken for granted at that time that the railway would have little commercial value and would not pay for its maintenance.[42] But later, development of the cotton industry in Uganda enabled the railway authorities to earn substantial revenue. This provided an incentive for expansion of the rail line from Kampala to Kasese to serve the copper mines and tea and coffee producing areas.[43] The line was envisaged as early as 1906 with the discovery of copper deposits, but work on it could not be started because of technical difficulties.

In former Tanganyika, German rule began in 1885 and two rail lines were built by the German Government. The northern railway line was constructed in 1899. It connects the ports of Tanga and Arusha. During World War I a new line from Tanga to Kenya and Uganda was built for military purposes.[44] Now the line serves the sisal estates along its route and some important coffee producing areas.[45] The second line from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika "was built in 1904 by the German Government, following in the main an old slave caravan route, and was completed in 1914."[46] But now "little has been done to improve the capital equipment since the system was taken over from the Germans".[47] The separate systems of Tanganyika Railways and Port Services and the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours Administration were amalgamated into one transport system—the East African Railways and Harbours Administration. The work of amalgamation was completed with the introduction of railway traffic applicable to the whole system. This has provided means for the solution of some of the problems of inter-territorial traffic which had at one time engaged much of the attention of the two Governments.[48] But the Railway Administration has failed to keep pace with the tremendous increase in traffic in the post-war period.[49]

In Ethiopia the railway line was built to meet the requirements of the country's foreign and internal trade—its only raison d'etre.[50] There are two railway lines of primary importance, one starting from the port of Djibouti in French Somaliland and running through Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa and the other starting from the port of Massawa and running through Asmara to beyond Agordat. The Djibouti-Addis Ababa, or the Franco-Ethiopian line, built between 1894 and 1927, was the first modern link between Ethiopia and the outside world. At present a substantial amount of the country's total imports and exports is handled by this line. The Massawa-Asmara line connects the port of Massawa with Asmara, the industrial centre of Eritrea.

The construction of railways in Sudan was for "military purposes." In 1899 Kitchener's railway line from Wadi Halfa was completed. But later there was a rapid development of railway construction due to the expansion of traffic. In 1904 work was begun on the construction of a vital line to the Red Sea coast via Atbara. In 1907 it was decided to bring the line right into the centre of Khartoum. Now Sudan has 4,727 kms. of railway lines. Cotton and agricultural produce is transported by rail and during the harvesting periods (January and June) the volume of traffic is heavy.

Railways in Central Africa

The credit for construction of railways in the erstwhile Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland largely goes to Cecil Rhodes "under whose influence the Chartered Company assumed a heavy obligation in the field of railway development."[51] Realising that the work of settlement and development would come to a standstill without railways, one of Rhodes' dreams "was to see the line from the Cape to Cairo. With some countries barring instead of opening their borders that dream could not come true."[52] The vital part played by railways in the region is shown by the history of their construction. By 1897 the railway from Veryburg had reached Bulawayo and later Beira and Salisbury. The line was then extended north via Wankie to tap the coal fields connecting Victoria Falls and the mining areas at Broken Hill.[53] The line reached the Congo border where it now links through the Katanga Railway with the Benguela Railway to Lobito. At a later stage some branch lines were constructed to connect the copper belt mining centres and farming areas. This helped a great deal in earning substantial revenue.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953 and dissolved on 31 December 1963 having failed to obtain the support of Africans in two of the constituent territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was agreed to share the federal debt and corresponding assets—51.120 per cent by Rhodesia, 37.127 per cent by Zambia, and 10.753 per cent by Malawi. Rhodesia Railways and Central African Power Corporation assets are divided on a 50 : 50 basis between Rhodesia and Zambia.[54]

The railway lines of these countries pass through another neighbouring country—Mozambique. The port of Beira in Mozambique acts as a threshold for imports and exports of Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. Malawi is linked with Beira by a rail link starting from Salima. The outlet for Zambia to the sea is through the port of Beira but goods from Zambia to Beira must pass through Rhodesia. Now Zambia is trying to have another route through Tanzania by building a railway line. The railway—the third biggest development project in Africa—will provide a new route to the sea for Zambian copper.

In the Congo, railways were originally designed to supplement the means of transport provided by the Congo Basin. The most immediate necessity of the territory was the construction of a railway which would unite the sea at Matadi with the navigable part of the Congo at Stanleypool.[55] "Though the existing lines continue to fulfil this purpose, the modern expansion of road transport and the opening of new sources of production in areas distant from the navigable rivers have created a somewhat different outlook on the function of the railways."[56] They are now considered major arterial lines of communication. If we look at the present system of railways, we shall find that one railway line is designed to serve the gold mining areas in the north-east and the other has its terminus in the copper mining areas of southern Katanga. On the first line the Congo river provides the chief line of transport from Leopoldville to Stanleyville. From Stanleyville there is a mixed line of river and railway transport up to Albertville on Lake Tanganyika. The second line is formed by the Kasai river route to Port Francqui where the Bas-Congo-Katanga line runs northeast to Bukama and then runs to Tanke where a connection takes it to Benguela Rail on the Angola border. The line further proceeds through Katanga copper fields to link the Rhodesian Railway system at Sakania.[57]

Until the completion of Benguela Railway in 1929, Angola had only two railways, one running from Luanda to Malange and the other from Mossamedes to Sa da Bandeira. This position has been materially changed by the opening of Benguela Railway. About 70 per cent of the line lies in Portuguese territory and the rest in the Congo. It was constructed to transport copper. Benguela Railway in Angola provides the main exit route for Katangan copper and eventually links up with Lourenco Morques Railway in Mozambique, which, together with Beira Railway, is an important outlet for the Rhodesias.[58]

III

A bird's eye-view of railways in Africa shows that they have played a very important part in building up the economic fabric of African countries, though most of them were constructed with non-economic motives. By transporting very heavy loads at a low cost they have revolutionised agriculture and industry and stimulated internal and external trade. Further, the "bulk of the African resources lay inland and their development could not begin until the railroads made it possible."[59] Rail-road facilities have also given an impetus to the urbanisation of African countries.

But a cursory glance at the present railway system shows that it cannot be considered satisfactory or economically rational from the viewpoint of export or import trade. With the exception of the Republic of South Africa, no country has an adequate number of railway lines in its own territory. There are vast areas where production of goods for internal, and more particularly external, trade is inhibited by the lack of transport facilities. Moreover, almost "nowhere in tropical Africa is there a fully integrated transport complex permitting a rational selection of either road, rail or air transport"[60]. Whatever rail lines are there were not constructed with due regard to the subsequent need for linking them to assure a coordinated flow of traffic. The situation is more unsatisfactory so far as the availability of railway facilities between different sub-regions is concerned. In West Africa "the transport picture is marred by missing 'international' links."[61] These lines built for various reasons will continue to be a heavy financial burden so long as they remain isolated.

There are certain physical, social, economic and political factors which have hampered the construction of railways in Africa. In most cases they have made the existing railway systems more difficult to operate economically. "Africa is the 'plateau continent', and the word 'plateau' immediately suggests some of the major problems besetting transport by road, rail and inland waterway. Almost everywhere the coastal plain, which averages for the continent only 20 miles in width, is backed by more or less formidable scraps......It was a high-cost proposition to build road and rail lines up on these steep slopes; it was difficult to maintain the lines, and expensive to operate on them."[62] The Franco-Ethiopian Railway line requires 760 km to cover a distance of 576 km and there are numerous tunnels on the way. In this respect West Africa is somewhat more fortunate than East Africa since the plateau is lower. But routes are even more difficult and costly.

Among the physical factors, climate is probably the greatest hindrance in developing transport facilities. Extremes of temperature and rainfall raise transport costs well above what they would be in similar conditions in temperate lands.[63] "High temperatures make for a high consumption of water, and lines in steppe areas often have great problems in securing an adequate supply."[64] This difficulty is faced by Benguela Railway in Angola and railways in Tanzania. High temperatures combined with high humidity create complicated problems contributing to high maintenance costs. In the equatorial belt, dense rain forests make road and railway construction difficult and costly and for large parts of the rainy season most of the routes are impassable. Track maintenance is difficult and expensive where rainfall can cause many washouts.[65]

The construction of railways is also seriously hampered by the general lack of suitable local fuels and, in some cases, by water difficulties. Rhodesia, Mozambique and Nigeria produce significant quantities of coal but most of the regions do not have sufficient coal for use by the railways. In some regions coal is of a low grade. Although it has helped in reducing import requirements for, say, Nigeria and Ghana, its poor quality has led to higher maintenance costs of steam locomotives so that it is now planned gradually to dieselize these services.[66] In the Congo poor quality coal was used on rail lines. Moreover, many railways "have consumed large quantities of wood for fuel and continue to do so. This is an expensive business, however, and in some places the forests have been denuded to such a degree that adequate supplies within reasonable distances of routeways are no longer available."[67] The use of wood not only takes more time but also occupies more space. Thus the cost of fuel, "whether it be domestically produced or imported, remains one of the factors accounting for the high operating expenses of many African lines."[68]

Several railway lines in Africa have to cross unproductive, thinly peopled areas The lines were built "as acts of faith in the hope that traffic would later justify the cost."[69] Since most of the railway lines were built not for economic reasons but for political or military purposes some of them ran at a loss for decades. The economic returns were too meagre to justify the heavy capital expenditure involved in building them.

"Managerial staffs on the railways and in ports have not always been composed of people of high calibre. Management has sometimes been unimaginative, short-sighted, and lacking in aggressiveness. The top levels have failed to develop adequate plans for a continuing growth of traffic."[70] Social factors are responsible for this state of affairs. For example, in South Africa, whites are given preference for some jobs on the railways though many of them are less qualified. In Nigeria, due to Africanisation, people are sometimes given positions for which they are not fully trained. This has created some operational problems and led to greater maintenance requirements.[71]

Despite these difficulties, it is now realised that transport and industrialisation are closely linked and intra-African trade is dependent on expansion of transport.[72] In several countries higher allocations of expenditure on transport have been made in the Development Plans. Table IV shows that most countries in Africa in their Plan programmes have allocated more than 30 per cent of the total investment for transport. Maximum allocations have been made by Nigeria and Ethiopia followed by Cameroon. So with the implementation of the Development Plans, the expansion of transport has been more rapid than during the past quarter century.

Comprehensive studies have been undertaken by different agencies for the development of transport links within the sub-region. For example, a study of transport links covering Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan has been made by a team provided under bi-lateral assistance by the Government of Italy.[73] The UNDP (Special Fund) is sponsoring a transport study of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania through their joint agency, the East African Railways and Harbour Authority. A report on new transport links among Central African countries and their immediate neighbour has also been prepared.[74] In West Africa, it has been decided to set up a Permanent Transport Committee within the framework of the organisation for general sub-regional economic cooperation.[75]

TABLE IV

Planned Public Capital Expenditure (Sector-wise)

Country	*Plan Period*	*Agriculture*	*Industry*	*Electricity*	*Transport and Communications*	*Education*	*Health*	*Others*
Development Programmes	*Percentage of Total*							
Cameroon	1961-65	32	—	—	48	8	4	8
Congo (Brazzaville)	1961-63	22	—	—	23	13	7	35
Ethiopia	1957-61	7	10	11	54	5	3	10
Ghana	1959-64	7	6	31	15	8	5	28
Guinea	1960-63	28	15	3	23	10	5	16
Kenya	1960-63	37	1	—	15	8	2	37
Madagascar	1959-62	41	1	1	33	6	5	13
Mali	1961-65	18	6	6	35	35	—	—
Nigeria	1955-61	1	1	7	56	6	2	27
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	1959-63	2	—	44	35	8	6	5
Senegal	1961-64	18	7	—	34	12	5	24
Tanganyika	1961-63	24	3	8	18	14	4	29
Uganda	1961-66	17	—	—	21	14	7	41

IV

It has been said that during the past 100 years so much attention was paid to the expansion of railways due to administrative and strategic considerations that roads were neglected. Since the railway system in Africa is now sufficiently developed, greater attention should be given to roads. In West Africa particularly, the "railway age" is over.

Although West African railways now carry more freight and more passengers than before,[76] they are not sufficient to meet the increasing demand from the various sectors of the economy. Nigeria has a greater length of railway lines than all other countries of West Africa, but even then it "is not adequate in the sense of being able to move, promptly and at reasonable cost, the present volume of traffic".[77] Sierra Leone is also short of capacity. Although the situation has improved somewhat, a study of the region shows that its increased capacity can meet only 60 per cent of the actual demand. In Ghana, the railway system was considered "compact, well-managed and prosperous"[78], but the gold mines and manganese ore at Trakwa have justified the need for a double track. An ECA study has strongly recommended expansion of railways especially in Ghana and Nigeria. In other parts of Africa, there is also sufficient need for the development of railways, particularly in Sudan to open up new areas towards the south and west, in East Africa to replace a more costly and complicated land-water transport route and in Angola and Mozambique to open up new areas. Hence "Africa continues to be the only region in the world where there is still justifiable reason for large-scale building of railways."[79]

But it does not mean that roads should be neglected. Merely covering the country with railways would not lead to economic development. Expansion on a wider front is called for to improve transport facilities. Railways are a very expensive proposition and can only link important places situated at great distances. There is little justification to construct railway stations in villages which are too far away from railway lines. Roads linking small and large cities can produce better results by helping farmers in marketing their products. So in an underdeveloped country whose population mainly depends on agriculture, rail and road transport should exist side by side.

What is required is to guard against expansion of duplicate transport services and avoid unfair competition. Since mechanised road transport came into being there has been a competition between rail and road transport. The latter has some advantages especially in short-distance traffic.[80] This competition has deprived the railways of considerable goods traffic. In West Africa the "road and rail compete in the West African transport market, and that competition from road transport has affected the volume of and receipts from the railway passengers and freight traffic".[81] Moreover, competition between and overlapping of transport services is "wasteful as well as harmful inasmuch as it means that two sets of capital are trying to get remunerated where there is scope for only one".[82] The policy of free competition has not been accepted even in the US where there is ample supply of automobiles and oil on the ground that an unrestricted competition would result in an enormous loss to the nation. Similarly in Europe when co-ordinated policies were originally adopted, the principal aim was to find ways and means of protecting railways against competition from road transport.

It is now generally accepted that one of the functions of co-ordination is to eliminate "wasteful competition".[83] The fact that each type of transport has certain advantages for a particular type of work provides an economic basis for co-ordination. The funds available for capital expenditure on transport should largely be adjusted in such a way that roads may serve as a feeder for the railways for at least such traffic that they are capable of handling more economically. Rail and road transport are complementary to each other. While a road system "links up the cultivators' holdings with the local market and the nearest railway station, the railway provides connecting links between the areas of production and consumption at a distance."[84] Co-ordination between them will certainly improve the efficiency of a transport system as a whole—an essential pre-requisite for economic development.[85]

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85. According to Lord Lugard, "the material development of Africa may be summed up in one word—transport".

Road Development in India

P. P. LAKSHMANAN*

THE mode of transport limits and is in turn limited by the level of economic development in a country. This was true of the bullock cart in the simple economy of the self-sufficient villages in India in the era immediately preceding British rule. There is however historical evidence of long road routes, maintained for civil administration and military defence, in earlier periods of Indian history. The ancient Rig Veda and the later literature of the Aryan period (3500-2500 B. C.) refer to highways called Mahapathas, and the inter-village roads maintained at the expense of groups of villages or the king's treasury. Kautilya (about 300 B.C.) refers to the economic and military importance of roads, Megasthenes (about 200 B. C.) about distance pillars on roads and the Chinese traveller H'uen-Tsang (700 A.D.) about road facilities like food, medical attention and rest houses. Roads constructed over the periods varied in kind. The width of the road varied from about 32 feet to 60 feet. The road surfaces were like "the back of the tortoise" (convex surfaces) with drains on both sides. Various kinds of chariots, bullock-carts, horses, and pack animals went over these roads. Roads of historical importance include the Great Trunk Road connecting the cities of North India with the north-west frontier which was restored by Babar in the 15th Century A.D. Rulers of the Deccan built roads connecting the plateau with the ports of the west and east coasts.

With the commencement of British rule in the 19th century, a large number of roads were constructed by British military engineers connecting important military and commercial centres. But a large number of the old historical roads had deteriorated so badly that some of them were beyond recognition. It was Lord Dalhousie who set up the Public Works Department in the Indian Provinces to look after roads, buildings and other public works. It is interesting to read from the first administration report of the Punjab P.W.D. that the Grand Trunk Road from Lahore to Peshawar had been traced and surveyed.

With the development of railways from about the middle of the 19th century, a new transport system began to emerge in the country. The railways connected all the major ports with their hinterland and also the provincial capitals and military centres. Major road works were relegated to the background and attention was mainly concentrated on the construction of feeder roads to the railways. The transport system that emerged assumed a distinct colonial character and was designed primarily to serve the economic, political and military interests of the foreign rulers, although incidentally it also helped to integrate the country and widen the market for its products. Under this system, roads came to be looked upon as a subject of local interest and importance only. With the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1919, roads became a provincial subject and were transferred from the Central Government to Provincial Governments who, in turn, placed the greater part of road mileage in charge of Local Bodies.

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* The views expressed by the author are not necessarily those of the organisation to which he belongs.

Review of Recent Developments

The First World War and the decade following it witnessed great changes in transport all the world over. The disposal of surplus military vehicles led to an increasing number of converted trucks and buses on principal roads in India. The increased number of motor vehicles and the traditional bullock carts and other types of vehicles soon led to widespread deterioration of roads, with little or no maintenance. Public opinion was aroused, and in 1927 the Government of India appointed a committee, popularly known as the Jayakar Committee, to advise on a road policy. The recommendations of the Committee led to the Central Road Fund, to be raised out of tax collections at the rate of 2 annas per gallon of gasoline. The Fund was instituted in 1929 for promoting development of roads and facilitating road research. The creation of the Fund may be considered to be the first important measure taken by the Central Government to promote road development in India.

In 1933, discussions took place between the Centre and the provinces regarding the development of a skeleton trunk road system in India. The Government of India proposed to the Secretary of State that provision might be made specifically in the Constitution Act, then under contemplation, to permit national trunk roads becoming in some measure a federal charge. It was recognised that eventually it might be necessary for the future federal legislature to enact a Federal Roads Act. But, because of the emphasis on provincial autonomy, no specific provision was included in the Government of India Act, 1935, to cover Central interest in the development of arterial roads.

Indian Roads Congress

The Indian Roads Congress (I.R.C.) came into being in 1934, with members representing engineers of all ranks from the Central and State Governments, Military Engineering services and commercial interests. The Congress was constituted to provide, among other things, a forum for pooling of experience and ideas on matters affecting the construction and maintenance of roads in India and to recommend standard specifications. The affairs of the Congress are controlled by a Council and an Executive Committee. The Executive Committee manages the day-to-day administration, examines and makes recommendations to the Governments on points arising from time to time in connection with road development. The Consulting Engineer to the Government of India (Road Development) is the permanent Treasurer of I.R.C. I.R.C. has functioned continuously at an advanced technical level during the last 33 years of its existence. It has fixed many road standards and published a code of practice on bridges and bridge specifications. It has provided a useful forum for discussion of road engineering problems and for pooling and dissemination of the results of road tests and experiments. The Nagpur Plan and the 20-Year Road Plan (1961-81) came to be formulated largely on the advice and initiative of the Indian Roads Congress and its members.

The Nagpur Plan

In 1943, the Chief Engineers in charge of roads throughout the country met at Nagpur and evolved a 10-year road development plan to meet the country's requirements over a twenty-year period. This has since come to be known as the "Nagpur Plan". The plan proceeded on the basis that in highly developed agricultural areas no village should be more than two miles (about 3 kilometres) from a road, nor more than five miles (about 8 kilometres) from a main road, the average distance from a main road being generally less than two miles (about 3 kilometres). In non-agricultural and less developed areas, no village should be more than five miles (8 km.) from a road, nor more than 20 miles (32 km.) from a main road, the average distance from a main road being 6-7 miles (10-11 km.) in most cases. It was reckoned that if road development proceeded along these lines, in 10 years the length of surfaced roads* would increase from 140,800 to 196,800 kilometres and of unsurfaced roads** from 211,200 to 332,800 kilometres.

Road development plans drawn in the post-war reconstruction phase and under the First and Second Five-Year Plans have broadly followed the approach of the Nagpur Plan as translated in terms of the requirements of different parts of the country, excepting for some princely States which came into the picture later.

Road Plan (1961-81)

By the end of the Second Plan in 1961, the targets of road mileage envisaged in the Nagpur Plan had been exceeded for the country as a whole, although progress as between individual States and regions was by no means even and large tracts still lagged behind. Towards the end of the Second Plan, the Chief Engineers from the Centre and the States met together to formulate a new twenty-year road development plan for the period 1961-81. The plan proceeded on the basis that in developed agricultural areas no village should remain more than 4 miles (about 6.4 km.) from a metalled road or more than 1½ miles (2.4 km.) from any type of road. Under the Plan, compared to an average at the end of the Second Plan of 16 kilometres for every 100 square kilometres of area, the Plan envisaged that by 1981 the average length of roads would be 32 kilometres per 100 square kilometres. The total length of roads in the country in 1981 is envisaged at about 1,051,000 km., of which 403,000 would be surfaced and 648,000 km. unsurfaced. The plan also proposed a scheme of priorities which included, amongst others, provision of missing bridges, improvement of road surface to at least one-lane black topped specifications for National and State Highways, widening of the main roads in the vicinity of large towns to two lanes or more and provision of two-lane roads on major arterial routes. The cost of completing the programme was estimated at Rs. 52,000 million, of which Rs. 6,300 million was for village roads. The plan outlined by the Chief Engineers has remained a broad guide for more detailed planning in the States and its priorities have been generally kept in view. However, specific commitments made by the Central and State Governments have so far been only in terms of five-year and annual plans of development. The total outlay proposed in the Draft Fourth Plan (1966-67 to 1970-71) for road development is Rs. 7,600 million against an anticipated expenditure of Rs. 4,450 million under the Third Plan (1961-62 to 1965-66). The targets proposed for the Fourth Plan period include about 50,000 kms. of additional surfaced roads against an achievement of 49,000 kms. in the Third Plan. The targets in respect of total road length of surfaced and unsurfaced roads envisaged in the 20-year plan may well be achieved, but it is far from certain whether the targets in regard to widening, upgrading of road crust, construction of culverts and bridges, etc. suggested by the Chief Engineers will be accomplished within the twenty-year period ending 1981.

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*Surfaced roads: A general term applied to roads constructed of waterbound Macadam or black-top surface or cement concrete surface.

**Unsurfaced roads: A general term applied to roads constructed of earth, gravel, moorum and stabilised soil.

In 1951, the country had about 156,000 kilometres of surfaced roads and about 242,000 kilometres of unsurfaced roads. Progress from 1951 to 1966 is shown in the following table, along with the targets envisaged for 1971.

TABLE I

Progress in road development in India from 1951 to 1966, and progress anticipated in 1970-71

(in kilometres)

Year	*Surfaced Roads*	*Unsurfaced Roads*	*Total*
1	2	3	4
1951	156,107	241,512	397,619
1956	181,960	313,490	495,450
1961	234,419	470,581	705,000
1966	284,000	674,000	958,000
1971 (target)	334,000	874,000*	1208,000

* Estimated.

Source : Planning Commission : (i) Fourth Five-Year Plan, A Draft Outline, August, 1966.
(ii) Final Report of the Committee on Transport Policy and Coordination, January 1966.

Between 1951 and 1966, the length of surfaced roads increased by about 76 per cent and of unsurfaced roads by about 179 per cent. The extension of road mileage has been taking place in the country at a fast rate. The 1981 target for unsurfaced roads envisaged in the 20-year plan was exceeded even in 1966, taking into account all the roads constructed including unclassified village roads. The target for surfaced roads is also likely to be exceeded in 1981, if not earlier. The developments taking place in the country since Independence have been beyond the normal expectations of road engineers who met in 1943 to fix road targets for 1961, and again in 1958 to fix road targets for 1981. The long-range aspects of road planning were clouded to the vision of road engineers, and they fixed the road targets low in view of the tight financial resources position existing then*. The road system has shown a strong tendency to grow, although the new road links that come into being are not always according to specified standards, at least in the initial stages. Unprecedented economic developments have necessitated new road links, while threats of foreign aggression have led to larger road construction programmes being undertaken for border security and defence.

National Highways

The National Highways in India would make interesting history. As noted earlier, the proposal for national trunk roads could not make much progress in the 'thirties in view of the emphasis on provincial autonomy. The idea slowly gained ground and received powerful support not only in forums like the Indian Roads Congress, but in the Central Legislature as well. In 1947, the year of Independence, the Government of India assumed complete financial responsibility for the development and maintenance of certain roads provisionally approved by them for inclusion in a system of national highways. The main objective behind this step was to develop the major trunk roads of the country and to give relief to States so that they could concentrate more on the development of district and village roads.

Under the new Constitution of free India which came into force in 1950, the National Highways became a Central subject. In 1956, the Government of India enacted the National Highways Act, and statutorily took over the roads classified by them as National Highways. The enactment of this legislation marked a unique occasion in the history of road development in the country as this was the first time that the Central Government took over direct statutory responsibility for certain highways in the States. The present length of roads included in the National Highway system aggregates about 22,500 kilometres. This system includes *inter alia* the road from Amritsar to Calcutta, the Agra-Bombay Road, the Bombay-Bangalore-Madras Road, the Madras-Calcutta Road, the Calcutta-Nagpur-Bombay Road the Banaras-Nagpur-Hyderabad-Kanyakumari Road, the Delhi-Ahmedabad-Bombay Road, the Ahmedabad-Kandla Road and the branch road to Porbandar, the Hindustan-Tibet Road from Ambala to Tibet border via Simla, the Delhi-Moradabad-Lucknow Road, the Lucknow-Muzaffarpur-Barauni Road with a branch road to the Nepal border, the Assam Access Road, the Assam

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* Report of Chief Engineers on Road Development Plan for India (1961-81) presented to the Department of Transport, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Government of India, New Delhi, 1958, page (i) of Preface.

Trunk Road on the south bank of the Brahmaputra and the road branching off from the Assam Trunk Road towards the Burma border through Manipur. Of these, the road from Amritsar to Calcutta and beyond to East Pakistan border (a total of 2760 km), as also the road from Nepal border to Moradabad and Delhi and beyond to West Pakistan border would form part of the International Highway known as the Asian Highway which is expected to be completed in 1970. Thus, from purely local roads to national roads, and now to international roads, road development has been opening new horizons for transport in this country.

Road Administration

Roads in this country are at present divided into 5 categories, namely, (i) National Highways, (ii) State Highways, (iii) Major District Roads, (iv) Other District Roads, (v) Village Roads. The National Highways fall directly within the sphere of responsibility of the Central Government and are included in the Central sector of the Five-Year Plans, while the other categories of roads form part of the plans of States and of local authorities. The Central Government meets the entire expenditure required for the construction, improvement and maintenance of the National Highways.

TABLE II

Length of different classes of roads during the years 1951, 1956 and 1961

(In Kilometres)

Class	*1951*	*1956*	*1961*
1	*2*	*3*	*4*
National highways	19,696	20,485	22,504
State highways	42,560	46,883	61,691
Major district roads	89,280	94,634	112,824
Other district roads	80,800	86,429	111,310
Village roads	165,283	240,589	386,582
Unclassified roads	...	6,430	10,090
Total	387,619	495,450	705,002

Source : Final Report of the Committee on Transport Policy and Coordination, January 1966.

The Central Government also assists the State Governments in the construction of selected roads of interstate and economic importance. Similar assistance is extended for roads taken up for strategic reasons. Within the States, the State Highways and the Major District Roads are the better types of roads providing through communication between the main centres, and are looked after by the Public Works Department of the State Governments. "Other district roads", which include roads linking villages with markets, block headquarters, etc., and "village roads" are looked after by local authorities such as the Zila Parishad and the Village Panchayat. It is felt that enough attention has not been given in the past to planning for the entire road system of a State in an integrated manner, including National Highways which are a charge on the Centre, and the roads for which the State Governments are responsible. Great emphasis is now being laid on the preparation of district road plans, so that within the frame-work provided by the National and State Road Plans, roads connecting market centres, small towns and villages in the different districts could be planned and executed in a systematic manner.

Although the Central Government is responsible for the administration and finance of National Highways, hitherto construction and maintenance of these roads have been undertaken by the Public Works Departments of the State Governments concerned which act as agencies on behalf of the Centre. The Central Government has not had a road construction agency of its own at its disposal. With the large programmes of road construction which it has been necessary to take up in recent years particularly in Assam, West Bengal, Rajasthan and Gujarat, and the considerable burden thrown in consequence upon the Public Works Departments in the States, it has been felt that there should be a road construction agency with the Central Government which could supplement the State agencies to the extent necessary and, on the basis of agreed programmes, could also take up some of the difficult works. In the States also, the volume of road construction work is now considered large enough to justify the setting up of separate highway departments in several States with specialised highway and bridge engineering personnel who are able to provide the technical planning and supervision needed in highway road and bridge construction and to ensure the standards required for high specification roads. These highway departments might also be called upon in future to undertake other necessary functions like traffic surveys, cost-benefit studies of major projects, etc.

The Existing Road System

The road system in India at present is stated to be inadequate when compared to the requirements of the economy. The road requirements in terms of mileage are estimated on the basis of formulae worked out on the grid and star principle taking into consideration area, population groups, present level of development, growth potential, etc. It is difficult to be too dogmatic about the total road requirements in view of the method of estimation, and, consequently, about the extent of inadequacy of road length in India. Roads have to be viewed as part of the total transport system consisting of rail, road, inland and coastal waterways, etc. Sometimes the point is emphasised that whatever might be the other transport modes, roads have a definite role to play particularly in the transport of general merchandise in small lots to a number of consuming centres. It will be seen from Table III that the road length per 100 sq. kilometres in India is more than in African countries like Algeria and Morocco, and is also more than in some advanced countries like Canada, Australia, Spain and Sweden; the road length per lakh of population in India, however, is less than that in the countries mentioned. This would show that the areas in India would be more accessible by road, whereas the large population in India depresses the road length per lakh of population. In India itself, the road length according to area and population varies considerably among the different States. As will be seen from Table IV, the road length per 100 sq. kilometres varies from 5 kilometres in Jammu and Kashmir to 120 in Kerala, and the road length per lakh of population varies from 100 in Bihar to 636 in Nagaland. Within each State, there are areas showing large variations from the average road length shown for the State as a whole. As regards the utilisation of roads, the regional transport surveys now being undertaken under the auspices of the Joint Technical Group for Transport Planning have pointed out specific roads in the regions concerned which are under-

TABLE III

Road length in different countries in relation to area and population in 1965

(length in kilometres)

S. No.	*Country*	*Per 100 sq. kilometres of*		*Per lakh of population*	
		surfaced roads	*all roads*	*surfaced roads*	*all roads*
0	1	2	3	4	5
Africa—					
1.	Algeria	N.A.	1.7	N.A.	377
2.	Morocco	4.0	11.6	139	400
3.	United Arab Republic	1.0	4.0	34	168
4.	Union of South Africa	7.8	27.2	548	1897
Asia—					
5.	Burma	2.1	3.7	60	103
6.	Ceylon	50.0	51.8	299	310
7.	India	8.3	25.7	56	173
8.	Iran	0.7	2.1	48	151
9.	Japan	N.A.	262.8	N.A.	1003
10.	Pakistan	3.2	4.2	30	39
11.	Thailand	2.3	2.4	40	41
Europe—					
12.	France	137.1	261.4	1549	2954
13.	West Germany	152.9	152.9	652	652
14.	Italy	63.1	66.4	372	391
15.	Spain	15.7	15.7	253	253
16.	Sweden	21.5	21.5	1262	1262
17.	United Kingdom	140.9	140.9	634	634
America—					
18.	Argentina	1.8	4.9	225	614
19.	Canada	5.3	7.9	2726	4077
20.	U.S.A.	46.9	62.6	2287	3052
21.	Venezuela	2.8	5.6	299	605
Oceania—					
22.	Australia	4.7	11.3	3228	7774
23.	New Zealand	34.2	34.2	3539	3539

NA—data not available.

Source : Ministry of Transport and Shipping : Basic Road Statistics of India 1965 (Table compiled on the basis of the information furnished in the International Road Federation Staff Report 1965, and the United Nations Statistical Year Book 1965).

utilised, and those which need to be strengthened to cater to increased traffic. International comparisons are available regarding utilisation of roads in different countries, but these are based on road traffic of motor vehicles only. On Indian roads, we have a mixed traffic consisting of motor vehicles, bullock carts and others. The volume of mixed traffic has to be taken into account in determining utilisation of capacity of roads in India. In view of all these considerations, it is difficult to be precise about the extent of inadequacy of the Indian road system. Broadly speaking, the increasing road length in the growing road system in India, as noted earlier, may not be considered too inadequate, but the system, as we shall see later, needs strengthening in regard to width of roads, road crust, bridges and culverts, etc.

TABLE IV

Road length in various States of India in 1965 in relation to area and population

(Length in kilometres)

S. No.	*State*	*Per 100 sq. kms of area*			*Per lakh of population*		
		Surfaced roads	*Unsurfaced roads*	*All roads*	*Surfaced roads*	*Unsurfaced roads*	*All roads*
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1.	Andhra Pradesh	10	15	25	71	106	177
2.	Assam	3	29	32	28	258	286
3.	Bihar	7	22	29	25	75	100
4.	Gujarat	7	9	16	60	74	134
5.	Jammu & Kashmir	1	4	5	70	265	335
6.	Kerala	25	95	120	52	197	249
7.	Madhya Pradesh	6	7	13	70	89	159
8.	Madras	29	21	50	105	75	180
9.	Maharashtra	9	13	22	61	88	149
10.	Mysore	17	23	40	122	171	293
11.	Nagaland	1	14	15	40	596	636
12.	Orissa	5	22	27	42	180	222
13.	Punjab-Haryana	10	31	41	51	165	216
14.	Rajasthan	5	8	13	73	116	189
15.	Uttar Pradesh	8	32	40	29	117	146
16.	West Bengal	17	36	53	39	80	119
17.	Others (Union Territories)	2	12	14	44	242	286
	All-India	8	18	26	56	117	173

Source : Ministry of Transport & Shipping : Basic Road Statistics of India, 1965.

Rural Roads

It will be seen from Table II that about half the total length of roads in India is accounted for by village roads. Practically all the village roads, and some of the district roads and State highways, and even some sections of the National Highways are not surfaced. The village roads on which largely the bullock carts ply have remained unsurfaced, and are likely to remain so, while an increasing proportion of roads other than village roads is likely to be surfaced in future in view of the increasing number of motor vehicles. Not only in India but in African countries like Algeria and Morocco, in Latin American countries like Argentina and Venezuela and even in more advanced countries like the Union of South Africa, Canada, Australia and France, a large proportion of roads are unsurfaced (Table V). In many of these countries, the unsurfaced roads are mostly the feeder roads branching off from surfaced trunk roads, and serving remote areas. Surfacing all the feeder roads would be very costly and might not be economically justified in view of the nature and volume of traffic on such roads. In India, a large portion of the unsurfaced roads are those which carry foodgrains and other agricultural products to the markets or railheads, although in certain areas such roads carry iron ore, coal, etc. as well. The villagers' requirements of manufactured goods from towns and cities are also met via these roads. The deplorable condition of most of these roads has been emphasised by the commodity transport studies and the regional transport surveys undertaken under the auspices of the Joint Technical Group for Transport Planning. A recent survey of the regulated markets in Maharashtra conducted by the Maharashtra Regional Transport Survey showed that more than three-fourths of road lengths actually used in the transport of foodgrains and other agricultural produce from the farms to the market are village roads of which only about one-third could be used throughout the year. Roughly two-thirds of the village roads could not be used for a considerable part of the year due to the unsurfaced roads becoming unserviceable during monsoon, the rivers getting flooded, and for other reasons. Of late, the need for construction and improvement of village roads has received much public attention in this country. Voluntary contributions of the people in the villages have helped to build up a considerable number of unsurfaced roads, but these have tended to deteriorate rapidly without proper maintenance. It is now felt that the village approach roads constructed through local efforts should form part of a larger area plan (district road plan referred to earlier) which provides for both continuous maintenance and a gradual changeover to higher specifications. In pursuance of a recommendation made recently by the Committee on Transport Policy and Coordination, the Central Government have also suggested to the State Governments to consider earmarking for rural roads 20% of the total allocation for roads in the State plans.

Road Maintenance

The maintenance of roads in India has not been altogether satisfactory. Presiding over the Sixth Session of the Indian Roads Congress in December 1939, Sir Kenneth Mitchell said : "I would remind you of the story of the Irishman and his donkey. The Irishman reasoned that

TABLE V
Road length by nature of surface in different countries in 1965

(in thousand kilometres)

S. No.	*Country*	*Paved*	*Gravel or crushed stone or stabilised soil surface*	*Earth roads graded or drained*	*Un-im-proved roads*	*Total*
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Africa					
1.	Algeria	—	—	41	—	41
2.	Morocco	18	—	5	29	52
3.	United Arab Republic	10	@	12	27	49
4.	Union of South Africa	32	64	99	137	332
	Asia					
5.	Burma	7	8	9	1	25
6.	Ceylon	18	15	1	@	34
7.	India	141	131	— 570	—	842
8.	Iran	9	2	11	12	34
9.	Japan	40	— 932	—	—	972
10.	Pakistan	17	13	—	9	39
11.	Thailand	5	7	@	—	12
	Europe					
12.	France	500	250	80	600	1,430
13.	West Germany	242	138	—	—	380
14.	Italy	140	50	10	—	200
15.	Spain	43	36	—	@	79
16.	Sweden	21	76	—	—	97
17.	United Kingdom	342	2	—	—	344
	America					
18.	Argentina	23	27	79	6	135
19.	Canada	141	384	185	76	786
20.	U. S. A.	2264	2130	739	731	5,864
21.	Venezuela	15	10	5	21	51
	Oceania					
22.	Australia	136	224	223	283	866
23.	New Zealand	33	59	—	—	92

—Nil or negligible @ below 500 kilometres.

Note : Paved roads include all roads with a wearing surface of concrete, brick, cobblestones, asphalt or other bituminous binder.

Source : International Road Federation, Staff Report, 1965, Washington, D.C.

the donkey being a patient animal would not notice a gradual cut in his food and could therefore be accustomed to have much less and, even perhaps, none at all. He therefore reduced the rations by 10 per cent a week. The experiment was successful in that the donkey made no complaint, but unfortunately at the end of ten weeks it died, and the owner had to buy another. Sir, that is a frivolous but apt parallel of arbitrary economy in road maintenance, particularly in India where roads are generally of a type which is cheap to construct but is dependent on regular maintenance and renewal. The effects of starvation may not be immediately apparent but later on deterioration is rapid and in the end your road may have to be re-constructed at greater cost than has been saved". This has been largely true, but past neglect has left useful lessons. Between 1952 and 1962, the expenditure on road development increased four-fold but the provision for maintenance increased only two-fold. Road crusts in India originally meant for light traffic are unable to bear heavier traffic and heavier volume of movement which have developed in this country in recent years. Roads break and the damage done is sometimes beyond normal repair. The State Governments have lately stepped up their expenditure on maintenance, but there is still room for improvement in the maintenance of National Highways. Taking all roads together, the total maintenance expenditure in India is now seen to be rising faster than the total development expenditure, thus reversing the earlier trend. Table VI would show that during the later phase of 1957-65, the maintenance expenditure increased by about 87 per cent when the increase in development expenditure was 72 per cent.

Roads in Urban Areas

Special problems have been posed by the growing towns and cities in India. Some of these problems have been caused by lack of overall town planning which has led to unplanned land uses. Basically good transportation solutions for cities and towns depend on the proper physical inter-relationship of functions in the metropolitan area and on the principle and practice of relative self-containment, so as to minimise the length and number of journeys necessary, especially at peak hours. The traffic and transporation studies made in recent years have indicated that the course of attempting to supply transportation services to meet demand arising from unplanned growth of cities would be doomed to continuing failure. The increase in population, land development and travel demand in the metropolitan cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi has led to a continuous increase in transportation capacities on the rail and road systems. According to the transport plans drawn up by different agencies for these metropolitan cities, it would cost about Rs. 1000 million for Bombay, Rs. 500 million for Calcutta and Rs. 340 million for Delhi, for road development alone.

The traffic and transportation problems in metropolitan cities in India are being studied at present by a Metropolitan Transport Team. According to an interim report submitted by the Team, there is urgent need to determine the relationship between traffic generation and various types of land use in the metropolitan cities through survey and research. It is necessary to provide infrastructure facilities in towns around the metropolis which would serve as counter magnets and thereby arrest the existing trend of migration to the metropolitan centres. Such a strategy of dispersal is important, especially in view of the fact that the big push in urbanisation is yet to come in India. There should be a comprehensive and systematic urban renewal of the core areas of the metropolitan cities which have become derelict and functionally obsolete to provide for the efficient movement of traffic. Through urban renewal, a balance between developed land and space required for movement of traffic could be restored. It would thus be evident that road problems in some of the major cities in India which have grown up phenomenally in recent years call for basic solutions in respect of overall town planning itself. The Transport Team has also made specific suggestions for easing traffic congestion in the cities concerned at present, like the provision of freeways and by-passes, over- and under-bridges, parking facilities etc.

Road Research

Roads in India are carrying motor vehicles in greater numbers, larger in size and faster in speed. On many routes, the existing road pavements are proving inadequate in both width and strength. It is becoming necessary on several routes to widen the road pavements, strengthen the hard crust, and provide improved surfaces with cement concrete, asphaltic carpets, etc. Long lengths of completely new roads of high standards are also required to be built in specific cases such as the Express Highway to Paradeep Port in connection with the programme of export of iron ore. The old methods of stage construction are not applicable at the present stage of development in the country in many cases, because traffic develops very fast soon after the road is built. Under these circumstances the need for adopting modern and advanced construction techniques is being increasingly felt in the country. Techniques have been evolved for highly trafficked roads such as stabilisation of soil, controlled compaction of road embankments, properly designed and controlled dense bituminous carpets, properly controlled high strength cement concrete used in conjunction with high-tensile steel in pre-stressed concrete bridges, and others. These new techniques call for precise testing of materials and quality control.

At present, besides the Central Road Research Institute which serves as a national laboratory, there are road research stations in States like Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and West Bengal. These stations perform the function of testing and control, but are not adequately equipped and staffed for research work. The Indian Roads Congress in co-operation with the Roads Wing of the Ministry of Transport and Shipping and the Central Road Research Institute try to bring together the results of the research work done in the various laboratories and ensure that repetition and duplication are avoided as far as possible. In 1957, following a recommendation by the Indian Roads Congress, the Ministry of Transport recommended to the State Governments that they should earmark at least 1 per cent of the Central Road Fund allocations for road research to encourage the adoption of the results of research, and promote the use of new techniques of road construction, use of local materials, etc. A Central Assessment Committee was set up by the Government in 1961 for underwriting any loss or excess costs incurred by a State on account of the failure of a new technique adopted by it.

Road research can lead to better and cheaper roads and has therefore a crucial role in future road development in the country. The Government may find it necessary to strengthen the organisation and programme for road research on the basis of past experience.

Road Transport

Road traffic in India at present includes, among others, about 12 million bullock carts and about 1 million motor vehicles. The 1 million motor vehicles consist of about 2,55,000 trucks, 70,000 buses, and the balance of about 6,75,000 motor cycles, auto-rickshaws and others. The number of motor vehicles in India has shown an increasing trend. On the basis of the anticipated increase in traffic, the number of trucks would need to be increased from 2,55,000 in 1965-66 to 4,25,000 in 1970-71, and of buses from 70,000 to 1,00,000 during the same period. According to a recent survey of bullock carts in India by the Programme Evaluation Organisation, even the bullock carts show a tendency to increase with the increase in agricultural production. According to this survey, bullock carts have an indispensable role to play in the rural economy and they are not likely to be replaced by motor transport so long as farming in India is done on small farms and farm surpluses are available in small market lots scattered over wide areas. Even in the years to come, bullock carts will continue to be the main users of the roads leading from the farms to the markets, whereas trucks are likely to be seen in larger numbers on roads connecting markets with distant consuming centres. In respect of inter-city traffic, of not only agricultural goods but also of a large variety of other goods including manufacturing goods, road transport has been carrying an increasing proportion of the total traffic in the country. It was chiefly the problem of coordination of rail and road transport with due regard to the needs of the growing economy of the country that led the Government to set up a Committee on Transport Policy and Coordination in 1959. The Committee submitted its Final Report in January 1966. The studies made by the Committee showed that over the 14 years from 1950-51 to 1964-65, the total freight and passenger traffic by rail and road in India had grown faster than the national income, and considering the total traffic in the country, road traffic had increased tremendously, both absolutely and proportionately. Another notable point that has emerged is that the average length of road haul of commodities is also showing an increasing trend. About 54 per cent of cotton and raw jute, 39 per cent of textiles and 20 per cent of iron and steel which moved by road were found to move beyond 480 kilometres on certain routes in India in 1959-61. The Committee concluded that increasing quantities of textiles, chemicals, textile machinery and other miscellaneous goods were now moving by road over considerable distances, which might extend to as much as 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres and sometimes even more. The studies made by the Joint Technical Group for Transport Planning also have shown that considerable interstate movements are taking place by road in respect of foodgrains like rice and wheat, and other commodities. With the increasing trend in the average length of road haul of commodities, the need for facilitating interstate traffic by road is making itself felt. Roads and road transport are no longer merely for providing feeder traffic for the railways. With economic development taking place under the Five-Year Plans, more and more traffic is being generated at a larger number of centres which the railways themselves would not be able to cope with. The transport system is being more oriented to domestic production, unlike the old transport system which was largely colonial in character. In the new system, interstate road transport is likely to play a larger role, and consequently interstate roads and National Highways are likely to get much greater attention than they have received so far.

Road Finance

The expenditure on development and maintenance of roads in India has been rising since 1951, due mainly to large development outlays provided under the Five-Year Plans. The total expenditure on development and maintenance increased in recent years from about Rs. 865 million in 1956-57 to Rs. 1533 million in 1964-65 (Table VI). The revenue from road transport includes import and excise duties on motor fuel, motor vehicles and accessories accruing to the Centre, the taxes on motor vehicles, sales tax on motor fuel, and passenger and goods taxes accruing to the States (Table VII). The revenue from road transport increased from 808 million in 1956-57 to 3469 million in 1964-65, the increase being largely due to the increase in the number of motor vehicles and enhancement of rates. The revenue may be expected to increase still further with the increase in motor vehicles expected in future years. Table VI and Table VII highlight the difference between the revenue from

TABLE VI

Revenue from Road Transport and Expenditure on Roads in India from 1956-57 to 1964-65

(In million rupees)

Year ending 31st March	*REVENUE*			*EXPENDITURE*			*DIFFERENCE*
	Central	*State*	*Total*	*Development*	*Maintenance*	*Total*	*Revenue minus expenditure)*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1957	523.1	284.8	807.9	571.1	294.2	865.3	(—)57.4
1958	636.3	377.6	1013.9	515.6	270.7	786.3	227.6
1959	641.5	431.8	1073.3	486.0	322.6	808.6	264.7
1960	795.2	551.5	1346.7	552.2	354.3	906.5	440.2
1961	1117·2	552.4	1669.6	698.0	399.6	1097.6	572.0
1962	1268.6	670.9	1939.5	746.7	446.7	1193.4	746.1
1963	1446.7	828.9	2275.6	819.3	500.9	1320.2	955.4
1964	2023.4	1069.9	3093.3	935.6	515.2	1450.8	1642.5
1965	2223.8	1145.5	3469.3	982.0	550.7	1532.7	1936.6

Source : Ministry of Transport and Shipping : Basic Road Statistics of India, 1965.

road transport and the expenditure on roads in India. Attention is frequently drawn to the faster rate in revenue earnings and the slower rate in expenditure on roads. It is sometimes argued that larger amounts should be allotted for roads on the ground that larger revenue is accruing from road transport. This raises a number of basic questions concerning public finance in theory and practice, a detailed discussion of which would be beyond the scope of this paper. Two points may however be stated here. Firstly, in a planned economy, there would be greater economic justification for providing for roads on the basis of the overall transport requirements of the economy, and the place accorded by it for road transport, than on the basis of the revenue earned from road transport. Secondly, the level of taxes on road transport should be as close as possible to the cost of construction and maintenance of roads so as to provide a just cost basis to the rail and road competition in the country.

TABLE VII

Revenue from Road Transport and Expenditure on Roads in India during the year 1964-65

(In million rupees)

Revenue		*Expenditure*	
1		2	
CENTRAL (*Import & Excise duties*)		*Development*	
Motor vehicles and accessories	437.5	National Highways	368.6
Motor vehicle tyres and tubes	253.4	Central Road Fund	29.3
Motor fuel	1632.9**	Roads of Economic or Inter-State Importance	45.1*
Total (Central)	2323.8	Roads in Union Territories	13.9
STATES (*including Union Territories*)		State Roads including roads under local bodies	460.1
		Urban Roads	65.0**
Motor vehicle taxes and fees	592.5	Total (Development)	935.6
Sales tax on motor fuel	259.5	*Maintenance*	
Passenger and goods tax	293.5	National Highways	73.6
Total (States)	1145.5	Roads in Union Territories	4.8
		State Roads including roads under local bodies	397.3
		Urban Roads	75.0**
		Total (Maintenance)	550.7
GRAND TOTAL	3469.3	GRAND TOTAL	1532.7

*Provisional
**Estimated.

Source : Ministry of Transport and Shipping : Basic Road Statistics of India, 1965.

Any large divergence between taxes and costs would involve either a penalty for using road transport or a subsidy for its increased usage, and therefore would need to be justified as such in the light of the transport policy to be followed. These and other points might be engaging the attention of the Road Taxation Enquiry Committee appointed by the Ministry of Transport and Shipping some time ago.

Transport Co-ordination

Co-ordination between different modes of transport in India has to be seen as an important aspect of the expansion of the Indian economy and the growth of its transport system as a whole. The various transport services in India—rail, road, inland water and coastal, airways, pipelines and ropeways—together have to meet a total demand, each service being not competitive but complementary to the others. The Committee on Transport Policy and Co-ordination which considered the problem of coordination in great detail has offered specific suggestions in respect of fiscal and pricing policies, as also on regulation and integration of the different modes. According to the Committee, in the last analysis what is hoped for is not complete co-ordination but a set of conditions favourable to co-ordination and development progressively in the direction of a composite transport network under which various transport services become available to the extent needed and at minimum capital and operational costs to the community. Detailed recommendations have been made by the Committee for undertaking the necessary studies and for setting up machinery at the Centre and in the States for bringing about the required co-ordination and development of the different transport modes. Since an overall view has to be taken of the requirements of road transport in terms of the integrated development of transport facilities, according to the Committee's recommendations, the State Transport Authorities would be required to function on the basis of systematic assessment of the requirements of road transport made by them for the States concerned, and for the country as a whole by the Inter-State Road Transport Commission, wider questions of policy and co-ordination being settled by a Central Planning and Co-ordination Committee. Whatever be the methods and machinery for co-ordination that would eventually come into being, for purposes of future development, roads in India would be viewed increasingly as part of a composite transport network embracing all modes rather than as constituting an independent transport facility. Coordination of transport is not a cloak for restricting road transport as it is sometimes believed, but in the changed context of freedom and economic growth, increasing traffic, and a changing transport system, roads and road transport might be expected to play a larger role than in the past.

Summary

To sum up, the colonial character of the transport system in India under British rule with its focus on ports, military centres and headquarters of civil administration has been changing since Independence, giving way to a new emerging transport system in free India linking more closely the economically inter-dependent areas, through its Five-Year Plans. In the new system, road transport would not only continue to meet the local traffic and feeder traffic to the railways as in the past, but would have an increasing share of the rising long-distance traffic as well. The existing road system cannot be considered too inadequate in terms of mileage, but the system needs strengthening in regard to width of roads, road crust, bridges and culverts, to cater to motor vehicles which are becoming greater in number, larger in size, and faster in speed. Rural roads which cater largely to bullock cart traffic would need special attention, while traffic on urban roads has created problems demanding basic solutions in overall town planning itself. The maintenance of roads in India has not been altogether satisfactory but has shown overall improvement in recent years. Road research can lead to better and cheaper roads, use of local materials etc., and has therefore a ‘ urical role in future road development in the country. The development and maintenance of roads in the country should proceed on the basis of the requirements of the economy under planned development rather than on the basis of the revenue earned from road transport. Transport co-ordination will not restrict road transport but will lead to development, on sound lines, of roads and road transport in the changing transport system.

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Indian Railways: Lifeline of the Nation

C. M. POONACHA

RAILWAYS in India are 114 years old. The first train in the country ran at 3-30 p. m. on April 16, 1853, when, to the accompaniment of the Governor's band and a 21-gun salute, 14 four-wheeled teak wood coaches carried 400 passengers on a historic journey of 33 kilometres from Bori-Bunder (Bombay) to Thana. Right from the inception of the railways, the Government played a leading role in their development although the process of nationalisation commenced only in 1925. In 1920, there were as many as 175 railway administrative units in India and even on the eve of the country's Independence in 1947, the railway system was a conglomeration of 42 separate railways. They have since been regrouped into nine well-defined and viable zones: Central, Eastern, Northern, North Eastern, Northeast Frontier, Southern, South Central, South Eastern, and Western Railways.

Reconstruction and Development

The railways, as the king-pin of the national economy, were called upon to meet new challenges when the country launched its industrial and economic programmes under the stimulus of the Five-Year Plans. The task which the railways faced was complicated because, for over two decades they had been starved of fresh capital investment. Having been neglected during the economic depression of the 'thirties' and depleted during World War II when considerable rolling stock and track had been sent to the theatres of war, the railway system was in a hopeless state of disrepair when India attained Independence. Partition of the country dealt a severe blow, dismembering the system and depriving the railways of some major workshops and a large body of skilled workmen.

The railways were thus faced with the gigantic task of rehabilitating the worn-out assets, of freeing the system from abject dependence on imports, of developing it by taking in hand a large number of additional works, and of introducing modern techniques in order to augment their capacity and efficiency. The Indian railways today are indeed the result of growth during the last few years of planned development. An outlay of over Rs. 32,000 million (Rs. 7.5 = 1 US $) has been put in during the three Five-Year Plans. Likewise, a sum of about Rs. 20,000 million has been envisaged for railway development during the Fourth Plan

(1966-67 to 1970-71). The railways themselves are likely to contribute over 40 per cent of the resources required.

Delivering the Nation's Goods

The phenomenal expansion in railway facilities consequent on the growth in other sectors of Indian national life is relatable to the unprecedented increase in the volume of traffic handled by the railway system. During the 15 years of the last three plans, originating freight traffic increased from 93 million tonnes to 203 million tonnes and the tonne-kilometres from 44,117 million to 116,784 million, representing an increase of 118 per cent and 165 per cent respectively. Freight traffic to be lifted by the railways by the end of the Fourth Plan is estimated to be around 295 million tonnes.

The principal dynamic factor in the growth of railway traffic has been, and will continue to be, the striking increase in the movement of bulk commodities like coal, metallic ores, gypsum, limestone, dolomite etc. While about 90 per cent of the country's coal moves by rail, the growing steel industry depends almost wholly on railway transport for movement of raw materials and finished products. Traffic in iron ore, of which India has some of the biggest high-grade reserves in the world available for export, is largely railborne. Consumption of petroleum products in India has been constantly rising and a fleet of about 15,000 special type tank wagons is in use for their transport. Similarly, rail movement of cement, fertilizers, foodgrains and industrial implements has been steadily increasing.

In order to meet the spiralling traffic demand, various measures have been undertaken by the Indian Railways. They have put in service high capacity four-axle broad gauge wagons with a tare weight of 25 tonnes and carrying capacity of 55 to 65 tonnes against 22 tonnes of the conventional two-axle wagon. These wagons are of a welded design and have a much higher intensity of loading, enabling thereby the running of heavier trains with a corresponding increase in throughput. Loading and unloading of wagons at important centres, as also at transhipment points, are being progressively mechanised.

A beginning has been made in the introduction of container services and mechanised handling of parcel traffic while the super express goods trains, connecting the principal industrial centres, have helped trade to move their consignments on a fixed, fast schedule.

Moving Millions

The increase as witnessed in goods traffic is reflected in passenger traffic too. Against 1,284 million passengers carried by the railways in 1950-51 the annual increase thereafter has been over four per cent. With the rising trend towards urbanisation, there has been a pronounced increase in commuter traffic which now accounts for almost 50 per cent of the total passengers originating and 18 per cent of the total passengers kilometres. Suburban passenger traffic over the 15-year Plan period has registered an increase of about 145 per cent as against 63 per cent increase in total passenger traffic. In order to meet the rising suburban traffic a large-scale programme of electrification around principal cities like Calcutta, Bombay and Madras has been adopted for efficient, fast and clean commuter services.

Many of the trains in India cover long stretches. As many as 75 trains run over 1,000 kms each, a dozen of them over 2,000 kms. Some of these have been put on diesel traction leading to acceleration and augmentation of accommodation. Among the better known are the air-conditioned express trains, connecting the major cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Madras. Popularly known as *deluxe* trains, there is provision on them for air-conditioned coaches with sleeper berths as also air-conditioned 'chair-cars' where accommodation is reserved and fares charged on the basis of lower class travel and a small additional surcharge. There are a few other elegant short-distance trains like the *Taj Express* between Delhi and Agra, the city of the world-famous Taj Mahal, the *Deccan Queen* between Bombay and Poona and the *Black Diamond Express* between Howrah (Calcutta) and Dhanbad. The decor and comfort provided in these trains have won acclaim from sophisticated tourists from all over the world. A number of hill stations like Simla, Darjeeling, Ootacamund and Kulu are connected by mountain railways taking off broad gauge rail-heads on trunk routes.

A number of additional amenities have been provided for passengers. Facilities exist for reservation of seats and sleeping accommodation on long journeys without any extra charge even in the lowest class. Passenger coaches of new designs, of light weight and anti-telescopic shell-construction, incorporating many an improvement not only in the standard of amenities but also from the point of view of safety, are manufactured at the Railways' Integral Coach Factory at Madras.

Special travel concessions are offered to overseas tourists. When travelling from any place to any place in air-conditioned accommodation, they are allowed a 15 per cent concession. There is a provision for 'Travel As You Like' tickets valid for 30 days on a lump sum charge of Rs. 657/- which enable tourists to go from any place to any other in air-conditioned class of first class where air-conditioned accommodation is not available. Similarly, while travelling by excursion specials, two of the conditions normally applicable in the case of specials for tourists in general, that the tour should be circular and should cover a distance of over 2,500 kms, are relaxed for overseas tourists: their tour may be for only a distance of 1,500 kms.

Concessional return tickets at one-and-a-half single journey fares, to and from a number of hill stations, are also issued during the season. Standard circular tour tickets with fixed itineraries proposed by passengers and approved of by railways are also issued at three-fourths the normal fare, valid for three months, to both individuals and groups of tourists. Foreign students on educational tours are offered travel concession in first class on payment of second class mail fares; in second class on payment of third class mail fares and in third class at half the normal mail fares.

Modern Locomotion

The history of electric traction in India is over forty years old. A modest beginning was made in 1925 when the first electric train covered a distance of 16 kms from Victoria Terminus (Bombay) to Kurla and Bandra. It remained confined, till the First Five-Year Plan, to short sections around Bombay and Madras, covering in all 388 kms of route, electrified on 1,500 volts DC system. Electrification now extends over 2,000 route kms on 25 KV AC single phase system. Diesel traction is in operation some 10,000 route kms on both broad gauge and metre gauge sections. Some of the important sections on narrow gauge have also been dieselised.

Seeking Self-reliance

After the reorganisation of the railways, the second important milestone in their efforts was the achievement of self-reliance in their varied requirements of stores and equipment. Progress in indigenous production, particularly of rolling stock, has made impressive headway in both diversity and volume. The country is not only self-sufficient in most of the items but has also developed considerable export potential. For the manufacture of steam locomotives, a factory was established in 1950 at Chittaranjan near Calcutta, which has so far turned out over 2050 steam locomotives. The factory has also now taken up production of electric locomotives and an annual outturn of 150 AC electric locomotives is expected by 1970-71.

The Diesel Locomotive Factory, set up in 1961 at Varanasi (Benaras), is likewise busy turning out diesel locomotives, and during the next three years an annual production of 150 locomotives is expected to be reached. Over 100 diesel locomotives of 2,600 h.p. have already been manufactured at the Varanasi Works. The factory is also expected to undertake manufacture of metre gauge diesel locomotives.

The requirement of passenger coaches for the railways is now being met indigenously. The Integral Coach Factory at Madras, since its inauguration in 1955, has turned out over 5,400 coach shells and furnished over 3,400 of them while its present annual capacity stands at 700. The factory is also manufacturing electric multiple unit coaches, air-conditioned chair-cars, diesel rail cars, tourist cars and a number of similar other items of coaching stock. The country has already entered the export market in many parts of the world; while quite a few countries have placed firm orders for the supply of passenger coaches and bogies, negotiations are in progress with many others.

As regards freight cars manufactured mostly in workshops in the private sector with an annual production capacity of 40,000 units, the country is not only self-sufficient but a few orders for export of wagons have been secured, principally from African and East European countries.

Significant progress has been made in developing indigenous capacity for components required for 25 KV AC over-head equipment. A beginning has been made with the manufacture of copper wire and conductors including cadmium copper catenary, aluminium, bronze and malleable cast iron fittings, forged steel fittings and insulators.

For various items needed for track and bridge girders, the railways no longer depend on imports. Three factories are proposed to be set up for manufacturing concrete sleepers with a total capacity of 500,000 sleepers per annum.

In the case of other items like mechanical signalling equipment, the railways besides reaching self-sufficiency have developed a rich potential for export.

Forging Ahead

The impetus given to railway expansion by the nation's programme of rapid industrialisation has brought to the fore several challenging problems to railway engineers. The Research Designs and Standards Organisation assists the railways in investigating a wide range of engineering problems and developing designs of new types of railway equipment—permanent way, bridges, buildings, locomotives, carriages, wagons and signals.

To cater for fast-increasing and heavier traffic, the track structure is being strengthened. New designs have been evolved for sleepers and use of prestressed concrete sleepers planned. The use of welded rails is being intensified and mechanised maintenance of track introduced.

There are over 98,900 bridges on the Indian Railways of which more than 8,000 are major ones having waterways of 18.29 lineal metres or more or a minimum clear opening of 12.19 lineal metres. Two of the major bridges constructed in recent years have been acclaimed as outstanding engineering achievements. One of them, the bridge over the river Ganga, with a total waterway of 1,850 lineal metres and consisting of 14 main spans, permits a discharge of 0.8 million cubic metres per second. The second bridge on the Brahmaputra river, built on deep well-foundations some of them more than 63 metres below the highest flood level, has a waterway designed for the maximum estimated discharge of 0.7 million cubic metres per second. It was the subject of a special study by a team of engineers sponsored by the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East.

With a view to exploiting the vast mineral wealth of the country and opening up difficult and backward regions, a phased programme for construction of new lines is being implemented. About 4,500 kms. of new lines have been opened in the last 15 years and construction of some 2,000 kms. of new lines is under way. Most of these new lines have been laid in difficult terrain involving deep cuttings, spanning of gorges and crossing of major rivers.

Winds of Change

Considerable improvements have been made in the types and standards of mechanical signalling and tele-communication to effectively meet the ever-increasing traffic demands.

On electrified routes, the colour light signal is fast replacing the semaphore arm. At important junction stations, route relay interlocking is being introduced in place of mechanical appliances. The Indian Railways propose to set up a Central Signalling Workshop at Secunderabad at a cost of Rs. 13 million for the manufacture of modern electric signalling equipment so that by the end of the Fourth Plan import of signalling equipment is confined only to a few items of specialised or proprietary nature.

Automatic colour light signals are being provided on the highly congested routes. Centralised traffic control has been introduced as a pilot project on a section on the North Eastern Railway while on another section on the Northeast Frontier Railway its installation is nearing completion.

A number of marshalling yards have been mechanised. Mughalsarai, the biggest marshalling yard in the country with a handling capacity of over 7,000 wagons a day, is one of the yards already mechanised.

Men Behind the Wheels

The Indian railways are the largest single employers in the country with over 1.3 million men and women on the pay rolls. Service in the railways is considered among the most attractive in India. The cost of staff is about 50 per cent of the total ordinary working expenses. In order to train railway staff in various skills and trades, each zonal railway has a training school for different categories besides other technical institutions for training the running staff. For gazetted officers and senior supervisors, facilities exist for imparting higher technical and management training courses at the Railway Staff College at Baroda, the School of Advanced Permanent-way Engineering at Poona, the School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering at Jamalpur and the School for Signal Engineering and Tele-communication at Secunderabad. A number of railway apprentices and officers from many countries have been availing of the training facilities at these institutions.

True to the ideals of a welfare state, the railways have been pursuing a policy of progressively improving both working and living conditions of staff and providing them with the maximum possible amenities, housing, medical, recreational and children's education.

The medical and health facilities provided for the railway staff are among the best in India in both scale and quality. More than a third of the total staff are housed in railway quarters.

Sports stadia for railwaymen are located all over the country. Men and women working on the railways have achieved distinction in national and international sports meets.

Sound Financial Health

The Indian Railways are among the few world railways which have been enjoying a sound financial position. Revenue has been constantly increasing together with capital improvements and pronounced gains in operating efficiency. Constantly rising working expenses, mainly because of the rise in allowances to employees and increase in costs of materials, including fuel and maintenance and stores, will definitely have a bearing on the net surplus in the days to come. The operating ratio, which represents the percentage of expenses to earnings, was 79.5 in 1965-66 and the rate of net revenue to capital-at-charge over five per cent.

Out of the total revenues of Rs. 7,336 million during 1965-66, freight traffic receipts accounted for 62.4 per cent while 29.3 per cent came from passengers and the rest from other sources.

Looking Ahead

Never in their history of over 100 years have the railways in India changed their appearance as rapidly as in the past two decades. Sweeping changes have been taking place in the social and economic life of millions in India; railways have necessarily been adapting themselves to the fast changing conditions around them. Greater changes are bound to take place with the accelerated progress planned for the next few years which will surely call for further development of the country's major transportation system. The Indian Railways are fully geared to face the new challenges which the nation's mighty effort for economic and industrial progress would throw year after year.

Salient Features of Indian Railways

	1950-51	**1965-66**
Route kms.	54,000	58,400
Stations	6,000	7,000
Locomotives	8,200	11,700
Coaches	19,000	31,500
Freight cars	206,000	370,000
Freight originating (daily)	250,000	560,000
Passengers originating (daily)	3,500,000	5,740,000
Suburban passengers originating (daily)	1,140,000	2,800,000
		(Rs. in millions)
Capital-at-charge	8,270	26,803
Gross traffic receipts	2,633	7,338
Working expenses	2,157	5,989
Operating ratio	80	79.5
Dividend to general revenue	325	1038
Net profit	151	186

Telecommunications in India

I. K. GUJRAL

AFRICA and India face similar problems of providing telecommunication facilities over extensive areas. Both emerged into independence recently after centuries of colonial domination which left behind a crushing backlog of widespread illiteracy, economic stagnation and industrial backwardness.

There is the problem of laying down priorities and making the best use of limited resources to satisfy the urges and aspirations of free peoples. The shortage of foreign exchange makes it necessary to undertake indigenous production of the required equipment. If, however, mass communication is to become a reality, the urgency of providing the physical means of such communication cannot be ignored.

The growth of telecommunication facilities again cannot be considered in isolation. There have to be good roads, a railway network and an adequate air service. A broadbased industry is the *sine qua non* for the production of not only telecommunication equipment but also numerous ancillary items. Fortunately in India, the dynamic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru for nearly two decades at a stretch was a great asset. He had a passion for setting up what he called "mother industries", as also research and training institutions to keep abreast with the latest in science and technology. The priorities laid down by him in the past paved the way for our progress in the future.

Production of Telecommunication Equipment

As early as 1948, the Government set up the Indian Telephone Industries (ITI). It was one of its earliest major undertakings in the public sector. This factory at Bangalore produced about Rs 200 million worth of a very wide range of telecommunication equipment. It manufactures switching equipment--both of Strowger and Crossbar types—a variety of carrier telephone systems, microwave equipment and a large number of electronic measuring instruments.

It also produces telephones—automatic, central battery, magneto portable, loud-speaking and ampliphone, private automatic exchanges ranging from 10 lines to 100 lines, small automatic exchanges, rural automatic exchanges, PAX, PBX, main automatic exchanges, road traffic signalling equipment, telex exchanges, carrier communication and associated equipment, supervisory control equipment for railways for AC/DC traction and electronic measuring instruments.

Exports to Many Countries

The company has been able to meet practically the entire range of telecommunication equipment required by the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department. It has also been exporting its products to a number of countries at international competitive rates. From a nominal sale of just over Rs. 37,000 in 1963, its annual exports have risen within three years to over Rs 8.1 million. Complete telephone exchanges, telephone instruments and transmission items are among those exported to countries in Asia, Europe and South America.

Recently, ITI secured orders for supply of communication equipment to the East African Posts and Telegraphs Administration which controls the posts and telegraphs services in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Almost all leading firms in the world submitted their tenders for the 5,000 lines and 600 lines exchanges in Tanzania. But ITI secured the Tanzanian orders valued at more than Rs. 2.4 million. Two engineers from the East African Post and Telegraph Administration recently visited ITI and were impressed with the company's products.

Other African countries which have imported ITI's products in the past are the UAR, the Sudan, Somali Republic, Nigeria and Ghana. Even the United Kingdom has imported ITI equipment which speaks for the reliability and popularity of the company's products.

Cable Manufacture

All types of local telephone cables as well as coaxial cables of standard and pencil type are also being manufactured in India at the Hindustan Cables at Roopnarainpur. This factory was set up in 1954.

Teleprinter equipment, absolutely necessary for quick transmission, especially news, is also being manufactured in India by Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd., Madras. This public undertaking was set up in 1960 and has been assembling nine models of teleprinter equipment. In 1966-67 the company manufactured 2,500 units of teleprinters which will rise to 8,500 units by 1970-71. The company is now in a position to export teleprinters to other countries. In quality, these teleprinter machines are comparable to those manufactured in more advanced countries. Over 1,800 subscribers in principal cities have the teleprinter exchange service facility. They can also send messages abroad--to about 62 countries—over the international telex network.

Ancillary Industries

The demands of a modern telecommunication system are so wide and varied that a number of other factories are also engaged in producing components. The biggest amongst these, in addition to P&T workshops, is Bharat Electronics in Bangalore which is primarily producing HF and VHF equipment for both civil and defence purposes. It also produces large quantities of communication valves and transistors. A number of smaller industries are manufacturing components like transistors, resistors, capacitors, etc. India today can meet almost her entire telecommunication equipment requirement from indigenous sources and also export a vast variety of such equipment to other countries.

To conduct research in devising better equipment, a telecommunication research centre was set up in 1956. The centre has contributed to the development of new designs for long-distance open wire telephone and telegraph carrier systems, different types of switching equipment for local telephone networks, as well as for semi-automatic and automatic long-distance telephone and telegraph operations, electronic instruments, etc. It keeps abreast of developments in the field of communications abroad and makes assessment of different types with regard to their application in this country. Owing to the similarity of climatic conditions in India and Africa, equipment which holds good here has been found useful in African countries.

Speaking about the "frightful" conditions of communications in Africa under colonial rule, John Gunther says : "The British have been in Kenya, a showpiece colony, for 50 years, but the roads there would make a Tibetan blush; some are worse than western American roads before the advent of the automobile." In India too, we had only a few telephone exchanges in larger cities connected by inefficient and inadequate open-wire long-distance trunks.

With the help of a sound industrial base and increased allotment of funds for communications in the consecutive Five-year Plans, the long-distance network of overhead lines was replaced by the more modern underground coaxial cables. Microwave links were introduced during the Third Plan (1961-66) and in 1966 there were 1,500 miles of microwave routes in operation. Subscriber trunk dialling was introduced in 1960 and teleprinter exchanges in 1963.

In the telegraph network, the Baudot and Morse circuits were replaced by teleprinters operating on frequency modulated VFT links. Point-to-point subscriber trunk dialling was introduced a few years ago and now four large automatic trunk exchanges are being installed. The Posts and Telegraphs Department has changed from Strowger to Crossbar switching equipment and plans to introduce Pulse Code Modulation systems. Field trials of the first electronic exchange will be held in the near future.

Links with Outside World

Before independence India had communication links with the outside world only through London. Direct links have since been established with a large number of countries on HF radio circuits. At present there are 124 such circuits against 13 in 1948.

During the past 20 years additional and newer types of services have been provided through submarine telegraph cable links, direct wireless telegraph links, direct radio telephone links, direct radio-photo telegraph links, direct international telex links, and leased private telegraph circuits. Overseas communications will receive a big fillip when India enters the satellite communication network by eastablishing its first earth station near Poona by the end of 1968. This station will operate the Indian Ocean satellite to be launched towards the middle of next year.

Postal Traffic

The post and telegraph service in India is the second largest State undertaking. Today one post office serves about 4,500 people living in an area of 12 square miles, as against 16,000 people in an area of 57 square miles 20 years ago. The number of post offices has gone up by 76,000 to 97,000. Most of them—88,000—are in rural areas. The post offices deal with as many postal articles per month as there are people in the country. The post card and money order services are subsidised for the benefit of the common man. The annual loss on post cards is Rs. 53 million, on money orders Rs. 27 million.

An inland night air mail service links the principal cities—Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Delhi and Nagpur. All inland letters, letter cards and post cards and money orders are carried by air without any surcharge. The post office savings bank is the largest people's bank. It has almost twice as many depositors as all the commercial banks put together; deposits exceed Rs. 3,790 million. About 150,000 telegrams and 2,20,000 trunk calls are handled every day. Subscriber trunk dialling was introduced in 1960 ; today it is available on 16 routes, the longest being Delhi-Patna, a distance of over 900 km.

To run and maintain such a vast central network of postal and telecommunication services requires as many as 500,000 people, most of them highly technical. The Indian P & T Department offers adequate training facilities to its staff. Many of them have received specialised training abroad. India also trains a vast number of telecommunication personnel from other countries.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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DAY AND NIGHT

INDIAN POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

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26 FEB 1968

In old French it was called ZUCHRE. In Arabic and Persian it is SUKKAR and SHAKAR respectively. It is SHARKARA in Sanskrit and SAKKHARON in Greek.

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